The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari, disapproved of this Court’s interpretation of Bowers , and reversed the judgment of this Court. Campaign for Accountability v. Consumer Credit Research Foundation , 303 Ga. 828, 815 S.E.2d 841 (2018). The Supreme Court held that OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) of the Act does not bar a state agency from publicly releasing records, unless the specific exemption listed in the statute that covers the records at issue expressly prohibits disclosure.

The ORA thus imposes a duty upon "agencies" to produce or to provide access to public records upon a proper request. See OCGA § 50-18-71 (b) (1); Campaign for Accountability v. Consumer Credit Research Foundation, 303 Ga. 828, 830 (2), 815 S.E.2d 841 (2018) ("Government agencies therefore have a duty to disclose public records unless relieved of that duty by a specific exemption or court order.").Gonzalez has not challenged the form of the requests, the method by which they were submitted to her as the custodian of records for her office, or whether the records sought were public records under the ORA.

And, relatedly, "courts should avoid a statutory construction that will render some of the statutory language mere surplusage." Thornton v. State , 310 Ga. 460, 469 (3), 851 S.E.2d 564 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Campaign for Accountability v. Consumer Credit Research Found. , 303 Ga. 828, 832 (2), 815 S.E.2d 841 (2018). If OCGA § 16-9-93 (b) (2) is as broad as the State suggests, "obstructing" and "interrupting" become entirely surplusage and redundant; in such an event, the relevant text would need to list only "interfering."

See, e.g., Phillips v. State , 95 Ga. App. 277, 279, 97 S.E.2d 707 (1957) (trial court was "without jurisdiction" to modify sentence after term of court); Mauldin v. State , 139 Ga. App. 13, 14, 227 S.E.2d 862 (1976) (trial court "lost jurisdiction" to modify sentence); see also Shaw v. State , 233 Ga. App. 232, 233, 504 S.E.2d 18 (1998) (even after 1992 amendment when OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) did not expressly limit judges’ power to modify, trial court was "without jurisdiction" to modify sentence after term of court). Though we seek to "avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage," Campaign for Accountability v. Consumer Credit Research Foundation , 303 Ga. 828, 832 (2), 815 S.E.2d 841 (2018), the surplusage canon can be overcome by context, such as here, where context tells us that "power" and "authority" were already equivalent. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 176-77 (2012) ("[L]ike all other canons, [the surplusage canon] must be applied with judgment and discretion, and with careful regard to context.

OCGA § 50-18-71 (a). "Government agencies therefore have a duty to disclose public records unless relieved of that duty by a specific exemption or court order." Campaign for Accountability v. Consumer Credit Research Foundation, 303 Ga. 828, 830 (2) (815 S.E.2d 841) (2018). And the Open Records Act "expressly creates a private right of action to enforce the obligations imposed on persons or agencies having custody of records open to the public under the Act."

We have not yet addressed whether RSA 91-A:7 provides a remedy for, and grants standing to, an individual who seeks to prevent disclosure of information pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law. Compare Campaign for Accountability v. CCRF, 303 Ga. 828, 815 S.E.2d 841 (2018) (holding that parties with an interest in nondisclosure of public records pertaining to them may pursue a lawsuit to seek compliance with the state Open Records Act), and Beckham v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty., 873 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1994) (holding that a party affected by the decision of a public agency to release records pursuant to state Open Records Act had standing to contest the agency decision in court), with Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979) (holding that federal Freedom of Information Act does not provide a remedy for one who seeks to prevent disclosure), and R.I. Federation of Teachers v. Sundlun, 595 A.2d 799 (R.I. 1991) (holding that state Access to Public Records Act does not provide a reverse remedy to prevent disclosure). The legislature may wish to consider whether clarification as to who is entitled to seek relief under RSA 91-A:7 is warranted.

The surplusage canon has been adopted in Georgia. See Campaign for Accountability v. Consumer Credit Research Found. , 303 Ga. 828, 834, 815 S.E.2d 841, 846 (2018). "In the absence of words of limitation, words in a statute should be given their ordinary and everyday meaning."