Generally, there is no vested right in the continuation of a zoning classification. Furniture L.L.C. v. City of Chicago, 353 Ill. App. 3d 433, 437, 818 N.E.2d 839 (2004); 1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Mazur-Berg, 339 Ill. App. 3d 618, 631, 791 N.E.2d 60 (2003). A legislative body has the right to amend a zoning ordinance ( Constantine v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 217 Ill. App. 3d 4, 23, 575 N.E.2d 1363 (1991)), and a municipality may properly refuse to issue a permit for construction when an amendatory ordinance is pending that would prohibit the proposed building development ( American National Bank Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 19 Ill. App. 3d 30, 33, 311 N.E.2d 325 (1974)).

        On appeal, we found that LSA's vested rights claim required additional findings of fact to be made by the circuit court. Accordingly, we reversed those portions of the circuit court's order denying LSA's request for an order enjoining the City and its agents from applying any provision of the Chicago Zoning Ordinance which would prevent it from developing the property in accordance with the terms of RPD 196; and granting the intervenors' motion for a declaratory judgment that LSA is not entitled to a zoning certificate or a building permit pursuant to RPD 196. 1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Mazur-Berg, 339 Ill.App.3d 618, 641, 274 Ill.Dec. 264, 791 N.E.2d 60 (2003) (hereinafter referred to as " Lake Shore II "). We remanded the matter to the circuit court with directions that it make specific findings as to: (1) the date on which LSA knew or should have known that it was probable that Bernardini would introduce a down-zoning ordinance; (2) the total amount of the expenses which LSA had incurred in connection with the project as of that date; and (3) whether those expenses were substantial enough to give rise to a vested right to the issuance of a zoning certificate and building permit pursuant to RPD 196. Lake Shore II, 339 Ill.App.3d at 641, 274 Ill.Dec. 264, 791 N.E.2d 60.

A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the factual findings on which it is based are unreasonable, arbitrary or not based on the evidence. 1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Mazur-Berg, 339 Ill. App. 3d 618, 628-29 (2003). Generally, there is no vested right in the continuation of a zoning classification.

In general, the grant or denial of a request for declaratory judgment rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this court will not reverse such a decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Roland Machinery Co. v. Reed, 339 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 1096 (2003). As to the appropriate standard of review, the parties both cite to 1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Mazur-Berg, 339 Ill. App. 3d 618 (2003), which dealt with several actions for declaratory judgment and reviewed the trial court's decision, which followed a bench trial, employing a manifest weight standard. 1350 Lake Shore Associates, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 628.

We next address plaintiffs' argument that the trial court erroneously dismissed count IV, which alleged that plaintiffs enjoyed a vested right in constructing the facility and, therefore, Lake County was precluded from denying the conditional use permit and ultimately rezoning the property after the lawsuit began. It is well settled that no party has a vested right to the continuation of a statute or ordinance, and this general rule applies to zoning ordinances. See, e.g., 1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Mazur-Berg, 339 Ill. App. 3d 618, 631 (2003). However, there are circumstances under which a party may obtain a vested right to develop its property in accordance with a certain zoning ordinance despite an amendment thereto.

Illinois law permits parties to obtain "a vested right to develop its property in accordance with a certain zoning ordinance despite an amendment thereto." 1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Mazur-Berg, 791 N.E.2d 60, 73 (Ill.App.Ct. 2003). To establish a "vested right," a party must demonstrate that: (1) it made expenditures or incurred obligations "in good faith reliance on the probability that it would obtain a zoning certificate and a building permit pursuant to the current zoning ordinance"; and (2) "those expenditures and obligations were substantial."

To establish a vested right to a zoning certificate, Petra must demonstrate that: (1) it made expenditures or incurred obligations "in good faith reliance on the probability that it would obtain a zoning certificate and a building permit pursuant to the current zoning ordinance"; and (2) those expenditures and obligations were substantial. 1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Mazur-Berg, 339 Ill. App.3d 618, 791 N.E.2d 60, 73 (2003). "A probability that approval is forthcoming exists when the property at issue is zoned to permit the use requested by the landowner."

The appellate court found that LSA's vested-rights claim required additional fact-finding and remanded to the circuit court with directions to make specific findings as to (1) the date on which LSA knew or should have known that it was probable Bernardini would introduce a down-zoning ordinance; (2) the total amount of expenses incurred by LSA in connection with the project as of that date; and (3) whether those expenses were sufficiently substantial to give LSA a vested right to the issuance of a zoning certificate and building permit under the RPD 196 zoning classification. 1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Mazur-Berg, 339 Ill. App. 3d 618 (2003). On remand, the circuit court made the following findings: (1) LSA knew it was probable that Bernardini would introduce a down-zoning ordinance on any date after the meeting in April or May 1997 involving Guthman, the Draper representatives, and Bernardini; (2) as of that date, LSA had incurred expenditures in the amount of $18,900.16 in connection with the project; and (3) the expenses were insufficiently substantial to give rise to a vested right in LSA to the issuance of a zoning certificate and a building permit for its project.

We will not reverse a trial court's judgment unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 1350 Lakeshore Associates v. Mazur-Berg, 339 Ill. App. 3d 618, 628, 791 N.E.2d 60 (2003). "Against the manifest weight of the evidence" means that the opposite conclusion is "clearly evident" or the finding is "unreasonable, arbitrary or not based on the evidence."

" A reviewing court may reverse the trial court's judgment following a bench trial only if it is against the manifest weight of the Lake Shore Associates v. Mazur-Berg, 339 Ill. App. 3d 618, 628 (2003). A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the factual findings on which it is based are unreasonable, arbitrary or not based on the evidence.