Opinion
NO. 14-22-00932-CV
05-14-2024
AB LAND COMPANY, Appellant v. Beverlyn SANDERS, Appellee
Colleen M. Clear McClure, Houston, for Appellant. Evelyn Gordon, for Appellee. Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Wilson.
On Appeal from the 268th District Court, Fort Bend County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 16-DCV-229539
Colleen M. Clear McClure, Houston, for Appellant.
Evelyn Gordon, for Appellee.
Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Wilson.
OPINION
Frances Bourliot, Justice
This is an appeal from the grant of a plea to the jurisdiction. The underlying case concerns a dispute regarding ownership of a strip of land that lies at the intersection of property owned by appellant AB Land Company and property owned by appellee Beverlyn Sanders. AB Land bought two small lots in 2015. Sanders has owned property adjoining both lots since 1986. A fence exists in the area in question. AB Land contends that the fence runs across its two lots and it has title to land on both sides of the fence by virtue of its warranty deeds. Sanders contends that her property runs up to the fence and that she owns title to such land also by warranty deed. Alternatively, Sanders contends that she adversely possessed the land up to the fence.
Sanders filed a plea to the jurisdiction alleging that AB Land lacked standing to bring its claims related to the property. Sanders also requested sanctions for filing a groundless pleading. The trial court granted Sanders’ plea and imposed sanctions against AB Land and its counsel totaling $19,800.19. In this appeal, AB Land challenges the trial court’s rulings on the plea and sanctions. Concluding that the trial court has jurisdiction to decide this dispute, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Background
The live pleadings. In its live petition, AB Land asserts that it owns, by warranty deed, lots 9 and 10 in block 4 of the Fresno Addition, a subdivision in Fort Bend County. AB Land additionally provides a property identification number and references a survey attached as an exhibit to the pleading which sets forth the properties’ metes and bounds. AB Land further asserts that a fence runs across its properties, cutting off about 30 feet at the end of each lot. AB Land states that the Fort Bend County Tax Authority and the Fort Bend Independent School District both impose taxes on the property using the same boundary lines as set out in the survey and AB Land has been paying those taxes since it purchased the property. AB Land further insists that it made a written demand on Sanders to remove the fence as well as a gate that blocks access from the properties to a county road, but she refused to do so. AB Land requests a declaratory judgment to establish the proper metes and bounds of its two lots.
In her live answer and counterclaim, Sanders asserts ownership in property up to the fence line by warranty deed. She also asserts ownership by adverse possession. Sanders generally denies all of AB Land’s allegations, asserts affirmative defenses including adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence, and asserts counterclaims including actions to try title and for a declaratory judgment, adverse possession, and boundary by acquiescence. Sanders further disputes the accuracy of AB Land’s survey and suggests AB Land did not have standing. Sanders requests that AB Land take nothing, that all of its claims be dismissed, and that a declaratory judgment be entered in her favor.
Motion for summary judgment. AB Land filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the survey, the deposition of the surveyor, and associated documents proved AB Land’s ownership of the property and that Sanders’ deposition testimony along with an affidavit from her stepbrother disproved her adverse possession affirmative defense. In response, Sanders objected to AB Land’s evidence; questioned the accuracy of AB Land’s survey with an affidavit by another surveyor; asserted adverse possession under the three-year, five-year, ten-year, and twenty-five-year statutes; and argued that AB Land lacked standing to defend against the adverse possession claim because he did not own the property at issue when the various statutes ran.
The trial court denied AB Land’s motion for summary judgment. In its order, the court stated as its bases for the ruling that "the Court finds that [AB Land] lacks standing to defend against [Sander’s] alternative counterclaim asserting ownership by adverse possession" and "there are genuine issues of material fact with regards to [Sander’s] rightful ownership and any claim of adverse possess[ion]."
Plea to the jurisdiction. Sanders then filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which she again challenged AB Land’s standing. Sanders specifically asserted that AB Land failed to plead facts sufficient to support a trespass to try title action, including that it failed to provide an adequate description of the property and failed to identify the statutory language that it relied upon. Sanders additionally asserted that AB Land’s evidence (apparently referencing the evidence offered in support of the motion for summary judgment) would be inadmissible at trial. Sanders then insisted AB Land’s claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations because the various adverse possession periods had all run before AB Land bought lots 9 and 10. Sanders made a similar argument related to boundary by acquiescence. Lastly, Sanders requested sanctions pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In support of the plea, Sanders presented numerous exhibits that included evidence which had been produced by both sides in the litigation.
