Opinion
1751 EDA 2022
03-08-2023
A.C. v. J.B. Appellant
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered June 3, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at No(s): CV-2012-009145
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM
PANELLA, P.J.
J.B. ("Father") appeals from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas' order denying his petition to modify custody of A.C. ("Child") in part and granting the petition in part. In 2018, the court issued a temporary order awarding sole physical and legal custody of Child to A.C. ("Mother") after Child alleged Father had sexually abused him. The Department of Human Services ("DHS") investigated the allegations and filed an indicated report, which was placed on the statewide ChildLine registry ("registry") as required by the Child Protective Services Law ("CPSL"), 23 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 6301-6386. Father filed an appeal with DHS seeking expungement, and DHS was directed to expunge the indicated report from the registry. Following the expungement, Father filed the petition to modify custody, essentially requesting the restoration of legal and partial physical custody of Child.
Father has filed a "motion to revise case caption and redact personal identifiers," seeking to substitute the parties' names with their initials in the case caption and in this memorandum. Given the allegations of abuse in the history of this matter, we grant this application to preserve Child's privacy, and have revised the caption accordingly.
The trial court held a trial on the modification petition, and issued a final custody order granting Mother sole legal and physical custody "at this time," but also instituting a reunification process for Father and Child. In support of its order, the trial court issued a thorough and thoughtful 66-page findings of fact and conclusions of law ("findings of fact"). Father now appeals from the court's custody order, raising a dozen allegations of error, most of which contain multiple subsections containing additional allegations of error. We find that many of these claims are waived and that the remainder of the claims are, based in large part on the trial court's findings of fact, as well as the trial court's 41-page Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion addressing the claims Father raises on appeal, without merit. We affirm.
For ease of reference, we have attached both trial court opinions.
This matter is, as Father puts it, a "high-conflict custody matter dating back to Child's birth in 2012." Appellant's Brief at 11. The trial court provides a detailed factual and procedural history of the case in its findings of fact, see Findings of Fact, 6/3/2022, at 1-9, but we offer the following summary of the case's history as is relevant to this appeal. The relationship between Mother and Father, who were never married, ended before Child was born. Shortly after Child's birth, Mother filed a complaint in custody. Eventually, in December 2014, the court entered an order upon agreement of the parties which granted Father and Mother shared legal custody of Child. The order also awarded primary physical custody to Mother, with Father having partial physical custody.
Both Mother and Father filed several petitions, but the basic structure of this custody agreement remained in place until November 2018, when Mother filed an emergency petition for temporary sole custody based on allegations that Father had sexually abused Child. Specifically, the petition alleged Mother had shared concerns of inappropriate sexual contact between Father and Child to Child's therapist, who, in turn, had reported the concerns to DHS. The trial court issued a temporary order granting Mother sole physical and legal custody.
DHS investigated the allegations and filed an indicated report of child abuse against Father in January 2019. DHS placed the indicated report on the registry and told Father his name would be listed as a perpetrator in the indicated report. Father filed an appeal with DHS, seeking to have DHS expunge the indicated report from the registry. The matter proceeded to an administrative hearing before the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals ("BHA"), and Father represented himself during the hearing. DHS called both the DHS social worker who had investigated Child's sexual abuse allegations as well as Child to testify. Father, acting as his own counsel, was the one to cross-examine Child about the allegations Child had made against him.
Father's DHS appeal does not appear to be part of the certified record in this matter. However, the adjudication and orders disposing of the appeal are in the record.
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") issued an adjudication, finding DHS failed to meet its burden of establishing Father abused Child and therefore recommending Father's appeal be sustained and DHS be directed to expunge the indicated report from the registry. In support, the ALJ found Child's allegations were not credible due to the inconsistencies in Child's testimony at the hearing with statements he had previously made. The BHA subsequently entered an order adopting the ALJ's recommendations on November 25, 2019.
Father filed a petition to modify custody the following month, citing the BHA's order and seeking generally to modify the custody order awarding sole physical and legal custody to Mother. The trial court interpreted Father's petition to be seeking shared legal custody, partial physical custody, and reunification therapy. See Findings of Fact, 6/3/2022, at 21-22. Father subsequently filed several pretrial motions, including requests for supervised telephone calls with Child, which the court denied. The court appointed a guardian ad litem ("GAL") for Child in October 2021.
