Carter v. Smith, 170 S.W.3d 402, 409 (Ky. App. 2004). On appeal, Angela relies on the recent Kentucky Supreme Court opinion, A.H. v. W.R.L., 482 S.W.3d 372 (Ky. 2016). In that case, the Supreme Court determined that Amy, mother's former partner, had asserted a cognizable legal interest in her motion to intervene in a stepparent adoption proceeding pursuant to CR 24.01(1)(b).

CR 24.01 gives a party the power to intervene by right if its mandates are met. CR 24.02, on the other hand, "provides trial courts with discretion to allow intervention in cases if the interest of the movant so warrants, even if the asserted interest fails to satisfy the dictates of CR 24.01." A.H. v. W.R.L., 482 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Ky. 2016). Though they did not directly invoke it in their motion to intervene, the McGeorges sought to intervene under CR 24.01, which states in pertinent part:

Thus, we review denial of a motion to intervene for clear error. A.H. v. W.R.L. , 482 S.W.3d 372, 373 (Ky. 2016) (citing Ashland Pub. Libr. , 610 S.W.2d at 896 ). ANALYSIS

A trial court's resolution of a motion to intervene in domestic relations cases receives special deference. See A.H. v. W.R.L., 482 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Ky. 2016). The Jackson Family Court deemed the motions to have been untimely.

In City of Henderson v. Todd: See City of Henderson v. Todd, 314 S.W.2d 948 (Ky. 1958); Hazel Enterprises, LLC v. Community Financial Services Bank, 382 S.W.3d 65 (Ky. App. 20.12); Baker v. Webb, 127 S.W.3d 622 (Ky. 2004); and A.H. v. W.R.L, 482 S.W.3d 372 (Ky. 2016). It was well settled under the former Civil Code that the filing of an intervening petition by an interested party was a matter of right and a denial thereof was an appealable order.

Instead, paternity can be established after intervention is granted as a precondition for granting custody on the basis of being a qualified relative. See A.H. v. W.R.L., 482 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Ky. 2016) (clarifying that regarding intervention in an adoption proceeding, "standing and intervention are two distinct concepts, and that standing to seek adoption is not a condition for intervening in an adoption proceeding" and the right to intervene did not hinge upon whether the intervenor would ultimately succeed in her custody petition). In McGeorge v. Brown, No. 2017-CA-000983-MR, 2019 WL 259443, at *3 (Ky.App. Jan. 18, 2019) (unpublished), the Court interpreted A.H. as equally applying to custody proceedings where intervention was sought and explained that "standing to seek custody is immaterial to the issue of whether the [grandparents] could intervene as a matter of right under CR 24.01."

This Court has repeatedly applied CR 24.01 to family law cases to determine whether or not a party should have been allowed to intervene in an action. The most recent of those cases was A.H. v. W.R.L., 482 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Ky. 2016), in which this Court held that biological mother's former same-sex partner had a cognizable interest, pursuant to subsection (b), in maintaining a relational connection with the child. Such cognizable interest granted the entitlement to intervene as a matter of right in the step-parent adoption proceeding brought by the biological mother's new spouse.

See A.H. v. W.R.L., 482 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Ky. 2016). CONCLUSION

We review a trial court's order granting or denying intervention for clear error. A.H. v. W.R.L., 482 S.W.3d 372, 373 (Ky. 2016).

Based upon our review of the relevant case law, we find the holding of the Kentucky Supreme Court in A.H. v. W.R.L., 482 S.W.3d 372 (Ky. 2016), is dispositive. In that case, the trial court permitted intervention by a former same sex partner in a step-parent adoption petition filed by the new spouse.