Opinion
14-P-1668
06-12-2015
MICHAEL G. AARON v. LISA M. ADDIVINOLA.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Michael G. Aaron, appeals from a Superior Court judgment granting the defendant's special motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. We affirm.
Background. Except where otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. The parties were involved in a romantic relationship and lived together at the property that is now in dispute for approximately seventeen years. The defendant, Lisa M. Addivinola, purchased the home in 1996 for $169,000, with the plaintiff providing the entire $5,000 down payment. The plaintiff, however, did not partake in title at the time of the conveyance; the defendant is the sole grantee on the deed. The plaintiff did not allege in his complaint that he contributed to the payment of the mortgage, but claims that he contributed to the upkeep of the house. At the end of the parties' relationship, the defendant informed the plaintiff that she intended to evict him from her property. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a "verified complaint to establish resulting trust in real estate," and a motion for approval of memorandum of lis pendens. The defendant responded with a special motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint under G. L. c. 184, § 15. The motion judge denied the plaintiff's motion and allowed the defendant's special motion to dismiss the complaint, concluding that the plaintiff's claim to joint ownership in the property violated the Statute of Frauds. This appeal ensued.
Discussion. We review the allowance of the defendant's special motion to dismiss to determine "whether the trial court judge 'committed an error of law or abused [her] discretion in applying the standards of G. L. c. 184, § 15(c).'" McMann v. McGowan, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 513, 519 (2008), quoting from Galipault v. Wash Rock Invs., LLC., 65 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 82 (2005). The motion judge determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to a resulting trust because his contribution of $5,000, approximately three percent of the purchase price, cannot entitle him to an ownership interest in half of the property. To claim an interest in half of the home as part of a resulting trust, the plaintiff was required to prove that he contributed half of the purchase price. See Carroll v. Markey, 321 Mass. 87, 88-89 (1947). Any oral agreement, such as that asserted by the plaintiff, that the parties intended that the plaintiff's contribution should entitle him to joint ownership of the property violates the Statute of Frauds. See Quinn v. Quinn, 260 Mass. 494, 501-503 (1927). Thus, the judge determined that the plaintiff's claim of joint ownership of the property based on his contribution of the down payment was "in the teeth of the [S]tatute of [F]rauds," ibid, and did not abuse her discretion in denying the lis pendens or in dismissing the complaint.
The plaintiff's assertion in his complaint that he contributed to the "expenses" of the house is unavailing as a basis for the creation of a resulting trust. See Saulnier v. Saulnier, 328 Mass. 238, 239-240 (1952).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Grainger, Hanlon & Carhart, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: June 12, 2015.