The court held a custody trial on Father's modification petition which spanned four days. Father was represented by counsel at the trial. During the first two days of the trial, December 1 and December 2, 2021, the court heard testimony from a number of witnesses. Those witnesses included Father, the GAL and Dr. Catherine Surbeck, who had been appointed by the court to perform a psychosexual evaluation of Father. Dr. Surbeck, an expert in forensic human sexuality, though not a psychologist, testified that she had interviewed Father and had not recommended that he receive treatment for problematic sexual behaviors. See N.T., 2/2/2021, at 156, 158.
The trial was continued to January 31, 2022. On that date, the trial court denied the motion in limine Mother had filed seeking to, inter alia, preclude the admission of the ALJ expungement decision. The court found the ALJ decision was admissible, but the court also stated it was not bound by the ALJ decision and would not accord it any weight.
The trial court held the last two days of the custody trial on January 31, 2022 and February 2, 2022. The court heard testimony from several more witnesses, including Mother and three of Child's treating psychologists, Nancy Braveman, Psy.D., Michael Morrow, Ph.D., and Allison Dovi, Ph.D. The court also heard from Julia Alexander, Ph.D., a child psychologist with an expertise in child sexual abuse who had been appointed by the court to perform a psychological evaluation of Mother, Father and Child. Dr. Alexander's testimony included her recommendation that any reunification therapy between Child and Father be with a clinician who has expertise in sexual abuse allegations, and only after certain conditions were met. Namely, that Father had completed a psychosexual evaluation, Child and Father were each in individual treatment with a clinician who also had expertise in sexual abuse allegations, and Child agreed to the therapy. See N.T., 1/31/2022, at 60, 65, 77-78.
The court also interviewed Child, who was nine years old at the time of trial and had not had custody time with Father since November 2018. Child told the court he did not like Father "because he sexually abused me," and that he had stopped seeing him for the same reason. N.T., 2/21/2022, at 311, 314. However, Child did not disclose details about the abuse with the court. Child informed the court he did not wish to see Father or his paternal relatives. See id. at 315.
Following the close of testimony, the court ordered a briefing schedule for the parties to submit their closing arguments. After the briefs were submitted, the court issued an order dated February 17, 2022, delaying the entry of its decision to no later than 45 days after February 14, 2022. The court, however, did not issue its final custody order until May 31, 2022, which was not docketed until June 3, 2022. As noted above, the court's final order directed that sole physical and legal custody of Child remain with Mother "at this time." However, the court made Mother's legal custody subject to the provision that Father be able to access Child's medical, mental health, and school records. The court further ordered Mother to ensure a full psychological evaluation of Child was completed within two months of the order. Finally, the court ordered the parties to select a reunification therapist so that reunification therapy for Father and Child could begin immediately upon the selection of the therapist.
The order was not docketed until March 3, 2022.
The court's findings of fact, which accompanied the order, laboriously went through an analysis of each of the 16 custody factors the court was statutorily required to consider pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). See 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5328(a) (1)-(16). The entirety of that analysis can be found on pages ten through 60 of the findings of fact, with the court carefully weighing evidence and making credibility determinations relevant to each of the 16 factors when reaching its determination whether that particular factor favored either party or was neutral. See Findings of Fact, 6/3/2022, at 10-60.
We highlight the court's consideration of two of those factors, beginning with its analysis of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(2.1), which requires the court to consider the information set forth in Pa. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329.1 (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with protective services). The court recognized the sexual abuse allegations were "the elephant in the room" during the trial and it summarized Mother's testimony about Child's disclosure of the abuse, testimony which the court found to be credible. See Findings of Fact, 6/3/2022, at 13-15. At the same time, the court acknowledged the ALJ adjudication concluding that DHS had not presented substantial evidence of sexual abuse and therefore recommending the indicated report of child abuse against Father be expunged from the registry.
