St. Louis Comprehensive Neighorhood Health Center, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 9, 1980

248 N.L.R.B. 1078 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

1078 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
St. Louis Comprehensive Neighborhood Health
Center, Inc. and Local 50, Service Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO and Pamela
Hunt. Cases 14-CA-12158, 14-CA-12543, 14-
CA-12594, and 14-CA-12571
April 9, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND TRUESDALE
On December 6, 1979, Administrative Law
Judge Benjamin Schlesinger issued the attached
Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respon-
dent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,'
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge,
as modified below, and to adopt his recommended
Order.
In section F of his Decision, the Administrative
Law Judge found that Respondent's post-strike
conduct toward employees McGaughey, Evans,
and Atkins violated Section 8(a)(1). We do not
agree with this conclusion. As the Administrative
Law Judge found, Respondent's questioning of
these employees concerning the strike misconduct
of which they were accused was part of a bona
fide investigation of those accusations. Consequent-
ly, the subsequent delivery to these employees of
letters which confirmed the legitimate purpose of
the questioning, and which stated that whether or
not any further action would be taken against them
depended on the desires of the complainants, did
not contain any coercive overtones not implicit in
the questioning itself. Since, as we have found, the
investigation was justified, it was not rendered un-
lawful by these innocuous letters. Accordingly, we
reverse the Administrative Law Judge's finding to
the contrary. 2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
' Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products.
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 Chairman Fanning would adopt the Administrative Law Judge's De-
cision in its entirety.
248 NLRB No. 143
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, St. Louis Com-
prehensive Neighborhood Health Center, Inc., St.
Louis, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN SCHLESINGER, Administrative Law Judge:
This proceeding was heard by me in St. Louis, Missouri,
on July 9, 10, and 11, 1979. Based on charges filed by
Local 50, Service Employees International Union, AFL-
CIO (herein the Union), on January 15, April 27, and
May 14, 1979, and on a charge filed by Pamela Hunt on
May 7, 1979, a consolidated complaint issued on May 31,
1979, alleging that St. Louis Comprehensive Neighbor-
hood Health Center, Inc. (herein Respondent or Center),
violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, by (a) refusing to bar-
gain with the Union in that (i) it failed to give its negoti-
ators authority to conduct meaningful and good-faith ne-
gotiations; (ii) it refused to meet at regularly scheduled
intervals to conduct meaningful and good-faith negotia-
tions; (iii) it unilaterally promulgated, maintained, and en-
forced new rules; and (iv) it failed to furnish the Union
with certain requested information;' (b) by interrogating
employees about their picket line activities;(c) by telling
employees that they would be denied raises because of
their activities on behalf of the Union; (d) by warning an
employee about garnishments on her salary; and (e) by
suspending Hunt without pay and refusing to reinstate
her to her former position in order to discourage her
membership in or activities on behalf of the Union. Re-
spondent denied the commission of any of these alleged
unfair labor practices.
I have considered the entire record of the proceeding
before me, including my observation of the demeanor of
the witnesses and the briefs filed by General Counsel and
Respondent. Accordingly, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent alleges that the National Labor Relations
Board has no jurisdiction over its operations because
"the Respondent has certain contractual obligations to
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, obli-
gations which cannot be fulfilled in light of the position
taken by the General Counsel in the instant cases." That
contention has been put to rest by the Board in St. Louis
Comprehensive Neighborhood Health Center, Inc., 244
NLRB No. 115 (1979), in which the Board held that this
"Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the
With the exception of one item of information, this allegation of the
complaint was withdrawn by General Counsel in his brief
ST. LOUIS COMPREHENSIVE NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH CTR. 1079
Act, and that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to
assert jurisdiction." 2
Accordingly, I find, as Respondent admits, that it is a
not-for-profit corporation duly organized under and ex-
isting by virtue of the laws of the State of Missouri and
that it maintains its principal office in St. Louis, Missou-
ri, where it is engaged in providing health services for
residents of neighborhoods within the City of St. Louis
and St. Louis County. During the year ending April 30,
1979, which period is representative of its operations,
Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business op-
erations, derived gross income in excess of $250,000, and
purchased and caused to be transported and delivered at
its St. Louis facility goods, supplies, and materials valued
in excess of $15,000, which were transported and deliv-
ered to its St. Louis facility directly from suppliers locat-
ed outside the State of Missouri. Accordingly, Respon-
dent is now, and has been at all times material herein, a
health care institution within the meaning of Section
2(14) of the Act and an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
I further find, as Respondent admits, that the Union is
and has been at all times material herein a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Re-
spondent further admitted, and I find, that on or about
June 17, 1977, a majority of the employees of Respon-
dent, in the unit described below, by a secret-ballot elec-
tion conducted under the supervision of the Regional Di-
rector for Region 14 of the National Labor Relations
Board, designated and selected the Union as their repre-
sentative for the purpose of collective bargaining with
Respondent; that on or about June 27, 1977, said Region-
al Director certified the Union as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of said employees; and that
at all times since June 27, 1977, the Union has been and
is now the exclusive representative for the purpose of
collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment for
all the employees in the following appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time employees, in-
cluding office clerical employees, employed by Re-
spondent at its St. Louis, Missouri, facility, exclud-
ing technical employees, confidential employees,
professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act.3
I also find, as Respondent admits, that on July 21,
1977, the Union also was certified to represent a unit of
technical employees, pursuant to a secret-ballot election
held on July 13, 1977, the appropriate unit being:
All technical employees employed at Respondent's
St. Louis, Missouri, facility, excluding office clerical
and professional employees, guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act, and all other employees.
