Theodore Charles. Wingrove et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 17, 2019

14976610 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 17, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/976,610 12/21/2015 Theodore Charles Wingrove 46107-02246(V215-0114) 9541
156760 7590 07/17/2019
Quinn IP Law / Visteon
21500 Haggerty Rd, Ste 300
Northville, MI 48167
EXAMINER
BEUTEL, WILLIAM A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2616
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/17/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
adomagala@quinniplaw.com
usdocketing@quinniplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte THEODORE CHARLES WINGROVE,
MICHAEL EICHBRECHT, KYLE ENTSMINGER,
ANDREW DESCISCIOLO, and JAMES JOSEPH KORNACKI1
________________

Appeal 2018-008579
Application 14/976,610
Technology Center 2600
________________

Before JASON V. MORGAN, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
DANIEL N. FISHMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final
Rejection of claims 1–13 and 17–19. Claims 14–16 are canceled. Final Act.
2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Appellant is the applicant and real party in interest, Visteon Global
Technologies, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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Summary of disclosure
The Specification discloses an apparatus that includes two displays
that are adjacent to each other with a gap formed between them. Light
emitting diodes (LEDs) and lightguides in the gap are configured to give the
illusion that an image moving from one display to the other when the image
shifts between the two displays. Abstract.
Exemplary claims (key limitations emphasized)
1. An apparatus to transition an image between at least two
displays with a vehicle, comprising:
the at least two displays positioned adjacent to one another
with the vehicle such that a gap is formed there between,
wherein the displays are configured to display the image;
at least one light emitting diode (LED) disposed within the gap
between the at least two displays and being configured to emit
light in a specific configuration corresponding to the image;
and
at least one lightguide disposed adjacent to the at least one
LED and within the gap between the at least two displays,
wherein the lightguide is configured to disperse light from the
LED in response to the image transitioning between one display
to the other.
7. The apparatus of claim 1, further comprising:
at least one layer of optical clear adhesive (OCA) bonding
material disposed on a portion of one of the at least two
displays.
9. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the at least one layer
of OCA bonding material is a plurality of layers of OCA
bonding material for visually changing the depth of the image
on a portion of one of the at least two displays.
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10. The apparatus of claim 7, further comprising:
at least one lens affixed to a portion of the at least two displays
via the OCA bonding material.
11. The apparatus of claim 10, wherein the at least one lens
has a curvature configured to change the depth of the image on
one of the at least two displays.
12. The apparatus of claim 10, wherein the at least one lens
is a first lens affixed to the first display and a second lens
affixed to the second display,
wherein the first lens has a first curvature in a first direction
and the second lens has a second curvature in a second
direction different from the first curvature.
17. A method for transitioning an image between at least two
displays using a lightguide disposed in a gap between the two
displays within a vehicle, comprising:
displaying the image on one of the at least two displays;
processing image transitioning via an electronic control unit;
and
transitioning the image by activating at least one light emitting
diode (LED) to emit light in a specific configuration
corresponding to the image via the electronic control unit,
wherein transitioning the imaging includes dispersing light
from the LED in the specific configuration when the image
transitions between the displays.
18. (Previously Presented) The apparatus of claim 1, further
comprising:
a plurality of LEDs within the gap form by the display,
wherein each of the displays extend in a vertical and horizontal
direction, and
the gap being formed in the vertical direction between the
displays, and a placement of the plurality of LEDs extend in the
vertical direction.
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Rejections
The Examiner rejects claims 17–19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being
indefinite. Final Act. 6–7.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–6, 13, and 17–192 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Kilpatrick, II et al. (US
2010/0079355 A1; published Apr. 1, 2010) (“Kilpatrick”), Klement et al.
(US 2015/0185397 A1; published July 2, 2015) (“Klement”), and Rovik (US
2011/0298808 A1; published Dec. 8, 2011). Final Act. 7–19.
The Examiner rejects claims 7–9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Kilpatrick, Klement, Rovik, and Park (US 2015/0177541
A1; published June 25, 2015). Final Act. 19–21.
The Examiner rejects claims 10–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Kilpatrick, Klement, Rovik, Park, and Wang et al. (US
2015/0378240 A1; published Dec. 31, 2015) (“Wang”). Final Act. 21–24.
