0720070015
05-22-2008
Vera J. Robinson,
Complainant,
v.
Henry M. Paulson, Jr.,
Secretary,
Department of the Treasury,
(Internal Revenue Service),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0720070015
Hearing No. 330-2006-00003X
Agency No. 052210
DECISION
Following its December 14, 2006 final order, the agency filed a timely
appeal which the Commission accepts pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).
On appeal, the agency requests that the Commission affirm its rejection
of an EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) finding of discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The agency also requests that
the Commission affirm its rejection of the relief ordered by the AJ.
Specifically, the agency stated that it would not implement the AJ's
findings of race discrimination, nor would it implement the findings of
reprisal discrimination; the agency fully implemented the AJ's finding
of no retaliation regarding an allegation of nonselection and a finding
of no discrimination regarding the termination of a detail. For the
following reasons, the Commission reverses in part and affirms in part
the agency's final order.
On December 2, 2004, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that
she was discriminated against on the basis of race (African-American)
and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII when:
(1) on or about October 1, 2004, she was not selected for the position of
Bankruptcy Specialist, GS-1101-12; and (2) on or about October 2, 2004,
her temporary detail as a GS-1169-13 Supervisory Revenue Officer ended,
resulting in payment problems.
On February 15, 2006, complainant requested to amend her complaint.
The AJ granted complainant's request and amended the following claim
to her complaint: complainant alleged that (3) she was subjected
to retaliatory harassment when: (a) on February 8, 2005, her Manager
("Manager") made threatening comments; (b) on March 17, 2005, she was
issued a Letter of Reprimand; (c) on April 12, 2005, the Manager issued
complainant a counseling letter; (d) on July 29, 2005, she received
her mid-year performance appraisal in which the Manager lowered three
critical elements; (e) on November 10, 2005, the Manager issued her a
negative write-up before investigating the issue; and (f) on February
10, 2006, the Manager wrote her up on work assignments which had been
reassigned to the agency's Philadelphia Service Center.
The record reflects that complainant was employed as a Bankruptcy
Specialist, GS-1101-11, with the agency in Houston, Texas. During the
time of the alleged discrimination, complainant was detailed as a
GS-1169-13 Supervisory Revenue Officer; prior to that detail, she was
detailed as a Bankruptcy Specialist, GS-1101-12. At all times relevant to
the complainant, the Manager (Black male/prior EEO activity) was employed
in the agency's Small Business/Self Employed Division. Another agency
manager was the Territory Manager (TM) (White male/prior EEO activity),
in Phoenix, Arizona, and he was the selecting official for the position
at issue. In March of 2004, complainant applied for the Bankruptcy
Specialist position and was detailed in that position at the time
she applied. Three other applicants applied for the position and were
interviewed by the interview panel. All of the applicants were asked the
same questions. Complainant's interview score was 96, and on October 1,
2004, the TM selected another applicant with an interview score of 130.
The record also reflects that in May of 2004, complainant received a
settlement agreement (SA) which stated that she was to receive a two week
temporary promotion to the Supervisory Revenue Officer position expiring
on July 30, 2004. When complainant received the promotion certificate,
she noticed several errors which she noted to her regular Manager, who
took no action. Specifically, complainant noted that the certificate
listed the promotion for one month rather than two weeks per the SA.
While complainant apparently was promoted for a two week period, her
promotions were extended several times by the TM, and she was paid at
the GS-13 level for several pay periods. However, in October of 2004,
complainant was retroactively changed back to her position as Bankruptcy
Specialist effective July 25, 2004, and she was required to pay the
overpayment she received during the temporary promotion, in the amount
of $1,657.85.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely
requested a hearing and the AJ held a hearing on April 18, 2006, and
issued a decision on October 31, 2006.
The AJ found that complainant established a prima facie case of race
discrimination when she was not selected with regard to claim (1).
The AJ then considered the agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for choosing the selectee over complainant for the position at issue.
The AJ noted that the TM stated that he considered the entire application
package but gave greater weight to the interview. The Manager stated that
both complainant and the selectee interviewed well, and the AJ noted that
complainant was the only applicant who had Chapter 11 experience. The AJ
found that, while the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for not selecting complainant over the selectee, there were
"serious credibility issues" with the TM's statements. The AJ noted that,
while all the applicants were supposed to be asked the same questions,
complainant was asked who her manager was; whether she had experience
with Chapter 11; and the effect of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
(Question 7). The AJ further noted that complainant was given a
lower score because she could not recall the name of that decision.