2 Respondent agreed that the assertion of jurisdiction over it would be
determined by the results of the cited Decision, which had not been ren-
dered when the hearing herein was held
3 The parties litigated whether this was an appropriate unit and other
related representation matters in Case 14-RC-8401.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A.Prior Proceeding
In 244 NLRB No. 115, the Board found that Respon-
dent had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act "by
failing to supply the Union information necessary for the
purposes of collective bargaining, by failing to meet with
the Union and engage in collective bargaining, and by
failing to authorize any agent or representative to bar-
gain with the Union." Those conclusions resulted from
findings that Respondent refused to meet with the Union
pending advice from the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare as to whether it could negotiate and
what position should be taken during negotiations, Re-
spondent's refusal from August 1977 to February 1978 to
meet and negotiate an agreement, Respondent's position
that it had no authority to make agreements in the areas
of wages, hours, and working conditions, and Respon-
dent's refusal to supply certain information to the Union
which was necessary for it to conduct meaningful collec-
tive bargaining. The Board adopted, with minor modifi-
cation, the remedy proposed by the Administrative Law
Judge, ordering, inter alia, Respondent to supply the
Union with information necessary for the purposes of
collective bargaining, to meet with the Union and
engage in collective bargaining, and to authorize an
agent or representative to bargain with the Union upon
request.
The complaint herein is partly a sequel to the Board's
earlier Decision, and General Counsel requests essential-
ly the same remedy which has previously been granted
by the Board. However, as set forth in footnote 1, supra,
Respondent has already supplied most of the information
necessary for the purposes of collective bargaining, in
conformity with the Administrative Law Judge's recom-
mended Order.
B.Respondent's Alleged Refusal To Bargain
It is obvious that, with some change of technique, Re-
spondent continues to refuse to bargain with the Union,
albeit that for a period of time its conduct was apparent-
ly condoned and agreed to by the Union.
The lengthy delay of bargaining stems from Respon-
dent's position that, as a community health service
funded by the Public Health Service of HEW, it was re-
quired 4 to establish a governing board with specific re-
sponsibility for, inter alia, "personnel policies and proce-
dures, including selection and dismissal procedures,
salary and benefit scales, employee grievance procedures,
and equal opportunity practices." Respondent's board of
directors consists of 25 members" who represent the
population served by the Center, to wit, members elected
by various neighborhood organizations and representa-
tives of the medical, legal, business, and banking profes-
sions, all of whom serve on a volunteer basis.
In preparation for any meeting with the Union, Re-
spondent's practice has been to call a meeting of its
442 CFR Sec. 51c. 304 (1976)
a CFR Sec 5 c. 304 (a) requires that the governing board consist of at
least 9 but not more than 25 members, but this requirement may be
waived by the Secretary of HEW for good cause shown
1080 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
board to discuss negotiation tactics and to decide on a
primary and backup position to offer to the Union. How-
ever, it has often proved to be difficult to schedule meet-
ings which would be convenient for all the board mem-
bers; and it has been equally difficult to schedule month-
ly meetings of the five-member labor relations committee
of the board.
As a result, each time that the Union requested negoti-
ations with Respondent, Respondent first had to arrange
a meeting of its board or its labor relations committee to
discuss among the members what position to take once a
meeting would be arranged with the Union. The sched-
uling difficulties were then compounded because, once
Respondent decided what position it would take, often
on only a few of the Union's many demands, then a date
had to be set for the meeting with the Union when at
least three of the five committee members would be
available.
