, 13 S.E.2d 1. As to the Plaintiff's assumingthe risk of the consequences of his conduct thereby relievingthis Defendant of any responsibility and thereby barring recovery: 255 S.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 475; 233 S.C. 20, 103 S.E.2d 395; 172 Mass. 106, 51 N.E. 521; 187 So. 138; Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Negligence (Vol. V., p. 754, sec. 6296. Herbert W. Louthian, Esq., of Louthian Merritt, Columbia, for Respondent, cites: As to the exceptions of Appellants'being dismissed upon the ground that the exceptionsfail to comply with Rule 4, Section 6, of the SouthCarolina Supreme Court Rules in that they do not consist ofa concise statement of one proposition of law or fact and inthat they are long or argumentative in form: 118 S.C. 300, 110 S.E. 152. As to the evidence being sufficient to submitto the jury the matter of whether or not the Defendants L.A.Barrier and Sons and Sloan Construction Company, Inc.were guilty of actionable negligence or breach of any dutyowed to the Plaintiff: 244 S.C. 508, 137 S.E.2d 604; 260 S.C. 271, 195 S.E.2d 610; 231 S.C. 516, 99 S.E.2d 181; 15 A.L.R.2d 163; 197 S.C. 66, 14 S.E.2d 552; Section 33-491, South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962; § 46-251, South Carolina Code of Laws, as amended, (1962); 239 S.C. 25, 121 S.E.2d 289; 39 Am. Jur.2d Highways, Streets and Bridges, § 363; Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts, § 70; 94 Ga. App. 361, 94 S.E.2d 503. As to the Plaintiff's not being barred from recovery asa matter of law: 244 S.C. 508, 137 S.E.2d 604; 231 S.C. 516, 99 S.E.2d 181; 260 S.C. 271, 195 S.E.2d 610; 225 S.C. 80, 815 S.E.2d 32; 65 A.C.J.S. Negligence § 118 (3); 273 N.C. 592, 160 S.E.2d 692; 248 S.C. 365, 150 S.E.2d 79. As to the plaintiff's nothaving assumed the risk of the consequences of his conductthereby relieving Defendants of any responsibility and therebybarring recovery by him as a matter of law: 65 A.C.J.S., Negligence, § 174 (3); 164 Cal.App.2d 612, 331 P.2d 107; Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed. p. 203; 237 N.W.2d 620. November 9, 1976.

Messrs. Francis C. Jones, of Lexington, F. Dean Rainey, of Greenville, and John Gregg McMaster, and Robert J.Thomas, of Columbia, for Appellant, cite: As to the evidencefailing to establish any actionable negligence on thepart of Appellant: 238 S.C. 27, 118 S.E.2d 880; 106 S.C. 123, 90 S.E. 260; 195 S.C. 238, 11 S.E.2d 275; 24 A.L.R.2d 1201; 179 S.C. 493, 194 S.E. 96; 213 S.C. 413, 49 S.E.2d 725; 246 S.C. 470, 144 S.E.2d 220; 244 S.C. 508, 137 S.E.2d 604. As to itbeing error to instruct the jury "* * * it's undisputedhere that the plaintiff was a passenger in this car. * * *": 234 S.C. 291, 108 S.E.2d 86; 218 S.C. 537, 63 S.E.2d 478.

