VisionQuest Industries, Inc. v. SurgiTech, Inc.

16 Cited authorities

In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 190 times 33 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Ritchie v. Simpson
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982) Cited 58 times
Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America
970 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Cited 39 times
Finding similarity between "CENTURY 21" and "CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA" in part because "consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word"
In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.
315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003) Cited 12 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises, Inc.
951 F.2d 330 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Cited 14 times
Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”
University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co.
703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Cited 20 times 2 Legal Analyses
In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.
SquirtCo v. Tomy Corp.
697 F.2d 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Cited 12 times
Rejecting argument that SQUIRT SQUAD in standard letters is distinct from SQUIRT registered in “distinctive lettering on a dark medallion”; “[b]y presenting its mark merely in a typed drawing, a difference cannot legally be asserted by that party”
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp.
931 F.2d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Cited 4 times
No. 91-1011. May 2, 1991. Don B. Finkelstein, Ladas Parry, Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for appellant. Allen J. Baden and Jonathan D. Reichman, Kenyon Kenyon, of New York City, argued, for appellee. With them on the brief, was William T. Boland, Jr. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before LOURIE, CLEVENGER, and RADER, Circuit Judges. LOURIE, Circuit Judge. Hewlett-Packard Company appeals from the final decision of the United States Patent
San Fernando Electric Mfg. Co. v. JFD Electronics Components Corp.
565 F.2d 683 (C.C.P.A. 1977) Cited 11 times
Appeal No. 77-576. November 23, 1977. Rober C. Comstock, Los Angeles, Cal., of record, for appellant. Edward A. Meilman, Ostrolenk, Faber, Gerb Soffen, New York City, of record, for appellee; Sidney G. Faber, New York City, of counsel. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Associate Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) dismissing an
Rule 36 - Requests for Admission
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 Cited 6,348 times 13 Legal Analyses
Noting that facts admitted pursuant to a Rule 36 discovery request are "conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended"
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,605 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 23 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

VisionQuest Industries, Inc. v. SurgiTech, Inc.

16 Cited authorities

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”

Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"

Finding similarity between "CENTURY 21" and "CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA" in part because "consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word"

Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion

Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”

In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.

Rejecting argument that SQUIRT SQUAD in standard letters is distinct from SQUIRT registered in “distinctive lettering on a dark medallion”; “[b]y presenting its mark merely in a typed drawing, a difference cannot legally be asserted by that party”

Noting that facts admitted pursuant to a Rule 36 discovery request are "conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended"

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"