FN40. Collier, supra. FN41. Jackson v. State, 284 Ga.App. 619, 621(2), 644 S.E.2d 491 (2007) (defendant's claim that indictment charging him with eluding police was fatally defective because it did not charge that he was attempting to elude a “pursuing” police officer was not properly before this court because it was not raised before or during trial, nor after conviction in the form of a motion in arrest of judgment or habeas corpus); Seymour v. State, 210 Ga. 21, 77 S.E.2d 519 (1953); Abreu v. State, 206 Ga.App. 361, 363(2), 425 S.E.2d 331 (1992) (if the indictments were void for any reason, the question should have been raised by demurrer before pleading to the merits, or by motion in arrest of judgment after conviction). FN42. Jackson v. State, supra.

Palmer v. State , 282 Ga. 466, 468, 651 S.E.2d 86 (2007). See Abreu v. State , 206 Ga. App. 361, 363 (2), 425 S.E.2d 331 (1992) (prior cases were not controlling because, unlike the case being decided, they did not address the "issue of the proper procedural vehicle" for a particular claim). [A]n extraordinary motion for new trial is not a remedy available to [Patterson] because [he] pled guilty.

Accordingly, Moore did not establish binding precedent with respect to that question. See State v. Outen , 289 Ga. 579, 582, 714 S.E.2d 581 (2011) (although the question at issue may have been before the court in previous cases, those cases did not directly address the question and therefore "no binding precedent was established") (citation and punctuation omitted); Abreu v. State , 206 Ga. App. 361, 363 (2), 425 S.E.2d 331 (1992) (same). See also Gordy Tire Co. v. Dayton Rubber Co. , 216 Ga. 83, 89 (1), 114 S.E.2d 529 (1960) ("[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents") (citations and punctuation omitted).

Parks v. State, 246 Ga.App. 888, 889, 543 S.E.2d 39 (2000); Eubanks, 239 Ga. at 485, 238 S.E.2d 38. A motion for a new trial is not a viable procedural substitute for a motion in arrest of judgment. Abreu v. State, 206 Ga.App. 361, 363, 425 S.E.2d 331 (1992); Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 85, 90 S.E.2d 664 (1955). In Abreu, we found that the issue of whether an indictment was defective could not be considered in the trial court by motion for new trial, and that, because the issue was not properly raised in the trial court, it presented nothing for this Court to review on appeal.

(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Abreu v. State, 206 Ga.App. 361, 363(3), 425 S.E.2d 331 (1992). Thus, venue properly lies in the county wherein Adams attempted to entice Savannah. Based on the allegations of the indictment, venue in this case is not limited to Adams's physical location at the time he used the online service to attempt to entice Savannah. Count 4 of the indictment alleged that Adams:

Nor has Fairwell claimed her trial counsel's performance, as it relates to this claim of error, was compromised such that counsel was ineffective.Jackson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 619, 621 (2) ( 644 SE2d 491) (2007) (defendant's claim that indictment charging him with eluding police was fatally defective because it did not charge that he was attempting to elude a "pursuing" police officer was not properly before this court because it was not raised before or during trial, nor after conviction in the form of a motion in arrest of judgment or habeas corpus); Seymour v. State, 210 Ga. 21 ( 77 SE2d 519) (1953); Abreu v. State, 206 Ga. App. 361, 363 (2) ( 425 SE2d 331) (1992) (if the indictments were void for any reason, the question should have been raised by demurrer before pleading to the merits, or by motion in arrest of judgment after conviction).Jackson, supra.

(Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Abreu v. State, 206 Ga. App. 361, 363 (2) ( 425 SE2d 331) (1992), citing Rucker v. State, 114 Ga. 13, 14 ( 39 SE 902) (1901). (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

(a) A motion in arrest of judgment, made during the same term the judgment was entered, not a motion for new trial, as here, is the proper vehicle to challenge a defective indictment. Kirkland v. State, 282 Ga. App. 331, 334-335 (3) ( 638 SE2d 784) (2006), citing Abreu v. State, 206 Ga. App. 361, 363 (2) ( 425 SE2d 331) (1992). Haupt's failure to challenge the indictment below by a timely filed motion in arrest of judgment, results in waiver on appeal.Kirkland, supra, 282 Ga. App. at 334-335 (3).

Thus, trial counsel's failure to object to the recharge does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, and does not warrant a reversal. See, e.g., Peavy v. State, 262 Ga. 782 (2) ( 425 SE2d 654) (1993); Abreu v. State, 206 Ga. App. 361, 362 (1) ( 425 SE2d 331) (1992). 4. Skaggs-Ferrell next contends that trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to comply with reciprocal discovery precluded him from introducing evidence of Grier's prior convictions.

[Cit.]" Abreu v. State, 206 Ga. App. 361, 363 (2) ( 425 SE2d 331) (1992). This enumeration therefore also must fail.