Opinion
G054590
06-19-2018
TERRY JO ABRUZZISE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CANDICE R. WHITE, Defendant and Appellant.
Law Office of Linda Rose Fessler and Linda Rose Fessler for Defendant and Appellant. Legal Aid Society of Orange County, Kate Marr, Lili Vo Graham and Sabyl Landrum; Pepper Hamilton, Pamela S. Palmer and Yue Wang for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2015-00811765) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Deborah C. Servino, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of Linda Rose Fessler and Linda Rose Fessler for Defendant and Appellant. Legal Aid Society of Orange County, Kate Marr, Lili Vo Graham and Sabyl Landrum; Pepper Hamilton, Pamela S. Palmer and Yue Wang for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Plaintiff Terry Jo Abruzzise sued defendant Candice R. White to recover the title to his home. Abruzzise alleged White had fraudulently transferred the title to the home to herself. The trial court agreed, and after a three-day bench trial, found the deed was void and quieted title in Abruzzise's favor. White now appeals. She does not contest that substantial evidence supported the judgment; instead, she has 11 separate complaints about the trial court's alleged abuse of discretion by various actions or rulings. At almost no point does White support her arguments with a showing that the court's ruling was prejudicial; some of the arguments are barely supported by any legal argument at all. Accordingly, most of her points are waived, and the rest are without merit. The judgment is affirmed.
I
FACTS
As we must, we state the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment.
White's briefs frequently miscite the record, referring us to pages that do not include the purported fact. She also cites to portions of documents that were not admitted at trial. We disregard all such references to the record and caution counsel to be more deliberate and careful in the future. We also reject any points raised in her reply brief for the first time. (Schubert v. Reynolds (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 100, 108-109.)
In 1985, Abruzzise, his mother, and his stepfather purchased a home in Garden Grove as joint tenants. In 2014, after his parents' deaths, sole legal title was granted to Abruzzise. After taking time off to care for his aging parents, Abruzzise was unable to return to work as a truck driver and construction worker due to injuries to his legs. Because he did not have a stable income, he fell behind on his property taxes.
In August 2013, Abruzzise received a notice from the Orange County Treasurer-Tax Collector showing taxes owed of $41,821.65, dating back to 2007. By 2014, the property was valued at over $450,000.
In October 2013, Abruzzise was arrested on drug-related charges and pleaded not guilty. (As of the time of trial in this matter, that case had not been disposed of.) At the time of his arrest, he had swelling and a wound on his leg that was later determined to be an ulcer. He was prescribed Vicodin to take as needed. This prescription was later changed to Norco, according to Abruzzise's trial testimony, which, impacted his memory and cognitive abilities. By February 2014, he testified, he was in great pain and taking higher dosages of Norco than prescribed.
Prior to the present dispute, Abruzzise and White were friends, despite the fact that Abruzzise was approximately 31 years older than White. In February 2014, after receiving a notice of tax auction, he told her that he was afraid he was going to lose his home. He testified that his intent was to enter into an agreement with White. As relevant here, he would add White to the title of the property, she would take out a loan to pay the delinquent property taxes and all future property taxes, Abruzzise would stay in the home until he died, and White would inherit the property upon his death. The record includes a copy of an unsigned document essentially setting forth these terms, and an illegible copy that purports to be signed by the parties.
According to the record, Abruzzise was born in January 1954; White was born in January 1985.
White testified she believed this document was drafted by her purported agent and property manager, Steven Hallsted. White characterized her signature on the signed copy as forged. The final paragraph of this document stated: "Both parties, Terry-Joe Abruzzise and Candice White, agree that neither party enjoy the privilege of legal familiarity. Despite this understanding, both parties agree that the PRIMARY INTENTION of all efforts associated with this agreement, are dedicated to insuring that [Abruzzise] retain residence, in the [Garden Grove] home, for the remainder of his life, or until he chooses otherwise, either being his sole discretion. If a conflict should occur between either party, or terms involving said parties, [Abruzzise]'s right to inhabit the [Garden Grove] property shall prevail." In an unlawful detainer action between the parties, disposed of prior to this matter, White agreed this paragraph reflected both parties' intent.
She presented expert testimony at trial that the document was forged, but the trial court found the evidence did not establish the forger's identity.
Rather than sign a document that would add White to the title, however, on or about February 22, 2014, White purchased a blank quitclaim deed at a retail store on her way to the Garden Grove house. She testified that she knew the purpose of the quitclaim deed was to "remove[] Mr. Abruzzise from title, to my name." White brought a notary to the house to notarize the quitclaim deed, which Abruzzise signed. White later brought Abruzzise a grant deed after an escrow company informed her the quitclaim deed was insufficient. Abruzzise also signed that document, which was eventually recorded. Both purported to terminate his interest in the property.
