Opinion
60 2022
08-22-2022
RICHARD L. ABBOTT, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. KATHLEEN M. VAVALA, DAVID A. WHITE, COLLINS J. SEITZ, JR., JAMES T. VAUGHN, JR., TAMIKA R. MONTGOMERY-REEVES, GARY F. TRAYNOR, and KAREN L. VALIHURA, Defendants Below, Appellees.
Submitted: July 7, 2022
Court Below-Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware C. A. No. 2021-0409
BEFORE RIDGELY, JUSTICE; [*] NEWELL AND DANBERG, CHIEF JUDGES, [**]
ORDER
PER CURIAM
(1) On May 10, 2021, Plaintiff-Appellant Richard L. Abbott filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery against the Chief Disciplinary Counsel and Disciplinary Counsel of the Delaware Office of Disciplinary Counsel (the "ODC Defendants") and the Chief Justice and Justices of the Delaware Supreme Court (the "Supreme Court Defendants" and, together with the ODC Defendants, the "Appellees"). The complaint alleged that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") "has been harassing and attacking Abbott in bad faith based upon false allegations" by pursuing lawyer disciplinary proceedings against Abbott arising from a Vice Chancellor's referral to ODC in mid-2015 alleging, in essence, that Abbott had advised a client to enter into a sham transaction in order to avoid enforcement of a court order. The complaint further alleged that the Supreme Court Defendants "declined to take any action or intervene in order to stop" the alleged wrongdoing by the ODC Defendants. It also alleged that Delaware's lawyer disciplinary system targets sole practitioners and fails to discipline "big firm and big government" lawyers for ethical violations.
Abbott v. Vavala, C. A. No. 2021-0409, Docket Entry No. 1, Complaint ¶¶ 24-37 and exhibits cited therein (Del. Ch. filed May 10, 2021) [hereinafter Complaint]. See also Abbott v. Vavala, 2022 WL 453609, at *2 n.2 & accompanying text (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2022) (explaining court's understanding of the status of the disciplinary proceedings and noting Abbott's disclosure of the nature of the proceedings); id. at *4 ("The impetus of the complaint against Mr. Abbot[t] stemmed from a Delaware judicial officer's report to ODC that Mr. Abbott engaged in unethical litigation tactics. Those allegations included his alleged advice to a client regarding how to circumvent a court judgment." (citations omitted)).
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 42.
Id. ¶¶ 42-43.
(2) The complaint asserted that the Appellees violated Abbott's constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, entitling Abbott to declaratory and injunctive relief. Abbott also asserted that the Appellees violated the Federal RICO statute, the Federal Civil Rights Act; and the Delaware State RICO statute. In addition to a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, the complaint sought three forms of relief. First, the complaint sought a declaratory judgment holding that "the Defendants must cease further harassment, attacks, and prosecution of Abbott;" the Appellees had violated federal and state racketeering laws and Section 1983; and the attorney disciplinary system generally, and the proceeding against Abbott specifically, were invalid and unenforceable. Second, the complaint sought a permanent injunction prohibiting current and future disciplinary proceedings against Abbott and preventing future unconstitutional conduct of the attorney disciplinary system. Third, the complaint asked the court to appoint a receiver "to take over control and management" of ODC. The Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that (i) the Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction over Abbott's claims because this Court has sole and exclusive authority over attorney discipline; (ii) the Supreme Court Defendants were protected by judicial immunity; (iii) the claims against the ODC Defendants were barred by quasi-judicial immunity and prosecutorial immunity; and (iv) the complaint failed to state a claim.
18 U.S.C. ch. 96.
11 Del. C. ch. 15.
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 135-36.
Id. ¶ 148.
Id. ¶ 153.
(3) On June 3, 2021, after briefing and a hearing, the Court of Chancery denied Abbott's motions for a temporary restraining order and to expedite portions of the proceedings. Abbott filed a notice of appeal from those interlocutory orders. The Chief Justice designated former Justice Henry duPont Ridgely, Chief Judge Michael K. Newell of the Family Court, and Chief Judge Carl C. Danberg of the Court of Common Pleas to fill the quorum. The Court refused the interlocutory appeal.
