Opinion
No. 00 C 770
March 9, 2001
Defendant Chicago Transit Authority ("CTA") filed a motion to dismiss a complaint filed by plaintiffs Access Living of Metropolitan et. al. alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act. The CTA argues that it is immune from this suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, such that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this litigation. For the following reasons, the CTA's motion to dismiss is DENIED.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State. . . ." Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a state by citizens of another State, the Supreme Court has extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own states, See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73, 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000). The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that non-consenting states may not be sued by private individuals in federal court. See id. at 73, 120 S.Ct. 631. Despite this rule, Congress may abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and "act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority." Id., 120 S.Ct. 631. The Supreme Court has recently ruled that the provision of Title I of the ADA, which authorizes suits for damages on the basis of employment discrimination by states, was not a proper exercise of authority under the Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, --- S.Ct. ----, 2001 WL 173556 (Feb. 21, 2001). In so ruling, the Court specifically declined to rule on the constitutionality of suits against states brought under Title II of the ADA. See id.
The bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts extends to states and state officials in appropriate circumstances, but does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572 (1977). The issue here thus turns on whether the CTA is to be treated as an arm of the State partaking of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, or is instead to be treated as a municipal corporation or other political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does not extend. See id. The answer depends, at least in part, upon the nature of the entity created by state law. See id. The Seventh Circuit has looked to a variety of factors in determining how an entity is to be treated for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, including: (1) the extent of the entity's financial autonomy from the state, including whether the entity has independent power to raise its own funds; (2) the entity's the general legal status; and (3) whether it serves the state as a whole or only a region. Kashani v. Purdue University, 813 F.2d 843, 845-47 (7th Cir. 1987).
Applying these factors to the instant case leaves no doubt that the CTA is a political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does not apply. First, it should be noted that the CTA has cited no case in which an intrastate metropolitan transit system has been held to be an arm of the state. After the CTA filed this motion, the Fifth Circuit, on facts less favorable to the transit authority than those presented here, found that the Dallas Area Rapid Transit ("DART") was not an arm of the state of Texas. See Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 2001 WL 102279, at *5 (5th Cir. Feb. 22, 2001). The Fifth Circuit employed a six-factor test similar to that employed by the Seventh Circuit. Both Williams' reasoning and the Seventh Circuit factors demonstrate that the CTA is not an arm of the state.
First, the state law under which the CTA was created calls the CTA a "municipal corporation," 70 ILCS 3605/3, and the mayor of Chicago selects the majority of the CTA's Board. While that definition and control may not be dispositive, it is certainly illustrative. In Williams by contrast, Texas law was silent as to what type of organization DART would be. Second, while the State does provide some funding to the CTA, the vast majority of the CTA's funding comes from fares paid directly to the CTA and local taxes. The CTA also has the authority to issue bonds which the State does not guarantee. 70 ILCS 3605/12. As such, the CTA enjoys financial autonomy from the state. Most importantly, there is nothing in the record to indicate that a judgment against the CTA would impact the State treasury. See Kashani, 813 F.2d at 845 (noting that effect on state treasury is the "most important" factor in determining nature of entity). The CTA's governing statute expressly provides that the State will not be responsible for the debts and promises of the CTA. 70 ILCS 3605/5. Finally, while the CTA serves passengers from all over the state, it operates only in a small region of the State. While the CTA strenuously argues that it is not a "municipality" under the law, that does not mean that it is a "state agency, " or an "arm of the state." There are a wide range of entities which are neither state agencies nor municipalities" within the law. Many entities, such as school boards, are not "municipalities, " and are also not "arms of the state" for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
For the reasons stated, the CTA is not an "arm of the state" for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, the CTA's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED.