"Where a . . . court has granted a permanent injunction, the parties will already have had their trial on the merits, and, even if the case would otherwise be moot, a determination can be had on appeal of the correctness of the trial court's decision on the merits, since the case has been saved from mootness by injunction bond." Accurate Forging Corporation v. UAW Local No. 1012, 189 Conn. 24, 27-28 n. 5, 453 A.2d 769 (1983), quoting University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 396, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981). Accordingly, Manchester's mootness claim is without merit.
Audrey Worrell, the commissioner of mental health, and Colin Angliker, the director of Whiting, were named as parties defendant in addition to the commissioner of correction. "`It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow.' Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22 (1944); McCallum v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 196 Conn. 218, 225, 429 A.2d 508 (1985); Accurate Forging Corporation v. UAW Local No. 1017, 189 Conn. 24, 26, 453 A.2d 769 (1983); State Farm Life Accident Assurance Co. v. Jackson, 188 Conn. 152, 156, 448 A.2d 832 (1982); CEUI v. CSEA, 183 Conn. 235, 246, 439 A.2d 321 (1981). `In the absence of an actual and existing controversy for us to adjudicate in any sense of the term, the courts of this state may not be used as a vehicle to obtain judicial opinions upon points of law; Reply of the Judges, 33 Conn. 586; and where the question presented is purely academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal. Young v. Tynan, 148 Conn. 456, 459, 172 A.2d 190.' Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 177 Conn. 17, 19, 411 A.2d 1 (1979).
"It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow." Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22 (1944); McCallum v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 196 Conn. 218, 225, 492 A.2d 508 (1985); Accurate Forging Corporation v. UAW Local No. 1011, 189 Conn. 24, 26, 453 A.2d 769 (1983); State Farm Life Accident Assurance Co. v. Jackson, 188 Conn. 152, 156, 448 A.2d 832 (1982); CEUI v. CSEA, 183 Conn. 235, 246, 439 A.2d 321 (1981). "In the absence of an actual and existing controversy for us to adjudicate in any sense of the term, the courts of this state may not be used as a vehicle to obtain judicial opinions upon points of law; Reply of the Judges, 33 Conn. 586; and where the question presented is purely academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal.
"`It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow.'" Arnold Bernhard Co. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 194 Conn. 152, 158, 479 A.2d 801 (1984); Accurate Forging Corporation v. UAW Local No. 1017, 189 Conn. 24, 26, 453 A.2d 769 (1983); State Farm Life Accident Assurance Co. v. Jackson, 188 Conn. 152, 156, 448 A.2d 832 (1982); CEUI v. CSEA, 183 Conn. 235, 246, 439 A.2d 321 (1981). Because the relief sought by the plaintiff would be unavailing by reason of the subsequent amendment of the commission's regulations, the issues presented in this appeal are moot.
Because we agree with this final claim, we hold that the trial court erred in dismissing the writs of all of the petitioners except Braswell and DeForge, whose cases have become moot by virtue of the hearing of their appeals. Accurate Forging Corporation v. U.A.W. Local No. 1011, 189 Conn. 24, 26, 453 A.2d 769 (1983); Waterbury Hospital v. Connecticut Health Care Associates, 186 Conn. 247, 249, 440 A.2d 310 (1982). Petitioner Braswell's appeal was heard in this court on May 2, 1984. Petitioner DeForge's appeal was heard in this court on June 6, 1984.
We must first address the commission's claim that the expiration of the moratorium on April 30, 1979, has rendered the case moot. "It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow." CEUI v. CSEA, 183 Conn. 235, 246, 439 A.2d 321 (1981); Accurate Forging Corporation v. UAW Local No. 1017, 189 Conn. 24, 26, 453 A.2d 769 (1983); State Farm Life Accident Assurance Co. v. Jackson, 188 Conn. 152, 156, 448 A.2d 832 (1982); Rosnick v. Zoning Commission, 172 Conn. 306, 308-10, 374 A.2d 245 (1977); Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22 (1944). In Rosnick v. Zoning Commission, supra, we held that the expiration of a similar zoning moratorium had rendered moot the plaintiff's appeal, which challenged the validity of the moratorium.
We simply do not know. It is a plaintiff's burden to ensure that this court is provided with an adequate appellate record. Accurate Forging Corporation v. UAW Local No. 1017, 189 Conn. 24, 28, 453 A.2d 769 (1983); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 186 Conn. 387, 388 n. 1, 441 A.2d 629 (1982); Hartford National Bank Trust Co. v. DiFazio, 177 Conn. 34, 40, 411 A.2d 8 (1979). Therefore, we do not consider this aspect of the plaintiffs' claim.
This court cannot respond to claims based on allegations extraneous to the formal record. Accurate Forging Corporation v. UAW Local No. 1017, 189 Conn. 24, 27-28, 453 A.2d 769 (1983). Furthermore, the defendants have cited no authority that confers upon them an absolute constitutional right to a continuance under the circumstances of this case, even if one had been properly requested and improperly refused.
Our Supreme Court "has never asserted jurisdiction over a case that would otherwise be moot simply on the ground of the public importance of the question presented. Apart from the numerous cases in which appeals raising serious questions about labor injunctions have been declared moot; Accurate Forging Corporation v. UAW Local No. 1017, [ 189 Conn. 24, 26, 453 A.2d 769 (1983)]; CSEA v. AFSCME, 188 Conn. 196, 488 A.2d 1341 (1982); Waterbury Hospital v. ConnecticutHealth Care Associates, supra [ 186 Conn. 251]; Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, supra [ 177 Conn. 21]; we have held unreviewable questions of importance involving the authority of numerous instrumentalities of government, including the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority; DeFonce Construction Corporation v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 177 Conn. 472, 474-75, 418 A.2d 906 (1979); the insurance commissioner; State Farm Life Accident Assurance Co. v. Jackson, [ 188 Conn. 152, 152-60, 448 A.2d 832 (1982)]; and the juvenile court. Maloney v. State, 179 Conn. 309, 310, 426 A.2d 288 (1979). In each instance, [our Supreme Court has] expressly concluded that [it] lacked jurisdiction when the principle of `capable of repetition, yet evading review' was inapplicable.
Further, because the defendant failed to attack the judgment of the trial court awarding custody, the evidentiary issue is moot. "`It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow.'" State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 178, 540 A.2d 679 (1988); Accurate Forging Corporation v. UAW Local No. 1017, 189 Conn. 24, 26, 453 A.2d 769 (1983). IV