Abbott v. Vavala, 2021 WL 2935349 (Del. July 12, 2021).
(4) On February 15, 2022, the Court of Chancery, after briefing and a hearing, entered an opinion and order granting the Appellees' motion to dismiss. The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant Abbott the relief that he sought. The court determined that it need not address the Appellees' immunity defenses or the Rule 12(b)(6) component of their motion to dismiss. Abbott filed a motion for correction of the February 15, 2022 order, which the Court of Chancery denied. Abbott then filed this appeal.
Abbott v. Vavala, 2022 WL 453609 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2022).
Abbott v. Vavala, 2022 WL 563048 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2022).
(5) On February 28, 2022, the Chief Justice entered an order stating that a three-Justice panel was not available to consider this appeal and designating retired Justice Ridgely, Chief Judge Newell, and Chief Judge Danberg (collectively, the "Merits Panel") to make up the quorum required by Article IV, Section 12 of the Delaware Constitution.
Abbott v. Vavala, 60, 2022, Docket Entry No. 3 (Del. Feb. 28, 2022); see DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 12 ("A quorum of the Supreme Court shall consist of not less than three Justices.").
(6) Abbott filed a motion for disqualification of former Justice Ridgely, which the Merits Panel denied by order dated March 15, 2022. Abbott filed a timely motion for reargument. On April 5, 2022, the Court entered an order granting reargument, withdrawing the March 15, 2022 order, and directing that the original motion to disqualify shall be heard anew and affording Abbott the opportunity to submit full briefing on the motion for disqualification. The order granting reargument also stated that former Justice Ridgely had decided not to participate in the Court's decision on the motion to disqualify. On April 29, 2022, the Chief Justice entered a second order designating Judge Peter B. Jones of the Family Court to serve on the panel with Chief Judge Newell and Chief Judge Danberg (collectively, the "Disqualification Panel") to consider the motion for disqualification. The Order also provided that Chief Judge Newell would serve as the head of the Disqualification Panel.
Abbott v. Vavala, 60, 2022, Docket Entry No. 18 (Del. Apr. 29, 2022).
Id.
(7) The Disqualification Panel denied the motion for disqualification of former Justice Ridgely on July 7, 2022. Abbott did not move for reargument. Therefore, Judge Jones's designated service was complete. The motion for disqualification having been denied and briefing of the appeal having been finished on June 22, 2022, the appeal was ready for submission for decision by the Merits Panel. We turn now to the merits of the issues raised in this appeal. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Chancery dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Abbott v. Vavala, 60, 2022, Docket Entry No. 27 (Del. July 7, 2022).
See Abbott v. Vavala, 60, 2022, Docket Entry No. 18 (Del. Apr. 29, 2022) ("[A] quorum of the Supreme Court not being available to sit as a three-justice panel to consider the Appellant's motion for disqualification of retired Justice Henry duPont Ridgely from the panel to consider his appeal, Judge Peter B. Jones of the Family Court is designated pursuant to art. IV § 12 of the Delaware Constitution and Supreme Court Rule 2(a), to make up the quorum required by art. IV § 12 of the Delaware Constitution.") (emphasis added).
(8) The Court of Chancery held that "[n]o trial court in Delaware has jurisdiction over attorney discipline or governance matters. Based upon that premise, it follows that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive or declaratory relief against the individuals who are part and parcel of a higher Court that holds exclusive jurisdiction over the matter." Abbott argues that the Court of Chancery's general equitable jurisdiction, including its jurisdiction over matters involving requests for equitable relief, provided it with jurisdiction over his claims. More specifically, he contends that the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to enjoin administrative proceedings and bad faith criminal prosecutions, and he argues that lawyer disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal, professional regulatory proceedings that the Court of Chancery may enjoin. We review de novo the issue whether the Court of Chancery has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.
