Z124

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 19, 2020

2019002613 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 19, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/824,846 08/12/2015 Sanjiv Sirpal 6583-68-CON 7400
111285 7590 06/19/2020
Sheridan Ross P.C.
1560 Broadway
Suite 1200
Denver, CO 80202
EXAMINER
FIBBI, CHRISTOPHER J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2174
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/19/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
edocket@sheridanross.com
flexpatents-sr@sheridanross.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SANJIV SIRPAL, PAUL E. REEVES,
ALEXANDER DE PAZ, EDUARDO DIEGO TORRES MILANO,
JARED L. FICKLIN, DENISE BURTON, and
GREGG WYGONIK
____________

Appeal 2019-002613
Application 14/824,846
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III,
and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final rejection of
claims 21–40. Claims 1–20 are cancelled. We have jurisdiction over the
pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2018). According to Appellant, the real party in interest
is “Z124.” See Appeal Br. 2.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
Introduction
Appellant’s claimed invention relates generally to “an annunciator
display or window . . . that spans across both the primary and secondary
screens.” (Spec. ¶ 7).
Independent Claim 21
21. A method of displaying information on a multi-display device
including a plurality of desktops and/or applications each having at
least one window, and an annunciator window, the method
comprising:

receiving, by a processor, a first input to reveal one of a desktop or
application on a first display of the multi-display device;

in response to the first input, selecting, by the processor, a desktop or
application to display on the first display;

displaying, by the processor, the selected desktop or application on the
first display;

displaying, by the processor, an annunciator window, having
information therein showing at least one of a device status, a
connectivity status, and a messaging status;

configuring, by the processor, the annunciator window to display a
first portion of the annunciator window in the first display and a
second portion of the annunciator window in the second display;

receiving a user input gesture in the first portion of the annunciator
window displayed in the first display;

2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed Jan. 23, 2018 (“Final
Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed July 30, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s
Answer, mailed Dec. 14, 2018 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief, filed Feb. 8,
2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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Application 14/824,846

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in response to the user input gesture:

expanding, by the processor, a first size of the first portion of
the annunciator window, wherein the annunciator is expanded
as a drawer over the first display; and

maintaining a second size of the second portion of the
annunciator window displayed in the second display, wherein
the second portion of the annunciator window is not expanded
over the second display.

Appeal Br. 10, Claims Appendix, dispositive disputed limitation
emphasized.
Evidence
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence:
Name Reference Date
MediaChance Non-Patent Literature3 Mar. 23, 2009
Tseng et al. US 2009/0249247 A1 Oct. 1, 2009
Anttila et al. US 2012/0005602 A1 Jan. 5, 2012

Rejection
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
21–40 103(a) Tseng et al. (“Tseng”),
Anttila et al. (“Anttila”),
MediaChance

3 MediaChance, “MultiMonitor TaskBar,”
https://web/archive.org/web/20090323041828/http://www.mediachance.com
/free/multimon.htm.
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Issue on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 21–40 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a), as being obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of
the cited references?
ANALYSIS
Rejection of Claims 21–40 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Issues: Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), we focus our analysis on the
following argued claim limitations that we find are dispositive regarding the
rejection of claims 21–40:
Did the Examiner err by finding that Tseng, Anttila, and
MediaChance collectively teach or suggest the disputed, dispositive
limitations:
in response to the user input gesture:
expanding, by the processor, a first size of the first
portion of the annunciator window, wherein the
annunciator is expanded as a drawer over the first
display; and
maintaining a second size of the second portion of
the annunciator window displayed in the second display,
wherein the second portion of the annunciator window is
not expanded over the second display,
within the meaning of independent claim 21? (emphasis added regarding
disputed limitations).
Appellant traverses the Examiner’s reliance (Final Action 4) on
Tseng’s description at paragraph 53, as found to teach or suggest: “in
response to the user input gesture: expanding, by the processor, a first size of
the first portion of the annunciator window, wherein the annunciator is
expanded as a drawer over the first display.” Claim 21 (emphases added).
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In particular, Appellant contends that “Tseng never mentions that the
message area or status bar can have portions or that one of the portions may
be expanded while another portion maintains its size.” Appeal Br. 8
(emphases added); see also Reply Br. 2–3.
Additionally, Appellant contends: “Anttila never states that the
application status bar has two portions” Appeal Br. 8 (emphasis added).
The Examiner disagrees with Appellant, and further explains the basis
for the rejection:
While Tseng is shown operating on a single display, Anttila and
MediaChance cure the “dual-display” status bar deficiency of
Tseng. Anttila teaches a multi-display device where expanded
information is triggered based on input received within the
status bar area and then displayed on the same display for
which the input occurred (see Anttila paragraphs 0054–56,
0061 and Figs. 6A–D, 7A–D). MediaChance teaches
independently operable taskbars for each monitor (see
MediaChance page 1 and Figure “with multimon taskbar”).
Ans. 4 (emphasis added).
Claim Construction 4
As an initial matter of claim construction, we turn to the Specification
for context regarding the claim term “annunciator window.” Claim 1. See
Spec. ¶ 7: “In accordance with the present invention, an annunciator display
or window is provided that spans across both the primary and secondary
screens. Because of the increase in size of the annunciator window,
annunciations are better displayed.” The Specification also describes:
“FIG. 7 is a first representation of a preferred embodiment showing a device

4 We give the contested claim limitation the broadest reasonable
interpretation (“BRI”) consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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incorporating an annunciator window or display, and an enlarged exploded
view of the annunciator window disposed above the device.” Spec. ¶ 69
(emphasis added). We reproduce Figure 7 of Appellant’s drawings below:

Figure 7 of Appellant’s Drawings, illustrating the claimed
“annunciator window” 1100:

Figure 7 of Appellant’s Drawings, as reproduced above, depicts the claimed
“annunciator window” 1100, as shown spanning across the top of dual
displays D1 and D2, respectively.