The trial court found, however, that it was not bound by the ALJ determination when making its custody decision. The court first noted that the standard of proof in an expungement proceeding is different from the standard of proof in custody matters, with the first being substantial evidence and the latter being preponderance of the evidence. The court also explained that the purpose of a custody hearing was distinct from an expungement proceeding:
The purpose of the child abuse expungement hearing is to determine whether an indicated report of child abuse is "inaccurate or it is being maintained in a manner inconsistent with the [CPSL]. Thus, the ALJ adjudicates whether "substantial evidence" of child abuse exists to establish that the agency is maintaining an indicated report of the child abuse on the state child abuse registry in a manner consistent with the CPSL. In contrast, the charge in a custody proceeding is broader as the trial court must determine [the] "best interest of the child," a far-reaching inquiry that includes sixteen custody factors. Thus, an expungement hearing fails to address the ultimate conclusion which the trial court must address in any custody proceeding: the best interests of the child with "weighted considerations to those factors which affect the safety of the child." [23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)]. Given the different purposes and processes of a custody proceeding and an expungement hearing, affording substantial weight to the expungement decision would constitute an inappropriate abdication of the trial court's responsibility under the custody statute to render an independent decision based on the record.Findings of Fact, 6/3/2022, at 64 n.23.
The trial court also noted it was declining to give weight to the ALJ adjudication as it disagreed with the ALJ's conclusion that Child's allegations were not credible. The trial court pointed to several reasons to support its disagreement with the ALJ, including the fact that Child was forced to testify at the expungement hearing at seven years old "without the support of Mother or a [GAL] when he was questioned by Father, the alleged perpetrator." See id. at 17.
Notwithstanding the above, the trial court ultimately found there was insufficient evidence for it to make a finding that Father had sexually abused Child under the applicable preponderance of the evidence standard. In doing so, the court noted Child refused to discuss the allegations in any detail with the court or the GAL. The court also specifically stated it could not "consider the expunged indicated report of child sexual abuse as it ceases to exist." Id. at 19. However, the court found that, even though it did not have sufficient evidence to make a finding the abuse had in fact occurred, it could not overlook the fact that Child unequivocally believed he had been sexually abused by Father. The court explained:
[T]he court must stress that, regardless of the truth or falsity of these allegations, it cannot discount Child's firmly held belief that Father had sexually abused him. The court must deal with [Child] as he is - with his current mental state and belief - and make a custody determination that best promotes Child's physical, psychological and emotional well-being.Id. at 20.
Because of Child's current mental state and belief, and Mother's credible testimony regarding the disclosures, the court found the custody factor related to child abuse favored Mother. See id.
The court expanded on its analysis of Child's mental state when considering 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5328(a)(16), which requires the court to consider "[a]ny other relevant factor," which the court emphasized clearly included Child's psychological well-being. The court concluded that after considering the testimony of Child's three treating psychologists, Drs. Braveman, Morrow, and Dovi, "the considerations related to Child's mental health are complex." Findings of Fact, 6/3/2022, at 47.
The court explained this complexity at length in its findings of fact. See id. at 47-60. In summary, the court pointed out: Child had demonstrated behavioral issues beginning at age two; Child was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct when he was four years old; following the disclosure of the sexual abuse allegations, Child received Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy between January 2019 and July 2019 with Dr. Bravemen; Child began seeing Dr. Morrow in January 2020 for behavioral difficulties and, although Child reported the sexual abuse during sessions with Dr. Morrow, Dr. Morrow did "not focus on potential trauma" because doing so could be harmful "when there's potential to be reunified with an alleged perpetrator" N.T., 2/1/22, at 39-40; Dr. Morrow's diagnostic impressions were that Child presents a complicated set of symptoms which may include ADHD, anxiety disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, OCD, and post-traumatic disorder; Child required emergency mental health treatment in October 2020 for violent tantrums and threats of self-harm; Child was referred and admitted to a therapeutic day program on October 26, 2020; Dr. Dovi initially met with Child and Mother in October 2021 and informally diagnosed Child with adjustment disorder but could not rule out PTSD; both Dr. Morrow and Dr. Dovi recommended Child undergo a comprehensive psychological evaluation.
As for reunification with Father, the court noted Dr. Morrow recommended a "slow and gradual" reunification process if it were to happen, with separate individual therapy support for Child. See N.T., 2/1/22, at 56-57, 59. Dr. Dovi, meanwhile, declined to give an opinion on whether reunification therapy should proceed at that time but recommended Child also have individual therapy along with reunification therapy if reunification commenced. See id. at 244.
