Opinion
Index No. LT-303090-22/NY
08-05-2024
19 West 8th Street LLC, Petitioner, v. Analogue LLC, Respondent.
Attorneys for Petitioner Novick Edelstein Pomerantz, PC Micheli I. Perez, Esq. Attorneys for Respondent Pierce & Kwok LLP Aaron H. Pierce, Esq.
Unpublished Opinion
Attorneys for Petitioner
Novick Edelstein Pomerantz, PC
Micheli I. Perez, Esq.
Attorneys for Respondent
Pierce & Kwok LLP
Aaron H. Pierce, Esq.
Rena Malik, J.
Petitioner commenced the instant commercial nonpayment proceeding on or about March 8, 2022, which was resolved by a so-ordered stipulation dated August 30, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc No 5) (the stipulation). The stipulation provided for entry of both monetary and possessory judgment in favor of petitioner in the amount of $290,000.00 and execution of the warrant was stayed through September 15, 2022 for respondent to pay the stipulated amount. In the stipulation, petitioner also agreed "to inspect and repair as legally required and necessary" certain leaks in specific areas of the premises (see NYSCEF Doc No 5).
Upon the foregoing papers, respondent moves for an order entering "as a final judgment against [petitioner] for any and all repairs stipulated in the Stipulation of Settlement [so-ordered] on August 30, 2022... along with any and all costs incurred by [respondent] as a result of the ongoing refusal by [petitioner] to many any repairs.... (NYSCEF Doc No 14). Respondent claims that although petitioner attempted to make some of the repairs, petitioner failed to address most of the leaks referenced in the stipulation (see NYSCEF Doc No 13 at ¶ 12).
Petitioner filed and served opposition papers, and during the first appearance on the motion on June 25, 2024, this Court rejected petitioner's arguments as to the timeliness of the application under CPLR 3404 and 22 NYCRR 208.14, reasoning, on the record, that CPLR 3404 does not apply to the Civil Court (see Hon. Mark C. Dillon, Supplemental Practice Commentaries [2023], McKinneys Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, C3404:1 ["A reminder to the bar: CPLR 3404 does not apply to the New York City Civil Court, the city courts outside of New York City, or the District Courts on Long Island"]) and that Uniform Rule 208.14 was inapplicable because this matter was never stricken from the trial calendar.
Via FTR in Room 772 on the 9:30 am calendar.
At said motion appearance, the Court also raised the issue of jurisdiction to entertain the requested relief and granted respondent leave to file and serve reply papers. The Court stated that if the reply addressed the issue of jurisdiction, petitioner would be entitled to file and serve sur-reply on that issue.
In reply, respondent did not raise the issue of this Court's jurisdiction regarding the relief sought, but argued that this Court had the jurisdiction to entertain motion practice related to this proceeding until either a final stipulation of discontinuance or judgment was entered. Respondent further argues that, because petitioner never made the repairs, this matter has not been expressly discontinued and that the Court should enter a final judgment regarding the repairs pursuant to the parties' stipulation.
At oral argument on the fully briefed motion held, respondent further clarified that it is essentially seeking specific performance to enforce the settlement terms. Petitioner argued that the Court sua sponte raised the issue of jurisdiction and respondent has not provided the Court with any authority to grant the requested relief under the RPAPL or CCA; and that if there were any applicable rules under the Housing Part, they do not apply because this is a commercial case.
Oral argument held virtually via Teams and FTR in Room 949 at 12:00 pm.
The Court finds that it does not have the authority to entertain the requested relief (see CCA 201, 202, 203; cf. CCA 110; see generally Board of Mgrs. of Highview Condominium v Mahland, 177 Misc.2d 502, 504 [Civ Ct, Richmond County 1997] ["Absent either a specific constitutional or statutory grant, the Civil Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain certain actions. Consequently, the court has only those powers which are specifically conferred upon it by the New York Constitution or statute"]).
The decision in Goldstein v Stephens (118 Misc.2d 614, 615 [App Term, 1st Dept 1983]) is instructive, where the Appellate Term held that the Civil Court did not have the jurisdiction to enforce a provision in a stipulation that settled a holdover summary proceeding:
Even under the modern doctrine favoring motion practice over a plenary proceeding, it is doubtful that the underlying stipulation could support a motion directed to its enforcement.... In any event, even assuming that a motion seeking enforcement of the terms of the stipulation was appropriate, the Civil Court lacked the authority to grant the type of relief tenants sought; such relief could only be obtained in Supreme Court. The Civil Court has clearly circumscribed and limited equitable powers. It may issue injunctions or "other orders for the enforcement of housing standards" (CCA, § 110, subd [a], par [4]; § 203, subd [o]); may provide for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property where the contract price does not exceed $10,000 (CCA, § 203, subd [d]); or, may issue injunctions in matters relating to replevin or enforcement proceedings (CCA, § 209, subd [b]). The order to accept tenants' subscription agreement and turn over shares of stock and the proprietary lease of the apartment to which those shares relate was one beyond the power of the Civil Court to issue.(Goldstein v Stephens, 118 Misc.2d 614, 615 [App Term, 1st Dept 1983] [internal citation omitted]).
Here, the Court finds that respondent similarly failed to cite to any applicable statute providing this Court with the authority to direct petitioner-landlord to make the repairs as promised in the stipulation (see id.; see, e.g., Lehmann v Lehmann, 182 Misc.2d 22, 26-27 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1999] [finding the Civil Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the equitable remedy of specific performance]).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.