In response, AB Land argued, among other things, that Sanders was not using the plea to the jurisdiction pleading properly by attempting to use her own affirmative claims of adverse possession to assert AB Land lacked jurisdiction on its claims. AB Land further defended its description of the property as adequate and asserted its ownership of the lots in question.
During the hearing on the plea, Sanders continued to assert that the only people who would have standing to defend against her adverse possession claims would be the people who owned the property during the running of the limitations periods. Meanwhile, AB Land continued to insist it had standing as the title holder to the property at issue.
In its order granting the plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court stated that AB Land’s petition had failed "to confer jurisdiction on this Court." The court further explained that by the time AB Land purchased lots 9 and 10, Sanders "had exclusively used and possessed the disputed tract of land for over twenty-five years without objection" and that such possession had "been open and notorious." The court noted that AB Land "was not the owner of its Lots 9 and 10 during the accrual of the 3-, 5-, 10-, and 25-year statutes of limitations." The court denied all relief requested by AB Land. The court further ordered AB Land to pay sanctions of $19,800.19, comprised of Sanders’ attorney’s fees and costs. The sanctions were pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 10.001 and 10.004 and based on the finding that AB Land’s claims were unsupported by law or fact and had resulted in years of unnecessary litigation.
Appellate issues. Although AB Land raises four issues in this appeal, we will concentrate our analysis on its third issue, which directly challenges the trial court’s holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In its first two issues, AB Land challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. The denial of a motion for summary judgment is generally not appealable, and we see no reason to address that ruling in this appeal. See, e.g., Cont’l Cas Co v. Am. Safety Cas. Ins. Co., 365 S.W.3d 165, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). AB Land’s fourth issue also challenges the jurisdictional ruling, but we need not address that issue in light of our resolution of the third issue.
Standards of Review
[1–4] A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea used to defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit. Bland I.S.D. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The plea challenges the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. See Clint I.S D. v Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 558 (Tex. 2016). The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. See Wheelabrator Air Pollution Control, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 489 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Tex. 2016).
[5–9] Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and a prerequisite of maintaining suit. KIPP, Inc. v. Grant Me the Wisdom Found, Inc, 651 S.W.3d 530, 542-43 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. denied). The standing inquiry "focuses on whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a ‘justiciable interest’ in its outcome." Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005). To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege a concrete injury and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court. Farmers Tex. Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2020). Courts lack jurisdiction to hear a claim brought by a plaintiff who lacks standing to assert it. Heckman v. Williamson Cty, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). The mere fact that a plaintiff may ultimately not prevail on the merits does not deprive the plaintiff of standing. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d at 241; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304-05 (Tex. 2008) ("A plaintiff does not lack standing simply because he cannot prevail on the merits of his claim; he lacks standing because his claim of injury is too slight for a court to afford redress.").
[10–14] A plea to the jurisdiction "may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both." Alamo Heights I.S.D v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). We generally construe the pleadings liberally in favor of jurisdiction, take all factual assertions as true, and look to the pleader’s intent. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150 When a plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties if necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004). In doing so, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Id at 228. If the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court should rule on the plea as a matter of law, but if there is a disputed issue of jurisdictional fact that implicates the merits, it must be reserved for the factfinder at trial. See id. This standard generally mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c). Id.
Discussion
Sanders has raised several grounds in support of her plea to the jurisdiction, none of which have merit. These grounds can be grouped in the following manner. First, Sanders challenges the sufficiency of AB Land’s petition by asserting that it fails to satisfy the pleading requirements for a trespass to try title action. Second, she asserts that AB Land has not presented any evidence that would be admissible at trial in support of its claim of ownership to the disputed property. Third, she argues that AB Land does not have standing to defend against her affirmative defenses and counterclaims of adverse possession and acquiescence. We will discuss each set of arguments in turn.
Sanders asserted essentially the same grounds and arguments in the plea itself as she does in her briefing to this court
Sanders additionally argues that AB Land failed to plead any facts supporting damages and that the trial court had no jurisdiction to designate a public roadway. These assertions have no apparent relevance to any of AB Land’s claims in its live petition and may instead relate to claims that were m earlier pleadings We will not further address these irrelevant arguments
I. Sufficiency of Pleadings
As stated, Sanders first challenges the sufficiency of AB Land’s petition. These arguments raise the subsidiary question of exactly what is the nature of AB Land’s claims. Sanders insists that this is a trespass to try title case and argues AB Land has failed to sufficiently plead the requirements for such a suit. In its pleadings, however, AB Land styles its claims as a declaratory judgment action.