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We agree with the Examiner that Tseng teaches only a single display,
for example, at Figure 2B, as found by the Examiner on page 4 of the Final
Action. See also Ans. 4: “Tseng is shown operating on a single display.”
(emphasis added). Therefore, without more, Tseng cannot teach both a first
and second display:

the annunciator window to display a first portion of the annunciator
window in the first display and a second portion of the annunciator
window in the second display[,]
as recited in independent claim 21 (emphases added).

Turning to the secondary reference, Anttila (¶ 54–56 and 61), we find
no express teaching of “a first size of the first portion of the annunciator
window” and “a second size of the second portion of the annunciator
window,” as recited in independent claim 21. (Emphases added).
Although Anttila (¶ 54) describes that “an application status bar . . .
may be displayed in the top or bottom portion of an application window” on
a multi-display computing apparatus 102, and that an icon in the application
status bar can be selected to trigger display of a task selection interface on
one of the displays (see Anttila ¶ 54, Figs. 6A–D, 7A–D), we find some
degree of speculation is required to ascertain whether the respective
“application status bar” on each of the displays, or the triggered “task
selection interface” being displayed within the application window(s), is
being relied upon by the Examainer as teaching a “first portion of the
annunciator window,” as recited in independent claim 21 (emphasis added).
To the extent the claimed “annunciator window” is being read by the
Examiner on Anttila’s task switch 906 (Figure 9B), because the task
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switcher can span dual displays 902 (top display) and 904 (bottom display),
as shown in Figure 9B, (and described in Anttila’s ¶¶ 61–62) we find this
reading still does not teach or suggest at least the “maintaining . . . wherein
clause” negative limitation (shown in bold) of claim 21:
in response to the user input gesture:
expanding, by the processor, a first size of the first
portion of the annunciator window, wherein the
annunciator is expanded as a drawer over the first
display; and
maintaining a second size of the second portion of
the annunciator window displayed in the second display,
wherein the second portion of the annunciator window is
not expanded over the second display.
Claim 21 (emphases added).
“A rejection . . . must rest on a factual basis . . . .” In re Warner, 379
F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). “The Patent Office has the initial duty of
supplying the factual basis for its rejection. It may not . . . resort to
speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to supply
deficiencies in its factual basis.” Id.
Here, we find that to affirm the Examiner on this record would require
some degree of speculation as to the Examiner’s intended mapping of the
claimed “annunciator window” to the corresponding feature(s) found in the
cited reference(s).5 We decline to engage in this speculation.

5 See the mapping rule: “When a reference is complex or shows or describes
inventions other than that claimed by the applicant, the particular part
relied on must be designated as nearly as practicable. The pertinence of
each reference, if not apparent, must be clearly explained and each rejected
claim specified.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2) (emphasis added).
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In reviewing MediaChance (page 1), we also find no express teaching
of “a first size of the first portion of the annunciator window” and “a
second size of the second portion of the annunciator window” (emphases
added). Consistent with our understanding of the Examiner’s findings and
explanations, we only find that MediaChance teaches displaying two
independently operable taskbars by adding a second taskbar to the extended
desktop on a second display, and not two separate “portions” of a single
taskbar (“the annunciator window”), in which the single taskbar spans dual
displays. See also MediaChance (page 2, middle of left column), i.e., the
“MultiMon Task bar” description: “The real multi-monitor support in
Windows has task-bar only in the primary monitor. The extended monitors
are plain ‘ta[s]kbarless.’ There is no other way to add another taskbar to the
extended monitor.”
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find a
preponderance of the evidence supports Appellant’s contention that Tseng,
Anttila, and MediaChance collectively fail to teach or suggest the disputed,
dispositive limitations:
in response to the user input gesture:
expanding, by the processor, a first size of the first
portion of the annunciator window, wherein the
annunciator is expanded as a drawer over the first
display; and
maintaining a second size of the second portion of
the annunciator window displayed in the second display,
wherein the second portion of the annunciator window is
not expanded over the second display
Claim 21 (emphases added).

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Application 14/824,846

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Therefore, we are constrained on this record to reverse the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of independent claim 21 over the cited combination of
Tseng, Anttila, and MediaChance. Because remaining independent claims
30 and 36 recite the disputed limitations using similar language of
commensurate scope, we also reverse the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 30 and 36.
Because we have reversed the rejection of each independent claim on
appeal, we also reverse the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of each
associated dependent claim.
Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of all
claims 21–40 on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 21–40, as being obvious under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a), over the cited combination of Tseng, Anttila, and
MediaChance.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
21–40 103(a) Tseng, Anttila,
MediaChance
21–40

REVERSED