In fact, each of the cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their rebuttal evidence turned on sworn submissions by treating physicians or other medical experts. See Abedin v. Tynika Motors, 719 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (2d Dep't 2001) (affirmation of treating orthopedist); McVey v. Collins, 692 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (2d Dep't 1999) (affidavit of treating chiropractor); Livai v. Amoroso, 658 N.Y.S.2d 973 (2d Dep't 1997) (affirmation of treating physician);Risbrook v. Coronamos Cab Corp., 664 N.Y.S. 2d 75, 76 (affidavit of treating physician).CONCLUSION

These findings are sufficient to raise a question of material fact with respect to whether plaintiffs sustained serious injuries. See, e.g., Toure, 98 N.Y.2d at 350, 774 N.E.2d at 1200 ("a numeric percentage of a plaintiff's loss of range of motion can be used to substantiate a claim of serious injury"); Abedin v. Tynika Motors, 279 A.D.2d 595, 719 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (2d Dep't 2001) (holding that treating orthopedist's affirmation, based upon a recent examination of plaintiff, attesting to quantifiable limitations in motion in the cervical and lumbar spine was sufficient to defeat summary judgment); Rand, 2007 WL 1351751, at *12 ("[W]hile there is no set percentage for determining whether a limitation in range of motion is sufficient to establish `serious injury,' the cases have generally found that a limitation of twenty percent or more is significant for summary judgment purposes." (quoting Hodder v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 2d 335, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2004))).

The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale (see CPLR 5501[a][1] ). We agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting the plaintiff's motion, denominated as one to reargue, but which was, in actuality, to vacate so much of the June 1, 2017 order, as, sua sponte, directed cancellation of the notice of pendency filed against the subject property, discharged the referee, and, in effect, granted the defendants leave to serve and file an answer within 30 days of entry of the order (see generallyLaSalle Bank N.A. v. Lopez, 168 A.D.3d 697, 700, 91 N.Y.S.3d 259 ; Abedin v. Tynika Motors, Inc., 279 A.D.2d 595, 596, 719 N.Y.S.2d 698 ). While the court should not have, sua sponte, vacated so much of the June 1, 2017 order as granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was to vacate a prior order entered May 10, 2016, this determination was rendered academic when the court thereafter vacated the May 10, 2016 order. In addition, the Supreme Court, in effect, providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was, in effect, to vacate their default in answering the complaint because the defendants failed to provide a reasonable excuse for their default (seeU.S. Bank N.A. v. Crawford, 174 A.D.3d 762, 763, 105 N.Y.S.3d 536 ; Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Besemer, 131 A.D.3d 1047, 1049, 16 N.Y.S.3d 819 ).

In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff, inter alia, submitted magnetic resonance imaging (hereinafter MRI) reports taken approximately two months after the accident which revealed disc bulges in the cervical and lumbar portions of her spine. She also submitted an affirmation from a physician, and a medical report from another physician, which quantified restrictions in the range of motion of the plaintiff's cervical and lumbar spine based on both initial and recent examinations (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345; Abedin v. Tynika Motors, 279 A.D.2d 595; Moreno v. Delcid, 262 A.D.2d 464, 465). The unsworn medical report of one of the physicians and the MRI reports were initially relied upon by the defendants, and were therefore properly before the court (see Raso v. Statewide Auto Auction, 262 A.D.2d 387). These submissions were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff sustained a permanent or consequential limitation of the use of her cervical and lumbar spine (see Jacobowitz v. Roventini, 302 A.D.2d 432 [2d Dept., Feb. 10, 2003]).

The IAS court thereafter denied Labendz's motion, granted Vinder summary judgment and, sua sponte, dismissed Labendz's cross claims against Vinderboim. While a court may deny a party's motion for summary judgment and yet search the record to grant summary judgment to the non-moving party on the same issue, summary judgment may not be granted sua sponte with respect to a separate issue which was not addressed by any party (see City Wide Payroll Service, Inc. v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, 239 A.D.2d 537, 538; Abedin v. Tynika Motors, Inc., 279 A.D.2d 595, 596;Andriano v. Caronia, 117 A.D.2d 640). There was no motion for summary judgment by any party relating to the merits of the cross claims against Vinderboim. The issues related to Vinder's claims and the counterclaim by Labendz were independent of and separate from the cross claims and, accordingly, should have been left unresolved since it was premature to resolve them (see Aguirre v. Castle American Construction, L.L.C., 278 A.D.2d 348). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

The plaintiff gave a reasonable excuse for his delay in answering the motion for summary judgment ( see, Matter of Kaufman v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 210 A.D.2d 226). Furthermore, the plaintiff demonstrated that he has a meritorious cause of action ( see, Abedin v. Tynika Motors, 279 A.D.2d 595; Martin v. JL Distribs., 274 A.D.2d 420; Moreno v. Delcid, 262 A.D.2d 464; Petrone v. Thornton, 166 A.D.2d 513). SANTUCCI, J.P., ALTMAN, FLORIO, H. MILLER and COZIER, JJ., concur.