Thus, “[w]hile a cause of action for permanent injury to land must be brought within two years, damages for temporary injury to land may be recovered for the two years prior to filing suit.” ACCI Forwarding, Inc. v. Gonzalez Warehouse P'ship, 341 S.W.3d 58, 63–64 (Tex.App.2011) (emphases added) (citing Bayouth v. Lion Oil Co., 671 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex.1984)). The distinction between permanent and temporary damages does not, as EnerQuest seems to suggest, allow a plaintiff to avoid the strict requirements of the discovery rule: that the injury be one that is both inherently undiscoverable and objectively verifiable.
Because each of these theories independently supports liability, we need only address the sufficiency of the evidence to support liability under any one of these theories. See ACCI Forwarding, Inc. v. Gonzalez Warehouse P'ship, 341 S.W.3d 58, 68 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Checker Bag Co. v. Washington, 27 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. denied). The Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
Having rejected each of Shumate’s legal sufficiency challenges to Bay’s theft claim, we need hot address his sufficiency arguments pertaining to Bay’s remaining claims. See ACCI Forwarding, Inc. v. Gonzalez Warehouse P’ship, 341 S.W.3d 58, 68 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) ("In cases in which the judgment rests on multiple theories of recovery, an appellate court need not address all causes of action if any one theory is valid."); see also Air Jireh Serv. Corp. v. Weaver & Jacobs Constructors, Inc., No. 13-15-00180-CV, 2019 WL 3023315, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg July 11, 2019, no pet.)
When the judgment rests on multiple theories of recovery, an appellate court need not address all causes of action if any one theory is valid. See, e.g., ACCI Forwarding, Inc. v. Gonzalez Warehouse P'ship, 341 S.W.3d 58, 68 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.). We need not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support alternative theories that support the judgment unless the Lamberts' DTPA claim fails, which we conclude it does not.
With a permanent injury to real property, as occurred here, the limitations period does not begin anew with each subsequent trespass or injury. Cf. ACCI Forwarding, Inc. v. Gonzalez Warehouse P'ship, 341 S.W.3d 58, 63-64 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (recognizing temporary trespass claim "accrues anew with each successive trespass" under the continuing-tort doctrine). Accordingly, ATC, Asset Sub, and Metro established the affirmative defense of limitations as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in their favor or by denying RayMax's motion regarding RayMax's trespass claim.
In cases in which the judgment rests on multiple theories of recovery, an appellate court need not address all causes of action if any one theory is valid. See, e.g., ACCI Forwarding, Inc. v. Gonzalez Warehouse P'ship, 341 S.W.3d 58, 68 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2011, no pet.) ; Checker Bag Co. v. Washington, 27 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex.App.–Waco 2000, pet. denied) ; George Grubbs Enters., Inc. v. Bien, 881 S.W.2d 843, 851 n. 7 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 900 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.1995). Super Ventures and Tariq's remaining two issues concern their complaints with respect to Chaudhry's statute of frauds, fraudulent inducement, and DTPA theories of recovery, all of which sought rescission of the lease amendment and return of the option fee.
Ordinarily, when a judgment rests on multiple theories of recovery and one theory is valid, an appellate court need not address other theories. See George Grubbs Enters., Inc. v. Bien, 881 S.W.2d 843, 851 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 900 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1995); see also Jefferson Cnty. v. Davis, No. 14-13-00663-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 9640, at *22 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 28, 2014, pet. filed) (mem. op.); ACCI Forwarding, Inc. v. Gonzalez Warehouse P'ship, 341 S.W.3d 58, 68 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Checker Bag Co. v. Washington, 27 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. denied). Because we have determined that the evidence is legally sufficient to support Nguyen's section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, we need not address the County's arguments pertaining to jury question 5 and Nguyen's claim for alleged violations of due process, or the effect, if any, of her "at-will" status on such claims.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 343; Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d at 678; ACCI Forwarding, Inc. v. Gonzalez Warehouse P'ship, 341 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.). Further, Jackson presents no argument specific to any challenge to the trial court's granting of Carlton's no-evidence motion for summary judgment with regard to the DTPA cause of action.
Because we affirm the trial court's liability finding on appellee's breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, we need not address his issues about the trial court's liability findings on appellee's claims for fraud and conversion. See ACCI Forwarding, Inc. v. Gonzalez Warehouse P'ship, 341 S.W.3d 58, 68 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (declining to address nuisance claim because trespass claim was upheld); see also Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (where trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, appellate court must affirm judgment on any legal theory that finds support in evidence). Natho's fifth issue challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's award of actual damages in the amount of $87,296.00.
But the damages question was also predicated on the positive finding of breach of contract contained in Question No. 1. Consequently, we must determine if the affirmative answer to the breach of contract question will support the award of damages under Question No. 4. See ACCI Forwarding, Inc. v. Gonzalez Warehouse P'ship, 341 S.W.3d 58, 68 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.). a. Damages Related to Breach of Contract