“The determination of a motion for leave to voluntarily discontinue an action pursuant to CPLR 3217(b) rests within the sound discretion of the court” (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Chaplin, 107 A.D.3d 881, 883, 969 N.Y.S.2d 67; see Tucker v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 378, 383, 449 N.Y.S.2d 683, 434 N.E.2d 1050; 25 Jay Street Tenants' Assn. v. 25 Jay Street, 290 A.D.2d 503, 504, 736 N.Y.S.2d 271). While ordinarily such motions should be granted, “[p]articular prejudice to the defendant or other improper consequences flowing from discontinuance may however make denial of discontinuance permissible or ... obligatory” (Tucker v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d at 383–384, 449 N.Y.S.2d 683, 434 N.E.2d 1050; see Turco v. Turco, 117 A.D.3d 719, 720, 985 N.Y.S.2d 261).
PER CURIAM Civil Court properly exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to discontinue the action on the eve of trial, where defendant was able to establish prejudice to it if the action were discontinued ( see Tucker v. Tucker, 55 NY2d 378, 383-384; 25 Jay St. Tenants' Assoc. v. 25 Jay St., 290 AD2d 503, 504). This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
"While the authority of a court to grant or to deny an application made to it pursuant to CPLR 3217 (subd. b) by a party seeking voluntarily to discontinue litigation is within its sound discretion, ordinarily a party cannot be compelled to litigate and, absent special circumstances, discontinuance should be granted * * *. Particular prejudice to the defendant or other improper consequences flowing from discontinuance may however make denial of discontinuance permissible or * * * obligatory" (Tucker v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 378, 383-384; see 25 Jay St. Tenants' Assoc. v. 25 Jay St., 290 A.D.2d 503, 504; East 4th St. Garage v. Estate of Berkowitz, 265 A.D.2d 249, 249-250). "The court must consider whether substantial rights have accrued * * * as well as the stage that litigation has reached; the later the stage, the greater should be the court's scrutiny of the plaintiff's motives" (Kane v. Kane, 163 A.D.2d 568, 570)
"[T]he authority of a court to grant or deny an application pursuant to CPLR 3217(subd. b) by a party seeking voluntary discontinuance is within its sound discretion [and because] ordinarily a party cannot be compelled to litigate, . . . absent special circumstances, discontinuance should be granted" ( White v County of Erie, 309 AD2d 1299, 1300, quoting Tucker v Tucker, 55 NY2d 378, 383-384). When considering whether special circumstances exist to justify denial of an application seeking discontinuance, the court should consider whether defendant would be prejudiced by the discontinuance ( see Tucker, 55 NY2d at 383-384; White, 309 AD2d at 1300-1301; 25 Jay Street Tenants' Ass'n. v 25 Jay Street, LLC., 290 AD2d 503, 504).