The upshot of this most cumbersome procedure was
that meetings were held with the Union, at best, sporadi-
cally (August 2 and 17, September 7 and 26, and Novem-
ber 2, 1978),6 but with the tacit approval of the Union
not only as to the date, but also as to the time of the
meeting, always in the early evening, so that members of
Respondent's committee who were employed in the day-
time could attend in the evening. On December 12, 1978,
the Union finally refused to comply with its prior tacit
acquiescence to the method of Respondent's procedures.
At that meeting, Respondent presented a wage proposal
which the Union questioned concerning what the pro-
posal reflected by way of actual increases and concern-
ing certain omissions and errors. The Union then coun-
tered with a prior wage demand, plus 6 percent. Respon-
dent's spokesman, David Outlaw, said that he was not
prepared to discuss the Union's counterproposal because
there had to be three members of Respondent's commit-
tee present and only one (Outlaw) was there, and he was
there solely to put Respondent's wage proposal in the
Union's hands. Kenneth Kenney, the Union's then busi-
ness representative, asked why there even had to be a
negotiating session, because, if there were to be no dis-
ttscions ad :g:etor. its, Respondent's wage propoisal
could have Ih)cn dei;vcred to the Union. Outlaw rpea;t-
cd his earlier comments, adding that Respondent's board
of directors was a volunteer board and that he was not
able to get other members to attend.
Two days later Kenlhey wrote to Morris Ienderson,
Respondent's project director, 7 modifying the 6-percent
wage increase sought on December 12, 1978, to a 5-1,/2-
percent wage increase and modifying the Union's posi-
tion with respect to a union-security clause. Kenney
asked for an immediate response to his counterproposal,
adding that, if Henderson was not in a position to give a
written response, Kenney would appreciate a date being
set immediately for a new meeting. Finally, Kenney ex-
F Eilrlier meetings ad been held t Decemnber 12. !977, and March
1I. 9 , at which the lUnion had presented two different sets of propos-
als ihe delay blsveen those sessicns and that of August 2, 1978, appears
to be wholly caused b the Ution. Such delay does not excuse Respon-
dcnlts actions thereafter.
' Henderson was neither a mnember of Respondent's board orf directors
nor its labor rlations committee.
pressed his hope that the proposals of the Union would
be resolved at least by January 15, 1979. Henderson re-
plied, by letter dated December 26, 1978, which was es-
sentially unresponsive to Kenney's December 14 letter,
but relied on the fact that "every institution has to oper-
ate under certain prescribed policies and guidelines," that
the "ultimate authority for the governance of the Center
is in the hands of its Board of Directors," and that the
Center's contract with HEW required that "All pro-
posed contracts must be submitted to the Regional
Health Administrator for review and approval prior to
entering into the agreement .... " Henderson stated
"with a fair degree of assurance" that the members of
the board of directors "are going to do what they con-
sider best in the long range interests of the Center" and
that all of the employees "recognize that we are doing
the best we can to run this Center in an efficient, first
class way so that their long range interests of the patients
we serve and the employees will be protected." Finally,
he stated that "we cannot do more than that which is
reasonably anticipated and allowable by HEW, and by
that which the Board considers in its judgment is best for
the Center."
On January 9, 1979, another negotiating session was
held at which Respondent was represented by Outlaw,
another board member, and Henderson. They gave the
Union Respondent's counterproposal on wages, and
there followed a discussion as to the effective date of the
contract and how the various increments set forth on the
pay schedule would be implemented in relation to in-
creases normally granted to employees on the anniversa-
ries of their employment. During the course of the dis-
cussion, the Union noticed that there were a few typo-
graphical errors but was nonetheless ready to sign off
Respondent's counterproprosal.8 Outlaw said that there
were not sufficient representatives of Respondent to
make that decision and that they could not sign off the
provision. Because of the omissions and typographical
errors, Outlaw wanted to take the counterproposal back
to his board of directors. Kenney asked whether the
counterproposal was being withdrawn; Outlaw said that
it was not, but that he wanted to review it again.
Henderson described this meeting as a violent confron-
tation between Kenney and Outlaw with tempers flaring.
He testified that, during the course of a discussion about
when the parties would meet again, Outlaw had suggest-
ed that the best time would be a week or two from then,
to which Kenney stated that the Union had no problem
with that but that he would not be responsible for any
acts that others might do. Outlaw wanted to know what
Kenney was alluding to, that there had been meetings all
summer and attempts had been made to hammer out an
agreement, that substantial progress had been made, and
that he did not care to be threatened. This was followed
by some heated words from Kenney suggesting, in Hen-
derson's words, "violence or militant or federal nature."