The AJ found that complainant presented sufficient testimony that her
qualifications were superior to those of the selectee.1 As such,
the AJ found the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory
animus and complainant was not selected due to the agency's race based
discrimination.
Next, addressing claim (2), the AJ found that complainant failed to
establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, since she failed to
identify any similarly situated employees outside of her protected group
who were treated differently under similar circumstances. However, the
AJ found that complainant established a prima facie case of retaliation
regarding processing her temporary detail retroactive to July 25, 2004
and requiring her to repay the overage. The AJ then determined that
the agency failed to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for its actions, finding serious credibility problems with the testimony
of the TM. First, the AJ noted that the testimony of the TM regarding
the reasons for the overpayment was contradicted by the Human Resource
Specialist, who stated that the overpayment was not complainant's fault,
and she should not have been required to repay it. Second, the AJ found
that, when complainant's waiver of overpayment was approved, she was
not reimbursed the monies which were taken out of her check. Third,
the AJ noted that complainant continually expressed her concerns about
the detail pursuant to the SA, but management ignored her. Finally,
the AJ found that the agency retaliated against complainant and was also
"unjustly enriched" as complainant performed the duties of a temporary
detail as a GS-13, including during the twice extended period, but was
nonetheless required to pay the money back. Moreover, the AJ concluded
that complainant proffered sufficient evidence to establish that the
level of hostility towards her was sufficiently severe and pervasive to
constitute a hostile work environment.
Regarding remedies due to the acts of discrimination, the AJ initially
found complainant was entitled to the pay differential between her
position and that of the Bankruptcy Specialist, GS-12, for which she
applied and was not selected, as well as all benefits to which she is
entitled from October 1, 2004 (the date of the non-selection) to August
21, 2006. In addition, the AJ found that complainant was entitled to
reimbursement for the amount of the overpayment she received and which
was taken out of her paycheck, with interest, from October 2, 2004 to
August 21, 2006. Regarding non-pecuniary damages, the AJ found that
complainant was entitled to $85,000, which took into account the severity
and duration of the harm done to complainant due to the non-selection, the
retroactive termination of her temporary promotion and the hostile work
environment to which she was subjected. Thereafter, the agency issued
a FAD and declined to implement the AJ's findings of discrimination and
retaliation, and appealed to the Commission.
In its appeal brief, the agency stated that the AJ made several errors
of law, which are not entitled to deference. Specifically, the agency
alleged that: (1) the AJ's decision lacked analysis, failed to consider
evidence contrary to its conclusions, and failed to base any credibility
determinations on witness demeanor or tone of voice, resulting in
a decision that is flawed and should not be sustained; (2) regarding
complainant's non-selection, the AJ erred in finding that recognition of
the relevant case name was not required during the interview process,
and in finding that the interview panel members scored complainant low
on questions 1 and 2, but were unable to testify as to her deficiencies
regarding these questions; (3) contrary to the AJ's finding, the record
indicated complainant's experience regarding bankruptcy was not as good
as the selectee's; (4) the AJ's conclusions regarding the pay issue
were inconsistent and disregarded record evidence which contradicts
her conclusions; (5) the AJ ignored evidence which established that
any request for repayment of the overpayment was not due to agency
management, but was rather a function of the payroll division; and (6)
the payroll division stated that there was no record that complainant
was ever required to repay the overpayment. The agency also argued that
the evidence failed to establish that complainant was subjected to severe
or pervasive harassment sufficient to alter the terms and conditions of
her employment, and that complainant was not entitled to the award of
compensatory damages that the AJ awarded.
Complainant responded to the agency's appeal, essentially restating
facts which were favorable to her allegations of discrimination.
We note complainant did not contest the AJ's finding of no retaliation
with regard to claim (1) and no race discrimination with regard to claim
(2). As such, we decline to address these issues on appeal and affirm the
agency's adoption of the AJ's finding of no discrimination or retaliation
with regard to these claims.2
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a
de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. In the
present matter, we find that substantial evidence in the record supports
the AJ's finding of discrimination.
An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or
on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or
other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so
lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.
See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9,
1999).
With regard to claim (1), we find that the AJ did not specifically
make credibility determinations. Rather, the AJ determined that
the testimony of members of the selection panel lacked credence, and
therefore concluded that complainant established that the agency's
articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.
