Opinion
2:23-cv-576-JLB-NPM
02-05-2024
898 Fifth Avenue South Holdings, LLC, Plaintiff, v. Clark John Pear, Defendant.
ORDER
JOHN L. BADALAMENTI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Defendant Clark John Pear has filed an objection (Doc. 18) to the Magistrate Judge's Order (Doc. 17) remanding this landlord-tenant action to state court. After an independent review of the record, the Court OVERRULES Defendant's objection (Doc. 18). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), (b).
In May 2023, Plaintiff 898 Fifth Avenue South Holdings, LLC filed a two-count complaint in county court against Mr. Pear seeking to evict him and collect damages “not exceeding]” $30,000 for breaching the lease. (See Doc. 15 at 1-3). Mr. Pear removed this action to this Court on July 31, 2023. (See Doc. 1). But Mr. Pear has failed to establish any basis for this Court's jurisdiction. See Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2008) (reiterating that the “removing defendant bears the burden of proving proper federal jurisdiction” and that “[a]ny doubts about the propriety of federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A removing defendant “must show that the plaintiffs' complaint, as it existed at the time of removal, provides an adequate basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 1295 (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); accord Adventure Outdoors, 552 F.3d at 1295 (“In determining whether jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a court must look to the well-pleaded complaint alone”). But here, there is no federal question apparent on the face of Plaintiff's complaint. (See Doc. 15).
Mr. Pear instead appears to contend that this Court has federal-question jurisdiction based on his own asserted “complaint” and his asserted defenses. (See Doc. 18 at 1-2, 22; see also Docs. 1, 9, 13, 14, 16).But “[t]he existence of federal jurisdiction is tested at the time of removal” and “must be apparent from the face of the [plaintiff's] well-pleaded complaint and not from a defense or anticipated defense.” Adventure Outdoors, 552 F.3d at 1294-95; Newton v. Capital Assur. Co., Inc., 245 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001). Mr. Pear has accordingly not established any basis for this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
For example, in his “complaint,” Mr. Pear alleges federal constitutional and RICO violations (see Doc. 18 at 1-21), and he has argued that federal-question jurisdiction exists to address (i) the alleged violations of his constitutional rights by the county court judge (see, e.g., Doc. 1 at 1-2; Doc. 18 at 10-12) and by Plaintiff (see, e.g., Doc. 9 at 1; Doc. 13 at 4-6), and (ii) Plaintiff's failure to provide a safe and habitable residence under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (see Docs. 14, 16).
Mr. Pear also now suggests in his objections to the Magistrate Judge's Order that this Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (See Doc. 18 at 7). But Mr. Pear's conclusory assertion, at the very least, fails to meet his burden to establish the statutory requirements for such jurisdiction. See, e.g., Adventure Outdoors, 552 F.3d at 1294 (reiterating removing party's burden).
The Court further notes that Mr. Pear states that he is a “Citizen of Florida.” (Doc. 18 at 7). The removal statute provides, however, that “[a] civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons:
1. Defendant's objection (Doc. 18) is OVERRULED.
2. This case is remanded to the County Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Collier County, Florida. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to transmit a certified copy of this order to the Collier County, Florida, Clerk of Court.
3. Mr. Pear's motions for summary judgment and for a hearing (Docs. 24, 25, and 26) and Plaintiff's motion for ruling (Doc. 27) are DENIED as moot.
4. The Court retains jurisdiction as to any requests for attorneys' fees and expenses (see Doc. 17 at 3-4).
ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida on February 5, 2024.