A.C. v. C.B

25 Citing cases

  1. Chatterjee v. King

    2011 NMCA 12 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 10 times
    Recognizing that "the Legislature knows how to include language in a statute if it so desires"

    Equity and Common Law {30} We next address Petitioner's arguments that New Mexico case law gives her standing based on A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992), and Barnae v. Barnae, 1997-NMCA-077, 123 N.M. 583, 943 P.2d 1036, and that Subsection (K) "does not take into account the reality of psychological parentage and certainly does not trump the courts' plenary equitable powers." Petitioner alleges that she is "the equitable parent" of the child and that her parental right should be recognized under an equitable parent or de facto parent theory to maintain the stability of her parent-child relationship with the child.

  2. Sawyer v. USAA Insurance

    839 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D.N.M. 2012)   Cited 40 times
    Finding that "when a case is removed from state court, the federal court takes the case in its current posture and treats previously entered orders as its own."

    United Services contends that nothing in N.M.S.A.1978, § 39–1–1, affects the deadlines in N.M.R.A. 1–060(B), which also permits post-judgment relief. See United Services' Sawyer Response at 2–3 (citing N.M.S.A.1978, § 39–1–1; A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 584, 829 P.2d 660, 663 (Ct.App.1992)). United Services argues that Sawyer misunderstands the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries cause by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”

  3. West v. Superior Court

    59 Cal.App.4th 302 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 21 times
    Denying custody and visitation

    In New Mexico, the court of appeals held a contractual agreement giving an unrelated person a right to custody and visitation of a child is not per se unenforceable. ( A.C. v. C.B. (1992) 113 N.M. 581 [ 829 P.2d 660].) An unrelated woman, with whom the biological mother had lived, brought an action against the mother seeking joint custody and visitation.

  4. Matter of Adoption of Francisco A.

    116 N.M. 708 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that, in theory, third parties could be awarded visitation rights, but denying visitation to a former foster parent over adoptive parents' objections

    We have been no less cognizant of the overriding nature of children's best interests when visitation in the context of lifestyles that do not meet with mainstream approval was the issue. See A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (Ct.App.) (agreement that psychological parent has a right to visit with child of biological parent not repugnant to public policy even though parents were formerly in a sexually nontraditional relationship), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 449, 827 P.2d 837 (1992). Additionally, in Christian Placement Service, New Mexico Christian Children's Home v. Gordon, 102 N.M. 465, 697 P.2d 148 (Ct.App. 1985), a case with circumstances analogous to this one, we held that the lower court properly denied a grandparent intervention as of right and permissive intervention in an adoption proceeding.

  5. Chatterjee v. King

    280 P.3d 283 (N.M. 2012)   Cited 46 times
    Holding a case-by-case analysis is the best way to determine whether a parent has met the openly held out requirement and established a personal, financial, or custodial relationship with the child

    {36} Additionally, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has already embraced the idea of a child having two mothers in appropriate situations. In A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 585, 829 P.2d 660, 664 (Ct.App.1992), the Court of Appeals held that a “[p]etitioner's sexual orientation, standing alone, is not a permissible basis for the denial of shared custody or visitation.” In Barnae v. Barnae, 1997–NMCA–077, ¶ 10, 123 N.M. 583, 943 P.2d 1036, the Court of Appeals again recognized a lesbian partner's standing to assert a legal right to a continuing relationship with a child.

  6. Janice v. Margaret

    404 Md. 661 (Md. 2008)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that de facto parenthood is not recognized in Maryland and concluding that any person who would qualify for such status cannot obtain visitation or custody without demonstrating exceptional circumstances as prerequisite to court's consideration of children's best interests

    Id. at 891 (citations and footnotes omitted). See also V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539 (2000) (recognizing special status for psychological parents); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 976 (R.I. 2000) (finding no "infer[ence] [of] legislative intent to preclude standing to a de facto parent" and concluding that "a person who has no biological connection to a child but who has served as a psychological or de facto parent to that child may . . . establish his or her entitlement to parental rights vis-a-vis the child"); AC. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (Ct.App. 2002) (recognizing same-sex dual parent relationship and reversing trial court's ruling that a coparenting agreement was per se unenforceable), cert. denied, C.B. v. AC, 113 N.M. 449, 827 P.2d 837 (1992). Courts have continued to recognize the de facto parenthood concept post- Troxel.

  7. Griego v. Oliver

    316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013)   Cited 57 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that denying same-sex couples the right to marry violated the state constitution's equal protection clause

    The New Mexico Court of Appeals has held that “a person's sexual orientation does not automatically render the person unfit to have custody of children.” A.C. v. C.B., 1992–NMCA–012, ¶ 19, 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660. This Court has held that same-gender couples have custody rights to children under the New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 40–11A–101 to –903 (2009), because, among other reasons, “it is against public policy to deny parental rights and responsibilities based solely on the sex of either or both of the parents.” Chatterjee, 2012–NMSC–019, ¶¶ 5, 37, 280 P.3d 283.

  8. St. Mary v. Damon

    129 Nev. Adv. Op. 68 (Nev. 2013)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that both members of a same-sex couple could be considered “legal mothers” to a child born by implanting the fertilized egg of one partner into the other partner

    When a child has the opportunity to be supported by two loving and fit parents pursuant to a co-parenting agreement, this opportunity is to be given due consideration and must not be foreclosed on account of the parents being of the same sex. See Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 37 Cal.4th 156, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 117 P.3d 690, 696 (2005) (stating that, in the context of a child being parented by two women, “public policy favor[s] that a child has two parents rather than one”); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886, 892–93 (1999) (engaging in an analysis that indicated that a same-sex couple's co-parenting agreement could be enforceable insofar as it was in the child's best interest); A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660, 663–64 (App.1992) (finding that child visitation provisions of a co-parenting agreement between two women are enforceable if they are in the child's best interest). To bar the enforceability of a co-parenting agreement on the basis of the parents' genders conflicts with the Nevada Parentage Act's policies of promoting the child's best interest with the support of two parents.

  9. Latham v. Schwerdtfeger

    282 Neb. 121 (Neb. 2011)   Cited 21 times
    In Latham v. Schwerdtfeger, 282 Neb. 121, 802 N.W.2d 66 (2011), the Nebraska Supreme Court applied the in loco parentis doctrine in a custody dispute involving unmarried domestic partners who had separated.

    As other courts have done, we have also considered scholarly articles in this area. See A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (N.M.App.1992) (articles collected). The courts that have applied the doctrine of in loco parentis in cases such as ours have looked to the purpose of the doctrine and noted that the focus of an in loco parentis analysis must be on the relationship between the child and the party seeking in loco parentis status.

  10. Mullins v. Picklesimer

    317 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2010)   Cited 126 times
    Holding that non-biological parent of child conceived through artificial insemination, but who cared for the child from birth, had standing to seek custody of the child

    See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161 (2005) (partner had standing as a common law de facto parent which was limited to nonparents who have fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child's life); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 453 Pa.Super. 78, 682 A.2d 1314 (1996) (mother's former domestic partner stood in loco parentis with child and, therefore, had standing to seek partial custody of child born during their relationship); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 193 Wis.2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995) (nonparent has standing to seek visitation of child if a parent-like relationship with the child is shown); A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (N.M.Ct.App. 1992) (former partner who had entered into oral co-parenting agreement had standing to seek joint legal custody and time-sharing of partner's biological child). The facts in J.A.L. v. E.P.H., are nearly identical to those in the case at hand.