What constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default generally lies within the sound discretion of the motion court. ( Chevalier v. 368 E. 148th Street Associates, LLC , 80 A.D.3d 411, 914 N.Y.S.2d 130 [1st Dept. 2011] ; 38 Holding Corp. v. New York , 179 A.D.2d 486, 578 N.Y.S.2d 174 [1st Dept. 1992].) In addition to the grounds set forth in CPLR 5015(a), this court has the discretion to vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice.

"A defendant seeking to vacate a default under [CPLR 5015 (a) (1)] must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its delay in appearing and answering the complaint and a meritorious defense to the action" (Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]). "A determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the court" (38 Holding Corp. v City New York, 179 AD2d 486, 487 [1st Dept 1992]). Public policy favors disposing of cases on their merits (see Johnson-Roberts v Ira Judelson Bail Bonds, 140 AD3d 509, 509 [1st Dept 2016]).

What constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default generally lies within the sound discretion of the motion court. Grutman v. Southgate At Bar Harbor Home Owners' Assn., 207 A.D.2d 526, 527, 616 N.Y.S.2d 68 (2nd Dep't 1994) ; 38 Holding Corp. v. New York, 179 A.D.2d 486, 578 N.Y .S.2d 174 (1st Dep't 1992). The determination of whether a reasonable excuse has been offered is sui generis and should be based on all relevant factors, among which are the length of the delay chargeable to the movant, whether the opposing party has been prejudiced, whether the default was willful or deliberate, and the strong public policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits rather than on default.

What constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default generally lies within the sound discretion of the motion court. Grutman v. Southgate At Bar Harbor Home Owners' Assn., 207 AD2d 526, 527, 616 N.Y.S.2d 68 (2nd Dep't 1994); 38 Holding Corp. v. New York, 179 AD2d 486, 578 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1st Dep't 1992). The determination of whether a reasonable excuse has been offered is sui generis and should be based on all relevant factors, among which are the length of the delay chargeable to the movant, whether the opposing party has been prejudiced, whether the default was willful or deliberate, and the strong public policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits rather than on default.

Appeal from default final judgment (Brenda Spears, J.), dated March 12, 2012, dismissed, without costs, as taken from a nonappealable paper ( seeCPLR 5511). The requirement that a motion for leave to renew be based upon newly-discovered facts is a flexible one, and a court, in its discretion, may grant renewal upon facts known to the moving party at the time of the original motion ( see Petsako v. Zweig, 8 AD3d 355, 356 [2004];38 Holding Corp. v. City of New York, 179 A.D.2d 486, 488 [1992] ). The circumstances here present warrant the grant of the long-term, rent stabilized tenant's renewal motion and, upon renewal, the grant of her prior motion to vacate her isolated default in defending against the holdover petition.

Accordingly, neither the parol evidence rule, nor the agreements' merger clause, bars defendants' claim of fraudulent inducement.Under these circumstances, we find that defendants' claim of fraudulent inducement is sufficiently substantial and meritorious to support vacatur of their default, and the order appealed from should be reversed ( see Crespo v. A.D.A. Mgt., 292 A.D.2d 5, 9, 739 N.Y.S.2d 49 [2002];38 Holding Corp. v. City of New York, 179 A.D.2d 486, 487, 578 N.Y.S.2d 174 [1992] ).

In January 2010, the court granted renewal, and upon renewal vacated its dismissal and reinstated Notias's third-party claims "pursuant to the [longstanding policy of the Courts to favor adjudication of the merits over default dismissals, and pursuant to an adequate showing herein that there are issues of fact to be resolved at trial as to Triboro's possible responsibility for the injuries sustained by plaintiff." An application to vacate an order of default may be granted if the movant shows that the default was excusable and that the defense to the action is meritorious ( 38 Holding Corp. v City of New York, 179 AD2d 486, 487). It is within the court's sound discretion to determine whether the movant's excuse for the default is sufficient ( id.; see also Chelli v Kelly Group, P.C., 63 AD3d 632, 633 [court abused its discretion in denying motion to vacate where defendants' failure to appear "was purely the result of inadvertent law office failure" by their attorneys]; SS Constantine Helen's Romanian Orthodox Church of Am. v Z. Zindel, Inc., 44 AD3d 744, 745 [court providently exercised its discretion in determining that excuse was reasonable, where counsel's failure to oppose summary judgment motion was isolated and unintentional with no evidence of willful neglect I).

To vacate their default in answering pursuant to CPLR 3211 (f), the appellants were required to demonstrate a justifiable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense ( see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Waste Mgt. of N.Y., Inc. v Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corp., 13 AD3d 362; cf. Ennis v Lema, 305 AD2d 632, 633). The appellants proffered a justifiable excuse for the short delay in serving an answer ( see Kranz v Braverman, 15 AD3d 451; Fine v Fine, 12 AD3d 399; 38 Holding Corp. v City of New York, 179 AD2d 486, 487-488), and demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense through the affidavit of the appellant Gopal Burgher ( see Franklin v 172 Aububon Corp., 32 AD3d 454). Accordingly, that branch of the appellants' motion which was to vacate their default should have been granted.

In moving to vacate the order dismissing the complaint, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default in appearing at the conference and a meritorious cause of action ( see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141; Bitterman v. Hurewitz, 15 AD3d 434; Santiago v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 10 AD3d 393, 394; Lopez v. Imperial Delivery Servs., supra at 197; Syed v. Fedor, 296 AD2d 399). The plaintiffs' trial counsel provided a reasonable excuse for his failure to appear at the trial/settlement conference based upon his wife's emergency dental treatment, which was substantiated by medical documentation ( see Fine v. Fine, 12 AD3d 399, 400; 38 Holding Corp. v. City of New York, 179 AD2d 486, 487). Furthermore, the affidavit of the plaintiff Antonina Zeltser set forth facts sufficiently establishing that the action is meritorious ( see Bianco v. LiGreci, 298 AD2d 482; Anamdi v. Anugo, 229 AD2d 408, 409).

There is a sufficient basis set forth in the complaint to support a cause of action based upon fraud ( see CPLR 3016 [b]; Kaufman v. Kaufman, 135 AD2d 786). The plaintiff's counsel provided a reasonable excuse for her default in opposing the defendant's motion to compel compliance with a term of the stipulation based upon the serious illness and death of her mother-in-law which disrupted her small family law practice ( see CPLR 2005, 5015 [a]; 38 Holding Corp. v. City of New York, 179 AD2d 486, 487-488). Further, since questions have been raised as to whether the stipulation is enforceable, there was sufficient evidence of a meritorious defense ( see Schorr v. Schorr, 213 AD2d 621).