Opinion
No. FST CV 09 5012939 S
June 1, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE APPLICATION FOR PREJUDGMENT REMEDY DATED OCTOBER 20, 2009 (#100.31)
The court has applied the well-known standards for determining a prejudgment remedy. New England Land Company Ltd v. DeMarkey, 213 Conn. 612, 619-21 (1990); Ledgebrook Condominium Assn, Inc. v. Lusk Corporation, 172 Conn. 577, 584 (1977).
The plaintiff is seeking a PJR only on the first count of the proposed unsigned three-count complaint dated January 20, 2010 (#104.00). The plaintiff's proof presented in the four-day evidentiary hearing has established probable cause that the plaintiff will recover from the defendant the sum of $1,190,678. Ex. 3, Ex. 4, Ex. 5. ("Grand Total 1,190,678.")
Paragraph 1 of the Sourcing Agreement executed by the parties forms the basis for the $1,190,678 debt. That agreement contains no mention of interest or rate of interest. Ex. 3. The Sourcing Agreement contains a venue clause in paragraph 9(f): " Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of the State of New York, U.S.A., excluding the choice of law and conflicts of law provisions thereof." Since the Agreement is silent on the subject of interest, whether interest shall be awarded, and if so, the rate of interest, is not a dispute involving the language of the Agreement. Paragraph 9(f) does not control the choice of law on the subject of interest.
Under Connecticut law prejudgment interest is discretionary and must be based on a finding of wilful withholding. Smithfield Associates, LLC et al v. Tolland Bank, 86 Conn.App. 14, 26 (2004). Connecticut has no set rate for statutory prejudgment interest: ". . . interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more . . ." Gen. Stat. § 37-3a; The statute only sets the maximum rate of interest a court can award: no more than ten (10%) per cent a year ". . . the trial court will have to decide what the appropriate rate of interest for any such award should be." Sears, Roebuck and Company v. Board of Tax Review, 241 Conn. 749, 763 (1997). New York law makes an award of interest mandatory in breach of contract claims. "Interest shall be recovered upon a sum awarded because of a breach of performance of a contract . . ." New York Consolidated Laws § 5001 N.Y.C.P.L.R. "Interest shall be at the rate nine per centum per annum . . ." New York Consolidated Laws § 5004 N.Y.C.P.L.R.
Since this action has been commenced in Connecticut, Connecticut procedural conflicts of law must be applied. Paine Webber Jackson Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, 22 Conn.App. 640, 648-54 (1990). Prejudgment interest is substantive under Gen. Stat. § 37-3a as opposed to the procedural interest statute, Gen. Stat. § 52-192a. Id., 650. "While there is no precise definition of either [substantive or procedural law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress." State v. Fielding, 296 Conn. 26, 41 (2010). The Sourcing Agreement states in paragraph 9(f) that New York law governs the parties' contractual rights. Paragraph 9(f) is a limited choice of law claim. The phrase "shall be governed, construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware, excluding principles of conflict of laws," has been held to be a limited choice of law provision also referred to as a "narrowly drawn choice-of-law provision." Wall Street Technology Partners, LP v. Kanders, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk Complex Litigation Docket at Stamford, Docket Number X05 CV 09-5010098 S (February 2, 2010, Blawie, J.). Applying Connecticut conflicts of law rules, "New York law applied to the substantive issues of liability and damages." Id., 650. New York interest law must apply. Santoro v. Osman, 149 Conn. 9, 12 (1961).
