Taft D. Kelly, Complainant,v.Ray H. LaHood, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Motor Carriers), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 23, 2010
0520110068 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 23, 2010)

0520110068

12-23-2010

Taft D. Kelly, Complainant, v. Ray H. LaHood, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Motor Carriers), Agency.


Taft D. Kelly,

Complainant,

v.

Ray H. LaHood,

Secretary,

Department of Transportation

(Federal Motor Carriers),

Agency.

Request No. 0520110068

Appeal No. 0120102207

Agency No. 2009-00023-FMCSA-02

DENIAL

Complainant timely requested reconsideration of the decision in Taft

D. Kelly v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 0120102207

(September 9, 2010). EEOC Regulations provide that the Commission may,

in its discretion, grant a request to reconsider any previous Commission

decision where the requesting party demonstrates that: (1) the appellate

decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact

or law; or (2) the appellate decision will have a substantial impact on

the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. See

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(b).

BACKGROUND

In the underlying case, Complainant alleged that the Agency discriminated

against him on the basis of race (African-American), color (black),

and in reprisal for prior protected activity when, in April 2009, the

Agency failed to open for competition a GS-15 Chief of the Enforcement

and Compliance Division/Supervisory Transportation Specialist position

and instead placed an applicant from another vacancy into the position,

which denied Complainant the opportunity to be selected. The Commission

affirmed the Agency's final decision, which found that Complainant

failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as

alleged. Specifically, the Commission found that Complainant failed

to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the bases of race,

color, and reprisal. Regarding the prima facie case of race and color

discrimination, the Commission found that Complainant was not similarly

situated to the selectee and did not provide any evidence to raise an

inference of discrimination. Regarding the prima facie case of reprisal,

the Commission found that Complainant failed to show that the Director of

the Office of Enforcement and Compliance (Director)1 and the Associate

Administrator for Enforcement and Program Delivery (Administrator)

were aware of or involved in his previous EEO activity. In addition,

the Commission found that Complainant failed to show that there was any

nexus between his previous EEO activity and his non-selection.

ARGUMENTS ON RECONSIDERATION

In his request for reconsideration, Complainant, through his attorney,

argued that the appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law for three reasons. First,

Complainant argued that the appellate decision erroneously stated that the

Director was the selecting official, when in fact "the ROI makes clear

that he was not the selecting official" and the Administrator "was and

admitted that he was." Complainant contended that this misstatement of

fact creates the impression that the selecting official had no involvement

with his prior EEO activity, when in fact the Administrator was "deeply

involved with the most significant event": Complainant's reassignment

from a previous position only months before the Administrator made the

decision not to post the position at issue. Second, Complainant argued

that, although the appellate decision stated that the Director of the

Office of Human Resources told the Director and the Administrator that

they could fill the same position through the same certificate if the job

titles were the same, the position descriptions were vastly different.

Third, in reference to a selection memorandum dated April 3, 2009 that

justified the selection of the two selectees, Complainant argued:

The very fact that this justification memo does not even refer to [the

selectee for the position at issue] as being recommended at the end

of the memo shows that it was slapped together at the very last minute

and asserted the usual generalties and banalties with regard to all the

efforts expended to make certain that all minorities and candidates of

diverse backgrounds were considered.

In response, the Agency asserted that Complainant failed to demonstrate

that the appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law. Regarding Complainant's first argument, the

Agency asserted that there is no record evidence to support Complainant's

claim that the Administrator was the selecting official. In addition, the

Agency asserted that the appellate decision specifically concluded that

the Director and the Administrator had no knowledge of Complainant's prior

EEO activity and Complainant did not cite to record evidence supporting

his contention otherwise. Further, the Agency asserted that the appellate

decision specifically found that Complainant's reassignment was undertaken

by management officials who were not involved in the selection process

at issue. Regarding Complainant's second argument, the Agency asserted

that there is no record evidence to support Complainant's claim that

the position descriptions were vastly different. In addition, the

Agency asserted that, even if the positions descriptions were different,

this was not a material fact because it would not alter the appellate

decision's analysis of whether Complainant established a prima facie case.

Regarding Complainant's third argument, the Agency asserted that it is

deficient for several reasons: (a) it is misleading because there was

nothing "secretive" about the selection process; (b) it is irrelevant

because unconfirmed speculation about the selection memorandum is not a

material fact related to Complainant's burden to establish a prima facie

case; and (c) it is inappropriate for a request for reconsideration

because such speculative statements are not meant to demonstrate a

clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Upon review, we find that Complainant's request does not establish that

the appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law, or that the appellate decision will have

a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of

the Agency. As to Complainant's first argument, we note that the

record reflects the following: (a) the Administrator did not attest

to being the selecting official; (b) the Director attested to making

the selection at issue; and (c) the Certificate of Eligibles contains

the name and signature of the Director as the selecting official.

In addition, although Complainant asserted that this was a "factual

error of major importance" because of the Administrator was involved

with his reassignment, we find that Complainant did not cite to any

record evidence showing that the Administrator knew about his prior

EEO activity at the time of the non-selection. Further, we note that

the appellate decision specifically addressed Complainant's reassignment

argument; it concluded that the reassignment was undertaken by management

officials who were not involved in the selection and that Complainant did

not show that the Administrator knew about his prior EEO activity at the

time of the non-selection. As to Complainant's second argument, we find

that the content of the position descriptions is not a "material" fact

because the appellate decision did not rely on that fact in finding that

Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case. As to Complainant's

third argument, we note that the second page of the selection memorandum

does indeed refer to the recommendation of both selectees. In addition,

we find that this particular argument does not assert that the appellate

decision involved a "clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact

or law."

We remind Complainant that a "request for reconsideration is not a second

appeal to the Commission." Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (MD-110), at Ch. 9 � VI.A. (Nov. 9,

1999). We emphasize that the appellate decision found that Complainant

failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the bases of

race, color, and reprisal. Therefore, Complainant must demonstrate in

his request for reconsideration that the appellate decision clearly erred

in that respect. We find that Complainant's arguments on reconsideration

failed to make such a showing.

CONCLUSION

After reconsidering the previous decision and the entire record, the

Commission finds that the request fails to meet the criteria of 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405(b), and it is the decision of the Commission to deny

the request. The decision in EEOC Appeal No. 0120102207 remains the

Commission's decision. There is no further right of administrative

appeal on the decision of the Commission on this request.

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0610)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right

of administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the

right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District

Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive

this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_12/23/10_________________

Date

1 The appellate decision referred to the Director as the selecting

official.

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2

0520110068

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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