As a result of those comments, Henderson stated that
there were "real credibility problems developing" and
that henceforth the Union had to educe its position to
8 The parties, daring the course of their negotiations, submitted written
proposals to one another and, when they were agreed upon, the parties
then initialed each proposal agreed to, known to them as a "sign off."
ST. LOUIS COMPREHENSIVE NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH CTR. 1081
writing because Respondent was having "some real
problems" with some of the Union's activities and some
things the union representatives were saying and doing.
Henderson also testified that "a few unfair labor charges
had been filed," that he felt that the Union was not fair
to file them, and that he told the Union it would be ad-
vantageous to put everything in writing and that Re-
spondent would do the same.
I am not persuaded, because of the lack of clarity of
Henderson's testimony, and because no unfair labor prac-
tice charge had been filed by January 9, that all the
things which he said actually happened; but I have no
doubt that, at that meeting, the Union's negotiators final-
ly lost their patience with the delay of the ultimate reso-
lution of the negotiations, Respondent's continued refusal
to send to the bargaining table representatives who were
able to negotiate, and Respondent's continued insistence
on returning to its board of directors to establish a firm
position, holding the ultimate stick of app' val by HEW
over the head of the Union. If, prior to January 9, 1979,
or prior to the previous negotiating session on December
12, 1978, the Union had complied with Respondent's
modus operandi of constant consultation among its board
of directors and committee members and the consequent
delays inherent in that procedure, as of January 9, 1979,
the Union no longer acquiesced in such delays. Further,
Henderson's testimony was singularly unpersuasive and
unconvincing to justify Respondent's position that,
henceforth, all negotiations had to be in writing and that
the parties could not expeditiously meet at reasonable
hours to consummate an agreement, especially when
there were at that time only a few outstanding issues sep-
arating the parties.
There followed an exchange of letter, between the
parties. On January 16, 1979, Henderson wrote to Union
President Stodghill, enclosing a corrected copy of the
wage schedules which had been revised to correct the
errors and omissions found during the negotiating session
of January 9 and attempting to outline the position of
Respondent with regard to the remaining differences.
Those included (1) the Union's insistence on paid holi-
days of Lincoln's Birthday and Veterans Day, and Re-
spondent's counterproposal of two floating holidays; (2)
a union-security provision proposed by the Union in the
form of a 30-day required membership clause, an agency
shop, or a maintenance-of-membership clause, all three of
which Respondent rejected; (3) a provision relating to
the functioning of union stewards; and (4) provisions for
union dues checkoff. Outlaw concluded by stating:
Prior to concluding a package for presentation to
our Board, a complete review by us of all issues
will be necessary in order that any other outstand-
ing questions are identified.
Another negotiating session was held on or about Feb-
ruary 6, 1979, called by the Federal Mediation and Con-
ciliation Service (FMCS) to clarify the need for further
mediation. Only Respondent's attorney, Welch, appeared
for Respondent. By that time the first unfair labor charge
in this proceeding, dated January 15, 1979, had been filed
with the National Labor Relations Board. The Federal
mediator said that FMCS had a policy that, when unfair
labor practices were involved, FMCS did not like to get
involved. During the course of the session, Welch re-
viewed with Kenney the need for the Union to submit
all issues outstanding to Respondent's board of directors
so that they might clarify them. He noted that no lan-
guage relating to a dues checkoff had ever been pro-
posed by the Union. Kenney replied that the issue of
dues checkoff had not been raised at the bargaining table
and that, because the Union was relying on a provision
in Respondent's personnel policies, the clause did not
need to be a part of any collective-bargaining agreement.
The meeting ended with no understandings having been
reached.
There followed a further exchange of correspondence
between the parties. On February 12, 1979, Stodghill
wrote to Henderson requesting that a meeting be set for
a mutually agreeable time, date, and place to resolve the
remaining bargaining issues, which he stated were the
substitution of two personnel leave days for the existing
Lincoln and Veterans Day holidays, structure of steward
representation, grievance and arbitration,9 and union se-
curity. By letter dated February 22, 1979, Outlaw replied
to what he deemed to be "disturbing . . . implications"
of Stodghill's letter, which suggested that negotiations
should proceed as if nothing had happened despite the
fact that the Union had formally charged Respondent
with violating the Act and which ignored the fact that,
due to the pending unfair labor practice charges, the
FMCS was seriously considering removing itself from
the negotiations. Outlaw ended his letter by stating:
Finally, in order that we are not again placed in the
position of not having all items expressly on the
table when and if we meet, I am requesting that you
provide me with the details of your "Structure of
Steward Representation" proposal, as well as a
formal statement in writing as to your position on
dues checkoff ....
