The proscription against citing to unpublished opinions remained the same. The rationale underlying the prohibition against citing to unpublished opinions was discussed by the court of appeals in Aaron v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 424, 644 S.W.2d 301 (1982). There, the court stated:
After thoroughly reviewing the law on this issue, this court is convinced that the Arkansas legislature did not intend the result reached in Foster, and that the Arkansas Supreme Court would reject the position urged by SECU in this case. The Arkansas Supreme Court would not look to an unpublished decision of a federal district court, no matter where it was located, Aaron v. Everett, 6 Ark.App. 424, 644 S.W.2d 301, 302 (1982), and even a published federal district court decision would not be binding.Fidelity and Surety Bonds Generally
We have long held that "[a]n opinion which qualifies as one not designated for publication is written primarily for the parties and their attorneys. . . . Once again, we state that nonpublished opinions will not be considered as authority and should not be cited to this court." Weatherford v. State, 352 Ark. 324, 330-31, 101 S.W.3d 227, 232 (2003), quoting Aaron v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 424, 644 S.W.2d 301 (1982). (Emphasis ours.)
This appears to conflict with Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Rule 21(4). See also Aaron v. Everett, 6 Ark.App. 424, 426, 644 S.W.2d 301, 302 (1982).
We note, however, that the chancellor relied on an unpublished opinion of this court as authority for considering the other children as dependents. While appellant does not claim this as a predicate for error, we take this opportunity to again point out that citing, quoting or referring to unpublished opinions of this court is prohibited by Rule 21 of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. See Yockey v. Yockey, 24 Ark. App. 169, 750 S.W.2d 420 (1988); Aaron v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 424, 644 S.W.2d 301 (1982). We further note that the case referred to by the chancellor involved a reduction in child support based partially on the circumstance that custody of two of the parties four minor children was changed to the payor spouse, and is thus not directly supportive of the chancellor's ruling.
We would not remand if we could find that the appellant was not prejudiced by this additional evidence. Aaron v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 424, 644 S.W.2d 301 (1982). We fear, however, that prejudice did result and are especially concerned by a letter from the hospital's attorney which told the board that the same Appeal Tribunal referee who heard appellant's claim for unemployment benefits had heard Amy Lowe's claim for benefits and did not find that Lowe was the aggressor in the altercation.