Abbott v. Vavala, 2022 WL 453609, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2022).
See 10 Del. C. § 341 ("The Court of Chancery shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters and causes in equity."); id. § 342 ("The Court of Chancery shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other court or jurisdiction of this State.").
See Nat'l Indus. Group (Holding) v. Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C., 67 A.3d 373, 382 (Del. 2013) ("It is well-established that the Court of Chancery has subject matter jurisdiction where (among other things) a party: 1) seeks an equitable remedy, such as specific performance or an injunction, and 2) lacks an adequate remedy at law.").
Candlewood Timber Group, LLC v. Pan Am. Energy, LLC, 859 A.2d 989, 997 (Del. 2004).
(9) "As Delaware's Constitutional court of equity, the Court of Chancery can acquire subject matter jurisdiction over a cause in only three ways, namely, if: (1) one or more of the plaintiff's claims for relief is equitable in character, (2) the plaintiff requests relief that is equitable in nature, or (3) subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by statute." Abbott does not point to any statute that expressly confers jurisdiction on the Court of Chancery over Federal RICO, State RICO, or Section 1983 actions. Rather, he claims the Court of Chancery's equity jurisdiction permitted the court to grant him injunctive relief based upon his claims under those statutes.
Id. (citations omitted).
We note that the Delaware Code expressly confers jurisdiction on the Superior Court over State RICO claims. See 11 Del. C. § 1505(a) ("The Superior Court of this State shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including but not limited to: Ordering any person to divest any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in; or ordering the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision of the rights of innocent persons."). As to jurisdiction over actions under Section 1983, this Court has observed that "[w]hile concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims may lie in either the Superior Court or the Court of Chancery, the selection of the forum is dictated by the relief sought." Kerns v. Dukes, 707 A.2d 363, 368 (Del. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC v. ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund, 68 A.3d 665, 685 & n.94 (Del. 2013).
(10) The Court of Chancery is a court of limited jurisdiction that hears matters in equity, not attorney disciplinary proceedings. At bottom, Abbott's constitutional claims which he seeks to assert through the above statutes are matters that he may raise in the pending disciplinary proceeding. The Court of Chancery's general power to provide injunctive relief does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on that court to enjoin the Supreme Court, the members of the Supreme Court, or the ODC attorneys from performing their respective functions under the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. As this Court has repeatedly stated, it has "the 'inherent and exclusive authority to discipline members of the Delaware Bar.'" This Court has established a process for exercising that authority that includes substantial procedural protections for an attorney who is accused of misconduct. The injunction that Abbott seeks would halt ongoing disciplinary proceedings against him, prohibit future disciplinary proceedings against him, and place control of the entire lawyer disciplinary system outside the control of this Court. Regardless of Abbott's attempt to frame his claims as asserting violations of Federal or State RICO or Section 1983, the Court of Chancery lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief that Abbott seeks. Indeed, this Court has reversed, on the basis of the Court's exclusive authority to govern the Bar, trial courts' much more circumscribed forays into the attorney-discipline arena.
In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 484 (Del. 2007) (quoting In re Froelich, 838 A.2d 1117, 1120 (Del. 2003)); see also, e.g., State ex rel. Abbott v. Aaronson, 2019 WL 925856, at *1-2 (Del. Feb. 25, 2019) (stating that the "Superior Court, of course, does not have the power to command this Court or its employees to carry out their official duties" and that "[t]his result is also consistent with this Court's inherent and exclusive authority to discipline members of the Delaware Bar" (citations and internal quotations omitted)); In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 220 (Del. 1990) ("In Delaware there is the fundamental constitutional principle that this Court, alone, has sole and exclusive responsibility over all matters affecting governance of the Bar.").