Upon receipt of requested items, I will convene
the Labor Relations Committee and determine what
future course we will take.
On March 1, 1979, Stodghill sent a telegram to Outlaw
stating his belief that it was necessary that negotiations
resume at a mutual date and place within the next 5 days
so that settlement might be reached through the discus-
sion on the issues, and indicating his belief that the
matter could be resolved "without further agitation," re-
sulting in the withdrawal of the unfair labor practice
charges. On March 2, 1979, Outlaw replied, repeating his
demand for the written statements of position in the
above-quoted Feburary 22 letter and stating that he
would make his recommendation to his committee on re-
ceipt of that material. By letter dated March 13, 1979,
Stodghill forwarded his suggested language relating to
union representation, union stewards, union activities,
bulletin boards, and union security.
Outlaw responded by letter, dated March 29, 1979, in
which he advised that the labor relations committee had
reached certain conclusions regarding the Union's pro-
° Sidghill ncl osed suggested language fir he grieance proceldure
1082 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
posals, agreeing in principle to the language entitled
"union activities," rejecting almost all the other lan-
guage, and agreeing to provide the Union with "com-
plete and detailed explanations" regarding its position
"whenever it is mutually convenient." On April 2, 1979,
Stodghill replied to Outlaw requesting that he forward
any language that Respondent would consider acceptable
and asking Outlaw if he would send the Union the expla-
nations of Respondent's position in writing within the
next 48 hours. On April 9, 1979, Outlaw replied to
Stodghill with a summary of the labor relations commit-
tee's feelings on the various issues, indicating: "We
would be happy to meet with you in connection with
these matters and explain them to you in greater detail."
As a result of Outlaw's alleged willingness to meet
with Stodghill, Stodghill attempted to contact Hender-
son to arrange for negotiations.' 0 His telephone calls
were unsuccessful: sometimes he spoke with Henderson's
secretary; other times he spoke to Henderson whose
normal response was that he would have to get his board
together, that the board was a volunteer board and not
easy to get together, or that his attorney was out of
town. By consequence, no meetings were held until
April 20, which was a result, first, of the Union's giving
the required notice of its intention to strike on or about
April 6 or 7 and, second, of Stodghill's attempt to avoid
the strike which was set for Monday, April 23, by a "last
ditch" meeting with Respondent.
Acting on Stodghill's request, FMCS called a joint ne-
gotiating session for Friday, April 20, 1979, at 10 a.m.,
apparently failing to understand that, until then, all nego-
tiating sessions had been held in the evening because of
the unavailability of Respondent's board of directors to
meet during the daytime. Only Henderson and Davis,
Respondent's administrator, appeared for Respondent
and Henderson took the position, in answer to Stodgh-
ill's question, that he had no right to negotiate on behalf
of Respondent and that his board was not available to
meet at that time.
There is a dispute as to what further occurred at that
meeting. Henderson testified that he told Stodghill that
Respondent's labor relations committee had met the
evening or so before the meeting and that there were
four issues that were unresolved: bulletin boards, griev-
ance machinery, union stewards, and a union-security
clause. Henderson stated that he had been authorized to
indicate agreement on the first three items but that lan-
guage would have to be worked out. On the fourth item,
a union-security clause, Respondent was wholly opposed
to any form of imposition on employees of involuntary
payments. Henderson further testified that Stodghill re-
quested that they then work out the language but Hen-
derson stated that he could not "retreat" from his posi-
tion-the language had always been worked out with the
committee and usually with his attorney's input. Stodgh-
ill then accused Henderson of not being authorized to
negotiate and terminated the meeting. On the other hand,
Stodghill denied that Henderson had stated the commit-
tee had met on the union proposals and that all issues
had been agreed upon, subject to language, with the ex-
10 Stodghill testified that his attempts dated back to April 2.
ception of union-security provisions. Rather, Henderson
merely denied that he had any right to negotiate with
the Union because his board was unavailable to meet at
that time. It is unnecessary to resolve this conflict, al-
though I am inclined to credit Stodghill's testimony in
light of the fact that normally nothing was accomplished
when Respondent was not fully represented.
