Opinion
No. 349252
05-14-2020
AHDAWANTAZALAM AARON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MELISSA STAFFELD, Defendant-Appellee.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Court of Claims
LC No. 19-000040-MZ Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and SAWYER and RIORDAN, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (immunity granted by law and statute of limitations). We affirm the trial court's ruling that plaintiff's complaint was time-barred.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a dispute over two billboards that plaintiff erected on his own property. Defendant is a Highway Advertising Specialist at the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT). In 2011, defendant advised plaintiff that he was in violation of the Highway Advertising Act of 1972, MCL 252.301 et seq., because he lacked permits to display the billboards on his property. Defendant requested that plaintiff remove the signs.
Plaintiff unsuccessfully sought administrative review of this determination and unsuccessfully appealed the administrative decision. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Claims, again challenging defendant's 2011 notices. Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that plaintiff did not comply with the notice requirement for bringing a claim against the state, MCL 600.6431, and that plaintiff filed his complaint beyond the three-year limitations period for bringing a claim against the state, MCL 600.6452. Defendant further argued that the prior administrative decision, which was affirmed on appeal, precluded plaintiff's claim. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition, ruling that plaintiff did not meet the statutory notice requirement for bringing a claim against the state within one year of accrual of the claim, MCL 600.6431, and that plaintiff filed the complaint after the three-year limitations period, MCL 600.6452.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by failing to address the merits of his claim that defendant did not establish that the display of the billboards was impermissible. We disagree.
We review de novo a trial court's grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Citizens Ins Co v Scholz, 268 Mich App 659, 662; 709 NW2d 164 (2005). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is proper when the moving party has immunity or when a statute of limitations bars the claim. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
Plaintiff brought his claim against defendant in her capacity as MDOT's Highway Advertising Specialist. His claim is subject to the three-year limitations period set forth in MCL 600.6452. See MCL 600.6419(1)(a); MCL 600.6419(7). Plaintiff does not dispute that the claim accrued in 2011. Rather, he argues that the limitations period is four years, a number he arrives at by combining the one-year deadline to file notice of a claim against the state and the three-year limitations period. However, the notice requirement is independent of the statute of limitations, and does not extend the limitations period. Nor is the notice requirement provision applicable here. In any event, plaintiff filed the instant complaint in March 2019—well beyond his independently calculated four-year limitations period. Thus, the trial court properly applied the statute of limitations to bar plaintiff's claim.
MCL 600.6431(1) requires a claimant to file a notice in the Court of Claims of intent to file a lawsuit against the state within one year of the accrual of the claim. Failure to comply with this notice requirement warrants dismissal of a claim against the state. McCahan v Brennan, 492 Mich 730, 742, 745; 822 NW2d 747 (2012). Although the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over claims brought against an officer or employee of the state engaged in an official function, MCL 600.6419(1)(a) and (7), the notice requirement of MCL 600.6431(1) refers only to claims brought "against this state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies," not to individual state officers or employees. Accordingly, the notice requirement stated in MCL 600.6431 does not apply to individual officers or employees of the state. Pike v Northern Mich Univ, 327 Mich App 683, 698; 935 NW2d 86 (2019). In this case, plaintiff named "Melissa Staffeld, Highway Advertising Specialist for the Michigan Department of Transportation" as the defendant, but he did not name the state or MDOT. Therefore, the trial court erred by applying the statutory notice requirement to plaintiff's claim against an individual state officer or employee. However, this error does not require reversal because we agree with the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff's claim was time barred. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).
B. LACK OF PROGRESS
Plaintiff next makes the unpreserved argument that defendant's lack of progress in removing the unpermitted signs should have precluded summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.502(A)(1). We disagree.
Unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error. Demski v Petlick, 309 Mich App 404, 426-427; 873 NW2d 596 (2015). "To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights." Kern v Blethen-Coluni, 240 Mich App 333, 336; 612 NW2d 838 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The interpretation of a court rule is a legal question reviewed de novo. Lamkin v Engram, 295 Mich App 701, 707; 815 NW2d 793 (2012). Interpretation of court rules follows the same rules governing statutory interpretation. Haliw v Sterling Heights, 471 Mich 700, 704; 691 NW2d 753 (2005). We give the language of court rules their plain and ordinary meaning, and if the language poses no ambiguity, we need not look outside the rule or construe it, but must enforce the rule as written. Lamkin, 295 Mich App at 709.