Given Child's mental health and behavioral concerns, along with the court's consideration of the other custody factors and Child's long separation from Father, the court concluded it would not be in the best interests of Child for Father to immediately be awarded partial physical or legal custody of Child. The court also concluded it would have to proceed with "the utmost care in any reunification process." Findings of Fact, 6/3/2022, at 59. The court elaborated on both points:
Father failed to assure this Court that his exercise of partial physical custody will not pose any serious harm to Child's emotional, psychological, and social well-being. The record in this matter demonstrates that Child has serious mental health and behavioral concerns … While Child has treated with many mental health providers, his problematic behaviors have not yet been thoroughly addressed. Based on the record, this Court must conclude that Child is barely functional when he is under stress and frequently displays alarming behaviors which prevent him from partaking [in] the activities of daily life and attending school every day.
***
Further complicating this matter, the Court must consider not only Child's mental state but also the possibility that Child may suffer from PTSD. The court finds that Child wholeheartedly believes that Father sexually abused him, as he has constantly affirmed this sexual abuse from the time of his disclosures in November 2018 to his interview with the Court in February 2022. The Court also notes that Drs. Alexander and Morrow, along with [another provider], opined that Child may suffer from PTSD [with the only possible triggering trauma on record being that of the sexual abuse].Id. at 60-62.
Based on these considerations, the court concluded it could not award custody to Father at that time and would, instead, institute a reunification process for Father and Child. To that end, the court ordered the parties to select a reunification provider within thirty days of the order, or the court would appoint a provider in the event an agreement could not be reached. Reunification therapy would then begin immediately, with the reunification provider allowed access to Child's mental health providers and records in order to craft the reunification process that would promote the best interests of Child. The court made clear that it would be the reunification provider who would:
dictate the course and process of reunification. Therefore, supervised therapeutic, i.e., reunification sessions involving both Father and Child under the supervision of the reunification therapist, may begin at the therapist's discretion and at the speed dictated by the therapist.Final Custody Order, 5/31/22, at 3.
Father filed a timely notice of appeal from the final custody order, along with a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal that was anything but concise. "In his statement, Father raised twelve main issues of error as well as about twenty-one subparts for appellate review." Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 8/11/22, at 4. The court rejected all of Father's issues as waived or meritless in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, and urged this Court to affirm its final custody order.
The trial court sua sponte recused itself from the matter after filing its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
When this court reviews a custody order, we do so for an abuse of discretion. See Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 538 (Pa. Super. 2008). Such an abuse of discretion will only be found if the "trial court, in reaching its conclusion, overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or reaches a conclusion that is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will as shown by the evidence of record." Id.
Further, in reviewing a custody order:
We must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our role does not include making independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court's deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court's conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.Klos v. Klos, 934 A.2d 724, 728 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). As with any custody matter, the paramount concern is the best interests of the child involved. See id.
When ascertaining the best interests of a child in a custody matter, the court must conduct a case-by-case assessment of all the factors that may legitimately affect the physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being of that child. See id. To that end, Section 5328(a) of the Pennsylvania Child Custody Act lists 16 factors a court must consider when determining the best interests of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).
As noted above, the trial court considered and discussed all 16 factors when issuing its custody order, just as Section 5328(a) directs it to do. Father challenges the trial court's application of the 16 factors in exhausting detail in his brief to this Court, which, with permission from this Court, exceeds the word count limitations prescribed by Pa.R.A.P. 2135. See Pa.R.A.P. 2135 (providing that the length of a principal brief shall not exceed 14,000 words). To be sure, this Court did grant Father's "Motion Requesting Leave of Court to Increase Appellant Brief Word Count" on October 6, 2022. Father was not shy of taking full advantage of his granted request, and filed a 72-page, single-spaced brief with this Court, certifying that the brief contained 17,154 words. Father, acting pro se, also filed the brief late. While it is true this Court's order allowed Father to bypass Pa.R.A.P. 2135, it in no way excused Father's brief from complying with the other Rules of Appellate Procedure, including Pa.R.A.P. 124, which requires the text of briefs to be double-spaced.