The Union struck on April 23 and discontinued its
strike on or about May 3, 1979. On April 30, the Union
requested that FMCS convene a negotiating meeting to
resolve all outstanding issues between the parties. On
May 10, Stodghill wrote to Outlaw requesting negotia-
tions and, on May 14, with the Decision of Administra-
tive Law Judge Peterson in hand recommending that Re-
spondent engage in collective bargaining with the Union,
requested Henderson by telegram "that you immediately
meet and commence bargaining pursuant to this deci-
sion," suggesting that a meeting be held on Wednesday,
May 16, at which time he would be present and stating
that the Union "would regard [his) failure or refusal to
meet with [the Union] as an intolerable situation [and] a
blatant frustration of the bargaining process." He also
noted that the Union had previously given notice of its
intention to resume the strike as of May 21, 1979, in the
hope that Respondent would resume bargaining in the in-
terim.
Respondent replied by letter, dated May 16, 1979, indi-
cating that its labor relations committee decided on May
15 that it would not meet on May 16; that the committee
concluded that since three of its members were going to
be unavailable, including two of them being out of town,
it would be impossible for the committee to meet at that
time; and that nothing could be gained by further meet-
ings with the Union because of the bad faith the Union
had shown in the course of its negotiations with Respon-
dent. The Union's strike recommenced on May 22, 1979,
and there were some employees who were still on strike
at the time of the close of the hearing herein.
Inherent in the duty to bargain collectively, as defined
in Section 8(b) of the Act, are the duties to meet at rea-
sonable times and places and to have present at negotiat-
ing sessions individuals who may responsibly negotiate
and make commitments on behalf of the parties whom
they represent. 0 & F Machine Products Company, 239
NLRB No. 143 (1978). Respondent violated both duties
by insisting on its own policy of constant consultation
with and agreement of members of its labor relations
committee and board of directors. Its actions caused the
frequent delays in holding negotiating sessions and the
holding of negotiations where no one with the authority
to act was present. Coronet Casuals, Inc., 207 NLRB 304
(1973). The result was a patent frustration of the bargain-
ing process which ultimately led to the Union's conclu-
sion that nothing would be resolved at the table and that
only a strike might force Respondent to comply with its
bargaining obligations. Respondent has made no persua-
sive argument that the duties of the board of directors
could not be delegated to individuals who were willing
to meet at reasonable times and places and engage in
meaningful collective bargaining. Contrary to Hender-
son's testimony that only once or twice did Respondent
not have the requisite three representatives appearing on
ST. LOUIS COMPREHENSIVE NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH CTR. 1083
its behalf, Respondent's self-imposed requirements result-
ed in the absence of meaningful negotiations from De-
cember 12, 1978, to the date of the hearing herein.
I find that neither the Union's filing of an unfair labor
practice charge on January 15, 1979, nor the Union's
conduct at the negotiating session of January 9, 1979,
justified the refusal of Respondent to deal with the
Union other than by written communication. I am not
impressed with Henderson's explanation that there was
any justifiable loss of credibility; even if that were so,
that did not justify Respondent's further and later refusal
to meet and negotiate with the Union. Rather, I am per-
suaded that Respondent's real purpose of permitting its
relationship with the Union to fester and collective bar-
gaining to become futile was Respondent's ultimate con-
clusion that it was not subject to the Board's jurisdiction
and its desire to test that issue through the judicial pro-
cess. "
I further conclude that the initial strike of the Union
and its resumption were caused by Respondent's refusal
to bargain in good faith. I do not find that there was an
impasse reached in negotiations, because Respondent
never gave collective bargaining a chance to work. Of
the issues that remained unresolved prior to the com-
mencement of the Union's first strike, Henderson testified
that all the issues could have been resolved, but for lan-
guage difficulties, except for the Union's demand for a
union-security provision, which Respondent rejected.
Stodghill testified that early in 1979 he had unofficially
told Henderson of the Union's position that it would not
maintain its demand for a union-security provision. Hen-
derson did not deny this. As a result, even though the
Union continued to posit its options for a union-security
provision, it was clear that Respondent knew that the
Union's security clause was a "throw away" item, pend-
ing disposition of the other matters still not agreed upon.
As to those items, from January 9, 1979, on, Respon-
dent prodded the Union to reduce its demands to writing
and delayed bargaining negotiations until such time as
the Union complied with its request. By March 14, 1979,
the Union's proposed language was in the hands of Re-
spondent; yet, from that date forward, no meaningful ne-
gotiating session were scheduled despite the repeated re-
quests of the Union. It was only more than a month
later, on or about April 18 or 19, that Respodent's labor
relations committee allegedly met and reviewed the
Union's proposals. Even then, according to Henderson,
the committee did not have sufficient time to finalize its
proposed language modifications of the Union's propos-
als; and none were submitted to the Union up to the
" In his letter to Stodghill of May 16, 1979, Outlaw wrote:
The committee believes that our best resort is to get clarified by a
Court of Law the Board's jurisdiction over the Center, whether or
not we can have our volunteer Board members serve as our negotia-
tors, and whether or not we commit an unfair labor practice when
we advise you of our honest belief that all of our contracts with
HEW require that we submit any agreement that we reached with
you to DHEW before we give our final approval to it.