Abruzzise testified at trial that he was unaware that he was signing away his property, and he "was led to believe I was signing something else altogether." He testified to this effect at numerous points during trial. Although the notary asked him if he was going to read the documents before signing them, he replied: "No, I trust Candice White." Abruzzise also testified he was recovering from his hospital stay at the time the deeds were signed, and was taking increased dosages of Norco.
At the time the deeds were signed, White, Abruzzise, the notary, and Hallsted (White's agent), were present. Abruzzise attempted to continue the trial twice to take Hallsted's deposition, and White opposed both motions, which the court ultimately denied. Hallsted did not testify at trial.
After obtaining title, White took out a loan, mortgaged the property, and paid the overdue property taxes. White and Abruzzise, along with Hallsted, undertook work on the property to remedy code violations. The code violations were cleared by November 18, 2014.
Shortly thereafter, on November 24, Abruzzise was admitted to the hospital. He was diagnosed as suffering from a bacterial infection, foot pain, kidney injury, and a heart condition. He was hospitalized until December 3. While he was in the hospital, on December 1, Hallsted prepared a three-day notice to quit the Garden Grove property. The notice was served on Abruzzise on December 5, after he was released from the hospital, by posting a copy on the premises. In April 2015, the court entered judgment for Abruzzise, finding White had not presented sufficient evidence of her right to possession.
White served a second notice to quit on August 5, alleging the property had been sold by way of short sale. She dismissed this action before trial.
White made a third attempt at eviction later in August, serving another three-day notice. White asserts the court dismissed this action based on claim preclusion principles.
Shortly thereafter, Abruzzise filed the instant action, alleging six causes of action in a verified complaint: fraud and deceit, quiet title, partition, anticipatory repudiation, breach of contract, and injunction. White filed a cross-complaint for waste, fraud, conspiracy, quite title, and possession.
Prior to trial, the court made various rulings. It granted, in part, Abruzzise's motion in limine to preclude evidence of pending criminal charges against him, and the criminal convictions of Robert Johnson, Abruzzise's sometimes guest. The court took judicial notice that charges were pending against Abruzzise, but not of the specific charges. The court declined to take judicial notice of Johnson's convictions and charges, deeming them irrelevant and inadmissible. White nonetheless attempted to ask Abruzzise about the specific charges pending against him at trial.
The only witnesses who testified during the three-day bench trial were White, Abruzzise, and the handwriting expert. The parties submitted written closing arguments. Shortly thereafter, the trial court announced its tentative decision in Abruzzise's favor, and his counsel was directed to prepare a proposed statement of decision and judgment.
White responded with 22 objections "to form" and proposed new findings, which would have required Abruzzise to pay over $135,000 to White to quiet title, based on a previously unraised legal theory. Ultimately, the trial court, with few changes, adopted Abruzzise's proposed statement of decision and judgment.
In all pertinent respects on his claims relating to fraud and the title of the property, the trial court believed Abruzzise's version of events, finding his testimony credible. The court determined Abruzzise intended to add White to the deed as an additional owner, not to grant her sole title, and that White falsely represented the nature of the quitclaim and grant deeds. Further, the court found Abruzzise had presented "strong and persuasive evidence" that White exerted undue influence over him to obtain title to the property, taking advantage of his state of mind. The court concluded Abruzzise had been the victim of fraud, voided the grant deed, and quieted title in his favor as against White.
The court rejected Abruzzise's claims for anticipatory repudiation and breach of contract, finding there was no executed agreement. The court also rejected White's cross-complaint in its entirety.
White now appeals.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We begin with the basics. "'A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.'" (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Fundamental Investment etc. Realty Fund v. Gradow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 966, 971.) Error must be prejudicial to require reversal. "'The burden is on the appellant in every case to show that the claimed error is prejudicial; i.e., that it has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.'" (In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337.)
White claims the abuse of discretion standard applies to each of her arguments. To the extent she is correct, "[t]he appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court." (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479.) B. Motion in Limine
White's first two claims relate to the motion in limine regarding the criminal proceedings against Abruzzise. Her stated reasons this was error make little sense, but we need not address them in any event. Other than conclusory statements that admission of this evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial, White fails to make any factual argument regarding prejudice.