Nine (9%) percent interest must be added to the $1,190,678 amount due. "Interest shall be computed from the earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed . . ." New York Consolidated Laws § 5001 N.Y.C.P.L.R. Paragraph 1 of the Sourcing Agreement requires the fees to be paid "once a year in December for the 12 months ended the prior November 30th." The evidence discloses that the $1,190,678 was due in December 2008 for the previous year ending November 30, 2007. Ex. 3 is silent on what day in December the fees are due. The plaintiff requested through a series of e-mails that the defendant not transmit the funds in December 2008, the month the $1,190,678 was due. The plaintiff's various wiring instructions issued to the defendant between December 2008 and March 26, 2009 changed the receiving bank from the previous bank used, changed account numbers, referenced to different Access companies, named escrow agents and misspelled the plaintiff's correct name. In some instances the wiring institutions conflicted. The latest of these wiring instructions is a letter dated March 26, 2009. "On behalf of Access International Advisors Limited, please accept this letter as authorization to pay the outstanding introducing fees to our attorney and escrow agent of our account." Ex. 7. The payment was to be sent to "DELANDMETER (IBAN LU 1701418340 7730 7010/Access International Advisors/Argent." Mr. Delandmeter was the plaintiff's foreign attorney. IBAN and the following numbers are routine bank wiring information. Ex. 7. The plaintiff participated actively in the payment delay from December 2008 through March 26, 2009. This court hereby finds that March 26, 2009 is the "earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed." Nine (9%) percent interest on $1,190,678 from March 26, 2009 until March 25, 2010 is $107,161. The per diem interest using a 360-day year on or after March 25, 2010 is $297.67. This award of interest is simple interest. Nine (9%) percent interest will be awarded.
The defendant has not filed any formal pleadings since this is a prejudgment remedy hearing. The defendant has raised a number of defenses in its Memorandum of Law, by counsel's argument during the PJR hearing and by evidence and testimony offered. The court must take "into account any known defenses, counterclaims or set-offs." Gen. Stat. § 52-278c(a)(2). No counterclaims or set-offs were offered or argued by the defendant or are apparent from the record before this court. There was no evidence of insurance covering the plaintiffs' claim. Gen. Stat. § 52-228(d)(a)(2). Since the plaintiff has the burden of proof by a probable cause standard, if that standard is to be consistently applied, the defenses must be proven by a higher standard. The plaintiff argues without citation "something akin to proof beyond a reasonable doubt" #157.00 page 2. Connecticut law seems to support the logic of a higher standard for the proof of defenses to a PJR. Socci v. Pasiak, 116 Conn. 685, 689 (2009). The court will now consider the defenses raised by the defendant.
The first defense is stated in the Defendant's Reply Post-Hearing Memorandum dated May 7, 2010 (#159.00) on page 3. "Under New York law, rejection of tender of performance constitutes a breach of contract that excuses the party which made the tender from further performance under the contract."
The court rejects this defense for several reasons:
(1) The Sourcing Agreement does not require any tender of performance. As of December 2008 both parties had completely performed the contract. There was no further act to be performed by the plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the Sourcing Agreement. Ex. 3.
(2) There was insufficient evidence that the defendant made a tender of the $1,190,678 to the plaintiff. There was evidence that the defendant had the $1,190,678 and was prepared to make the payment but there is no evidence of the defendant actually tendering the $1,190,678 payment. "Please find attached the calculations of what Argent owes Access for 2007. Please review and let me know if you are OK with amount and we will process payment." Ex. 4, 12/11/08 e-mail. Being prepared to tender is not tender. Grossman v. Pendant Realty Corp., 200 A.D.2d 521, 606 N.Y.S. 20 669 (1994); Geary v. Dade Development, 29 N.Y.2d 457, 461-62 (1972).
(3) The choice of law provisions in paragraph 9(f) of the Sourcing Agreement states that: "This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of the State of New York, U.S.A., . . ." The requirement of tender by the defendant is not contained in the agreement nor is the acceptance of tender by the plaintiff defined as a contractual obligation on behalf of the plaintiff. Since the Agreement is silent on tender and the effect thereof, there is no need to construe to the agreement. The choice of law provision does not cover the tender issue. Wall Street Technology Partners, L.P. v. Kanders, supra.
(4) The issue of tender is not substantive but procedural and thus is governed by the law of the forum, Connecticut. Paine Webber Jackson Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, supra, 22 Conn.App. 650. ("The judicial rule of thumb, that in a choice of law situation the forum state will apply its own procedure.")
(5) The New York cases cited by the defendant relate to tender of performance of a physical act contemplated by the contract, such as delivery of goods. The Sourcing Agreement did not require the manufacture, storage, delivery and shipping of any goods.