MCR 2.502(A)(1) states:
On motion of a party or on its own initiative, the court may order that an action in which no steps or proceedings appear to have been taken within 91 days be dismissed for lack of progress unless the parties show that progress is being made or that the lack of progress is not attributable to the party seeking affirmative relief.MCR 2.502(A)(1) applies to the parties' conduct during a court case, not to the events leading to the court case or to defendant's delayed enforcement of plaintiff's statutory violations. This rule is meant to prevent an accumulation of "dead wood" in the trial court by permitting the dismissal of lawsuits that are not actively pursued with due diligence. See Robinson v Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 242 Mich 548, 550; 219 NW 661 (1928); Heaney v Verson Allsteel Press Co, Inc, 64 Mich App 597, 600; 236 NW2d 155 (1975).
Even if MCR 2.502(A)(1) were applicable to defendant's actions of enforcement, the only remedy provided under the rule is dismissal, which is the opposite of the relief that plaintiff seeks. For this same reason, we reject plaintiff's argument that MCR 2.502(A)(1) required dismissal of defendant's res judicata defense because defendant and the administrative law judge were not competent to declare that the billboards illegal. MCR 2.502(A)(1) only applies to the dismissal of a cause of action for failure to exercise diligence in pursuing the court action and has no apparent application to the doctrine of res judicata. Therefore, plaintiff's arguments relying on MCR 2.502(A)(1) have no merit.
"Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies," and the doctrine bars a subsequent action raising the same claim between the same parties. Wayne Co v Detroit, 233 Mich App 275, 277; 590 NW2d 619 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Res judicata applies to quasi-judicial administrative decisions." Id. at 277. The decisions by the administrative law judge are quasi-judicial administrative decisions and can preclude a subsequent claim. --------
C. TRANSFER
Plaintiff requests remand related to the circuit court's order that defendant file a notice of transfer to the Court of Claims. We reject this unpreserved request.
Unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error. Demski, 309 Mich App at 426-427. MCL 600.6404(3) governs the transfer of claims within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and states that the transfer of such a claim "shall be effective upon the filing of the transfer notice."
Before plaintiff filed the instant complaint in the Court of Claims, the Wayne Circuit Court dismissed plaintiff's previously filed complaint with an order that defendant file a notice of transfer to the Court of Claims. Plaintiff argues that this case should be remanded to the circuit court because defendant did not abide by the circuit court's order to transfer this matter to the Court of Claims. However, plaintiff obviated the need for transfer of his claim when he filed the instant complaint in the Court of Claims. Furthermore, the plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed because he did not file it within the statutory limitations period. MCL 600.6452. Therefore, remanding this case to the circuit court for transfer to the Court of Claims would bring plaintiff to the same procedural conclusion that began with his filing of a complaint in the Court of Claims and culminated in this appeal and would have no practical legal effect. Gen Motors Corp v Dep't of Treasury, 290 Mich App 355, 386; 803 NW2d 698 (2010) (an issue is moot when a judgment, if entered, cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect on the existing controversy).
Moreover, plaintiff did not file a claim of appeal from the circuit court's ruling that the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim. Thus, to the extent plaintiff seeks remand to the circuit court for the claim to proceed in circuit court, we have no authority to do so. Surman v Surman, 277 Mich App 287, 293-294; 745 NW2d 802 (2007) (we only have jurisdiction to review an order that is the subject of a properly filed claim of appeal). Therefore, we decline plaintiff's request for a remand to Wayne Circuit Court.
D. DISCOVERY
Plaintiff argues that defendant should have been required to respond to plaintiff's interrogatories and that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff's request for a scheduling order as moot. We disagree.
"A trial court's ruling on a discovery motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Truel v Dearborn, 291 Mich App 125, 131; 804 NW2d 744 (2010). "A trial court does not abuse its discretion when its decision falls within the range of principled outcomes." Rock v Crocker, 499 Mich 247, 255; 884 NW2d 227 (2016).
"Generally, a motion for summary disposition is premature if granted before discovery on a disputed issue is complete. However, summary disposition may nevertheless be appropriate if further discovery does not stand a reasonable chance of uncovering factual support for the opposing party's position." Peterson Novelties, Inc v City f Berkley, 249 Mich App 1, 24-25; 672 NW2d 351 (2003) (citations omitted). A party moving for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) may, but need not, include supporting documentation, nor is the opposing party required to provide supporting documentation to support its response. Maiden, 461 Mich at 119. The allegations in a complaint must be accepted as true unless contradicted by documentation. Id. Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is improper if a factual dispute remains. Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 406, 428-429, 430-431; 789 NW2d 211 (2010).
Plaintiff failed to identify any factual issue related to the application of the statute of limitations. He did not dispute the date his claim accrued or when he became aware of it. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendant's motion for summary disposition before the completion of discovery and dismissing as moot plaintiff's request for a scheduling order.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not committed error requiring reversal when it granted defendant's motion for summary disposition. Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael J. Riordan