I do not suggest that Respondent did not have a right to pursue whether
it was subject to the Board's jurisdiction through judicial proceedings.
However, if Respondent were incorrect, as the Board has already held.
then Respondent must suffer for its mistaken assumption that the Board
would not assert jurisdiction over it.
close of the hearing. 12 That constituted, together with its
refusal to meet with the Union, the stratagem to impede
and defeat the Union's efforts to secure a collective-bar-
gaining agreement. The aborted negotiation session on
April 20, where no one with authority appeared for Re-
spondent,13 was quickly followed by the Union's strike
on April 23. When the strike was called off, the Union
attempted again to bargain and, upon Respondent's refus-
al, the strike was soon resumed. These facts show ines-
capably that the cause of the strikes was Respondent's
refusal to bargain in good faith and meet with the Union.
I thus conclude that Respondent has failed and refused
to bargain in good faith with the Union in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and that the strikes
from April 23 to May 5 and from May 22 to the present
were and are unfair labor practice strikes, called to pro-
test Respondent's refusal to bargain and meet with it.
Albion Corporation, d/b/a Brooks, Inc., 228 NLRB 1365
(1977), enfd. in relevant respects 593 F.2d 936 (10th Cir.
1979).
C. Respondent's Alleged Imposition of New Rules
During the course of the first strike, on or about April
30, Respondent issued a memorandum to the home
health staff entitled "REINFORCEMENT OF POLI-
CIES AND PROCEDURES," which was given to the
strikers upon their return to work; and on or about May
10, another memorandum to all staff entitled "Socializ-
ing." General Counsel complains that both memoranda
include new policies, which were promulgated and en-
forced without bargaining with the Union, in violation of
Respondent's duty to bargain under Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act.
The notice about socializing read as follows:
It has been observed that employees are visiting
departments other than their own during business
hours for the purpose of small group discussions for
other than Health Center business.
All employees are strongly encouraged to per-
form their individual duties in the area to which
they are assigned leaving the social aspects to break
or lunch periods.
Supervisors are requested to closely monitor and
discourage this practice.
Respondent agrees that the Union was not notified of
these rules, but argues generally that they were "neither
new rules nor changed rules" and that there is nothing
that requires the finding of a violation when an employer
"periodcally advises employees of the existence of such
rules and the reinforcement of such rules." However, the
record is barren of any past rule dealing with socializing,
12 Henderson conceded that most of the tentative agreements reached
with the Union resulted from counterproposals prepared by Respondent.
s' Respondent correctly notes in its brief that at the meeting of Sep-
tember 7, 1978, "with only two Board members present substantial agree-
ments were made between the parties including modifications." This
demonstrates only that, when it suited Respondent's purposes, agreements
could be made without three members being present, or that Respondent
was prepared with a secondary position The record is clear, however,
that at no time from December 12, 1978, was Respondent prepared to
make any agreement in the absence of its self-imposed quorum
1084 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the justification for which, Respondent argues, was Hen-
derson's concern after the strike "about congregations of
employees and the different problems which existed,"
that the rule was adopted "for business reasons," and
that "Henderson had a basic fear of employees becoming
overly occupied with the events of the strike and he
wanted to return to business as usual as quickly as possi-
ble so that there would not be separation of groups of
strikers and non-strikers."
Although there may be business justifications for a no-
socializing rule, the Respondent's argument is not persua-
sive. Rather, it appears that, after the strike, Respondent
intended to separate the strikers from the nonstrikers and
did not intend, by the enforcement of this rule, to foster
their socialization. In the context of the rule's promulga-
tion immediately after the first strike had ended, it seems
clear that Respondent wished to isolate the two groups
from one another in order to discourage any talk of
union activities during working hours, a prohibited
object. Because there was no earlier rule in existence and
this rule was promulgated and enforced against several
employees by Respodent without consultation and bar-
gaining with the Union, and because the rule was pro-
mulgated for the purpose of discouraging union activi-
ties, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
I also find that the most of the rules, complained of by
General Counsel and contained in the April 30 memor-
dandum, were newly promulgated, without bargaining
with the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act. They involve the following matters:
(a)Under the prior practices, the workday was from 8
a.m. to 4:30 p.m., with an hour for lunch. Employees
were required to clock in in the morning and out at the
end of the workday. The new rule required that employ-
ees also had to clock in and out at lunch hour. Respon-
dent has offered no evidence of any past rule or practice
which indicates that the new rule had ever been in exis-
tence before, and the employees testified that they never
knew of such rule. That employees should be required to
clock in or out at any time is clearly a term and condi-
tion of their employment, and Respondent's unilateral
promulgation of this rule violates the Act.