(6) The defendants cite Perlman v. M. Israel Sons Co., Inc., 306 NY 254 (1954) for the proposition that a refusal of tender of performance is considered "a breach of contract excusing defendant from further performance on its part." Id., 257. Perlman involved a contractual requirement of delivery of sweater clips. Perlman and its line of cases involved the tender of goods or tender of performance and dealt with the legal concept of anticipatory breach. In none of the New York cases cited by the defendant had performance been completed as was the case here. The later case of Litwak v. Wolkenberg, 130 A.D.2d 630 (2d Dept 1987) discusses the tender of payment of a debt rather than goods. "It is well settled that the tender of payment of a debt capable of computation may be made after default at any time prior to the commencement of an action thereon . . . and that the unwarranted refusal of the tender operates to terminate all incidents of the obligation, such as interest." Id., 631-32. This is the New York tender rule applicable here. Therefore the tender of payment of a debt due and a refusal to accept that payment may terminate the right to collect interest since interest is one of the "incidents of the obligation." This has been the "incidents of the obligation" rule in New York for generations. Jermain v. Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, 91 N.Y. 483 (1883). New York case law does not hold that the entire principal amount due is forfeited by the non-acceptance of tender of payment, when all other contractual outs have been performed. Feldman v. Brodsky, 12 A.D.2d 347, 351 (1st Dept. 1961), affirmed, 11 N.Y.2d 692 (1962); In Re Levin Glasser v. Kenmore Properties, 192 (1st Dept 2-9-2010); Colgate v. Broadwall, 51 A.D.3d 437, 438 (1st Dept 2008). New York law holds that it is inequitable to permit interest to accrue after a tender of payment has been made. Matter of Venables v. Painewebber, Inc., 205 A.D.2d 788, 789 (2d Dept 1984); Consolidated Mutual Insurance Company v. Rogers, 69 Misc.2d 10, 17 (1972). Tender of payment of arrears has been held to a valid defense in a mortgage foreclosure. United Company Lending Corporation v. Hingus, 253 A.D.2d 764, 766 (3d Dept. 2001). This court has not been able to locate any case that such a valid tender in a mortgage foreclosure eliminates any of the mortgage debt including the tendered arrears when tender was not accepted. Tender of payment can stop the running of interest but does not discharge the underlying debt. Cardella v. Giancola, 297 A.D.2d 618, 619 (2d Dept. 2002); Matter of Jeffrey Towers v. Strauss, 31 A.D.2d 319, 325 (2d Dept. 1969), affirmed 26 N.Y.2d 812 (1970). This is also the rule in Connecticut and has been so for generations. Loomis v. Knox, 60 Conn. 343, 352 (1891): 2 Swift's Digest 210.
(7) The above rule of Jermain is similar to Connecticut law on prejudgment interest. Although New York has a statute making prejudgment interest mandatory for a breach of contract, N.Y.C.P.L.R. §§ 5001 and 5004, Connecticut's prejudgment interest rule requires a four-step determination: was the money wrongfully withheld, what was the date of the wrongful withholding, what is the appropriate rate of interest not to exceed 10% under Gen. Stat. § 37a-3a and the exercise of the court's discretion. Cecio Brothers, Inc. v. Feldmann, 161 Conn. 265, 275 (1971).
(8) The amount of $1,190,678 was never in dispute. Ex. 4, Ex. 5. The defendant created and prepared Ex. 5 from its own records. In the spring of 2009 the plaintiff's Chief Compliance Officer and General Counsel spoke by telephone with the defendant's General Counsel and asked where are the funds. The defendant's General Counsel responded that the money was not in dispute and will be forthcoming.
The defendant further defends claiming that the PJR should be denied and the underlying action stayed until the plaintiff obtains a certificate of authority to do business in Connecticut. The defendant filed a motion to that effect, which the parties agreed would be heard during and decided as part of the PRJ hearing; Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceeding dated April 22, 2010 (#150.00). The defendant claims that the plaintiff must obtain authorization to do business since it is and has been doing business in Connecticut under Gen. Stat. § 33-396 and therefore may not maintain an action in Connecticut until such certificate of authority is obtained. Gen. Stat. § 33-412(a).
The Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceeding dated April 22, 2010 (#150.00), Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively Stay This Proceeding dated March 1, 2010 (#135.00) and the resulting objection to the PJR must be denied for the following reasons:
The plaintiff is Access International Advisors Limited, a Bahamas corporation, doing business exclusively offshore, i.e., not in the 50 states of the United States of America, its territories and possessions including but not limited to the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam and Puerto Rico. There are entities with similar names to the plaintiff that are domestic corporations and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States: AIA, LLC is a Delaware corporation and is a SEC registered adviser; AIA, Inc. is a New York based corporation; and AIA Capital Markets is a Delaware corporation and is registered with the SEC. The only plaintiff is Access International Advisors Limited which have never been SEC registered since it deals exclusively with investors located outside the United States with offshore investments. The Sourcing Agreement in the Third WHEREAS clause states: "The Investment Manager desires that AIA prove assistance outside of the United States, to the Investment Manager in raising capital . . ." Ex. 3. As such the plaintiff is not and has never been authorized to do business in Connecticut or any other state, possession or territory of the United States.
The defendant's Vice President described the plaintiff's business as follows: "AIA is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the Bahamas with its principal place of business in the Bahamas. AIA effects, induces, and attempts to induce securities transactions with investors in order to raise capital. In connection therewith, AIA introduces prospective investors to investment funds in exchange for commissions based on the business AIA funnels to such funds." Affidavit of Patrick Ransom dated March 1, 2010 (#136.00). See #148.00.
The Prospectus of two of defendant's offshore investment funds that the foreign clients of the plaintiff were doing business with were offered in evidence. The plaintiff would help defendant obtain foreign investors for these two funds. The language of the Prospectus stated: "The Shares have not been and will not be registered under the United States Securities Act of 1933 as amended (The `Securities Act') or the securities laws of any state or other political subdivision of the United States and may not be offered, sold, transferred or delivered, directly or indirectly, in the United States or to, or for the account or benefit of US persons . . ." "The Shares may not be offered or sold to any US Persons . . ." The Shares are being offered outside the United States in reliance upon the exemption from registration requirements of the Securities Act provided by Regulation S thereunder. Ex. 1, page 4, Ex. 2, page 4.
"A foreign corporation, other than an insurance, surety or indemnity company, may not transact business in this state until it obtains a certificate of authority from the Secretary of the State." Gen. Stat. § 33-920(a). "A foreign corporation transacting business in this state without a certificate of authority may not maintain a proceeding in any court in this state until it obtains a certificate of authority." Gen. Stat. § 33-921(a). "A court may stay a proceeding commenced by a foreign corporation, its successor or assignee until it determines whether the foreign corporation or its successor requires a certificate of authority." Gen. Stat. § 33-921(c). The plaintiff is a foreign corporation incorporated in the Bahamas.
(1) This is a prejudgment remedy hearing and such is not a civil action. Bernhard-Thomas Building Systems, LLC v. Dunican, 286 Conn. 548, 558-61 (2008); Feldmann v. Sebastian, 261 Conn. 721, 727 (2002); Pinney Associates v. Castellano Electric, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket Number CV 01-1081802-S (March 15, 2001, D'Andrea, J.) [ 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 390]. A PJR is not a "proceeding" under Gen. Stat. § 33-921(a) and (c). "The adjudication made by the court on the application for a prejudgment remedy is not part of the proceedings ultimately to decide the validity and merits of the plaintiff's cause of action." E.J. Hansen Elevator, Inc. v. Stoll, 167 Conn. 623, 628-29 (1975).
(2) A PJR is permitted to proceed in aid of a pending arbitration even though by statute the cause of action may be stayed pending conclusion of the arbitration. Gen. Stat. § 52-422; Gen. Stat. 52-278d(c); Gen. Stat. § 52-409. Travelers Insurance Company v. General Electric Company, 230 Conn. 106, 107 (1994); Hotz Corporation v. Carabetta, 226 Conn. 812, 817 (1993); Taylor v. Synergy Productions, Ltd., 21 Conn.App. 661, 665 (1990). Gen. Stat. § 52-422 states that the court in an arbitration proceeding "may make forthwith such order or decree, issue such process and direct such proceedings as may be necessary to protect the rights of the parties pending the rendering of the award and to secure the satisfaction thereof when rendered and confirmed." This statute authorizes a PJR when the stay of an action pending arbitration is in effect. King v. Gardiner, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk of Stamford, Docket Number FST CV09-5013155 S (February 24, 2010, Adams, J.) [ 49 Conn. L. Rptr. 385].
