Opinion
No. 1-1026 / 01-0323
Filed September 25, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Alan L. Pearson, Judge.
A.Y. McDonald appeals from the district court's judgment affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's decision awarding benefits to William Lawrence. AFFIRMED.
Les Reddick of Kane, Norby Reddick, Dubuque, for appellant.
Mark Sullivan of Reynolds Kenline, L.L.P., Dubuque, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Hecht, JJ.
A.Y. McDonald Manufacturing Co. appeals from the district court's judgment affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's decision awarding benefits on review-reopening to its former employee, William Lawrence. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Lawrence originally injured his back while working at A.Y. McDonald on August 24, 1989. Because of that injury, he had surgery on a herniated disk on November 14, 1990. The surgeon removed disk material at the L4-5 level. After the injury and surgery, Lawrence applied for and received workers' compensation benefits for a fifteen-percent industrial disability. Lawrence returned to work until he was laid off in 1992. He was recalled to work later that year; however, he was unable to pass the employer's required physical test. Lawrence has not worked for A.Y. McDonald since then. Lawrence's condition worsened and he was awarded an additional fifty-percent industrial disability (for a total of sixty-five percent) after a review-reopening proceeding in 1994.
Since that time, Lawrence has had two additional surgeries. Dr. Field performed surgery in September 1997 and again in January 1998. As a result, Field increased Lawrence's permanent whole body impairment from fifteen percent to seventeen percent. In 1999 Lawrence filed another review-reopening seeking an increased industrial disability award. The commissioner determined Lawrence's industrial disability was one hundred percent and awarded benefits accordingly. On judicial review the district court affirmed, resulting in this appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
An appeal of a district court's ruling on judicial review of an agency's decision is limited to determining whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its judicial review function under Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) (1995). Herrera v. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Iowa 2001). The district court, as well as this court, is bound by the commissioner's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001).
III. The Merits.
The purpose of a review-reopening proceeding is to determine "whether or not the condition of the employee warrants an end to, diminishment of, or increase of compensation so awarded or agreed upon." Iowa Code § 86.14(2) (1997).
The claimant carries the burden of establishing by a preponderance of evidence that, subsequent to the date of the award under review, he or she has suffered an impairment or lessening of earning capacity proximately caused by the original injury. Blacksmith v. All-American, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 348, 350 (Iowa 1980); Deaver v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 170 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Iowa 1969).
The necessary showing in a review-reopening proceeding may be made without proof of change in physical condition. Blacksmith, 290 N.W.2d at 350, 3A Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 81.31(e), at 15-1030 (1989). That is because industrial disability is the product of many factors, only one of which is functional disability stemming from the physical injury. McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Iowa 1980). Other factors include age, education, experience, and "inability, because of the injury, to engage in employment for which [the employee] is fitted." Id. (quoting Olson v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 255 Iowa 1112, 1121, 125 N.W.2d 251, 257 (1963)).
Gallardo v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 482 N.W.2d 393, 395-96 (Iowa 1992). Another factor supporting an increase in the industrial disability award is the failure of a diagnosed physical condition to improve to the extent anticipated. Simonson v. Snap-On Tools, Corp., 588 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Iowa 1999).
On judicial review of review-reopening proceedings, the issue is whether substantial evidence supports the agency's conclusion that the claimant's worsened condition was not contemplated at the time of the original disability award. Id. "Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the given conclusion." St. Luke's Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 2000). Evidence in support of an agency decision is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences; nor is evidence insubstantial because of the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from it. City of Hampton v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 554 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Iowa 1996). The reviewing court must respect the weight given to the evidence by the agency. Burns v. Bd. of Nursing, 495 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Iowa 1993). The mere possibility that the record might support another conclusion does not permit the reviewing court to make a finding inconsistent with the agency finding so long as there is substantial evidence to support the agency ruling. City of Davenport v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 264 N.W.2d 307, 311-12 (Iowa 1978).
The commissioner's decision awarding Lawrence additional benefits includes the following findings:
Claimant has again shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he has sustained a change of condition not contemplated at the initial review-reopening proceeding. These changes, as noted in the second review-reopening decision are as follows:
Prior to the first review-reopening proceeding (April of 1994), claimant had undergone back surgery on January 22, 1993. Since that hearing, he has undergone two additional surgeries, one in September of 1997, the other in January of 1998.
Claimant testified that since April of 1994 (the first review-reopening hearing) his condition has deteriorated. While he reported improvement shortly after the third surgery (performed on January 16, 1998), claimant explained that the pain in the low back returned. Additionally, claimant indicated that he now experiences shooting pains in the back. Claimant also testified that he now has constant burning and pain in the right leg, as well as weakness in both legs. This deterioration has been in conjunction with the two additional surgeries which claimant has undergone since the April 1994 review-reopening hearing. The surgeon, Dr. Field, provided an opinion that the subsequent surgeries were necessitated by the original injury, and assessed an additional two percent permanent partial impairment rating to the low back.
A.Y. McDonald challenges the evidentiary support for the commissioner's findings, noting evidence indicating Lawrence's physical condition had not declined, as claimed, since 1994. A.Y. McDonald also argues that any impairment or lessening of Lawrence's earning capacity was attributable to his failure to successfully complete college courses in which he enrolled subsequent to the 1994 review-reopening hearing. In support of its argument, A.Y. McDonald cites testimony from its medical experts contradicting Dr. Field's assessment of Lawrence's medical condition. In addition, A.Y. McDonald claims Lawrence's receipt of social security disability benefits prior to 1994 is evidence that he was totally disabled and therefore his condition could not have declined to the extent claimed. A.Y. McDonald also claims that Lawrence's true motivation for dropping out of college was to preserve his eligibility for social security disability benefits rather than his claimed academic inability to do college coursework. While the evidence cited could support inferences contrary to those made by the commissioner, that fact does not render the evidence supporting the commissioner's decision insubstantial. St. Luke's Hosp., 604 N.W.2d at 649. The record indicates the commissioner considered the evidence supporting A.Y. McDonald's claims and reached a contrary conclusion based largely on the credibility assigned to testimony by Lawrence and his treating physician.
We, like the district court, find that the commissioner's decision awarding Lawrence additional benefits is substantially supported by the evidence. We accordingly affirm.