"A judgment of the trial court may not be reversed on the basis of the erroneous admission of evidence, unless that error was prejudicial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)" (Grail Semiconductor, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 786, 799.) "The record must show that the appellant 'sustained and suffered substantial injury, and that a different result would have been probable if such error . . . had not occurred or existed. There shall be no presumption that error is prejudicial, or that injury was done if error is shown.' [Citation.] Additionally, article VI, section 13, of the California Constitution provides that a judgment may not be set aside based on the erroneous admission of evidence 'unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.' Evidence Code section 353 reinforces that provision: we may not reverse a judgment 'by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . the error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice.'" (Ibid.)
White has failed to meet this standard, or to come anywhere close to meeting it. Accordingly, her first two contentions are rejected. C. "Condoning Drug Use"
In its statement of decision, the court referred to Abruzzise's possible overuse of prescription painkillers as a reason he was suffering from "weakness of mind" at the time the deeds were signed.
White's entire argument in her opening brief on this point consists of the following: "In its on-the-record statement of decision, the trial court appeared to condone [Abruzzise]'s claimed excessive prescription drug use, letting that use stand as an excuse for his presumed lack of awareness of the nature of the quitclaim deed. Furthermore, the trial court presumed that [White] was aware of [Abruzzise]'s diminished state of mind, and used this to her advantage. There is no evidence of this 'fact' in any of the entered pieces of evidence. The trial court seems to have relied solely on [Abruzzise]'s convoluted testimony to reach its conclusion that [White] purposefully defrauded [Abruzzise] . . . . This is an egregious abuse of discretion, since there is overwhelming evidence that [Abruzzise] knew what he was doing, and had purposefully set things up between himself and [White] in order to avoid the tax lien auction of the Property."
White offers no legal argument, and no record citations to the "overwhelming evidence" of Abruzzise's awareness of what was happening. The trial court did not "condone" drug use, but it is a relevant factor in determining whether Abruzzise was aware of the nature of the documents he was signing. Further, the trial court was completely within its discretion to find Abruzzise's testimony on this point credible, which it explicitly did. We do not "reweigh the credibility of witnesses or resolve conflicts in the evidence." (Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 622.)
In her reply brief, while admitting factual determinations that lie with the trial court, White makes the specious, unsupported argument that "the trial court let its emotions influence its factual determinations," because there was "no evidence other than [Abruzzise]'s own self-serving statements that he was mentally impaired." There is nothing in the record that supports White's assertion, and the trial court was fully entitled to find Abruzzise's testimony credible. "As with other facts, the direct testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a finding unless the testimony is physically impossible or its falsity is apparent 'without resorting to inferences or deductions.'" (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 608-609.) Neither applies here. White has failed to show error on this point. D. Attribution of the Forged Document
We caution counsel in the strongest possible terms to avoid inappropriate sexist stereotypes in the future. The implication that a female bench officer's decisions were influenced by "emotions," without any factual basis, has no place in legal discourse.
In its statement of decision, while rejecting Abruzzise's claims for breach of contract and anticipatory breach, the trial court observed that "based on both expert testimony and the testimony of the Parties, perhaps Mr. Hallste[]d, WHITE'S property manager was the culprit [or] author."
In neither her opening nor her reply briefs does White offer a moment's explanation of why or how this comment could possibly have been prejudicial, even assuming it was an abuse of discretion. It was mentioned only in the court's discussion of why Abruzzise had failed to prove his claims for breach of contract and anticipatory breach. The trial court rejected these claims and awarded no damages based on them. Accordingly, White has failed to even suggest, much less establish, prejudice. E. The Basis for the Fraud Claim
White's opening brief includes the following argument: "The actual process for producing such a forged document, and the method for discovering the forgery, are detailed in the expert witness testimony . . . . Despite the detailed information supplied by [the expert], the trial court abused its discretion by basing its determination regarding [White]'s 'fraud' primarily on the contents of the forgery." In her reply brief, White admits she said that the last paragraph of the agreement reflected their agreement. She claims, however, that the court referred to the previous paragraph: "[Abruzzise] to sign, quit claim deed, adding Candice White to property title, so that Candice White can obtain loan as listed in previous step five." She asserts "the court found that she had defrauded [Abruzzise] by luring him into signing a grant deed that was not in compliance with their 'agreement' (the very same document the court had determined was forged). This is another patently absurd determination illustrating the court's abuse of discretion . . . ."
That paragraph stated: "Both parties, Terry-Joe Abruzzise and Candice White, agree that neither party enjoy the privilege of legal familiarity. Despite this understanding, both parties agree that the PRIMARY INTENTION of all efforts associated with this agreement, are dedicated to insuring that [Abruzzise] retain residence, in the [Garden Grove] home, for the remainder of his life, or until he chooses otherwise, either being his sole discretion. If a conflict should occur between either party, or terms involving said parties, [Abruzzise]'s right to inhabit the [Garden Grove] property shall prevail."