35 U.S.C. § 112(B)
In rejecting claim 17 as indefinite, the Examiner finds that there is no
antecedent basis for the limitation of “the imaging” (emphasis added). Final
Act. 6. The Examiner suggests amending the limitation to “the image.”3 Id.
The Examiner does not explicitly offer, however, to enter an examiner’s
amendment to that effect.

2 The Examiner erroneously lists claims 14–16 in the statement of the
rejection (Final Act. 7), even though these claims had previously been
canceled (id. at 2).
3 The Examiner incorrectly suggests striking out “image” and inserting
“imaging” rather than striking out “imaging” and inserting “image.” Final
Act. 6.
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The Examiner similarly rejects claim 18 as indefinite as failing to
provide sufficient antecedent basis for the limitation of “the gap form of the
display” (emphasis added). Id. This rejection is related to the Examiner’s
objection to claim 18 for having “a grammatical or typographical error,”
which the Examiner suggests addressing by “amending the limitation to
recite ‘the gap formed . . .’” Id. (alteration in original). Again, the Examiner
does not explicitly offer to enter the suggested amendment as an examiner’s
amendment. Id.
Appellant concedes the lack of antecedent bases for “the imaging,” as
recited in claim 17, and for “the gap form by the display,” as recited in claim
18. Appeal Br. 6. Appellant argues, however, that the claims are not
indefinite because, as the Examiner’s suggested amendments show, an
artisan of ordinary skill would understand that the lack of antecedent bases
are merely due to clerical errors. Id. Appellant consents to both of the
suggested amendments proffered by the Examiner and submits that neither
rejection is proper. Id.
The Examiner declines to enter examiner’s amendments and withdraw
the 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) rejections. Ans. 22–24.
There is no dispute as to how to modify claims 17 and 18 to eliminate
the identified ambiguities. Nonetheless, 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(g) merely
“permits the Office to make amendments . . . by examiner’s amendments . . .
in the interest of expediting prosecution and reducing cycle time.” MPEP
§ 714(E). That is, “[w]hen a reply to a final Office action substantially
places the application in condition for allowance, an examiner may request
that the applicant (or representative) authorize an examiner’s amendment to
correct the omission and place the application in condition for allowance”
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(MPEP § 714.03 (emphasis added)), but taking such action is “solely within
the discretion of the examiner” (id. (emphasis added)).
Examiner “rulings dealing with procedural matters, such as whether
an affidavit or amendment is untimely, and formal requirements, such as
whether a new application title will be required, are reviewable upon
petition.” Ex parte Searles, 422 F.2d 431, 435 (CCPA 1970). “Review of
an examiner’s refusal to admit an amendment . . . is by petition to the
Director.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(d).
Here, the Examiner has suggested amendments Appellant could
proffer, but has not entered the suggested amendments as Examiner
amendments. This is a procedural matter, not a substantive matter. Thus, it
is a matter petitionable to the Director rather than appealable to the Board.
See MPEP § 1201. Therefore, we do not address the question of whether the
Examiner erred by not entering examiner’s amendments to overcome the
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) rejections of claims 17–19.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) rejections
of claims 17–19.
35 U.S.C. § 103
Claims 1–8, 13, and 17–19
In rejecting claim 1 as obvious, the Examiner relies on Kilpatrick’s
multi-panel device, which includes displays 102 and 106, separated by a
third display 104, to teach “at least two displays positioned adjacent to one
another with the vehicle such that a gap is formed there between” and “at
least one light emitting [element] disposed within the gap between the at
least two displays and being configured to emit light in a specific
configuration corresponding to the image.” Final Act. 7–8 (citing Kilpatrick
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¶¶ 79, 101, Figs. 1, 5). The Examiner relies on Klement to suggest using a
light emitting diode (LED) for the light emitting element taught by
Kilpatrick and to suggest “at least one lightguide disposed adjacent to the at
least one LED and within the gap between the at least two displays.” Id. at 8
(citing Klement ¶¶ 35–37, Fig. 2).
Appellant contends the Examiner erred because Kilpatrick’s displays
102 and 106 “are not adjacent to one another, but instead are separated by a
full third display.” Appeal Br. 7. Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive,
however, because claim 1 lacks recitations limiting the size of or requiring
other features in the gap between the two displays in a manner that precludes
use of another display to bridge the gap between the two displays.
