Thus, the jury's decision was not in conflict with Garrett by Garrett v. Moyston, 562 A.2d 386 (Pa.Commw. 1989). Nor was it in conflict with Abernant v. Wilkes Barre School District, 492 A.2d 1186 (Pa.Commw. 1985), in which we held a school bus with lights flashing was not a "traffic control device." We stated that a school bus could not be characterized as a device and noted that "school bus" was given a distinct and specific definition of its own in Section 102 of Vehicle Code.
Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118, 1123 (1987) (citing Casey v. Geiger, 346 Pa. Super. 279, 499 A.2d 606 (1985)); Wellons v. SEPTA, 141 Pa.Cmwlth. 622, 596 A.2d 1169, 1170 (1991) (citing Snyder v. Harmon, 522 Pa. 424, 562 A.2d 307 (1989)). See also Aberant v. Wilkes-Barre Area School Dist., 89 Pa.Cmwlth. 516, 492 A.2d 1186, 1188 (1985) (holding that a school bus with lights flashing did not constitute a traffic control). Thus, for all the above reasons, we hold that section (b)(4) of the Act does not apply to this situation, and therefore, defendants are immune from suit for negligence by plaintiffs.
The Pennsylvania Courts which have addressed this issue have stated that the enumerated exceptions are to be narrowly construed. Casey v. Geiger, 346 Pa. Super. 279, 499 A.2d 606 (1985); Aberant v. Wilkes-Barre Area School District, 89 Pa. Cmwlth. 516, 492 A.2d 1186 (1985); Vann v. Board of Education of School District of Philadelphia, 76 Pa.Cmwlth. 604, 464 A.2d 684 (1983). Clearly, then, when read into the facts of the instant case, the statutory waiver of immunity in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8542(b)(2) reaches only to damages occurring to the deed itself, and not to the attendant property rights associated therewith.
The lights are a part of the vehicle and not a traffic control signal. Aberant v. Wilkes–Barre Area Sch. Dist., 89 Pa.Cmwlth. 516, 492 A.2d 1186, 1188 (1985) (footnotes omitted). We apply the same analysis to a parked CWA truck with an activated strobe light.
See also Miseo v. Ross Township Police Department, 147 Pa. Commw. 263, 607 A.2d 806 (1992) (flare is not an official traffic control device because it does not specify any particular action which a driver must perform). Similarly, in Aberant v. Wilkes-Barre Area School District, 89 Pa. Commw. 516, 492 A.2d 1186 (1985), we concluded that a school bus, stopped with lights flashing, was not a traffic control signal, as defined in Section 102 of the Vehicle Code. Noting that although a school bus may, at times, direct traffic to stop, we concluded that it is not "a device" by which traffic is alternately directed to stop or proceed. Accordingly, we held that the school bus was not a traffic control within the meaning of the Section 8542 (b)(4) exception.
Unfortunate as it may seem, the fact that the Board did not comply with legislatively enacted duties is immaterial when the clear language of the Code provides the Board with immunity from suit. Aberant v.Wilkes-Barre Area School District, 89 Pa. Commw. 516, 492 A.2d 1186 (1985). Even though this hampers the legislative intent to protect school children, the unambiguous language of a statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.