See In re Kelly, 2022 WL 3270230, at *8 (Del. Aug. 10, 2022) (stating that "[p]roceedings to determine attorney incapacity" are "conducted in the same manner as disciplinary proceedings" and "contain extensive procedural due process protections for respondents," and reciting some of those protections); Abbott v. State Public Integrity Comm'n, 2019 WL 937184, at *5 (Del. Feb. 25, 2019) (recognizing that the "process for attorney discipline has extensive procedural due process protections"); see also, e.g., DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 64 (establishing the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and setting forth the powers and duties of disciplinary counsel); DEL. LAWYERS' R. DISCIPLINARY P. 9, 15 (providing for various procedural protections, including but not limited to preliminary review of alleged misconduct, notice to respondent, respondent's opportunity to respond to allegations and present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, a burden on ODC to establish misconduct by "clear and convincing evidence," and the opportunity to submit objections to the Supreme Court).
See, e.g., Hunt v. Court of Chancery, 2021 WL 2418984 (Del. June 10, 2021) (reversing sanction imposed by the Court of Chancery on a Texas attorney admitted pro hac vice for uncivil email, based in part on the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over attorney discipline); Crumplar v. Superior Court, 56 A.3d 1000, 1009-10 (Del. 2012) ("If a trial judge believes an attorney has committed misconduct, referral to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, not Rule 11 sanctions, is the proper recourse in the absence of prejudicial disruption of the proceeding.... Referral to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, an agency of this Court, is consistent with the principle that this Court alone has inherent and exclusive responsibility for disciplining members of the Delaware Bar."); Infotechnology, 582 A.2d at 216-17 (holding that Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction to disqualify plaintiff's counsel, which had previously represented defendants' investment banker in unrelated matters, because "[u]nless the challenged conduct prejudices the fairness of the proceedings, such that it adversely affects the fair and efficient administration of justice, only this Court has the power and responsibility to govern the Bar").
(11) Like the Court of Chancery we are not persuaded by Abbott's argument that case law addressing the Court of Chancery's authority to enjoin administrative proceedings or bad faith prosecutions applies. None of the cases on which Abbott relies-including Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., In re Ruffalo, Delaware River & Bay Authority v. Carello, and Hayward v. Gaston - addresses whether, let alone holds that, a trial court of limited jurisdiction may enjoin a higher court with exclusive jurisdiction over a matter and an arm of that court from carrying out their official functions as to that matter. To the extent that case law from other states reaches a different conclusion regarding the supervision of lawyers in those states, we decline to follow it because that case law is inconsistent with Delaware law. Moreover, contrary to Abbott's contentions, "the admission and the removal of attorneys are judicial acts" and attorney disciplinary proceedings are "judicial in nature." Abbott correctly observes that in 1984 this Court characterized the Board on Professional Responsibility ("BPR") as "an agency of this Court" and proceedings before the BPR as "administrative in nature." But nothing in Kennedy suggested or held that a Delaware trial court has jurisdiction to enjoin this Court or its "arms" or "agencies" from carrying out their respective roles in assisting this Court in governing the Bar. The Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Disciplinary Procedure adopted by this Court in 2000 confirm that the Delaware attorney disciplinary process at issue here is judicial in nature. They provide in Rule 1(a) that this Court is responsible for "dispos[ing] of individual cases of lawyer discipline" and "administer[ing] the lawyer disciplinary system."