AJ's Decision at 9-10. We note that although the AJ found that that
the testimony of the selection panel members had "serious credibility
issues," the AJ, in essence, found that the selection panel members'
testimony was not worthy of credence due to contradictions and because is
was vague. The AJ found that complainant presented sufficient evidence
to show that her qualifications for the Bankruptcy Specialist position at
issue were superior to those of the selectee. In making such a finding,
the AJ determined that the selecting panel's scoring of complainant was
suspect and provided vague reasons for ranking complainant's interview
lower than that of the selectee's. Consequently, we disagree with the
agency's contention that the AJ's credibility findings were in conflict,
or that she considered evidence only favorable to complainant. Rather,
a review of the AJ's decision indicates that she found that the hearing
testimony and evidence in the record showed that complainant established
that the agency's proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination.
We therefore find that the AJ's decision is supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Commission affirms the AJ's
finding of race discrimination with regard to claim (1).
With regard to claim (2) the AJ found that complainant established a prima
facie case of retaliation regarding the termination of her temporary
detail and resulting overpayment, inasmuch as the TM was aware of her
prior EEO activity and the adverse actions against complainant were
based on a retaliatory motive. AJ's Decision at 13. The AJ found
that the agency failed to articulate legitimate reasons regarding
the overpayment, and therefore concluded that complainant proffered
evidence which demonstrates that the TM's testimony on this matter was
a pretext for retaliation. Specifically, despite the allegations of the
agency that the overpayment and request for repayment was a "glitch" in
the payroll system, the AJ found that the TM's contradictory testimony
demonstrated that complainant should not have been required to repay the
overpayment, and she was never reimbursed the money which was taken out
of her bi-weekly check to repay the overpayment. AJ's Decision at 12-14.
We further note the AJ's finding that, contrary to the TM's testimony, the
agency's Human Resources Specialist stated that the overpayment was not
complainant's fault, and she should not have been required to repay it.
As further evidence that the TM's testimony was not worthy of credence,
the AJ noted that even after a waiver for the overpayment was approved
by the agency, complainant was not reimbursed for the money which was
taken out of her check. As such, the AJ found that the agency retaliated
against complainant and was "unjustly enriched." We find that the AJ's
finding of retaliation is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
As evidence of the agency's retaliatory animus, we note the AJ's finding
that complainant performed the work as a Supervisory Revenue Officer
during an extended period, yet was required to pay her additional salary
back, and she expressed her concerns about the series and extensions of
her detail to management. AJ's Decision at 14. As such, we affirm the
AJ's finding that the agency retaliated against complainant with regard
to claim (2).
Turning to complainant's amended claim of hostile work environment, we
find that the AJ's finding that complainant was subjected to a hostile
work environment is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
We find that the AJ appropriately determined that the agency's actions
were motivated by retaliatory animus and were sufficiently severe or
pervasive to render her work environment hostile. As such, we affirm
the AJ's finding that complainant was subjected to retaliatory harassment
with regard to claim (3).
Turning to the agency's arguments regarding the AJ's award of compensatory
damages, we note that a proper award of non-pecuniary compensatory
damages should not be "monstrously excessive" standing alone, the
product of passion or prejudice, and consistent with the amount awarded
in similar cases. See Ward-Jenkins v. Department of Interior, EEOC
Appeal No. 01961483 (March 4, 1999) (citing Cygnar v. City of Chicago,
865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989). Complainant requested damages for
loss of reputation, injury to professional standing, injury to character
and reputation, emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of
enjoyment of life, loss of health, emotional distress, loss of sleep,
anxiety, stress, depression, loss of self-esteem and excessive fatigue.
We find that the AJ's award of $85,000.00 is consistent with Commission
precedent and is not monstrously excessive. Wiggins v. Social Security
Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 07A30048 (January 22, 2004) ($70,000.00
awarded in compensatory damages where complainant cried frequently
for 3 months, and experienced stress, depression, nausea, insomnia,
headaches, embarrassment, loss of self-esteem, increased back pain, and
loss of enjoyment of life); Crear v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC
Appeal No. 07A50079 (January 26, 2006) ($70,000.00 awarded complainant who
experienced nightmares, anger, worry and embarrassment, felt disrespected
and degraded, felt that she was isolated at work and felt that her
professional education was in jeopardy); Lucas v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0720070051 (January 3, 2008) ($85,000.00 awarded
in compensatory damages where complainant felt devastated, hopeless, and
fearful, could not sleep, was treated by a psychiatrist, and stated that
her marriage was adversely affected by the harassment at the facility.).
