Virginia Cofield-Gipson, Complainant,v.Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, Department of Justice, (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 9, 2010
0120073270 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 9, 2010)

0120073270

07-09-2010

Virginia Cofield-Gipson, Complainant, v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, Department of Justice, (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency.


Virginia Cofield-Gipson,

Complainant,

v.

Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

Attorney General,

Department of Justice,

(Federal Bureau of Prisons),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120073270

Agency No. P20050004

DECISION

On July 12, 2007, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's June 8,

2007 final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et

seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is deemed timely

and is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following

reasons, the Commission MODIFIES the Agency's final decision (FAD).

ISSUES PRESENTED

1) Whether Complainant established that she was subjected to disparate

treatment and harassment; and

2) Whether Complainant established that she was subjected to an unlawful

medical exam and inquiry.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a WS-8 Cook Supervisor at the Federal Correctional Institution in

Talladega, Alabama. Complainant injured herself at work on January 13,

2004, when a metal food cart fell on her, and she filed a worker's

compensation claim. Complainant stated that she injured herself again

on April 17, 2004, by "tripping over a pallet." The Office of Workers'

Compensation Programs (OWCP) accepted Complainant's injury claims. For

the first injury, OWCP provided Complainant with 30 days of Continuation

of Pay (COP), and for the second injury, OWCP provided her with three

days of COP.

Complainant indicated that she was unable to perform the essential

functions of her Cook-Supervisor position and requested that management

provide her with a restricted light duty assignment as a reasonable

accommodation. The Associate Warden attempted to accommodate Complainant

by providing her with "light duty tasks." In this regard, Complainant

was assigned to listen to tape recordings of inmate phone calls, and to

supervise inmates while sitting at a desk. On June 17, 2004, Complainant

received a letter directing her to sit at a table in the inmate's dining

hall to monitor inmate movement. Complainant had been assigned to these

"light duty tasks" for over six months. On July 7, 2004, management

notified Complainant that her temporary light duty assignment would be

terminated. On July 8 and July 9, 2004, management charged Complainant

with annual leave when she did not report to work.

On August 5, 2004, the Associate Warden sent Complainant a letter

directing her to attend a "fitness for duty" medical examination

with a psychiatrist (Dr. E). Earlier, on June 23, 2004, Complainant's

physician could not find any physical problems with her and recommended

a psychological evaluation. On August 18, 2004, Complainant, as ordered,

went to Dr. E to undergo a psychological evaluation. The Agency gave

Dr. E eight criteria upon which to evaluate Complainant. Dr. E indicated

to Complainant that he could not evaluate her on these criteria because

they were inquires relating to her physical injuries. Dr. E indicated

to Complainant that he would only evaluate her from a psychological

standpoint.

Subsequently, Complainant failed to sign Dr. E's standard medical release

form. As a result, the Agency never received the documentation regarding

the evaluation from Dr. E. On October 10, 2004, Complainant received

a letter from the Associate Warden dated October 6, 2004. This letter

ordered Complainant to release her medical documentation from Dr. E. The

letter stated that her failure to release this medical documentation would

"lead to disciplinary action, up to and/or including removal." However,

Complainant was never disciplined by the Agency. The letter also noted

that since January 13, 2004, Complainant had been on COP, sick leave,

light duty, leave without pay, or absence without leave.

On October 5, 2004, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that she

was discriminated against on the bases of race (Black), sex (female),

disability, and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:

(1) she was subjected to a hostile work environment when management

ordered her to be evaluated by a psychiatrist, and ordered her to release

medical information from that evaluation.

(2) she was charged with annual leave on July 8 and July 9, 2004;

(3) on or about July 29, 2004, management refused to grant her

request for COP;

(4) management failed to provide her with the Claim for Compensation

Form (CA-7) in a timely manner, causing her pay to be interrupted;

(5) she was charged with Leave Without Pay (LWOP), Absent Without Leave

(AWOL), and sick leave (SL) in March, April, May, and June 2004;

(6) in May and June 2004, management segregated her from other staff

by directing her to perform tape monitoring duties in the staff lounge,

and also denied her request to utilize a vacant office for her duties;

(7) From June 17 through July 7, 2004, management jeopardized her safety

by ordering her to sit at a table in the inmate dining hall during the

noon meal; and

(8) In April 2004, management sent a letter to OWCP that contained

defamatory statements about her.

At the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Subsequently, the

Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). The

decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that she was subjected

to discrimination as alleged.