425 A.2d 156, 160 (Del. Ch. 1980).
390 U.S. 544 (1968).
222 A.2d 794 (Del. Ch. 1966).
542 A.2d 760 (Del. 1988).
See, e.g., Eugster v. Wash. State Bar Ass'n, 397 P.3d 131 (Wash.Ct.App. 2017) (holding that trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over attorney's claims under Section 1983, but that res judicata barred the lawsuit); State Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) ("The Court's inherent powers, such as the power to regulate the practice of law, are not jurisdictional powers. These powers are administrative powers, necessary to the preservation of the judiciary's independence and integrity." (citation omitted)); id. at 246 ("This is not to say that all remedies bearing upon the regulation of the legal profession would be unacceptable infringements on the inherent powers of the Court. Had this Court actually promulgated rules establishing a pro bono program and had Gomez challenged the constitutionality of such rules, the district court would have jurisdiction to decide, in the first instance, whether such rules met constitutional standards."); Clary v. Mathews, 160 S.E.2d 338, 339 (Ga. 1968) ("Upon reviewing the rules of the State Bar of Georgia, we find that the intent therein was to afford the member complained against a hearing before an impartial tribunal at all stages of the proceedings; however, no provisions for entering such challenge is provided at the probable cause hearing. Therefore, petitioner does not have a complete and adequate remedy at law and may resort to a court of equity to restrain a member from serving on such grievance tribunal when he is as alleged prejudiced against him in the cause." (citation omitted)).
See Opening Brief at 26-27 (arguing that attorney disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal or administrative in nature).
Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 535 (1868).
See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 433-34 (1982) (stating that New Jersey attorney disciplinary proceedings are judicial in nature); Abbott v. Mette, 2021 WL 5906146, at *2 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2021) (determining that Delaware attorney disciplinary proceedings constitute "judicial proceedings" for purposes of Younger abstention, and that the judicial proceedings begin even before formal charges are brought); Murphy v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 2019 WL 4752059, at *14 & n.19 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2019) (recognizing that Pennsylvania attorney disciplinary proceedings are "a unitary process that is judicial in nature").
In re Kennedy, 472 A.2d 1317, 1329 (Del. 1984).
DEL. LAWYERS' R. DISCIPLINARY P. 1(a).
(12) Finally, we agree with the Court of Chancery's conclusion that Abbott has an adequate alternative remedy to the injunctive relief that he sought, namely raising "his federal and state contentions that the process is unfair or unconstitutional" in the disciplinary proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Abbott v. Mette. In January of 2020, Abbott filed suit against ODC attorneys and the Supreme Court Defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware asserting, as in this case, Federal and State RICO claims and violations of Section 1983. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the case based on the Younger abstention doctrine, holding that Abbott had an "adequate opportunity in the Delaware disciplinary proceedings" to raise his federal claims.
Abbott, 2022 WL 453609, at *11; see also In re Kelly, 2022 WL 3270230, at *8-10 (Del. Aug. 10, 2022) (noting that attorney incapacity proceedings are conducted in the same manner as disciplinary proceedings and addressing attorney's Due Process, Equal Protection, and First Amendment objections to incapacity proceedings); Candlewood Timber Group, 859 A.2d at 997 ("The fact that a complaint contains a prayer for an equitable remedy, without more, does not conclude the jurisdictional analysis. In deciding whether or not equitable jurisdiction exists, the Court must look beyond the remedies nominally being sought, and focus upon the allegations of the complaint in light of what the plaintiff really seeks to gain by bringing his or her claim. To say it differently, the appropriate analysis requires a 'realistic assessment of the nature of the wrong alleged and the remedy available in order to determine whether a legal remedy is available and fully adequate.'"). We express no opinion about the legal or factual merit of Abbott's claims, nor has Abbott disclosed in this appeal whether he has timely and properly asserted them in the disciplinary proceedings.
2021 WL 5906146.
Abbott v. Mette, 2021 WL 327375, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 31, 2021) (magistrate's report and recommendation).
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Abbott v. Mette, 2021 WL 5906146, at *2. At this point, we pause to comment on one statement that the trial court did not need to make. The trial court stated in dicta that "in proper circumstances, the Court of Chancery may have jurisdiction to entertain . . . civil racketeering claims that seek equitable relief." Abbott, 2022 WL 453609, at *6. We conclude that this particular comment is of no precedential value because the comment suggesting that the Court of Chancery may have jurisdiction in other cases was unnecessary to decide the question of subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
(13) Because Abbott's request for injunctive relief did not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Chancery in this case, the court also lacked jurisdiction over Abbott's request for a declaratory judgment. The Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to provide declaratory relief if it otherwise has jurisdiction over the matter. Title 10, Section 6501 of the Delaware Code provides, in part: "Except where the Constitution of this State provides otherwise, courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Thus, the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action if there is an "underlying basis for equity jurisdiction measured by traditional standards." Because Abbott's request for injunctive relief did not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Chancery in this case, the court also lacked jurisdiction to issue the declaratory relief that Abbott sought.