Moreover, the middle display 104 in Kilpatrick serves the same purpose as
the claimed light emitting diode disposed between the two displays of claim
1. That is, the middle display 104 emits light in a specific configuration
corresponding to an image transitioning between displays 102 and 106. See,
e.g., Kilpatrick ¶ 5.
Appellant further argues that combining Kilpatrick and Klement
would result in “the display of Klement [being] the middle display of
Kilpatrick.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because
Appellant does not persuasively distinguish the disputed recitation from
Kilpatrick modified by replacing middle display 104 with the display of
Klement. Furthermore, Klement produces an image on cover screen 214 of
the display by controlling the light output by light emitting diodes 202, 204,
206, and 208 to produce light (represented by arrows 216, 218, 220, and
222) having “different intensities, different colors, [and changing] at
different times.” Klement ¶ 36; see also id. at Figs. 2–3. Therefore, we
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agree with the Examiner that Klement’s image production teaches or
suggests using at least one light emitting diode configured to emit light in a
specific configuration corresponding to an image. Final Act. 8 (citing
Klement ¶¶ 35–37, Fig. 2).
Appellant also contends that the Examiner erroneously concludes
“that a[n] LED display is the same as a[n] LED.” Reply Br. 9. Appellant
argues that Kilpatrick’s light emitting diode display does not teach or
suggest the claimed light emitting diode of claim 1 because the Specification
“specifically show[s] the LED being different than the displays in the
Figures. Id. at 10. The claimed invention, however, does not preclude the
two displays from also producing light using light emitting diodes.
Appellant’s argument that the two displays must be different from the light
emitting diodes disposed within the gap between them is not commensurate
with the scope of the claimed invention, and thus Appellant’s argument is
unpersuasive. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that the combination
of Kilpatrick and Klement teaches or suggests disposing at least one light
emitting diode (as taught or suggested by Klement) within the gap between
at least two displays (as taught or suggested by Kilpatrick). See Final Act. 8.
Similarly, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Kilpatrick
and Klement teaches or suggests “at least one lightguide disposed adjacent
to the at least one LED and within the gap between the at least two
displays,” as recited in claim 1. See id.
The Examiner relies on Rovik’s teaching of displays within a vehicle
to teach or suggest the claim 1 preamble recitation of “two displays with
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[sic] a vehicle.”4 Id. at 9 (citing Rovik Abstract, ¶ 34). Appellant contends
the Examiner erred because “the multi panel display of Kilpatrick and the
mobile device display of Klement are not suitable to be the audio head unit
and instrument cluster of Rovik.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant provides no
support or explanation to support this conclusory contention. Moreover, the
Examiner’s findings and analysis with respect to the disputed preamble
recitation are reasonable and supported by the evidence of record. See Final
Act. 9. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that it would have been
obvious to an artisan of ordinary skill to modify the displays formed using
the combined teachings and suggestions of Kilpatrick and Klement for use in
a vehicle. Id.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103
rejection of claim 1, and claims 2–8, 13, and 17–19, which Appellant does
not argue separately with persuasive specificity. Appeal Br. 9–12.
Claim 9
Park teaches the use of an optical bonding material to bond display
panel layers, each displaying two-dimensional images at different angles,
with a spacer layer in between, thus enabling a user to view an image in
three-dimensions. See, e.g., Park ¶¶ 44, 46, 50, Fig. 3. In rejecting claim 9,
the Examiner finds that this use of an optical bonding material teaches or
suggests modifying the combined teachings and suggestions of Kilpatrick,
Klement, and Rovik to include “a plurality of layers of OCA bonding
material for visually changing the depth of the image on a portion of one of

4 The use of “with” in the claim 1 preamble appears to be another clerical
error that should be corrected in the event of further prosecution.
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the at least two displays.” Ans. 33–35 (citing Park ¶¶ 44–46, 50, 52, Fig. 3);
see also Final Act. 21.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred because “the bonding material
of Park is merely used for attaching the panels, not for changing a depth of
the image at any portion of the display.” Appeal Br. 12. Claim 9 does not
require, however, that the bonding material alone change the depth of the
image. Moreover, Appellant does not rebut the Examiner’s interpretation of
“changing a depth of [an] image” as encompassing displaying an image in
three dimensions rather than in two dimensions. See Ans. 35.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of
claim 9.
