Aanestad v. Air Canada, Inc.

10 Citing cases

  1. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983

    664 F. Supp. 1478 (D.D.C. 1986)   Cited 5 times

    This Court holds that plaintiffs' is the sounder view. See, In Re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Massachusetts on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D.Mass. 1975); Jayne v. Royal Jordanian Airlines Corp., 502 F. Supp. 848, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, sub. nom. Lin v. American Airlines, 454 U.S. 878, 102 S.Ct. 358, 70 L.Ed.2d 187 (1981); Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557, 559 (D.N.J. 1982). Once the decision is made to apply the law of the transferor court, it is necessary to ascertain what that law is. The Ninth Circuit has never addressed the issue of what locations may be considered destinations for the purpose of determining subject matter jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention. Only in one case in the Central District of California was this matter discussed.See, Aanestad v. Air Canada, 382 F. Supp. 550 (C.D.Cal. 1974); Aanestad v. Air Canada, 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D.Cal. 1975). In Aanestad the Court, contrary to the holding of every other court in the United States, held that a round trip flight may have more than one place of destination.

  2. Rinck v. Lufthansa

    57 A.D.2d 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)   Cited 5 times
    Observing that where carrier sold ticket to passenger, "there was mutuality of obligation and a binding contract of carriage."

    The dictionary definition of "destination" is variously set forth as "[t]he place set for the end of the journey"; "the predetermined end of a journey." Plaintiffs in contending that their destination was New York, rely on Aanestad v Air Canada ( 390 F. Supp. 1165). In Aanestad it was noted (p 1168) that the "place of destination" as used in the Warsaw Convention does not state "final" or "ultimate" destination and that the phrase connotes, under certain circumstances, the place of origin and, in addition, where open fares are involved, the "outward destination."

  3. Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transport Co., LTD

    962 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1992)   Cited 31 times
    Recognizing rejection of Aanestad by the same District Court and holding that there can only be one destination for round trip transportation

    I. Place of Destination Swaminathan contends that New York City was the place of destination under Article 28 because he left the specific flight numbers and dates for his return to Dakar open, citing Aenestad v. Air Canada, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D.Cal. 1975), in support of his argument that when the flight number, time, and class on a return trip from the United States are left open, the place of destination is the city in the United States. He misperceives the law.

  4. Compania Mex. De Aviacion v. U.S. Dist. Court

    859 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1988)   Cited 47 times
    Holding that the denial of a motion to dismiss for sovereign immunity is an appealable collateral order

    The place of destination is the final destination according to the contract of carriage. Aanestad v. Air Canada, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D.Cal.), dismissed 549 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1977). See In re Alleged Food Poisoning Incident, March, 1984, 770 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1985).

  5. Lee v. China Airlines Ltd.

    669 F. Supp. 979 (C.D. Cal. 1987)   Cited 16 times

    The Lees argue that their "destination" was San Francisco, not Hong Kong. They note that although they purchased a round trip ticket, the return portion of the ticket did not specify a date or a flight number. They argue that under Aanestad v. Air Canada Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D.Cal. 1975), when passengers carry such "open" round trip tickets, the destination is the stopping point of the first leg of the trip. Although Aanestad was decided by a judge in this district, this court respectfully declines to follow its holding because it finds Aanestad's reasoning unpersuasive.

  6. Hurley v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

    562 F. Supp. 260 (C.D. Cal. 1983)   Cited 4 times

    The determination of whether a particular stop constitutes a place of destination is to be determined on a case to case basis taking into account such factors as the passenger's intent, the nature of the stop and the length of the stop. Cf. Aanestad v. Air Canada, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1165, 1168 (C.D.Cal. 1975) (place of destination as used in the Warsaw Convention describes at least two places of destination). Defendant cites and this court is cognizant of a line of cases arising out of the Second and Third Circuits which adopt the interpretation advanced by defendant.

  7. Butz v. British Airways

    421 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1976)   Cited 25 times

    Vergara v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines", 390 F. Supp. at 1269; accord, Parkinson v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 10 Av.Cas. 17,967 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Burdell v. Canadien Pacific Airways, Ltd., 17 Av.Cas. 17,356 (Ill. Cir.Ct. 1969); Felsenfeld v. Societe Anonyme Belge D'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne, 234 N.Y.S.2d 351 (City Civ.Ct. 1962); Bowen v. Port of N Y Authority, 8 Av.Cas. 18,043 (Sup.Ct.Queen City 1964); cf. 1 L. Kriendler, Aviation Accident Law § 11.05 n. 25; Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 497, 523 (1967); Note, Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention: A Suggested Analysis, 50 Minn.L.Rev. 697, 702 (1966). Aanestad v. Air Canada, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D.Cal. 1975) comes to a contrary conclusion. There, the court reasoned that because the flight, class, date and hour of the return was left open, to be taken or not at the option of the passenger before a specified date, there was no contract of carriage for the return flight but only an un-exercised option.

  8. Rinck v. Lufthansa

    376 N.E.2d 929 (N.Y. 1978)   Cited 2 times

    The Convention is silent on the definition of "destination" in cases involving open tickets. The courts in other jurisdictions have failed to develop a consensus (compare Aanestad v Air Canada, 390 F. Supp. 1165, app dsmd 549 F.2d 806, with Butz v British Airways, 421 F. Supp. 127), the United States Government, which negotiated the Convention, is unenthusiastic about this outcome (see Varkonyi v S.A. Empresa de Viacao Airea Rio Grandense, 71 Misc.2d 607, 611), and the cited earlier cases in this State do not deal with the situation where the injury occurred in New York on the final termination of a flight here (see Garcia v Pan Amer. Airways, 269 App. Div. 287, affd 295 N.Y. 852, cert den 329 U.S. 741; Wyman v Pan Amer. Airways, 181 Misc. 963, affd 267 App. Div. 947, affd 293 N.Y. 878, cert den 324 U.S. 882; Galli v Re-Al Brazilian Int. Airlines, 29 Misc.2d 499). I would therefore reverse the order of the Appellate Division and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, New York County, for trial. Order affirmed, etc.

  9. Steber v. British Caledonian Airways

    549 So. 2d 986 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989)

    British Caledonian rejects the theory that on a round-trip flight the point of origin is always the ultimate destination. For its position defendant relies on the cases of Hurley v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 260 (C.D.Cal. 1983), and Aanestad v. Air Canada, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D.Cal. 1975). These two cited cases stand for the proposition that in the round-trip situation there can be at least two places of destination for purposes of Article 28(1) jurisdiction.

  10. P.T. Airfast Serv., Indonesia v. Superior Court

    139 Cal.App.3d 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 5 times

    It is only after jurisdiction in both senses is had that the question of venue is reached and a determination made regarding the appropriateness and convenience for the parties of a particular domestic court." (See also Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. (2d Cir. 1965) 341 F.2d 851, 855; Vergara v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines" (D.C. Neb. 1975) 390 F. Supp. 1266; Aenestad v. Air Canada, Inc. (D.C.Cal. 1975) 390 F. Supp. 1165, app. dism. at 549 F.2d 806.) The Smith court further observed in a footnote that "If the Convention allows suit, a plaintiff may pursue his case in a federal or a state court, Congress having never placed Warsaw Convention suits exclusively within the province of federal courts.