Summary
dismissing earlier version of complaint and noting that it attempted to raise RICO and fraud claims
Summary of this case from Abellan v. World Sav. BankOpinion
No. C 08-00252 SI.
February 28, 2008
ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
Now before the Court are plaintiff's complaints and application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"), filed on January 14, 2008. For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiff's IFP application and DISMISSES plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Rizalina Abellan has filed a complaint against the Superior Court of California, an attorney who opposed her interests in a prior state court proceeding, her brother, Roseller Abellan, the Sheriff's Department of San Francisco, Farmers Insurance, and an individual named Phoebe Kwong. Following the filing of her original complaint, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on February 2, 2008, and more recently filed a second amended complaint on February 20, 2008. Plaintiff appears to be suing these defendants in an attempt to appeal an unfavorable state court ruling. Plaintiff's various complaints mention claims for fraud, obstruction of justice, attorney malpractice, civil RICO, Title VII, and possibly other statutes, though it is unclear what plaintiff's complaints actually allege. What is clear is that plaintiff takes issue with the state court's handling of her prior lawsuits. The factual circumstances that led plaintiff to file this lawsuit cannot be discerned from the unintelligible papers she has filed thus far.
LEGAL STANDARD
IFP applications are reviewed under a two-part analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This analysis looks first to whether a plaintiff meets the requisite financial status to be permitted to proceed in federal court without first paying a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The second stage of the analysis examines a plaintiff's complaint to ensure that it states cognizable, non-frivolous claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). The Court may, "at any time," dismiss an IFP claim if it determines that "the allegation of poverty is untrue," or the complaint "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Cato v. United States, 70 F. 3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that a court may dismiss an action under § 1915 if the "complaint neither identifies any constitutional or statutory right that was violated nor asserts any basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction . . .").
Courts treat the second prong of the analysis similarly to a motion to dismiss filed by a defendant. If it is "clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the [plaintiff's] allegations," then it is proper to dismiss an IFP. See Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying standard of review for motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). Also similar to a motion to dismiss, all material allegations in an IFP complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See NL Ind., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). A pro se litigant bringing an IFP suit is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome any deficiency unless it is clear that no amendment could cure the defect. See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1106.
DISCUSSION
The first stage of IFP analysis requires that a plaintiff file an affidavit describing the totality of the plaintiff's assets and stating that the plaintiff is unable to pay the required fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Plaintiff has filed such an affidavit, indicating that she is retired, receives a monthly pension of $1550, and that her only significant assets are a 1986 BMW vehicle. Although plaintiff's affidavit does not quantify her monthly living expenses, it does indicate that she pays about $500 per month to creditors and has two children whom she supports. Assuming that plaintiff is being truthful in her IFP application, plaintiff is within the parameters necessary to grant an IFP application due to her low monthly income, prior debts, and lack of assets. Accordingly, her application to proceed without the payment of a filing fee is GRANTED.
The Court's grant of plaintiff's IFP application does not mean, however, that she may continue to prosecute his complaint. The Court may review "at any time" plaintiff's complaint to determine whether it states a cognizable cause of action against defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Plaintiff's complaints, all of which are entirely distinct in content yet uniform in their lack of clarity, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and are frivolous. It is unclear what causes of action plaintiff seeks to present to the Court and what facts underlie these causes of action. It appears plaintiff's chief concern is the way the state courts have handled plaintiff's prior lawsuits. To the extent plaintiff seeks review of a state court order, the Court informs plaintiff that she may not file suit in federal court as an alternative to appeal from a judgment of a state court. Federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, may not review the final determinations of a state court. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) (district courts may not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state courts); Doe Assoc. v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2001); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1998). This is so even when the state court judgment is not made by the highest state court, see Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986), and when federal constitutional issues are at stake, see Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995); Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1995). This rule is referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
In addition, it is unclear from plaintiff's complaints whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction over her suit. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and cannot hear every dispute presented by litigants. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Federal courts may only adjudicate cases which the Constitution or Congress authorize them to adjudicate: (1) those cases involving diversity of citizenship (where all plaintiffs are from different states from all defendants and the amount in controversy is at least $75,000), see 28 U.S.C. § 1332; (2) those cases raising a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) those cases to which the United States is a party, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346. Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil cases and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
Plaintiff's complaints indicate that this court may not exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because there is not complete diversity between plaintiff, a California resident, and the other California defendants. In addition, although plaintiff's complaints mention, at times, various federal statutes such as Title VII and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), it is impossible to determine why plaintiff is bringing these federal claims, against whom she is bringing them, and what facts support the claims. Indeed, it appears that plaintiff primarily pleads state law causes of action against the various defendants, such as fraud, malpractice, violation of state insurance laws, and breach of contract. Thus, plaintiff's complaints must also be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In sum, because plaintiff is seeking judicial review of a state court determination, and because plaintiff has not demonstrated that this Court may exercise its jurisdiction over her claims, plaintiffs' complaints are DISMISSED. Although plaintiff has now filed three complaints, none of which have made the contours or details of her case any clearer, the Court will grant plaintiff one additional opportunity to amend her complaint. In addition, to the extent plaintiff's filing of a second amended complaint may be construed as a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, the Court GRANTS plaintiff leave to file the second amended complaint, but notes that it does nothing to save her prior complaints from dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS plaintiff's request to proceed IFP [Docket No. 3] and GRANTS plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint [Docket No. 12]. The Court also DISMISSES plaintiff's complaints WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. If plaintiff chooses to amend her complaint, she must file the amended complaint no later than March 14, 2008.