A judgment of bail forfeiture is as free from collateral attack as are other judgments. Authorities in support of the statements just made will be found collected in the footnote at 6 C.J., Bail, p. 1049. We shall refer to only two of them. From Abel v. State of Oklahoma, 79 Okla. 282 ( 193 P. 969, 20 A.L.R. 589): "The rule is well established that, where the court forfeiting an appearance bond has jurisdiction to declare a forfeiture, such forfeiture is conclusive evidence of its breach, and cannot be impeached by extrinsic evidence." From State v. Morgan, 136 N.C. 593 ( 48 S.E. 604), we quote:

"Now, if the said Richard E. Finch shall well and truly make his personal appearance before said court at its next term, to be begun and holden at the Court House of said County of Stephens, in the City of Duncan, on 1-2-67 and there remain from day to day, and term to term of said Court until discharged by due course of law, then and there to answer said accusation against him, this obligation shall become void. Otherwise to remain in full force and effect." The surety involved in the case of Abel et al. v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Saye, County Attorney (1920), 79 Okla. 282, 193 P. 969, made substantially the same argument concerning substantially the same situation and a substantially similar appearance bond. The conditions of the bond involved in that case are stated in the second paragraph of the court's syllabus, wherein it is held:

This court reversed a later judgment for plaintiff upon the forfeited bond, citing Rev. Laws 1910, Sec. 5963, to the general effect that after judgment and sentence, the defendant "* * * must be forthwith committed to the custody of the proper officer" (emphasis supplied). It should be noted that Sec. 5963 was repealed in 1913, and the rule set out in State ex rel. Vigg v. Romaine, supra, is no longer the law in this jurisdiction. See the later case of Able v. State ex rel. Saye, 79 Okla. 282, 193 P. 969, 20 A.L.R. 589. Defendant quotes from the cited case, State ex rel. Vigg v. Romaine, supra, in part, as follows:

Zellers v. Huff, 57 N.M. 609, 611, 261 P.2d 643; State v. Morris, 69 N.M. 89, 364 P.2d 348. See also, Ables v. State, 79 Okla. 282, 193 P. 969, 20 A.L.R. 589; State v. Radcliffe, 242 Iowa 572, 44 N.W.2d 646, 47 N.W.2d 175; Suit v. State, 212 Ark. 584, 207 S.W.2d 315 and cases cited therein. See also, State v. Mouch 1910, 174 Ind. 125, 91 N.E. 502.

Nevertheless this court affirmed the judgment of the lower court holding that the sureties were liable, and that the tardy appearance of the accused was not a defense to be interposed by his bondsmen. In Ables et al. v. State ex rel. Saye, 79 Okla. 282, 193 P. 969, the accused appeared on time, attended the trial, and was convicted. He was ordered to appear for sentence on a certain date, but failed to do so.

Under these circumstances there was clearly a default of the conditions of the bond and they must answer in the penalty thereof. In this connection see Abel v. State, 79 Okla. 282, 193 P. 969, 20 A.L.R. 589, and authorities cited in the note at page 594, et seq. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Had this showing been made to the county court on the application of defendant Kabetzke to set aside the forfeiture, the court would, no doubt, have released said surety. It is well settled, according to the contention of plaintiff, that the forfeiture of the bond by the county court was conclusive evidence of its breach and cannot be impeached by extrinsic evidence (Abel et al. v. State ex rel. Saye, 79 Okla. 282, 193 P. 969), or cannot be collaterally attacked in a subsequent action against the principal and sureties in the bond (state ex rel. Hankin v. Holt et al., 42 Okla. 472, 141 P. 969). In Melton v. State, 46 Okla. 487, 149 P. 154, it is said:

Section 6110, Rev. Laws 1910, provides for the forfeiture of bail and the procedure whereby and the time within which a forfeiture may be set aside, and this court has repeatedly held that after a court has decreed a forfeiture and the term of that court at which the forfeiture has been taken has expired, the final order of the trial court declaring such forfeiture cannot be collaterally attacked in subsequent proceedings against the sureties on the bond. Ables v. State, 79 Okla. 282, 193 P. 969; Andrews v. State ex rel. Saye, 80 Okla. 20, 193 P. 873; State v. Hines, 37 Okla. 198, 131 P. 688; Hines v. State, 39 Okla. 638, 136 P. 592; Edwards v. State, 39 Okla. 605, 136, Pac. 577; State v. Pierce, 65 Okla. 212, 166 P. 132; State v. Holt, 42 Okla. 472, 141 P. 969. The plaintiffs in error seek to escape the force of the rule announced and insist that the situation disclosed by the record was such as to bring this case within the class of cases wherein a court of equity is warranted in relieving against a judgment of forfeiture on one of the well-recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction, viz., unavoidable surprise or misfortune superinduced by the acts of the county attorney which, while not intended as a fraud, yet did actually operate as a "legal" fraud upon the principal and his bondsmen, and while counsel do not in any way impugn the personal motives or character of the county attorney, they contend that by his acts he was guilty of actual fraud in a legal sense, even thoug