In the only prior case in this jurisdiction in which a co-operative apartment was involved, the corporation itself was the landlord-petitioner. ( 542 Morris Park Avenue Corp. v. Wilkins, 120 Misc. 48.) That was in accordance with subdivision 1-a of section 1410 of the Civil Practice Act. This subdivision has since been repealed (L. 1939, ch. 356) and hence these decisions are not binding on this court.

Whatever may be the exact relation between a corporation holding title to a cooperative apartment house and one to whom it has sold one of the apartment units, the relationship is far more than the conventional relationship of landlord and tenant. One who holds stock or other certificate entitling him to use of a cooperative apartment is generally said to have "purchased" the apartment, Wardman Const. Co. v. Flynn, 60 App.D.C. 357, 54 F.2d 831, and in effect is regarded as the owner of it. 542 Morris Park Ave. Corporation v. Wilkins, 120 Misc. 48, 197 N.Y.S. 625. It has been said that although the corporation holds legal title the entire equitable estate is distributed proportionately among the owners of the apartments and that ownership of an apartment constitutes an interest in real property.

And when the rights of a landlord are as clear as we think they are here, it is the duty of the courts to give them validity. 1165 Fifth Avenue Corporation v. Alger, 261 App. Div. 608, 26 N.Y.S.2d 671 (reversed on other grounds in 288 N.Y. 67, 41 N.E.2d 461, 141 A.L.R. 1157); Tompkins v. Hale, 172 Misc. 1071, 15 N.Y.S.2d 854; 542 Morris Park Ave. Corporation v. Wilkins, 120 Misc. 48, 197 N.Y.S. 625. Penthouse Properties v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417, 422.

Therefore, as of September 10, the date of the trial herein, the tenant was not then protected by any such Federal requirement, as he had been prior to July 1, 1947.' See also Kole v. Kousnetz, 1948, 335 Ill. App. 123, 80 N.E.2d 451. It has been recognized, under Acts modeled upon the Federal pattern, that purchasers of apartments under the cooperative plan are to be treated as landlords or owners. See Hicks v. Bigelow, D.C. Mun. Ct., 55 A.2d 924, and Smith v. Feigin, 273 App. Div. 277, 77 N.Y.S.2d 229, affirmed without opinion by the Now York Court of Appeals, 298 N.Y. 534, 80 N.E.2d 668. [See, also, 542 Morris Park Ave. Corporation v. Wilkins, 197 N.Y.S. 625, 627; Curtis v. Le May, 60 N.Y.S.2d 768, 770.] "The appellant further calls attention to the fact that before the argument of this case on appeal, but after the passage of the decree appealed from, Congress extended the Act of 1947 for one year effective April 1, 1948, with certain amendments.

The purpose of the acts would be frustrated by any other interpretation. Where the circumstances are such as to warrant doing so, the courts, for certain purposes, will pierce the corporate veil, looking behind the corporate fiction ( Tompkins v. Miller, Tompkins Company, 207 App. Div. 819). In this instance, and for this limited purpose, the intention of the Legislature is more adequately accomplished by disregarding the entity of Doctors' Owning Corporation and treating the tenants as the titleholders of their respective spaces ( 542 Morris Park Ave. Corp. v. Wilkins, 120 Misc. 48, 51; cf. Abel v. Paterno, 245 App. Div. 285, 289, referring to a proprietary lease as the "purchase" of a home; Prudence Co. v. 160 West 73d St. Corp., 260 N.Y. 205, where such a transaction is described as a "sale"; and Penthouse Properties, Inc., v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 App. Div. 685, 692) where it is said that the arrangement "afforded the practical means for combining an ownership interest with a method for sharing proportionately the assessments for maintenance and taxes." The determination of the Appellate Term should be reversed, and the final order of the Municipal Court should be affirmed, with costs to the landlord in all courts.

The petitioner, though styled a "proprietary lessee", is still a lessee; he is but a stockholder of the corporate owner, who, by reason thereof, has obtained the right to lease certain space, "rental area" in a building owned by the corporation; he acquired no ownership or title to the area, but, as the lease itself provides, acquired merely the right to possession and peaceable enjoyment of the rented space, subject to having his lease terminated, and being ousted from such possession if he fails to perform the covenants and conditions on his part to be performed. In 542 Morris Park Avenue Corp. v. Wilkins ( 120 Misc. 48) a summary proceeding was instituted by the corporate owner of a co-operative apartment building in behalf of certain stockholders, and the point involved was whether the corporation had the right to maintain summary proceedings in their behalf. It was claimed that the stockholders who occupied certain apartments were the proper parties to bring the proceeding.