Moreover, Father's statement of questions involved is anything but concise, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Father essentially raises the same slew of issues he raised in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Over a course of six single-spaced pages in his brief, Father presents 12 issues, most with multiple subparts. In some of the issues, the claims raised in the subparts are wholly distinct from each other. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at 9 (arguing in Issue Seven that the trial court erred by, inter alia, sustaining a hearsay objection, denying Father's continuance request, failing to properly weigh the ALJ decision, and failing to properly weigh the closing arguments). Father's brief also tends to ramble and even cross-references itself, often making his assertions difficult to follow. At times, he makes general assertions that unspecified exhibits or testimony support his claims, without pinpointing where in the record he is referencing as Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) directs him to do.
We recognize, of course, that Father is proceeding pro se and is clearly of the belief there were many errors committed by the trial court. However, all parties, including those proceeding pro se, are required to submit briefs which comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211-1212 (Pa. Super. 2010). If they do not, they risk a dismissal of their appeal by this Court. See id. Such a dismissal would arguably be appropriate here.
Even if the deficiencies in Father's brief did not warrant a dismissal on that basis, we agree with the trial court that Father has failed to establish that the court abused its discretion in issuing its custody order.
In his first issue, Father complains the court abused its discretion and acted with partiality in favor of Mother when applying the 16 custody factors to his case. In rejecting this claim, the trial court stressed it had considered the entire record, weighed the statutory custody factors with particular consideration to Child's safety as directed by the statute, and had devised a custody order that was, as thoroughly explained by its findings of fact, based on the best interests of Child and his mental health needs. The court found Father's claims of partiality waived, and in any event, meritless, as they were simply based on his disagreement with the trial court's conclusions.
Father's brief makes clear that he disagrees with a whole litany of the trial court's conclusions, including some that even Father classifies as "minute details." Appellant's Brief at 25. Father lists each of the custody factors and, in the argument section pertaining to all but a few of the factors, he essentially proceeds to attempt to re-try the case. Throughout his arguments, Father repeatedly challenges the trial court's credibility determinations, the court's failure to "more thoroughly consider" pieces of evidence or testimony, or the amount of weight the court placed on certain testimony or evidence. Of course, this Court defers to the trial court as fact-finder on issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, and it is not for this Court to reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Klos, 934 A.2d at 728.
We separately address Father's claims regarding the indicated report and the ALJ expungement decision as his disagreements with the trial court's handling of the ALJ expungement decision is peppered throughout his discussion of the custody factors, as well as throughout the remainder of his brief.
Father first asserts, in essence, that the court erred by considering the indicated report because it had been expunged and 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329.1, referenced by the custody factor in 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5328(a)(2.1), only allows for consideration of an indicated or founded report of child abuse. However, the court specifically stated it did not consider the content of the indicated report as the report had been expunged, so there is no merit to this assertion. See Findings of Fact, 6/3/2022, at 19.
Father also argues the trial court improperly "proceeded to fact-find specifically on the issue of the expunged allegations" when it should have been bound by, or at least afforded substantial weight to, the ALJ's determination that DHS had not met its burden of proving child abuse and therefore must expunge the indicated report from the registry. In the first instance, the trial court found this issue waived as Father failed to object to the court's January 31, 2022 order which specifically stated that the ALJ adjudication was admissible but "should not be afforded any weight." Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 8/11/2022, at 14. However, as outlined above, the trial court also gave a thorough explanation in its findings of fact as to why it was not bound by the ALJ's determination. It expanded on that reasoning in its 1925(a) opinion, explaining that the ALJ adjudication and BHA order did not have precedential value, as they were issued by a Commonwealth agency as opposed to a judicial tribunal. See id. at 13-14.
In any event, Father's argument does not take into account that the trial court ultimately found that, although it disagreed with the ALJ's credibility determination regarding Child, it agreed with the ALJ to the extent that it found there was not sufficient evidence for the court to find there had been sexual abuse for purposes of its best-interest analysis. Rather, the court found that, whether the allegations were true or not, Child believed he had been sexually abused by Father as evidenced by his unwavering and continued allegations that the abuse had occurred. Based on all of the above, we fail to see how Father is entitled to any relief on his claim the court was bound by, and therefore did not give adequate weight to, the ALJ adjudication.