Claim 10
Appellant submits that the optical clear adhesive “bonding material in
Park (which was cited for the bonding material) is used to combine multiple
layers of a three-dimensional display.” Appeal Br. 13. Appellant further
submits that, “[b]y contrast, in the rejection of claim 10, the same material
without explanation is used instead to bond to a lens, namely a liquid crystal
lens.” Id. Appellant thus contends the Examiner erred in relying on the
combined teachings and suggestions of Kilpatrick, Klement, Rovik, Park,
and Wang. Appeal Br. 13. Appellant does not persuasively rebut, however,
the Examiners conclusion that it would have been obvious to use an optical
clear adhesive to affix a lens because use of such a bonding material in this
manner would have resulted “in an improved display device adhering layers
of the screen using a less obstructive layer of adhesive for more visually
pleasing images, using a material with better adhesiveness, without affecting
light emission of the lens.” Final Act. 22 (citing Wang ¶ 81); see also Ans.
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36. Appellant’s argument is especially unpersuasive in light of Wang’s
explicit teaching that “Optically Clear Adhesive is a type of special adhesive
for adhering transparent optical components, such as lenses.” Wang ¶ 79
(emphasis added).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of
claim 10.
Claim 11
The Examiner relies on Wang’s directional diffuser 3, a liquid crystal
lens with variable focus length, to teach or suggest “wherein the at least one
lens has a curvature configured to change the depth of the image on one of
the at least two displays,” as recited in claim 11. Final Act. 22 (citing Wang
¶¶ 3, 47, Figs. 2, 3); see also Ans. 37–38 (further citing Wang ¶ 81, Fig. 5).
Appellant does not dispute that Wang’s directional diffuser lens has a
curvature. See Appeal Br. 13. Rather, Appellant argues Wang’s directional
diffuser lens curvature “is used to distribute light for viewing comfort . . . ,
not to alter the depth of the image.” Id. (citing Wang ¶ 44).
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because Wang’s diffuser not
only provides for viewing comfort, it also improves the three-dimensional
viewing effect. See Wang ¶¶ 44, 47. That is, Wang’s directional diffuser
lens “directionally diffuses the light, such that the diffused light enters the
left and right eyes of the viewer, as standard left view image and right view
image” to impart a three-dimensional view of an image. Id. ¶ 58. As
discussed above with respect to the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of
claim 9, a reasonably broad interpretation of changing the depth of an image
encompasses displaying an image in three dimensions rather than in two
dimensions. See Ans. 35. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that
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Wang’s directional diffuser lens teaches or suggests “wherein the at least
one lens has a curvature configured to change the depth of the image on one
of the at least two displays,” as recited in claim 11.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of
claim 11.
Claim 12
Claim 12 recites first and second lens attached to first and second
displays respectively, wherein the lenses have curvatures in different
directions. Appellant contends the Examiner erred because “Wang does not
mention that adjacent displays should have lenses with different curvatures.”
Appeal Br. 14. The Examiner relies on Kilpatrick rather than Wang,
however, to teach or suggest the use of multiple displays. See Final Act. 7.
Furthermore, the Examiner’s findings show that the curvature of Wang’s
directional diffuser lens is used to create a three-dimensional viewing effect.
See id. at 22. Specifically, Wang’s directional diffuser lens “directionally
diffuses the light, such that the diffused light enters the left and right eyes of
the viewer, as standard left view image and right view image” to impart a
three-dimensional view of an image (i.e., to modify the depth of the image).
Wang ¶ 58.
As Kilpatrick illustrates, the displays 102 and 106 are at different
positions. See Kilpatrick Figs. 1, 5. Specifically, display 102 is on the left
and display 106 is on the right. Id. These different positions would change
each display’s position with respect to a user’s left and right eyes. An
artisan of ordinary skill would have recognized that the direction from each
display to each of the user’s eyes would not be the same because of these
different positions. Therefore, it would have been obvious to an artisan of
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ordinary skill—in relying on Wang to modify the displays of Kilpatrick to
modify the depth of an image on the two displays using directional diffuser
lenses—to use different directions for the directional diffuser lenses
curvatures so as to ensure the diffused light from each of the displays enters
the left and right eyes of the viewer as intended, despite the different
positions of the displays.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of
claim 12.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–13 and 17–19.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED