Both parties rely, in large part, on two recent cases decided by the Pennsylvania Superior Court that analyze if a property owner's general liability insurer was relieved of its duty to defend or indemnify based on an assault and battery exclusion. InAcceptance Ins. Co. v. Seybert, the court held that the assault and battery exclusion barred coverage. 757 A.2d 380 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2000). In QBE Ins. Co. v. M S Landis Corp. T/d/b/a Fat Daddy's, the court held that the assault and battery exclusion did not apply. 915 A.2d 1222 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2007).
Therefore, if an assault or battery was a "but for" cause of the plaintiff's injuries, an assault and battery exclusion will apply to allegations that the insured's negligence contributed to the injuries. See Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2000). The insurer only owes a duty to defend if the complaint alleges the insured's negligence itself directly led to the injuries.
Id. (citing Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2000)). "The insurer only owes a duty to defend if the complaint alleges the insured's negligence itself directly led to the injuries."
In addition, Victoria suggests that coverage for Mincin's alleged negligent hiring, supervision, and training of the two aggressive co-workers are similarly precluded by this exclusion. Relying on Britamco Underwriters Inc. v. Grzeskiewicz, 639 A.2d 1208 (Pa. Super 1994) and Acceptance Insurance Co. v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380 (Pa. Super. 2000), Victoria requests summary judgment. In response, Mincin attempts to distinguish the facts of its case from Britamco and Seybert suggesting that those cases involved an underlying complaint where the injuries sustained by the underlying plaintiff arose solely out of an assault and battery claim, not both assault and battery and negligence.
In Pennsylvania, the proper construction of an insurance policy is a matter of law, which a court may properly resolve when ruling on a summary judgment motion. Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380, 382 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2000); Fisher v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 621 A.2d 158 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1993). An insurer's duty to defend the insured is determined by the factual allegations of the underlying complaint.
Ā¶ 5 The usual procedure in declaratory judgments, where, as here, the facts are not in dispute, is for the parties to file cross motions for summary judgment and for the appeal to be taken directly from the order granting summary judgment. See, e.g.: Acceptance Insurance Co. v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380 (Pa.Super. 2000); Standish v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., 698 A.2d 599 (Pa.Super. 1997); Pempkowski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 678 A.2d 398 (Pa.Super. 1996), affirmed, 548 Pa. 23, 693 A.2d 2001 (1997); Bowers by Brown v. Estate of Feathers, 671 A.2d 695 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 550 Pa. 696, 705 A.2d 1303 (1997); Equibank v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 626 A.2d 1243 (Pa.Super. 1993), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 605, 642 A.2d 306 (1994); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Uninsured Underwriters Insurance Co., 657 A.2d 1252 (Pa.Super. 1995), reversed, 549 Pa. 518, 701 A.2d 1330 (1997); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Broughton, 621 A.2d 654 (Pa.Super. 1993) (en banc). Ā¶ 6 Nevertheless, a motion for summary judgment is not the sole means by which to resolve a declaratory judgment action.
Therefore, if an assault or battery was a "but for" cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the assault and battery exclusion will apply to allegations that the insured's negligence contributed to the injuries. See Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (finding no duty to defend where insured bar's negligence in serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated men who subsequently attacked plaintiff in underlying action was merely a contributing factor and not a direct cause of plaintiff's injuries). The insurer only owes a duty to defend if the complaint alleges the insured's negligence directly led to the injuries.
On the contrary, Pennsylvania courts have applied assault and battery exclusions without inquiring into the assailant's specific intent. See, e.g., Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380 (Pa.Super. 2000); Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Grzeskiewicz, 433 Pa.Super. 55, 639 A.2d 1208 (1994). The District Court's judgment requires only a finding ā which the court made ā that Jaworski's injuries arose out of an assault, not a determination of a particular actor's specific intent to inflict those injuries.
Ample case law supports their enforceability. See, e.g., Alea London, Ltd. v. Woodlake Mgmt., 365 Fed.Appx. 427 (3d Cir.2010); Unionamerica Ins. Co. v. Lim, No. 99ācvā4302, 2000 WL 1056450, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10698 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 1, 2000); Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super.Ct.2000). The provisions concerning assault and battery and liquor liability clearly exclude coverage for claims arising out of assaults or out of the service of alcohol.
Regardless of the language of the allegations, the original cause of the harm arose from an alleged assault and battery."). In Acceptance Insurance Company v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000), Michael Seybert filed a lawsuit alleging he was attacked outside a hotel parking lot after a night of drinking at the Belmont Bar. He also claimed that the Belmont Bar was negligent in serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated persons. Acceptance Insurance, the Belmont Bar's liquor liability carrier, filed a declaratory judgment action arguing that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Belmont Bar. The Superior Court agreed with the insurance company because the underlying complaint contained no allegations that the injured party was harmed other than by an assault and battery.