10 Del. C. § 6501 (emphasis added).
Diebold Computer Leasing, Inc. v. Commercial Credit Corp., 267 A.2d 586, 591 (Del. 1970); see also Kerns v. Dukes, 707 A.2d 363, 368 (Del. 1998) (explaining that the Court of Chancery may award declaratory relief "where there is otherwise a basis for equitable jurisdiction"), overruled on other grounds by Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC v. ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund, 68 A.3d 665 (Del. 2013).
(14) We next address Abbott's claim that the trial court erred when it concluded that a May 2021 Order of this Court independently divested it of jurisdiction. Following the referral to ODC in 2015, Abbott filed multiple complaints, actions, and appeals relating to his disciplinary proceedings. As a result, "[i]n the exercise of [the Delaware Supreme Court's] exclusive authority to supervise and discipline members of the Delaware Bar, and to protect the effective functioning of the disciplinary process," on May 18, 2021, this Court entered an order (the "May 2021 Order") that (i) stayed "[a]ll disciplinary complaints filed by Abbott against present or former ODC attorneys" until the final disposition by the BPR and the Court of the disciplinary charges against Abbott; (ii) provided that the proceedings against Abbott would continue before the same BPR Panel; (iii) stated that the Court would consider any objections to the conduct of the ODC attorneys or the BPR Panel, or their continued participation in the disciplinary proceedings, upon review of the Panel's recommendation; and (iv) enjoined Abbott, as of May 18, 2021, from "serving or filing any new complaints or actions in state court or with the Court on the Judiciary, ODC, or any state administrative board, arising out of or relating to the pending disciplinary proceedings against him."
See In re Abbott, 2021 WL 1996927, at *1 (Del. May 19, 2021) (listing various complaints and lawsuits).
Id. at *2 (citations omitted). Contrary to Abbott's contentions, the May 2021 Order does not indicate that "at least 3 members of the Supreme Court have already made up their mind that Abbott is wrong." Reply Brief at 14; see also id. at 6-7 (asserting that the May 2021 Order "evidences a conscious intent on behalf of at least 3 of the Appellees to summarily deny Abbott his Constitutional rights and presume him guilty"). Rather, the May 2021 Order by its terms stated the purpose of "protect[ing] the effective functioning of the disciplinary process" and further provided that "[a]ny objections to the conduct of the ODC attorneys or the BPR Panel, or their continued participation will be considered by the Court upon review of the Panel's recommendation." In re Abbott, 2021 WL 1996927.
(15) In this appeal, Abbott contends that the Court of Chancery erroneously held that the May 2021 Order divested it of jurisdiction over Abbott's claims. We agree with Abbott that the terms of the May 2021 Order did not apply to this case. Instead, the Order enjoined Abbott from filing only new complaints or actions.Abbott filed his Court of Chancery complaint in this action before this Court entered the May 2021 Order. Nevertheless, our conclusion does not warrant reversal because the Court of Chancery's lack of subject matter jurisdiction was an independent basis for dismissal.
In re Abbott, 2021 WL 1996927, at *2.
(16) Abbott next argues that the Court of Chancery erred by denying his motions for expedition and a temporary restraining order. The court based its decision, in part, on this Court's "sole and exclusive jurisdiction to regulate attorney conduct" and the court's determination that "there is no colorable claim to enjoin the Defendants from taking action that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court and appended agency which the individual Defendants together comprise." We review the Court of Chancery's denial of the motions for expedition and a temporary restraining order for abuse of discretion, "without deference to the embedded legal conclusions of the trial court."