Final Agency Decision

In its FAD, the Agency dismissed claims (5), (6), and (8) as untimely

pursuant to � 1614.105(a)(1). The FAD noted that the claims were discrete

acts that occurred outside of the 45 day time limit to contact an EEO

counselor. The FAD noted that Complainant contacted the EEO counselor

on August 14, 2004, and any alleged discriminatory act to be timely must

have occurred on or after July 1, 2004, which was 45 days before August

14, 2004.

In regards to claim (1), the FAD found that its request for Complainant

to provide current medical documentation was proper. Specifically,

the FAD found that the Agency was seeking more information concerning

Complainant's medical condition in order to provide her with a reasonable

accommodation. The FAD noted that Complainant was sent to Dr. E so the

Agency could obtain information concerning her medical diagnosis, when

she could return to work, and how her condition impacted her duties. The

FAD also noted that the Agency never received Dr. E's examination report

because Complainant failed to fill out Dr. E's medical release form.1

The FAD also noted that Complainant was not disciplined for not sending

her medical records from Dr. E to the Agency.

Regarding claim (2), The FAD found that management placed Complainant

on annual leave for July 8 and 9, 2004. In this regard, the FAD found

that there was no persuasive evidence in the record indicating that

Complainant was discriminated against because she was placed on annual

leave for those two days. For claim (3), the FAD found that there was

no evidence that her request for COP was denied. In particular, the FAD

found that Complainant's COP was stopped because she did not provide

proper medical documentation. The FAD noted that the Agency attempted

to contact Complainant for the required medical documentation to support

her April 17, 2004 injury, but she failed to respond to the requests.

Pertaining to claim (4), the FAD found that there was no evidence that

Complainant was not timely provided with Form CA-7. As to claim (7),

the FAD found at the time Complainant was assigned light duty, there

was no evidence that Complainant's doctors indicated that she should

stay away from inmates. The FAD also found no evidence that Complainant

told management that she felt unsafe around inmates, or that she asked

to stay away from inmates.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant raises no new arguments on appeal.2 The Agency asks the

Commission to affirm the FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Initially, we note that Complainant does not on appeal, specifically

challenge the decision to dismiss issues (5), (6), and (8) raised in her

formal complaint. Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (MD-110), Ch. 9, Sec. IV(A) at p. 9-10 (November 9,

1999) provides that the Commission has the discretion to only review

those issues specifically raised on appeal. Accordingly, we will not

address the Agency's dismissal of these issues in the decision herein.

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

Medical Inquiry (claim (1))

The Rehabilitation Act places certain limitations on an employer's ability

to make disability-related inquiries or require medical examinations of

all employees. An employer may require an inquiry or medical examination

of an employee only if the examination is job-related and consisted with

business necessity. Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries

and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the ADA (July 27, 2000),

at 5. This requirement is met when the employer has a reasonable belief,

based on objective evidence, that (1) an employee's ability to perform

essential job functions is impaired by a medical condition; or (2) that

an employee poses a direct threat due to a medical condition. Id. at

6-9. Objective evidence is reliable information, either directly observed

or provided by a credible third party, that an employee may have or has

a medical condition that will interfere with her ability to perform

essential job functions or will result in a direct threat. Id. at

7. Where the employer forms such a belief, its disability-related job

inquires and medical examinations are job-related and consistent with

business necessity. Id., see Janise v. United States Postal Service, EEOC

Appeal No. 01A13359 (September 19, 2002). The burden is on the Agency to

show that one of the criteria justifying the inquiry or examination was

met. Hampton v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01986308

(July 31, 2002).

Here, we find that the Agency failed to meet its burden showing that a

psychological evaluation was needed in this case. Complainant alleged

that she was hurt physically and a psychological evaluation had no

bearing on whether she could perform the essential functions of her job,

or whether she posed a direct threat. The Agency indicated that it sent

Complainant for a psychological evaluation because her doctor could

not find anything physically wrong with her. However, the Agency has

presented no evidence that Complainant's mental state was at issue or

that it felt that she was unable to perform the essential functions of

her position because of a mental condition. In this regard, we note

that the criteria the agency provided to Doctor E all pertained to

Complainant's physical injuries.

The record indicates that the Agency ordered this psychological

examination and the records from it for reasons that were not job-related

and consistent with business necessity.3 See Bernal v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0720080038 (June 17, 2008) (holding that

the Agency violated the Rehabilitation Act when it requested medical

information when it did not believe that Complainant's medical condition

impaired his ability to perform the essential functions of his modified

position). Herein, the Agency has failed to meet its burden. We conclude

that the Agency did not demonstrate that the psychological inquiries

Complainant was required to undergo were job-related or consistent with

business necessity. Therefore, the Agency has violated the Rehabilitation

Act.

