Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-CV-02270.
September 17, 2004
ORDER
NOW, this 17th day of September, 2004, upon consideration of the Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint, Filed on Behalf of Defendants Lisa Stofko, R.N., Emilia Caputo, R.N., Wexford Health Sources, Inc. and Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, filed September 3, 2004; upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Answer to Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Lisa Stofko, R.N., Emilia Caputo, R.N., Wexford Health Sources, Inc. and Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, filed September 10, 2004; and upon consideration of plaintiffs' Complaint, filed May 24, 2004,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees in Counts IX, X, XIII, XIV, XV and XVI are dismissed by agreement of counsel.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remainder of defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of defendants Stofko, Caputo, Wexford, and Lehigh County for a more definite statement, which is Count VI of defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' Complaint, is denied.
Defendants Lisa Stofko, R.N.; Emilia Caputo, R.N.; Wexford Health Sources, Inc.; and Lehigh County, Pennsylvania move to dismiss Counts II, IV, V, VI, IX, X, XIII, XIV, XV and XVI of plaintiffs' Complaint. Specifically, defendants seek to dismiss Counts II and IV, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against defendants Stofko and Caputo for violations of Christina Ackerman's due process rights to medical treatment while in state custody under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because plaintiffs have failed to plead the requisite deliberate indifference on the part of defendants Stofko and Caputo. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976); Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64 (3d. Cir. 1993). Defendants seek to dismiss Counts V and VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Wexford Health Sources (Wexford) and Lehigh County for violations of Christina Ackerman's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to medical treatment while in state custody, because plaintiffs do not plead that defendants Wexford and Lehigh County intentionally failed to provide Ms. Ackerman medical services and that the only manner in which plaintiffs seek to impose liability upon them is through the theory of respondeat superior, which is an impermissible method.
Defendants seek to dismiss Counts IX, X, XIII, XIV, XV and XVI, which are state law claims, because they mistakenly believe that fact pleading is required for pendent state law claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8; Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004); McGovern v. Jack D's Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1985 *10-11, 2004 WL 228667 *4, Civ. No. 03-5547 (E.D. Pa. February 3, 2004). Alternatively, defendants contend that if the court dismisses Counts II, IV, V and V, then the court should dismiss Counts IX, X, XIII, XIV, XV and XVI for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants also seek to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages because the alleged conduct was not outrageous.
When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the Complaint and construe all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jurimex Kommerz Transit G.M.B.H. v. Case Corp., 65 Fed. Appx. 803, 805 (3d Cir. 2003) (citingLorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir. 1993)). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted "if it appears to a certainty that no relief could be granted under any set of facts which could be proved." Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing D.P. Enter. Inc. v. Bucks County Community College, 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1984)). But a court need not credit a complaint's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions" when deciding a motion to dismiss. Morse, 132 F.3d at 906. (Citations omitted.)
In their Complaint, plaintiffs aver that defendants Stofko and Caputo intentionally refused to provide medical treatment to Christina Ackerman. Plaintiffs further aver that it was the policy or the deficiency of the policy of defendants Wexford and Lehigh County that caused plaintiffs' damages. See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996). Such accusations, if true, would permit plaintiffs to sustain both the allegations in Counts II, IV, V and V and for punitive damages. Accordingly, we deny defendant's motion to dismiss Count II, IV, V and VI and the claims for punitive damages. Moreover, because the federal questions in Counts II, IV, V and VI remain, we deny defendants' motion to dismiss Counts IX, X, XIII, XIV, XV and XVI.
Defendants move for a more definite statement because they contend that the Complaint is vague and that plaintiffs should be compelled to identify the defendant "Jane Doe" alleged in the Complaint. Plaintiffs counter that defendants know who the "Jane Doe" is, and that plaintiffs do not.
Upon review of the Complaint, we conclude that it provides defendants with sufficient notice of the factual and legal allegations. We further conclude that the parties may inquire as to the identity of the Jane Doe defendant during discovery. Accordingly, we deny defendants' motion for a more definite statement.