(3) Gen. Stat. § 33-921 does not impact subject matter jurisdiction. Trevek Enterprises v. Victory Contracting Corporation, 107 Conn.App. 574, 580 (1989); Mapei Corp. v. Bestflor Distributors, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket Number, HHD-CV 01-5010569S (June 29, 2009, Sheldon, J.).
(4) The plaintiff never had an office in Connecticut nor any employees based in Connecticut. It never had or solicited any clients who resided in Connecticut nor did those clients have their place of business in Connecticut. The plaintiff never advertised in Connecticut. It never sold anything in Connecticut.
(5) The plaintiff's clients were all foreign non United States residents with residence and business addresses located outside of the United States. The plaintiff's client did not make any investments in any assets based in the United States.
(6) The plaintiff introduced its foreign clients to the defendant at meetings in Greenwich, Connecticut. Ex. 17 contains sixty-six separate one-page information Memorandum of Argent from January 6, 2003 until December 12, 2006. Each page related to an introductory meeting with the plaintiff and/or clients of the plaintiff. Each memorandum followed a similar format of usually under an hour: Introduction to Argent investment products, presentation by Argent research and investment committees, Argent's management and investment strategy, and questions and answers. None of the memoranda reflected any sales effort, negotiating time or the purchase or closing of any investment products. None of the clients mentioned in Exhibit 17 were described as U.S. residents. All client's address in the memoranda are foreign addresses. No documentation is in evidence that the plaintiffs did business in Connecticut during those introductory meetings. No evidence was offered that these introduced clients were Connecticut residents or that any of the introduced clients did not conform to the Prospectus requirements. Ex. 1, Ex. 2. No evidence was offered that any introduced client bought any investment that was not an off-shore investment. Connecticut law holds that merely introducing clients in the State of Connecticut is not doing business in Connecticut. Gen. Stat. § 33-920(b)(6) "solicitation or obtaining orders whether by mail or through employees or agents or otherwise, if the orders require acceptance outside the state before they become contracts." Soliciting orders in state subject to being accepted outside Connecticut is not transacting business in Connecticut. Alfred M Best Co., Inc. v. Goldstein, 124 Conn. 597, 602 (1938); Hospitality Systems, Inc. v. Oriental World Trading Co., Ltd, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk of Stamford, Docket Number CV 99-0169927 S (February 1, 2000, Karazin, J.) [ 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 401]; Southfield Savings Bank v. Koinonia School, 2 Conn.App. 81, 85-86 (1984). All the funds listed in Ex. 5 are offshore investments made by foreigners. The defendant prepared Ex. 5. There was no evidence that the foreign clients purchased the offshore investments at the Connecticut meetings.
(7) Usually a defense of doing business requires a hearing more intense than a limited probable cause hearing conducted in a PJR. Such a hearing has not been held. Sawyer Savings Bank v. American Trading Co., 176 Conn. 185, 190 (1978) ("We have ruled that the question of whether a foreign corporation is transacting business so as to require a certificate of authority must be determined on the complete factual picture presented in each case . . .").
(8) The claimed defect that the plaintiff is and has been doing business in Connecticut without authorization, is not apparent on the face of the record. Such a defense must be formally raised by a special defense in the case in chief. Menley and James Laboratories, Ltd v. Mott's Super Markets, Inc., 26 Conn.Sup. 434, 436 (1966); State v. Bell Investment Corp, Inc., 32 Conn.Sup. 279, 292 (1974); DSP Software Engineering, Inc. v. NCT Group, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket Number CV 00-0370062 S (August 10, 2000, Melville, J.) ("Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-46 if a defendant intends to controvert the capacity of a corporate plaintiff to maintain a suit, the proper procedural vehicle to raise that issue is by way of special defense in his answer"); United States Trust Co. of NY v. DiGhello, 179 Conn. 246, 249-50 (1979).
(9) Gen. Stat. § 33-921(c) by the use of "may" does not make it mandatory that a court must stay the proceedings. The predecessor statute used the word "shall" which was changed to the current "may" in 1997. Gen. Stat. § 33-412. In this case the court exercises its discretion not to stay the PJR. Bisson v. Bisson, 5 Conn.App. 67, 68-69 (1985); Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 531 (2002).
(10) No evidence was offered that any of the foreign clients introduced by the plaintiff at the Connecticut meeting ever consummated the investment transaction in Connecticut. At most these potential investors introduced by the plaintiff were given a prospectus on the fund and their questions were answered at the Connecticut meeting. The defendant concedes these facts in the middle of page 7 of its April 21, 2010 Memorandum (#148.00).
