We give "substantial deference" to the State Department's interpretation of a treaty, and in the context of diplomatic immunity, the receiving state always has had "broad discretion to classify diplomats." Abdulaziz v. Metropolitan Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1984). Moreover, and perhaps most important, Al-Hamdi has failed to show how the State Department's interpretation violates the dictates of the Vienna Convention or infringes upon the Convention's purpose of "ensur[ing] the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States."

This view is also uniformly maintained by our sister circuits. See, e.g. , United States v. Al-Hamdi , 356 F.3d 564, 568, 573 (4th Cir. 2004) ; Abdulaziz v. Met. Dade County , 741 F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1984) ; United States v. Lumumba , 741 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[R]ecognition by the executive branch—not to be second-guessed by the judiciary—is essential to establishing diplomatic status."). In litigation implicating the status of diplomats, the courts and the Executive have developed a practice in which the Executive submits a certification of a diplomat's status to the court.

Although some have asserted that the State Department's decisions are reviewable by the courts, "the courts have generally accepted as conclusive the views of the State Department as to the fact of diplomatic status." Abdulaziz v. Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1984). But see Vulcan Iron Works, Inc. v. Polish American Machinery Corp., 479 F. Supp. 1060, 1067-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (the State Department's discretion to accept or deny notification of diplomatic status is not unlimited).

Even assuming Plaintiff is correct, “[t]he weight of relevant caselaw favors finding that if international officers acquire immunity during the pendency of a suit, the suit must be dismissed.” Zuza v. Office of High Representative, 14-01099 (RC), 2016 WL 447442, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2016) (citing Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 741 F.2d 1328, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that diplomatic immunity “serves as a defense to suits already commenced”)) (additional citations omitted). The Court concludes that the certification filed by Defendant confirms the State Department's position that Defendant's status as a Principal Resident Representative to the IMF entitles him to diplomatic immunity.

In support, the Government cites to the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade Cty. that "once the United States Department of State has regularly certified a visitor to this country as having diplomatic status, the courts are bound to accept that determination, and that the diplomatic immunity flowing from that status serves as a defense to suits." 741 F.2d 1328, 1329–30 (11th Cir.1984). However, unlike Abdulaziz and the other diplomatic immunity cases in the criminal, tort, and family-law context cited by the Government, the instant Motion does not concern Petitioner's current or future immunity suit.

See, e.g., In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 421, 10 S.Ct. 854, 34 L.Ed. 222 (1890) (noting that “the certificate of the Secretary of State ... is the best evidence to prove the diplomatic character of a person....”); United States v. Al–Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 572 (4th Cir.2004) (holding that “the State Department's certification, which is based upon a reasonable interpretation of the Vienna Convention, is conclusive evidence as to the diplomatic status of an individual”); Abdulaziz v. Metropolitan Dade Cnty., 741 F.2d 1328, 1329, 1331 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that “courts have generally accepted as conclusive the views of the State Department as to the fact of diplomatic status,” and that “once the United States Department of State has regularly certified a visitor to this country as having diplomatic status, the courts are bound to accept that determination”); Montuya v. Chedid, 779 F.Supp.2d 60, 62 (D.D.C.2011) (“The Court must accept the State Department's determination that Defendants have diplomatic status.”); United States v. Kuznetsov, 442 F.Supp.2d 102, 106 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (“A court's reliance on the State Department's certification when determining diplomatic immunity has a long history in this country's jurisprudence.”).

Despite termination of Defendants' status as diplomats, diplomatic immunity validly applied at commencement of the suit and service of the initial Complaint, and “once the United States Department of State has regularly certified a visitor to this country as having diplomatic status, the courts are bound to accept that determination, and [ ] diplomatic immunity flowing from that status serves as a defense to suits already commenced.” See Abdulaziz v. Metropolitan Dade Cty., 741 F.2d 1328, 1329–30 (11th Cir.1984) (affirming dismissal of action on basis of proof of diplomatic immunity at time of commencement); see also Swarna v. Al–Awadi, 607 F.Supp.2d 509, 514 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (explaining that initial suit was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction despite the fact that the diplomat had left his post because service was effected prior to the diplomat's departure). The certification of Defendants' status of diplomats by the State Department prior to service of the Amended Complaint therefore applies throughout the continuation of the suit, making Defendants immune from subject matter jurisdiction in this Court.

Diplomatic immunity flows from foreign state sovereign immunity, and consequently the underlying principles supporting the doctrines mirror each other. Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade Cty, 741 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The courts have recognized that diplomatic immunity serves the needs of the foreign sovereign and that the diplomat's privilege is 'merely incidental to the benefit conferred on the government he represents.'" (citation omitted)).

Slater musters scant authority in support of his argument that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1351 may be waived. Three of the cases he cites, Abdulaziz v. Metropolitan Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1984),Holloway v. Walker, 800 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1986), and Herman v. Apetz, 224 N.Y.S. 389 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1927), are inapposite, each dealing with the waiver of diplomatic immunity from suit rather than the jurisdiction of a particular court to hear a case against a defendant with diplomatic status. See supra note 4.

And in a case involving claims against members of the Saudi ruling family, the Eleventh Circuit held that diplomatic immunity requires dismissal even when the defendant becomes a diplomat after the action commences. See Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1984).