[15] While this is not a particularly complicated case—there is a dispute regarding the boundary line and a fence and Sanders alleges adverse possession—it does fall within something of a grey area in Texas jurisprudence. It is often said that any suit involving a dispute over the title to land is an action in trespass to try title, whatever its form and regardless of the relief sought. See, e.g., Kennedy Con., Inc. v. Forman, 316 S.W.3d 129, 135 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.); see also Tex. Prop. Code § 22.001(a) ("A trespass to try title action is the method for determining title to lands, tenements, or other real property."); Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 264, 267-68 (Tex. 2004) (interpreting petition as stating a trespass to try title claim even though it sought a declaratory judgment). The Texas Legislature, however, has also provided that "[n]otwithstanding Section 22.001, Property Code," a claimant may sue for declaratory relief "when the sole issue concerning title to real property is the determination of the proper boundary line between adjoining properties." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004(c); see also Brumley v. McDuff, 616 S.W.3d 826, 833 n.36 (Tex. 2021). There is indisputable overlap between title disputes and boundary disputes; indeed, "[a] boundary determination necessarily involves the question of title, else the parties would gain nothing by the judgment." Martin, 133 S.W.3d at 267; see also Eggemeyer v. Hughes, 621 S.W.3d 883, 893-94 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.).
[16] The basic test of whether a lawsuit should be considered a boundary dispute posits, "If there would have been no case but for the question of boundary, then the case is necessarily a boundary case even though it may involve questions of title." Plumb v. Stuessy, 617 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. 1981); see also Martin, 133 S.W.3d at 265-66 (quoting Plumb); Eggemeyer, 621 S.W.3d at 894-95 (quoting Plumb and distinguishing other cases "because at the core of each was a question of title that did not arise out of a boundary question"). Here, there is certainly a dispute as to where the proper boundary is between Sanders’ property and AB Land’s property, but there are also issues regarding Sanders’ fence that allegedly cuts across AB Land’s property and dispossesses AB Land out of about 30 feet of each of its lots and regarding Sanders’ adverse possession allegations:
[17] That said, for purposes of determining AB Land’s standing—the issue squarely before us—the analysis would be the same regardless of whether this case is properly brought as a declaratory judgment or trespass to try title action. In either type of suit, AB Land could establish standing by asserting an ownership interest in property that has been impacted by Sanders’ conduct resulting in a real controversy between the parties that could be remedied through the court action sought. See Beasley, 598 S.W.3d at 241; Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150; see also Purple Martin Land Co. v. Offord, No. 14-20-00265-CV, 2021 WL 6069272, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 23, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding party demonstrated standing in declaratory judgment and trespass to try title actions by presenting a real controversy between the parties concerning their competing claims of title to property); Cameron Cty v. Tompkins, 422 S.W.3d 789, 801 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2013, pet. denied) ("The record shows that the Tompkinses have standing to bring this lawsuit because they asserted an ownership inter- est in the Property and a related injury, and because they presented a real controversy between themselves and the County concerning that ownership interest.").
As discussed above, in its live petition, AB Land asserts that it owns, by warranty deed, lots 9 and 10 in block 4 of the Fresno Addition in Fort Bend County. AB Land additionally provides a property identification number and references a survey attached as an exhibit to its petition, which sets forth the properties’ metes and bounds. AB Land also alleges that Sanders has a fence that cuts off about 30 feet of each of its lots from the rest of the properties, and it requests that the court determine the proper boundary and order Sanders to remove the fence. These factual assertions are sufficient to allege an ownership interest, an injury, and a live controversy that would be resolved by the requested relief. Accordingly, the trial court erred to the extent it granted the plea to the jurisdiction based on Sanders’ challenge to AB Land’s pleadings.
As Sanders points out, trespass to try title actions generally have strict pleading and proof requirements; meanwhile, the requirements for demonstrating an interest in the disputed property are relaxed in a boundary dispute, whether brought as a trespass to try title or declaratory judgment action. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 783 (providing certain requisites for a trespass to try title petition); Lance v Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 735 (Tex. 2018) (listing elements of proof generally required in trespass to try title cases); Martin, 133 S.W.3d at 265 (explaining that the strict pleading and proof requirements in trespass to try title actions are relaxed in boundary dispute cases); Heredia v Zimprich, 559 S.W.3d 223, 231 & n.4 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (same). Contrary to Sanders' assertions, however, the strict trespass to try title requirements are not matters of standing but are matters first of pleading sufficiency (to be addressed through special exceptions) and then of sufficiency of the evidence. See Pike v Tex EMC Mgmt, LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 773-74 (Tex 2020) (explaining that whether a plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of a particular statute is generally not a matter of standing but a question of whether the plaintiff has stated a valid cause of action); Purple Martin Land, 2021 WL 6069272, at *5-6 (holding that arguments regarding the elements of proof in trespass to try title action were not proper grounds for finding the plaintiff lacked standing); Martin v McDonnold, 247 S.W.3d 224, 237-239 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet) (addressing special exceptions based on pleading requirements under Rule 783); Filipp v Till, 230 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (contrasting standing for subject matter jurisdiction purposes with pleading sufficiency under Rule 783).