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively, Stay This Proceeding dated March 1, 2010 (#135.00) raised the same issue of stay. This Motion to Stay is denied for the above reasons. The above Motion to Dismiss (#135.00) is moot because there is no longer any pending federal lawsuit.
Finally, the defendant claims that the plaintiff's notification to the defendant of a number of different wiring instructions excuses the defendant from payment since these acts were "frustration of performance." #159.00 pg 5. Platz v. Pecora, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket Number CV 08-50 14466 S (May 13, 2008, Gilardi, J.) (Plaintiff contractor failed to complete the structural home improvement work necessary for the defendant to complete the home's trim and tiling work. Plaintiff prejudgment remedy denied). That case and the following cited in Platz v. Pecora for that proposition including Godburn v. Meserve, 130 Conn. 723, 726 (1944) (Plaintiffs agreed to move in with elderly defendant and care for her in return receive the defendant's house in her will. "If the plaintiffs on their part were prevented by the decedent from completing the contract, they were entitled to bring their action for damages, for her breach of it"), and Hartford Electric Applicators, Inc. v. Alden, (Plaintiff, drywall contractor, sued and trial involved issues of delay and faulty construction) 169 Conn. 177, 180 (1975) do not support defendant's argument. The court finds that the conflicting wiring instructions do not amount to a frustration of performance-vitiating the entire debt.
The court has already imposed a penalty on the plaintiff for the delay in notifying the defendant of the correct wiring instructions by finding that the $1,190,678 was not wrongfully withheld from its due date in December 2008 until March 26, 2009. The court allowed no interest for that two- to three-month period. The plaintiff was therefore penalized between $25,302 and $34,530, depending on whether one calculates interest from December 1, 2008 or January 1, 2009. That loss of interest is the remedy available to the defendant. There is no authority in Connecticut or New York that a contract fully performed by both parties with only payment remaining by one party, that the debtor makes preparation for tender, which preparation for tender the other party refuses, requires the entire debt to be extinguished.
The court rejects all the defenses offered by the defendant. A prejudgment remedy of the principal sum of $1,190,678 enters. To that sum interest at the rate of nine (9%) percent from March 27, 2009 through and including May 31, 2009 is added, being the sum of $126,510. The total prejudgment remedy awarded by this court is $1,317,188.
Various witnesses testified at the PJR hearing that the defendant, Argent Management Co., LLC, changed its name after December 2008 to "Argent Management Co., LLC now known as Centaur Management Co., LLC." The plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-123 dated April 27, 2010 (#153.00) to change the caption of these proceedings nunc pro tunc to the new name. The Motion read: "Accordingly, ALA Limited should be permitted to secure its prejudgment remedy by attaching or garnishing any available assets of the defendant, regardless of whether those assets are held in the name of Argent Management Co., LLC or Centaur Management Co., LLC." The defendant has submitted a number of pleadings in this file in which the defendant is identified as "Centaur Management Co., LLC formerly Argent Management Co., LLC" or "The Defendant Argent Management Co., LLC n/k/a Centaur Management Co., LLC" (#131.00) (#147.00) (#148.00) (#151.00) (#156.00) (#159.00) No order was entered on Motion #153.00. That motion was not argued before the undersigned and according to the court's computer system, was never acted on by any court.
The prejudgment remedy is granted in the amount of $1,317,188 for an attachment of the defendant's interest in real property located in Connecticut. This $1,317,188 real property attachment is awarded without a bond. Gen. Stat. § 52-278d(a)(4); Gen. Stat. § 52-278d(d). The plaintiff has filed a Motion for Prejudgment Disclosure of Property and Assets dated October 16, 1999 (#100.35). In the event that this real property attachment is insufficient, then the plaintiff may reclaim the Motion for Prejudgment Disclosure of Property and Assets (#100.35). The court may then consider ordering the defendant to disclose additional assets either in affidavit, documentary and/or testimonial form. Gen. Stat. § 52-278n. Thereafter, the court may permit further prejudgment remedies subject to the consideration, if any, of an appropriate bond. Gen. Stat. § 52-278d(a)(4).