Further we find that the award is supported by substantial evidence in
the record.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record in its entirety and after
consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, including those
not specifically addressed, it is the decision of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to affirm the decision of the AJ. Accordingly, the
agency's decision is reversed in part and affirmed in part. The agency
is directed to comply with the Order below.
ORDER
To the extent it has not already done so, the agency is ordered to take
the following remedial action:
A. Within sixty (60) days of the date this decision becomes final, the
agency shall promote complainant to the position of Bankruptcy Specialist,
GS-1101-12, retroactive to October 1, 2004. The agency is also ordered
to provide complainant with all step and grade increases to which she
would have been entitled absent the discrimination.
B. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision becomes
final, the agency is directed to award complainant back pay, with
interest, for all wages and benefits to which she is entitled, if
applicable, from October 1, 2004 to August 21, 2006. The agency shall
determine the appropriate amount of back pay, interest, and other benefits
due complainant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(c). The complainant
shall cooperate in the agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay
and benefits due, and shall provide all relevant information requested
by the agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back
pay and/or benefits, the agency shall issue a check to the complainant
for the undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date
the agency determines the amount it believes to be due. The complainant
may petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.
The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the
Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled
"Implementation of the Commission's Decision."
C. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision becomes
final, the agency is directed to determine any compensation due
complainant for working in the Supervisory Revenue Officer position during
the period between October 1, 2004 to August 21, 2006, with interest.
Any money the agency collected due to the overpayment of salary to
complainant for work performed during this period will be returned to
complainant. Further, if complainant has already paid income tax on
the overpayment, the agency shall determine the tax ramifications and
assure that complainant is not required to pay income tax twice on the
overpayment.
D. The agency shall remove the counseling letter issued April 12, 2005
from complainant's official personnel folder. The agency is also ordered
to revise complainant's mid-year performance appraisal, received on
July 29, 2005, raising the three disputed critical elements to reflect
a rating of 4.8. All appraisals issued which utilized the mid-year
appraisal shall be removed from complainant's official personnel folder.
Complainant shall also award complainant any and all awards she would
have received with the higher performance appraisal.
E. The agency shall remove the February 10, 2006 write-up regarding work
assignments which had been reassigned to the Philadelphia, PA Service
Center, and any and all discipline issued as a result of the write up
from complainant's official personnel folder.
F. Within thirty (30) days of the date this decision becomes final, the
agency shall pay complainant the amount of $85,000.00 in non-pecuniary
compensatory damages.
G. Within thirty (30) days of the date this decision becomes final,
the agency shall consider appropriate disciplinary action against
the individual referred to as the TM in this decision and report
its decision. If the agency decides to take disciplinary action, it
shall identify the action taken. If the agency decides not to take
disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision
not to impose discipline. The Commission does not consider training to
be a disciplinary action.
H. The agency should provide training to the management officials who
discriminated and retaliated against complainant regarding Title VII
and their obligations not to restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate
against any individual who exercises his or her right to oppose practices
made unlawful by, or who participates in proceedings under, the Federal
equal employment opportunity laws. The Commission does not consider
training to be a disciplinary action.
The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as
provided in the statement entitled "Implementation
of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include supporting
documentation verifying that the corrective action has been
implemented. Copies of its report(s) must be provided to complainant
and his representative.
POSTING ORDER (G0900)
The agency is ordered to post at its facility in Houston, Texas, copies
of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the
agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency
within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,
and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer
at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the
Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration
of the posting period.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)
If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid
by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees
to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this
decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for
attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to
the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's
order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement
of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the
right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's
order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.
See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).
Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on
the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled
"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.
A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying
complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0408)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil
action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United
States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date
that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant
in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0408)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your
time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil
action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph
above ("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
___5-22-08__
Date
1 The AJ noted that complainant had been detailed to the position of
Bankruptcy Specialist, GS-12, for two and a half years at the time of
her application and received an outstanding performance evaluation;
complainant was the only applicant on the Best Qualified list who could
become permanent without further competition; she was the only GS-12
working on offer and compromise cases; and there are no African-Americans
in the GS-1101-12 position in the relevant territory.
2 To the extent that complainant is alleging that she has been subjected
to additional retaliation as a result of this or other pending EEO
matters, we remind complainant that she should raise those claims with
an EEO Counselor pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(1).
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0720070015
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P. O. Box 19848
Washington, D.C. 20036