Opinion
24A-JV-1622
12-12-2024
A.C., Appellant-Respondent, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Nancy A. McCaslin McCaslin & McCaslin Elkhart, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Kathy Bradley Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court The Honorable Elizabeth A. Bellin, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 20D06-2402-JD-43
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Nancy A. McCaslin McCaslin & McCaslin Elkhart, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Kathy Bradley Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ROBB, SENIOR JUDGE.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] A.C. appeals the juvenile court's determination that he is a delinquent child. The court concluded A.C. had resisted law enforcement by fleeing, an act that would be a Class A misdemeanor for an adult.
[¶2] A.C. argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show he knowingly fled from police. Concluding that the State's evidence is insufficient, we agree and reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] On February 1, 2024, at about 7:50 p.m., Corporal Jesse Morganthaler of the Elkhart Police Department was conducting a traffic stop near an apartment complex. Night had fallen. Corporal Morganthaler was driving a fully marked police vehicle, with red and blue lights.
[¶4] During the stop, Corporal Morganthaler heard two gunshots coming from the direction of the apartment complex. He finished the stop and drove into the complex, where he saw a group of people standing in a grassy area between buildings. Another officer was also in the area, and over the radio that officer reported seeing two individuals, both dressed in black, running from the group.
[¶5] Corporal Morganthaler continued to drive through the complex, and when he looked down a street to his right, he saw two people run across the street, disappearing from his view between two buildings. They were dressed in black, and they were running away from the location of the group he had spotted earlier.
[¶6] Corporal Morganthaler turned and drove down the street to the spot where he saw the two people run. He activated his red and blue lights and left the street, driving down the sidewalk between the two buildings. At this point, he had "lost sight" of the runners. Tr. Vol. II, p. 51.
[¶7] When Corporal Morganthaler turned a corner around one of the buildings, he saw an open, grassy area. One person who had been running was slowing down and stopping. The corporal got out of his vehicle, drew his handgun, and ordered the person to get on the ground. The person complied.
[¶8] Next, Corporal Morganthaler saw the other person partially concealed against a building. That person, who was later identified as fourteen-year-old A.C., walked into the open and got on the ground, in compliance with the corporal's directive.
[¶9] The State filed a delinquency petition, alleging A.C. had committed Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement by fleeing. The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing and determined A.C. was a juvenile delinquent. The court placed him on supervised probation, and this appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
[¶10] A.C. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court's judgment. "When the State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for committing an act that would be a crime when committed by an adult, the State must prove every element of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt." E.S. v. State, 198 N.E.3d 701, 703 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022). When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims arising from juvenile delinquency adjudications, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and will affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment. Id.
We note that A.C. did not timely file a Notice of Appeal. He sought and received the juvenile court's permission to file a belated Notice of Appeal pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2. But a juvenile may not bring a belated appeal under the post-conviction rules. Instead, a juvenile pursuing an appeal after the filing deadline has expired must file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. See Haluska v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1193, 1194 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996) (stating post-conviction remedies are not applicable to juvenile proceedings). Because the State does not object to A.C.'s appeal on timeliness grounds, and addressing A.C.'s appeal serves judicial economy, we choose to proceed to the merits of his claim.
[¶11] To obtain a delinquency adjudication against A.C. as alleged in the petition, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) A.C. (2) knowingly (3) fled from (4) Corporal Morganthaler (5) after the corporal had identified himself by visible or auditory means (6) and ordered A.C. to stop. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a) (2021); Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 42.
[¶12] Corporal Morganthaler did not verbally order A.C. and his companion to halt until he got out of his vehicle, when they had stopped running. The State notes that an order need not be audible, and flashing police lights may amount to an order to stop. "'The order to stop may be given through visual indicators. Evidence of a proper visual order to stop is based on the circumstances surrounding the incident and whether a reasonable person would have know[n] that he or she had been ordered to stop.'" Vanzyll v. State, 978 N.E.2d 511, 516 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012) (quoting Fowler v. State, 878 N.E.2d 889, 895 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008)).
[¶13] The State failed to present any evidence showing A.C. was aware of Corporal Morganthaler's presence or his flashing lights until the corporal drove around the corner of the building to the grassy area, at which point A.C. stopped moving. The corporal had lost sight of A.C. when he turned on his lights as he drove onto the sidewalk to go between the two buildings. The State notes the vehicle's flashing lights reflected off surrounding buildings as the corporal drove down the sidewalk and argues one may assume A.C. saw the reflections. This argument amounts to speculation.
[¶14] Although we defer to the juvenile court as the finder of fact, based on the circumstances there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that A.C. fled after the corporal identified himself and ordered A.C. to stop. Cf. Conley v. State, 57 N.E.3d 836, 839 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (evidence sufficient to determine defendant fled from law enforcement after being ordered to stop; defendant ran in front of marked police car and officer, in uniform, made hand gesture directing defendant to stop), trans. denied; Coleman v. State, 196 N.E.3d 274, 280 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (evidence sufficient to determine defendant fled after officer ordered him to stop; defendant disregarded officer's verbal directive and subsequent activation of police vehicle's flashing lights), trans. denied.2
Conclusion
[¶15] For the reasons stated above, we reverse the juvenile court's true finding of delinquency.
[¶16] Reversed.
Vaidik, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.