We also reject any assertion by Father that Mother was collaterally estopped from "relitigating" the issue of child abuse during the custody trial.
The trial court found this issue was waived as Father raised it for the first time on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). In any event, the court also found the issue was without merit as Mother was not a party to Father's BHA administrative expungement hearing. See K.D. v. E.D., 267 A.3d 1215, 1225 (Pa. Super. 2021)(listing the conditions that must exist for collateral estoppel to apply, including that the party against whom the issue is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior action). Father has failed to persuade us of any error in these conclusions.
In the end, Father has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in its careful and comprehensive application of the custody factors. His first claim therefore does not warrant relief.
We note Father has also filed a reply brief, which is, like his principal brief, single-spaced. In essence, the reply brief merely regurgitates many of Father's arguments regarding the trial court's partiality and its alleged errors in its credibility determinations and the amount of weight it accorded to evidence. Father has also filed an application to amend his reply brief, which we grant.
We find the remainder of Father's issues waived or without merit. As for the claims which are waived, we note: Father's Issue Three has no argument; subparts (b) and (c) of Issue Four only make a cross-reference to another part of the brief; Issue Six and its three subparts have no meaningful argument and merely assert the arguments are corroborated by "expert testimony; transcripts of Trial Judge's pre-trial conference statements; and Trial Judge's own Conclusions of Law," Appellant's Brief at 64; the argument for Issue Seven and its five subparts is a list of bald assertions or cross-references to another argument elsewhere in the brief; and the argument for Issue Eight and its three subparts, Issue Nine and Issue Ten and its two subparts are nothing more than bald assertions or cross-references to other arguments in the brief. These issues are all waived for lack of development. See Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that arguments that are not sufficiently developed are waived).
As for the remainder of Father's issues, we find them to be without merit. In Issue Two, Father argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Mother sole legal custody. The trial court thoroughly addressed this issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, and found it had not abused its discretion. In support, the court cited Father's three-year absence from Child's life, the contentious history of Mother and Father and their inability to make joint decisions, as well as Child's mental health struggles. See Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 8/11/22, at 6-9. The court further noted it had granted Father access to Child's records so Father could "become better informed to make decisions concerning Child." Id. at 8. It also pointed out it had ordered reunification counseling, "a safe process by which Father would be reintroduced to Child under the professional supervision of a mental health specialist." Id. at 7. Given the court's reasoning and careful crafting of the custody order, Father has not persuaded us that the trial court abused its discretion in maintaining sole legal custody with Mother at this time.
Subpart (a) of Issue Four deals with collateral estoppel, which we addressed above. Issue Five and Issue 11 generally deal with Father's complaint that the court found Dr. Alexander's testimony more persuasive than Dr. Surbeck's testimony. Again, credibility and weight determinations were for the trial court as the fact-finder to make, and Father has not established that either of these issues merit any relief. See Klos, 934 A.2d at 728.
In his last issue, Issue 12, Father argues the trial court erred by failing to enter an order within an appropriate time frame. Father recites the timeline leading up to the court's final order, which the trial court concedes was filed beyond the due date established by its March 3, 2022, order. Father, however, does not offer anything beyond a recitation of the timeline and does not indicate what relief he is seeking on the basis of this claim.
In any event, the trial court acknowledged it had not complied with the time requirements of Pa.R.Civ.P. 1915.4(d). While we do not condone this noncompliance, the trial court explained its reasons for the delayed filing of the custody order. Those reasons included the fact that the court had taken a planned vacation, and that this case was extraordinarily involved, requiring time for the court to consider the large amount of testimony and exhibits that had been presented to the court. The trial court made clear it had considered the entire record, and acted "carefully and deliberately" to issue a custody order which was in the best interests of Child. Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 8/11/22, at 39. Given the complexity of this matter and its long, contentious history, we cannot fault the trial court for the delay here. Again, we discern no abuse of discretion in the final custody order and Father's final issue, like his others, does not entitle Father to relief.
Order affirmed. Motion to revise case caption and redact personal identifiers granted. Application to amend reply brief granted.
Judgment Entered.