Opinion
No. CV 01 0380851S
April 7, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
RE OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR INTEREST
This was an action brought against St. Vincent's Medical Center by the estate of Gregory Ackley. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on November 13, 2007 in the amount of $3,500,000.00. The defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Verdict which was denied on December 20, 2007.
The defendant has filed an Objection to the Plaintiff's Motion for Interest (Motion #174) claiming that Connecticut General Statute Section 52-192a is unconstitutional in that it (1) violates the fundamental right of access to the courts and of trial by jury under Article First, Sections Ten and Nineteen of the Connecticut Constitution; (2) violates its right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (3) it bears no rational relationship to any legitimate governmental interest.
In both the State Supreme Court cases and state superior court cases, all of these arguments have been addressed. The courts have all held that the statute is constitutional. This court shall do the same. Therefore for all the reasons stated herein, the defendant's Objection is overruled and interest is awarded according to 52-192a and plaintiff's Amended Motion for Interest dated March 17, 2008.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for declaring a statute unconstitutional has been articulated by our Supreme Court: "We recognize that a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt . . . While the courts may declare a statute to be unconstitutional, our power to do this should be exercised with caution, and in no doubtful case . . . Every . . . presumption is to be given in favor of the constitutionality of the statute." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Const, Inc., 239 Conn. 708, 754, 687 A.2d 506 (1997).
1. 52-192a violates the fundamental right of access to the courts and of trial by jury under Article First, Sections Ten and Nineteen of the Connecticut Constitution.
The defendant claims that 52-192a violates the fundamental right of access to the courts and to trial by jury. It argues "all protections of the declaration of rights contained in article first of the Connecticut constitution" constitute "fundamental civil liberties." Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 641 (1977). It argues therefore that St. Vincent's right of access to the courts, and its right to trial by jury, are "fundamental" rights.
It claims that due to the punitive nature of the statute § 52-192a unconstitutionally burdens St. Vincent's access to the courts and its right to trial by jury. See Lindesy v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972).
The purpose of § 52-192a is "to conserve judicial resources by promoting settlements." See, e.g., Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, 239 Conn. 708, 758 (1997). The defendant insurance company in Black v. Goodwin, Loomis Britton, Inc., 239 Conn. 144 (1996), made the same argument. In that case the Supreme Court found the argument was without merit. The court held:
The interest assessment is not levied on all who elect to go to trial in light of an offer of judgment, but only on those who subsequently suffer a jury verdict against them in excess of the amount set forth in the offer. Furthermore, the strong public policy favoring the pretrial resolution of disputes; see Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin Kuriansky, 231 Conn. 168, 174, 646 A.2d 195 (1994); is substantially furthered by encouraging defendants to accept reasonable offers of judgment. We find no constitutional violation in the legislature's decision to implement this important public policy in such a manner.
The defendant's right to access the courts and to exercise its right to a jury trial have not been violated.
2. 52-192a violates the right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
This has been well analyzed in Chamberland v. Physicians for Women's Health, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury at Waterbury, Docket No. CV 01-0164040S (February 8, 2006, Gallagher, J.), 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 731. Judge Gallagher wrote:
In Blakeslee, supra, Aetna Insurance Company raised the constitutionality of § 52-192a of the Connecticut General Statutes on, inter alia, substantive due process grounds. The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, stating, with regard to the due process grounds raised:
"Aetna further argues that § 52-192a is fundamentally unfair, in violation of its constitutional right to due process.
"Specifically, Aetna contends that § 52-192a `fails to satisfy due process requirements because it is not rationally related to the legislature's goal of encouraging early, fair and reasonable settlement.' We disagree . . . We recently considered this precise claim in Black v. Goodwin, Loomis Britton, Inc., supra, 239 Conn. 166, in which we held: `Legislative efforts to structure and accommodate the burdens and benefits of economic life carry a presumption of constitutionality. One complaining of a due process violation flowing there from must establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way . . . Even under this less exacting test of constitutionality, an economic regulation will survive a substantive due process test only if it is both rational and related to a legitimate state purpose . . . As we have indicated, § 52-192a furthers the legitimate public policy interest of encouraging the pretrial settlement of claims. Moreover, the legislature is not required to implement a public policy in a manner that is most narrowly tailored to achieve its end; its legislation will survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Const., 239 Conn. 708 pp. 758-59 687 A.2d 506 (1997)."
In Black v. Goodwin, Loomis and Britton, Inc., 239 Conn. 144, 681 A.2d 293 (1996), the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that § 52-192a violated its due process rights and its claim that because the defendant's "[d]ue [p]rocess right is protected only by requiring the trial court to determine the reasonableness of the [o]ffer of [j]udgment at the time of filing." Id., 165-66. The Black court upheld the constitutionality of the statute." Chamberland, supra pp. 2816-17.
Given the decisions of the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding Connecticut General Statutes § 52-192a, the court denies the defendant's motion to preclude an award of prejudgment interest under this statute.
3. 52-192a bears no rational relationship to any legitimate governmental interest.
This was also discussed in Chamberland, supra as well as in Blakeslee, supra and in Knudsen v. Volpe, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield at Litchfield, Docket No. CV 94-0066028S (December 4, 1998, Sheldon, J.) 1998 Ct.Sup. 14292. All the courts which have analyzed the legitimate governmental interest test have held that an award of interest pursuant to § 52-192a is rationally related to the state's interest in promoting fair and reasonable compromise of litigation without trial. See Gillis v. Gillis, 21 Conn.App. 554; Fleet Bank v. Dowling, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 0446253 (January 14, 1992, Kremski, J.T.R., 7 CSCR 283) [ 5 Conn. L. Rptr. 555]; Fleet Bank v. Galluzzo, Raguskus v. Corbeti, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 227460 (September 12, 1988, Reynolds, J., 3 CSCR 869). Therefore, this court finds that the interest of the state to promote compromise and the conservation of judicial resources are indeed legitimate state interests. See also Lutynski v. B.B. J. Trucking, Inc., 31 Conn.App. 806 (1993) aff'd 229 Conn. 525 (1994) and Ceci Brothers, Inc. v. Five Twenty-one Corporation, 81 Conn. App 419 (2004). For all of the above reasons, the defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Interest is overruled and interest will be awarded according to the Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Offer of Judgment Interest to Be Added to the Jury's Verdict (Motion 177.01) and award interest to the date of December 20, 2007 (date the Motion to Set Aside the Verdict was denied and judgment entered).