Messrs. Fulmer, Barnes, Berry Austin, of Columbia, for Appellant, cite: As to there being error in the TrialJudge's refusal of Appellant's motion for nonsuit, directedverdict and judgment N.O.V. upon the grounds that Plaintiffwas, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence: 244 S.C. 508, 137 S.E.2d 604. As to if the verdictswere so inconsistent as to necessitate a new trial in thehusband's case, it was error for the trial court to refuse togrant a new trial in the wife's case: 3 N.J. Misc. 1006, 130 A. 444; 140 A. 248, 6 N.J. Misc. 145; 12 N.J. 71, 95 A.2d 705, 36 A.L.R.2d 1330; 28 Misc.2d 694, 208 N.Y.S.2d 186; 199 Tenn. 352, 287 S.W.2d 16; 167 Pa. Super. 62, 74 A.2d 529; 89 C.J.S., Trial, Sec. 562; 108 So.2d 67; 85 A.L.R.2d 53; 134 N.W.2d 549; 61 Mont. 497, 204 P. 485; 16 A.L.R.2d 969; 66 C.J.S., New Trial, Secs. 66, 77 (a); 131 S.C. 488, 127 S.E. 565. Messrs. Isadore Lourie and Henry Hammer, of Columbia, for Respondents, cite: As to in the wife's case, the TrialJudge properly denied the defendant's motion for judgmentn.o.v. made upon the ground that the wife was contributorilynegligent as a matter of law: 244 S.C. 508, 137 S.E.2d 604; 59 F. Supp. 613, aff. 149 F.2d 934; 372 F.2d 286. As to in the wife's case, the Trial Judgeproperly refused defendant's motion for a new trial mad

) 26 N.W.2d 355. Messrs. Carter Hill, of Greenville, for Respondent, cite: As to there being a reasonable inference of negligenceon the part of Appellant, that was a proximate cause ofRespondent's injuries, requiring the trial Judge to submitthe issue to the jury: 244 S.C. 508, 137 S.E.2d 604; 240 S.C. 46, 124 S.E.2d 580; 194 Va. 572, 74 S.E.2d 57; (Fla.) 163 So.2d 603; 106 Cal.App.2d 798, 236 P.2d 216; 303 F.2d 61; 11 Conn. 684, 165 A. 522; 267 Mass. 217, 166 N.E. 562, 28 N.C.C.A. 526. As to the issue contributory negligence being properlysubmitted to the jury: 128 N.J.L. 527, 27 A.2d 129; 30 A.2d 503; 132 S.E.2d 385, 243 S.C. 132; 91 S.E.2d 161; 224 S.C. 477, 80 S.E.2d 51; 188 S.C. 408, 199 S.E. 525; 84 S.C. 202, 65 S.E. 1053; 221 Pa. 25, 69 A. 1124, 21 L.R.A., N.S., 464; (Mo.App.) 202 S.W.2d 87; 303 Fed. 61; 15 F.2d 166, 48 A.L.R. 1420; 179 Va. 147, 18 S.E.2d 270.

Henry Busbee, Frampton W. Toole, Jr., and Toole Toole, all of Aiken, for Appellant, cite: As to erroron part of trial Judge in refusing Appellant's motions forjudgment in its favor on the ground that Respondent failedto prove that her injuries were not brought about by her ownnegligence, and that she did not negligently contribute thereto: 58 S.C. 413, 36 S.E. 661; 104 S.C. 228, 88 S.E. 463; 169 S.C. 403, 169 S.E. 84; 187 S.C. 414, 198 S.E. 45; 178 S.C. 323, 183 S.E. 8; 197 S.C. 66, 14 S.E.2d 552; 231 S.C. 516, 99 S.E.2d 181; 225 S.C. 528, 83 S.E.2d 166. As to in a case of this type, strict compliancewith the Statute is required: 180 S.C. 536, 186 S.E. 535; 231 S.C. 68, 48 S.E.2d 585. Messrs. Benjamin Surasky, Robert E. Johnson and Williams Johnson, all of Aiken, for Respondent, cite: As toTrial Judge properly submitting instant case to the jury: 244 S.C. 508, 137 S.E.2d 604; 188 S.C. 408, 199 S.E. 525; 231 S.C. 516, 99 S.E.2d 181; 225 S.C. 253, 81 S.E.2d 788; 234 S.C. 291, 108 S.E.2d 86; 197 S.C. 66, 14 S.E.2d 552; 169 S.C. 403, 169 S.E. 84; 187 S.C. 322, 197 S.E. 823; (S.C.) 135 S.E.2d 838. As toduty on a municipality to keep its streets in reasonably safecondition for public use and, to that end, it must use ordinarycare and reasonable diligence in the inspection and supervisionof its streets: 197 S.C. 66, 14 S.E.2d 552; 169 S.C. 403, 169 S.E. 84; 231 S.C. 516, 99 S.E.2d 181. April 8, 1965.