The co-operative tenant has been considered as in the nature of an owner, not merely a naked lessee — so that, for purposes of summary proceedings, he has been regarded a landlord. ( Curtis v. Le May, 186 Misc. 853, 856; 542 Morris Park Ave. Corp. v. Wilkins, 120 Misc. 48, 51; see Smith v. Feigin, 273 App. Div. 277, affd. 298 N.Y. 534; see, also, Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc.2d 588, 591.)

Respondent then added: "It has always been the unanimous position of the courts that the owner of a cooperative apartment is the `landlord' of a `housing accommodation * * * located in a one- * * * family house'". In support of this contention respondent quoted at length from Smith v. Feigin ( 273 App. Div. 277, affd. 298 N.Y. 534) and from Hicks v. Bigelow ( 55 A.2d 924 [Dist. of Col.]) and cited 542 Morris Park Ave. Corp. v. Wilkins ( 120 Misc. 48 [App. Term, 1st Dept., 1922, LEHMAN, J.]). Respondent then cogently urged: "Indeed, nowhere in the decided cases can there be found a single voice holding otherwise than that the owner of a cooperative apartment is the owner of his own home — in other words, the landlord of a one-family house.

Considered separately the shares of stock and the lease each would be considered personalty for purposes of estate distribution (Surrogate's Ct. Act, § 202, subds. 1, 8; Schmitt v. Stoss, 207 N.Y. 731; Wells v. Higgins, 132 N.Y. 459) and the fact that the stock ownership is prerequisite to the procurement of the lease would not seem to affect the legal classification of these assets. Some courts, for the very limited purposes of dispossess proceedings, have disregarded the corporate entity in co-operative apartment enterprises and have regarded a lessee as either an owner-lessee or a title holder of certain space (Smith v. Feigin, 273 App. Div. 277, affd. 298 N.Y. 534; Curtis v. Le May, 186 Misc. 853; see 542 Morris Park Ave. Corp. v. Wilkins, 120 Misc. 48, 51) while in other instances the shareholder-lessee has been considered a tenant (Greenberg v. Colonial Studios, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 87, revg. 105 N. Y. S. 2d 494; Braislin, Porter & Baldwin v. Sawdon, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 774; cf. Dunbar Apts. v. Nelson, 136 Misc. 561). Such rulings, however, are not necessarily inconsistent with the generally accepted classification of an estate measured by a definite number of years as personalty and not realty (see Despard v. Churchill, 53 N.Y. 192; Matter of Ehrsam, 37 App. Div. 272; Matter of Althause, 63 App. Div. 252, affd. 168 N.Y. 670; Rodack v. New Moon Theatre, 121 Misc. 63; Durand v. Lipman, 165 Misc. 615, 622; Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N.Y. 501; Decedent Estate Law § 80, subd. 1, and Restatement, Property, § 8). The testator was an attorney and was familiar with this traditional classification.

Considered separately the shares of stock and the lease each would be considered personalty for purposes of estate distribution (Surrogate's Ct. Act, § 202, subds. 1, 8; Schmitt v. Stoss, 207 N.Y. 731; Wells v. Higgins, 132 N.Y. 459) and the fact that the stock ownership is prerequisite to the procurement of the lease would not seem to affect the legal classification of these assets. Some courts, for the very limited purposes of dispossess proceedings, have disregarded the corporate entity in co-operative apartment enterprises and have regarded a lessee as either an owner-lessee or a title holder of certain space ( Smith v. Feigin, 273 A.D. 277, affd. 298 N.Y. 534; Curtis v. Le May, 186 Misc. 853; see 542 Morris Park Ave. Corp. v. Wilkins, 120 Misc. 48, 51) while in other instances the shareholder-lessee has been considered a tenant ( Greenberg v. Colonial Studios, 107 N.Y.S.2d 87, revg. 105 N.Y.S.2d 494; Braislin, Porter Baldwin v. Sawdon, 68 N.Y.S.2d 774; cf. Dunbar Apts. v. Nelson, 136 Misc. 561). Such rulings, however, are not necessarily inconsistent with the generally accepted classification of an estate measured by a definite number of years as personalty and not realty (see Despard v. Churchill, 53 N.Y. 192; Matter of Ehrsam, 37 A.D. 272; Matter of Althause, 63 A.D. 252, affd. 168 N.Y. 670; Rodack v. New Moon Theatre, 121 Misc. 63; Durand v. Lipman, 165 Misc. 615, 622; Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N.Y. 501; Decedent Estate Law § 80, subd. 1, and Restatement, Property, § 8).