Opinion
24A-JV-2049
12-18-2024
A.B., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT JUSTIN R. WALL WALL LEGAL SERVICES HUNTINGTON, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA JOHN R. OOSTERHOFF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Wells Circuit Court The Honorable Kenton W. Kiracofe, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 90C01-2405-JD-23
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT JUSTIN R. WALL WALL LEGAL SERVICES HUNTINGTON, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA JOHN R. OOSTERHOFF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
May, Judge
[¶1] A.B. appeals his placement in the Department of Correction ("DOC") following his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent for committing Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In the early morning hours of May 26, 2024, Wells County Sheriff's Department Deputy Farrell Swindell responded to a report of a shooting. When he arrived, he found sixteen-year-old M.C. "with a gunshot wound to his upper torso." (Tr. Vol. II at 7.) M.C. told Deputy Swindell that he had agreed to purchase a gun from another juvenile, J.S. When M.C. and his friend L.F. arrived to buy the gun, J.S., D.S., and A.B. were there. Instead of a gun, J.S. attempted to sell M.C. "a bag of macaroni and cheese and a Nerf gun[.]" (Id. at 8.)
[¶3] With "the transaction not going as planned," J.S., D.S., and A.B. "sped off" in a vehicle that A.B. was driving. (Id.) M.C. and L.F. gave chase in another vehicle. While A.B. was driving at a high rate of speed, J.S. and D.S. "began firing rifles from within the car towards the car that [M.C.] was driving, and at least one bullet struck [M.C.]." (Id.)
[¶4] After the incident, Deputy Swindell interviewed A.B., who admitted he knew about the plan "to basically go and . . . rip off [L.F.] of this real gun." (Id.) A.B. told Deputy Swindell that he did not know what happened to the rifles used in the shooting. However, when police conducted a search of A.B.'s residence, they found the two rifles involved in the shooting under A.B.'s bed. Deputy Swindell detained A.B. and placed him in the Delaware County Juvenile Detention Center ("JDC").
[¶5] On May 28, 2023, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that A.B. was a delinquent child for committing Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. After a detention hearing on May 29, 2023, the court ordered A.B. detained in the JDC until his delinquency hearing because doing so was "deemed essential to protect the child and the community." (App. Vol. II at 32.) On June 25, 2023, A.B. admitted the allegations against him and the court adjudicated him as a delinquent child. The court held a dispositional hearing and ordered A.B. committed to the DOC "for housing in any correctional facility for children." (Id. at 34.)
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] A.B. challenges his placement in the DOC. The juvenile court system is founded on the notion of parens patriae, which allows the juvenile court to step into the shoes of the parents. R.G. v. State, 212 N.E.3d 720, 722 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023). The parens patriae doctrine gives juvenile courts power to further the best interests of the child, "which implies a broad discretion unknown in the adult court system." Id. (quoting In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 634 (Ind. 2004)). Accordingly, juvenile courts have "wide latitude and great flexibility" in fashioning dispositions for delinquents, and we review a juvenile court's decision for an abuse of discretion. K.S. v. State, 114 N.E.3d 849, 854 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018), trans. denied. A decision is an abuse of discretion if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court or against "the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn" from those facts and circumstances. Id.
[¶7] While juvenile courts have "'wide latitude and great flexibility'" in fashioning dispositions for delinquents, id. (quoting C.T.S. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1193, 1203 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), trans. denied), our legislature also delineated factors the court should consider as it makes its decision:
If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:
(1) is:
(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and
(B) close to the parents' home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;
(2) least interferes with family autonomy;
(3) is least disruptive of family life;
(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and
(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6.
[¶8] A.B. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it committed him to the DOC because there was a less restrictive placement available, specifically electronic home detention in the custody of his mother or older brother. He asserts that because his last adjudication was in 2022 and he "had matured a lot since his freshman year of high school" a less restrictive placement was appropriate. (Br. of Appellant at 17.) A.B.'s counsel also argued during the dispositional hearing "he - like - you know, indicated he really wants to be home to be with his grandmother - um - (Child sniffling) and to help provide for her[.]" (Tr. Vol. II at 47.)
[¶9] However, A.B.'s argument ignores his prolific history of juvenile adjudications. As the court noted in its order, "A.B.'s first contact with the juvenile justice system was at the age of 10. A.B. has a prior history of eighteen (18) delinquent adjudications[.]" (App. Vol. II at 33.) As part of those adjudications,
A.B. has received counseling services, home detention, and family-centered therapy. In the past, probation has been extended to allow additional time for him to complete the services. In 2020, A.B. was placed in residential treatment at Youth Opportunity Center (YOC).(Id.) After he was released from the Youth Opportunity Center, A.B. committed other delinquent acts and "was again placed on probation to include home detention, individual counseling, and home-based case management." (Id.) A.B. violated the terms of that probation multiple times and was ultimately ordered to serve ninety days in secure detention. From the time of his release from secure detention on December 10, 2022, until the instant matter, A.B. had twenty contacts with law enforcement including an incident in which he "brandish[ed] what was ultimately determined to be a toy gun at the library." (Id.)
[¶10] For seven years, A.B.'s behavior has shown a blatant disrespect for the justice system. Every attempt by the court to rehabilitate him has been unsuccessful due to A.B.'s failure to modify his behavior based on placement options and treatments less restrictive than the DOC. Based thereon, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when it placed A.B. in the DOC. See M.M. v. State, 189 N.E.3d 1163, 1167 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by granting wardship to DOC when "numerous and intensive efforts and lesser restrictive placements" had failed).
Conclusion
[¶11] The court did not abuse its discretion when it placed A.B. in the DOC because he had been given many opportunities for less restrictive placement and they were unsuccessful. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶12] Affirmed.
Tavitas, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.