Advisory decisions of other jurisdictions are also factually distinguishable from this case. Abeles v. The Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Company (1964), 244 S.C. 508 ( 137 S.E.2d 604), involved an injury occasioned in the same type of area as involved in the present matter. However, the tenor of the opinion implies the land was privately owned by the defendant and, consequently, part of the supermarket premises.

Although the operator of a parking lot is not an insurer of the safety of those who use the lot, reasonable care must be used by the operator to keep the premises used by invitees in a reasonably safe condition. Felder, supra;Moore v. Levitre, 294 S.C. 453, 365 S.E.2d 730 (1988); Abeles v. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co., 244 S.C. 508, 137 S.E.2d 604 (1964); Bruno v. Pendlton Realty Co., 240 S.C. 46, 124 S.E.2d 580 (1962). The degree of care required must be commensurate with the particular circumstances involved, including the age and capacity of the invitee.

Although the operator of a parking lot is not an insurer of the safety of those who use the lot, reasonable care must be used by the operator to keep the premises used by invitees in a reasonably safe condition. Felder, supra;Moore v. Levitre, 294 S.C. 453, 365 S.E.2d 730 (1988); Abelesv. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co., 244 S.C. 508, 137 S.E.2d 604 (1964); Bruno v. Pendleton Realty Co., 240 S.C. 46, 124 S.E.2d 580 (1962). The degree of care required must be commensurate with the particular circumstances involved, including the age and capacity of the invitee.

It is well settled that respondent, while not an insurer, owed the plaintiff the duty of exercising ordinary care to keep the path or walkway in question in a reasonably safe condition for use by the public. Bruno v. Pendleton RealtyCo., Inc., 240 S.C. 46, 124 S.E.2d 580; Abeles v. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co., 244 S.C. 508, 137 S.E.2d 604; Coker v.Piggly Wiggly of Darlington, 274 S.C. 55, 261 S.E.2d 699. The questions of actionable negligence or recklessness and contributory negligence or recklessness presented disputed factual issues which should have been submitted to the jury for determination. It is inferable that the porous, light colored oyster shell path obscured the presence of underlying water which had accumulated from a leaking hose placed there by respondent's agents and that the walkway was made less firm by the wet condition.

1967); 17 S.C. Code Ann., Rules and Regulations, § 23 at 451 (1962). Messrs. Doyle, and Palmer, of Anderson, for Respondent, cite: As to the evidence establishing, by the greater weight,the breach of a duty owed by Appellant to Respondent thatwas a proximate cause of damages sustained by Respondent: 260 S.C. 271, 195 S.E.2d 610; 244 S.C. 508, 137 S.E.2d 604; 232 S.C. 139, 101 S.E.2d 262; 261 S.C. 292, 199 S.E.2d 766; 225 S.C. 253, 81 S.E.2d 788; 198 S.C. 173, 17 S.E.2d 150. As to under the commonlaw of South Carolina, the Appellant owed the Respondenta duty of due care; that the Appellant breached the duty;and that the Respondent was, under ordinary negligencestandards, entitled to maintain a cause of action against theAppellant in tort: 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173; 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875; 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385; 88 Ga. App. 252, 76 S.E.2d 536; 218 S.C. 155, 62 S.E.2d 109; 253 S.C. 537, 172 S.E.2d 120; 57 Am. Jur.2d Negligence, Section 47: Restatement. Torts 2d, Section 323. Messrs. Watkins, Vandiver, Kirven, Long Gable, of Anderson, for Appellant, in Reply.