The only thing patently absurd here is this argument. The court did not make its findings "primarily on the contents of the forgery" but on the other evidence, including Abruzzise and White's testimony about their actions and intent. The court, as we have mentioned, was free to make the credibility findings it found appropriate. There was no abuse of discretion. F. Hallsted as a Non-Party
This is the entirety of White's next argument in her opening brief: "The trial court abused its discretion when it pointed to Steven Hallsted as the possible source of the forgery, and yet, on two occasions, it refused to allow Mr. Hallsted to be added as a party . . . or to grant a continuance in order to depose Mr. Hallsted . . . ."
First, we point out, this is not a legal argument. "When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived." (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.)
Second, even if this argument were not waived, White would be estopped from making it. She is the one who opposed, on both occasions, a trial continuance to allow Abruzzise to take Hallsted's deposition. She was successful on both occasions. She is estopped from claiming the court erred. (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 181.)
Third, she has failed to establish prejudice regarding this statement for the same reason we discussed ante in section II.D. Even if this comment was an abuse of discretion, White has failed to show its absence would have changed the outcome of the trial in any respect. G. The Parties' "Conflicting Intentions"
White's argument in her opening brief, in its entirety, is on this point: "In its on-the-record statement of decision, the trial court said that 'the court finds that what occurred was fraud in inception' . . . . Then she said 'I think both parties had the intention of trying to help each other in this . . . .' These statements contradict each other, and this constitutes an abuse of discretion."
Her argument on this point in her reply brief seeks to undo the trial court's credibility determinations, claiming that really it was "gullible young" White who was defrauded by a "much older man." We decline to do so. --------
First, these were oral statements, not reflected in the written statement of decision. Second, they are not in conflict. The court set forth at length why it found White had defrauded Abruzzise. In context, the second statement reads: "Certainly this is a very sad case because we're talking about . . . best friends, and it's sad to see - and I think both parties had the intention of trying to help each other in this, and it's very sad that this is where it's gotten to." The court appears to mean that at one point, the parties had good intentions. This does not conflict with the court's earlier statement or anything in the written statement of decision. We find no error. H. The Weight Given to Abruzzise's Testimony
White next asserts the court gave "great weight" to Abruzzise's testimony while "ignoring his many contradictions." She then proceeds to list a number of facts that she believes are contradictory between his testimony in this trial and the first unlawful detainer trial, or in other documents. White then proceeds to argue - nothing. She offers no legal argument at all in her opening brief as to why these supposedly contradictory statements (many of which are entirely immaterial) impugn the trial court's right to find the facts and make credibility decisions. Her argument in her reply brief does manage to cite one case for the proposition that "abuse of discretion equates to lack of evidence," but offers little else. Instead, White asserts the purported contradictions in Abruzzise's testimony "would cause a normal person (or judge) to carefully consider how his testimony differs from that of [hers]."
The statement of decision reflects the trial court carefully considered the testimony of both parties, finding Abruzzise credible on all key points while declining to believe almost every point of import offered by White. White has failed to establish this contravenes the law in any respect, or demonstrates any kind of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. I. Lack of Consideration
White claims the following statement in the statement of decision reflects an abuse of discretion: "[Abruzzise] further proved the deed was signed without consideration, and that because of her undue influence, the real property was worth far greater than what WHITE would contribute." White claims Abruzzise offered no evidence to that effect immediately before stating the court relied on Abruzzise's testimony. But testimony is evidence. There was evidence presented, in the form of Abruzzise's testimony, and the court believed him while rejecting White's version of the facts. The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish a fact. (People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 608-609.) She fails to establish this was error. J. White's "Waste" Argument
White claims that in her closing argument, she "proved up damages for waste" of $71,432.54, and "discussed the options for pleading waste as a result either of [Abruzzise]'s tenancy at will, or in the alternative, as a result of his breach of the conditions of the life estate he alleges." Unfortunately for White, all of this became irrelevant as soon as the trial court decided the deeds were void ab initio. She once again fails to establish error. K. Objections to the Statement of Decision
Finally, White claims the court "completely ignored" her objections and failed to rule on them. This is not reflected by the record, because the court gave leave to Abruzzise to respond to White's objections. White offers no evidence to suggest the court did not in every manner conform to the requirements for reaching a final decision and issuing a judgment. In her reply brief, she asserted her arguments "needed to be heard in open court," but White fails to cite to any request she made to the court to have a hearing on the matter. She cannot complain now that the court failed to hold a hearing that is not required by rule or statute, and which she never requested. We find no error.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Abruzzise is entitled to his costs on appeal.
MOORE, ACTING P. J. WE CONCUR: ARONSON, J. IKOLA, J.