Opinion
2006-1980 K C.
Decided December 4, 2008.
Appeal and cross appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (George J. Silver, J.), entered June 22, 2006. The order, insofar as appealed from by plaintiff, granted the branch of defendant's motion, pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a), which sought, inter alia, to set aside the jury verdict as excessive, to the extent of granting a new trial on the issue of damages unless plaintiff stipulated to reduce the award to the sum of $125,000. The order, insofar as cross-appealed from by defendant, denied the branch of its motion to set aside the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on the issue of liability and for judgment in its favor as a matter of law or for a new trial, and granted the branch of its motion which sought to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of damages and for a new trial on that issue unless plaintiff stipulated to a substantial reduction in the award, only to the extent of granting a new trial on the issue of damages unless plaintiff stipulated to reduce the award to the sum of $125,000.
Order modified by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of defendant's motion, pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a), which sought, inter alia, to set aside the jury verdict as excessive, to the extent of granting a new trial on the issue of damages for pain and suffering unless plaintiff stipulated to reduce the award for pain and suffering to $125,000, and by substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion; as so modified, order affirmed without costs.
PRESENT: GOLIA, J.P., RIOS and STEINHARDT, JJ.
Plaintiff commenced this action in Supreme Court, Kings County, to recover damages for medical malpractice. The matter was transferred to the Civil Court pursuant to CPLR 325 (d). After a trial, the jury awarded plaintiff the sum of $200,000. Thereafter, defendant moved, pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a), for an order setting aside the jury verdict and for judgment as a matter of law, or, alternatively, for a new trial as to liability, or setting aside the verdict on the issue of damages and for a new trial on that issue unless plaintiff stipulated to a substantial reduction in damages. The Civil Court granted defendant's motion to the extent of setting aside the jury verdict and directing a new trial limited to the issue of damages unless plaintiff stipulated to reduce the award to the sum of $125,000. Plaintiff appeals and argues that the pain and suffering award of $200,000 was well within accepted limits. Defendant cross-appeals and contends that the evidence was legally insufficient, the verdict in favor of plaintiff was against the weight of the evidence and that, in any event, the award, as reduced by the court, deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation.
In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to direct judgment as a matter of law, the court must afford the party opposing the motion every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmovant ( see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556). After reviewing the record and applying the aforementioned standard, we are of the opinion that the evidence at trial provided a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences to support the jury's conclusions. Accordingly, the verdict in favor of plaintiff on the issue of liability was supported by legally sufficient evidence ( see Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499; Courtney v Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., 45 AD3d 801). Moreover, we find that the verdict was based upon a fair interpretation of the evidence presented to the jury, and therefore was not against the weight of the evidence ( see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744; Harris v Marlow, 18 AD3d 608, 610; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129). Thus, the court properly denied the branch of defendant's motion which sought to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of liability.
However, we are of the opinion that the award of $200,000 for pain and suffering was not excessive since it did not materially deviate from what would be reasonable compensation ( see CPLR 5501 [c]; Bennett v Henry, 39 AD3d 575, 576; Williams v Pelican Pest Control, Inc., 11 AD3d 454; Weldon v Beal, 272 AD2d 321). Thus, the lower court improvidently exercised its discretion by granting the branch of defendant's motion which sought, inter alia, to set aside the jury verdict as excessive to the extent of granting a new trial on the issue of damages unless plaintiff stipulated to reduce the award to the sum of $125,000. Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branch of defendant's motion which sought to set aside the jury verdict as excessive is denied.
Golia, J.P., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.