Opinion
C. A. 7:24-cv-00047-DCC-KFM
05-29-2024
Demurice Abrams, Plaintiff, v. Chuck Wright, Chindar Ryant, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
ALLEGATIONS
This is a § 1983 action filed the plaintiff, involving his time as a pretrial detainee at the Spartanburg County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”) (doc. 1). Of note, the plaintiff's claims appear to involve a charge for assault and battery high and aggravated in the Spartanburg County General Sessions Court. See Spartanburg County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2018A4210204083) (last visited January 24, 2024). The charge was indicted on September 20, 2019, and later nolle prossed. Id.
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff alleges that he was a pretrial detainee and was falsely imprisoned for a “false charge of assault” (doc. 1 at 4). The plaintiff indicates that in October 2018, he was illegally blamed for an assault of which he had no part (id. at 5). He contends that another individual was charged for the assault and found guilty (id.). The plaintiff asserts no injuries other than false imprisonment (id. at 6). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Screening Authority
There are two statutes that govern screening of pro se filings in this court: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915; 1915A. Section 1915 provides screening authority for cases filed in forma pauperis and Section 1915A provides screening authority for cases filed by prisoners. Here, the plaintiff's complaint is not subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because the plaintiff has paid the full filing fee (doc. 5). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this court is charged with screening lawsuits filed by prisoners seeking “redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Here, it is unclear whether the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c) for purposes of this action. For example, the plaintiff's complaint form, signed December 7, 2023, identifies him as a pretrial detainee and has a return address of the Rutherfordton County Detention Center (doc. 1 at 2, 12). However, based on the receipt of a letter from the plaintiff with his complaint, at some point after signing the complaint and before mailing the complaint for filing, the plaintiff was released from pretrial detention (see doc. 1-1). In any event, as recognized by another court in this circuit, screening under § 1915A may still be appropriate because the plaintiff identified himself as a pretrial detainee in his complaint and his claims involve his capacity as a pretrial detainee (albeit during a prior incarceration) (see doc. 1). Johnson v. Hill, 965 F.Supp. 1487, 1488 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1997) (recognizing that screening of released prisoner under § 1915A was appropriate based on the contents of the lawsuit as well as based on “a goal underlying the statute: to control the flood of litigation brought against the country's prison systems”).
Nevertheless, even presuming that the plaintiff is not a prisoner for purposes of screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this court possesses the inherent authority to review the pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (“Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (finding that “frivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.” (citations omitted)); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that “district courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee”). Accordingly, “[t]he present Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous.” Trawick v. Med. Univ. of S.C., C/A No. 2:16-cv-730-DCN-MGB, 2016 WL 8650132, at *4 (D.S.C. June 28, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 8650131 (D.S.C. July 7, 2016), aff'd 671 Fed.Appx. 85 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem).
Here, as outlined below, the instant matter is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court. In reviewing a complaint for frivolousness or malice, the court looks to see whether the complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory. Harley v. United States, 349 F.Supp.2d 980, 981 (M.D. N.C. 2004) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)). Section 1983 actions premised on malicious prosecution, false arrest, and/or false imprisonment are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
Of note, the plaintiff's claims are untimely. While a statute of limitations is not contained within the text of § 1983, the Supreme Court has determined that a state's general statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies, even if the state has different statutes of limitation for intentional torts. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989) (noting that “we accordingly hold that where state law provides multiple statutes of limitation for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions”). South Carolina law allows three years for a plaintiff to bring a personal injury action. S.C. Code § 15-3-530(5). Therefore, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in South Carolina is three years, regardless of the underlying allegations. See Hamilton v. Middleton, C/A No. 4:02-cv-01952-23, 2003 WL 23851098, at *4 (D.S.C. June 20, 2003). Here, construing the filing date in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's complaint was filed December 7, 2023, the date the plaintiff signed his complaint (doc. 1 at 12). However, the events described in the plaintiff's complaint occurred in 2018 (2019 at the latest) - meaning the plaintiff's claims in this action are time-barred.
However, “an indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)); see also Provet v. South Carolina, et al., C/A No. 6:07-cv-001094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (section 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded because of indictment). This Court, as noted above, has taken judicial notice of the plaintiff's Spartanburg County General Sessions Court proceedings, including a grand jury indictment in that proceeding. See Spartanburg County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2018A4210204083) (last visited January 24, 2024). The indictment acts as a bar to the plaintiff's claim; as such, this matter is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).