II. Existence of Jurisdictional Facts
[18] In her second set of grounds, Sanders challenges AB Land’s evidence, asserting that AB Land has failed to present any admissible evidence establishing the boundary between their properties or that it owns land past Sanders’ fence line. In particular, she questions the admissibility and veracity of AB Land’s survey, the deposition of its surveyor, and its affidavits. In making these essentially no-evidence style arguments, Sanders appears to be misunderstanding how a defendant’s challenge to a plaintiff’s jurisdictional facts works. As set out above, a challenge to a plaintiff’s jurisdictional facts proceeds like a traditional motion for summary judgment. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. In other words, Sanders can’t prevail on her plea solely on the ground that AB Land has not presented any admissible evidence; instead, Sanders must first present evidence establishing AB Land lacked standing to assert the claims in its petition. See Lorence v. Morequity, Inc., No. 14-15-00177-CV, 2016 WL 3213314, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 9, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). In support of these grounds, however, Sanders does not point to any evidence establishing the proper legal boundary between the parties; she merely relies on the alleged weakness of AB Land’s evidence. Accordingly, the trial court erred to the extent it granted the plea to the jurisdiction on this ground.
III. Adverse Possession
[19–22] Lastly, Sanders asserts that AB Land does not have standing to defend against her affirmative defenses and counterclaims of adverse possession and boundary acquiescence. Sanders specifically argues that AB Land lacks standing because it did not have an ownership interest in the property when the limitations periods for adverse possession and acquiescence ran. Limitations, however, is generally classified as an affirmative defense and is not jurisdictional in nature, absent some contrary expression of legislative intent. See, e.g., In re United Servs Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 308 (Tex. 2010); Uddin v. Cunningham, No. 01-18-00002-CV, 2019 WL 4065273, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2019, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.). There is no such indication in the adverse possession statutes, and Sanders does not argue otherwise. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 16.024-.028. Moreover, the fact that Sanders has a competing adverse possession claim to the property AB Land alleges it owns by warranty deed does not defeat AB Land’s standing or the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to decide the dispute, although it might ultimately mean AB Land loses the case. See Purple Martin Land, 2021 WL 6069272, at *7 (holding trial court erred in holding plaintiff lacked standing as a result of defendant’s competing claim to property based on adverse possession); see also Beasley, 598 S.W.3d at 241 (explaining that the fact a plaintiff may ultimately not prevail on the merits does not deprive the plaintiff of standing). The trial court erred to the extent it granted the plea to the jurisdiction based on Sanders’ adverse possession arguments.
" ‘Adverse possession’ means an actual and visible appropriation of real property, commenced and continued under a claim of right that is inconsistent with and is hostile to the claim of another person " Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 16.021(1) "A party seeking to establish title to land by virtue of the statute of limitations has the burden of proving every fact essential to that claim by a preponderance of the evidence " Rhodes v Cahill, 802 S.W 2d 643, 645 (Tex 1990) At no point does Sanders suggest under which particular statute of limitations her adverse possession claim lies, instead, she claims that she satisfies the requirements of several such statutes See Tex Civ Prac. & Rem Code §§ 16 024-028 If an action to recover real property is barred by application of one of the adverse possession statutes of limitations, the person who holds the property in adverse possession has full title therein Id § 16 030 A boundary may also be established by acquiescence when all interested parties have recognized that boundary for a period beyond that required by the statute of limitations for adverse possession McAllister v Samuels, 857 S W 2d 768, 778 (Tex App—Houston [14th Dist ] 1993, no writ)
Disposition
We sustain AB Land’s third issue and reverse the portions of the trial court’s order granting the plea to the jurisdiction and denying all relief requested by AB Land. Because we reverse the grant of the plea to the jurisdiction, we also reverse the award of sanctions against AB Land, which was premised on the grant of the plea to the jurisdiction.
We reverse the trial court’s order in full and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.