Disparate Treatment

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, Complainant must satisfy the

three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially

establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected

to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support

an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438

U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending

on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804

n. 14. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail,

Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the Agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

Claims (2), (3), (4) and (7)

Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established prima facie cases of

discrimination based on race, sex, disability, and reprisal, we find

that the Agency articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions. Regarding claim (2), the Agency noted that management terminated

Complainant's light duty status on or about July 7, 2004. As a result,

Complainant did not report to work on July 8 and July 9, 2004. Therefore,

the Agency charged Complainant with annual leave on those dates.

For claim (3), the Agency indicated that Complainant was asked to provide

policy-required documentation to substantiate doctor visits so she could

receive COP. SM's Deposition at 18. The Agency indicated that it attempted

to notify Complainant and her union representative that her doctor was

using the wrong claim number referencing her previous workers compensation

case. Id. The Agency also indicated that Complainant was being evaluated

by doctors that were not approved by workers compensation. Id. The Agency

further indicated that it telephoned and sent letters to Complainant

concerning these matters that went unanswered. Id.

In regards to claim (4), the Agency indicated that it attempted to

give Form CA-7 to Complainant on July 7, 2004, but she refused to

accept it. Id. at 22. The form was then issued to her supervisor who

then made it available to her union representative. Id. The form was

processed and received by OWCP on August 5, 2004. Id. On August 27,

2004, OWCP issued a check to Complainant for the time period from July

25 to August 23, 2004. Id. The Agency also indicated that another CA-7

Form was given to Complainant's union representative on September 3,

2004. Id. at 24. Regarding claim (7), the Agency indicated that there

was no evidence that Complainant told management that she felt unsafe

around inmates, or that she asked to stay away from inmates.

Complainant now bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of

the evidence that the Agency's articulated reasons were a pretext for

discrimination. Complainant can do this directly by showing that the

Agency's preferred explanation is unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450

U.S. at 256. Upon review, we find that Complainant failed to provide any

evidence of pretext in the record. Furthermore, we find that the record

is devoid of any evidence that the Agency's actions were motivated by

discriminatory animus towards Complainant's disability, race, sex or in

reprisal for her prior protected activity.

Harassment

To the extent that Complainant also alleges that she was subject to

a hostile work environment with respect to claims (2), (3), (4) and

(7), we find that under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) that complainant's claim of hostile work

environment must fail. See Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994). A finding

of a hostile work environment is precluded by our determination that

Complainant failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the

agency were motivated by discriminatory animus. See Oakley v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (September 21, 2000).

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we MODIFY the FAD,

and REMAND this case to the Agency to take remedial actions in accordance

with this decision and Order below.

ORDER

The Agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:

(1) Within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the Agency shall give Complainant a notice of her right to submit

objective evidence (pursuant to the guidance given in Carle v. Department

of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993) in support

of her claim for compensatory damages within forty-five (45) calendar

days of the date Complainant receives the Agency's notice. The Agency

shall complete the investigation on the claim for compensatory damages

within forty-five (45) calendar days of the date the Agency receives

Complainant's claim for compensatory damages. Thereafter, the Agency

shall process the claim in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(f).

(2) Within sixty (60) days of the date on which this decision becomes

final, the Agency shall provide EEO training for the Agency officials

involved in the decision to send Complainant for the "fitness for duty"

psychological examination. Such training shall focus on rights and

obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. The Commission notes that such

training is not considered disciplinary in nature.

(3) The Agency shall consider taking disciplinary action against the

Agency officials involved in the decision to refer Complainant for the

"fitness for duty" psychological examination. The Agency shall report

its decision. If the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall

identify the action taken. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary

action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose

discipline.

The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying

that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G0610)

The Agency is ordered to post at its Talladega, Alabama facility copies

of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the

Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the Agency

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous

places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily

posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said

notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0610)

If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29

C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable

attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency.

The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency --

not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal

Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming

final. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in

accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,

DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant.

If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,

1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant

has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil

Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).

If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of

the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)

This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

___7/9/10_______________

Date

1 The FAD noted that Complainant sent a medical release dated October

13, 2004, to Dr. E that she had prepared herself; however, Dr. E wanted

Complainant to use his standard medical release form.

2 We note that although Complainant requested a hearing, the Agency issued

a FAD. Neither the FAD nor the record provides any indication as to why

Complainant's hearing request was not granted. However, as noted above,

Complainant has not raised this issue or any other on appeal; therefore,

we will not address this matter in our decision.

3 The Warden told the EEO counselor that she felt that Complainant was

not as disabled as she claimed and "is able to return to a full duty

status and is attempting to 'doctor shop.'" Report of Investigation,

Exhibit 1, EEO Counselor's Report, p. 4.

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0120073270

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120073270