Appendix to Opening Brief at A-123-24.
Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 394 (Del. 1996).
(17) A court will issue a temporary restraining order only where the movant demonstrates (i) a colorable claim on the merits; (ii) a likelihood of imminent, irreparable injury if the relief is not granted; and (iii) that the balance of equities tips in favor of the issuance of the requested relief. As a general matter, a court "may hold proceedings to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a given action and, while doing so, impose orders to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of the proceedings." In this case, however, the Court of Chancery did not hold that it did not have power to issue interim relief while it examined its jurisdiction in the matter. Rather, at the hearing on the motions for expedition and a temporary restraining order, the court considered the parties' arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction and ruled that Abbott had not demonstrated a colorable claim that the court had jurisdiction. The Court of Chancery also noted that the investigative/disciplinary process afforded adequate due process. Thus, there was not likely irreparable harm under factor two. We find no error in the court's denial of the motions, nor would any purpose be served by the remand that Abbott seeks, in light of our determination that the Court of Chancery correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Arkema Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 2010 WL 2334386, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010).
Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1241 (Del. 2018); see also id. at 1241 n.208 (citing sources regarding the issuance of temporary restraining orders or temporary injunctions pending jurisdictional determinations).
(18) Abbott's final argument on appeal is that the Court of Chancery erroneously denied his motion seeking to correct certain purported errors in the Court of Chancery's opinion. He contends that the opinion (i) "falsely averred that Abbott was acting as a lawyer in this action," when he was actually proceeding pro se and not in his capacity as an attorney; (ii) "inaccurately asserted that the Preliminary Review Committee 'screened [Abbott's] case and found probable cause to believe he committed misconduct;'" (iii) "incorrectly alleged that 'the Supreme Court's decision . . . rejected [Abbott's] earlier attempt to compel ODC to file a disciplinary complaint against an ODC attorney,'" when "the fact is that Abbott sought to compel the ODC to take action (one way or another) on a disciplinary complaint against another attorney not employed by the ODC;" and (iv) "misstated the scope of the Third Circuit's holding in Abbott v. Mette."
Opening Brief at 44-45 (alterations in original).
(19) We review the Court of Chancery's decision to deny Abbott's motion for correction for abuse of discretion. "'To find an abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the trial court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.'" We conclude that it did not.
See Monnat v. Sparks, 2007 WL 914200 (Del. Mar. 28, 2007) (holding that appellant did not demonstrate "any error or abuse of discretion" in trial court's order on motion for clarification); McElroy v. Shell Petroleum, Inc., 1992 WL 397468 (Del. Nov. 24, 1992) ("A decision on a motion for reargument will be affirmed unless it involves an abuse of discretion.").
Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264, 1268 (Del. 2013) (quoting Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 930 A.2d 881, 887 (Del. 2007)).
(20) In its order denying Abbott's motion for correction, the Court of Chancery wrote:
Plaintiff's motion requests that the Court rephrase portions of its Opinion to satisfy Plaintiff's (1) preferences in phrasing, (2) his interpretations of controlling precedent, and (3) his interpretation of
persuasive authority. Furthermore, Plaintiff has acted as his own attorney throughout this litigation. As to whether his participation constitutes a pro se appearance, the record and his actions will speak for themselves. In any event, the distinction regarding his status, in the Court's eyes, is immaterial. Accordingly, neither a correction of the opinion's cover page, nor a correction in phrasing to adopt Plaintiff's theories of the case are warranted. Plaintiff's motion is Denied.
Abbott v. Vavala, 2022 WL 563048 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2022).
The Court of Chancery clearly articulated its bases for denial, namely that Abbott's desired corrections would have no material effect. We find no reversible error in the court's ruling.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of Chancery is AFFIRMED.
[*] Sitting by designation pursuant to DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 38, 29 Del. C. § 5610(a)(2), and Supreme Court Rule 2(a).
[**] Sitting by designation pursuant to DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 12 and Supreme Court Rule 2(a).