(b)The prior policy for break periods allowed office
employees to take two 15-minute breaks, one in the
morning and one in the afternoon, and field employees to
take two 15-minute breaks at their own discretion. Gen-
eral Counsel complains that the new rule is different in
that it only allows the break periods to be taken, one in
the morning and one in the afternoon, without distin-
guishing between office and field employees. However,
the "new" rule states: "(This is mainly for office work-
ers)." With that qualification, I do not find that there
was a change in rules promulgated or intended, although
the language of the April 30 notice is not unambiguous.
General Counsel must prove his case by a preponderance
of the evidence, and the mere chance that there is an am-
biguity-that the rule applied "mainly" to office employ-
ees and thus must also apply to others, to wit, field
workers-is insufficient to sustain this allegation. Indeed,
field employee McFadden knew of such a rule and be-
lieved it was unapplicable to her when she was working
in the field. The fact that it was called to her attention
on one rare occasion when she was in the office in the
morning is, at best, de minimis and does not prove that
this was a newly promulgated rule.
General Counsel also relies on testimony of employees
that they were never aware of such a rule or that the
rule had never been brought to their attention. I discredit
such testimony, finding that Respondent's personnel poli-
cies were available to all employees, who were equally
aware of their terms and conditions of employment.
(c)The new rule complained of by General Counsel
provided that, when an employee leaves her office or de-
partment, she is to advise her supervisor of her where-
abouts. General Counsel alleges that there was no such
rule or practice in the past, but Respondent points to a
memorandum issued in July 1975 by a supervisor cau-
tioning an employee that she is to notify the supervisor
about her whereabouts when taking a break. Other than
this solitary disciplinary warning to a lone employee, re-
lating to advice when taking a break, there seems to
have been no overall policy of Respondent until the pro-
mulgation of the new rule. When considered in conjunc-
tion with the strike then pending, the enforcement of the
rule upon the strikers' return to work on and after May
3, and the no-socialization rule imposed on May 10, the
logical inference is that Respondent was attempting to
impede employees' free movement at the Center, and
that the unilateral imposition of the rule, which I find to
be much broader than the practice (if any) set forth in
the disciplinary memorandum, was in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the Act.
(d)General Counsel next complains of Respondent's
rule prohibiting smoking in all areas except the nurses'
lounge. The testimony of his witnesses is conclusive that,
prior to the imposition of the new rule, smoking was per-
mitted in work areas. I note that Respondent's witnesses
did not directly deny this. However, Respondent submit-
ted a July 1975 disciplinary memorandum issued to an
employee which stated, in part, as follows:
Cigarettes have been found un-attended by you.
Due to the enormous amount of paper flow, espe-
cially your handling patient records, this can not be
tolerated. We are asking that you confine your
smoking to the nurses lounge or the caferteria
during your lunch time and/or breaks.
At best, this memorandum represents not an overall
rule to be generally applied but a punishment of one
careless employee who habitually had endangered the
safety of the Center and was requested to confine her
smoking to nonworking areas. I do not read this notice
as an indication of any general rule prohibiting smoking.
Accordingly, I find that the rule imposed on April 30
was entirely new and required bargaining with the Union
prior to its promulgation and enforcement. Respondent,
by failing to bargain, violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
(e)The April 30 memorandum also provided that:
"When employees leave their job to pick up their chil-
dren, either from school or to be seen in the clinic, this
should be approved by the supervisors, and that employ-
ee should clock out for that day. Under no circum-
ST. LOUIS COMPREHENSIVE NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH CTR., 1085
stances will employees be allowed to use Health Center's
time to do their own personal business." Employee
Evans stated that this was a new rule and that, previous-
ly, if she "had to bring [her] child in [she] would just
take [her] lunch hour, at evening or that day and bring
them in." Respondent introduced no past written rule.
However, at a meeting held on February 22, Supervisor
Jackson reported to the home health department that it
had been called to her attention that a few employees
were picking up their children from school on Respon-
dent's time and that this could not be tolerated. I find
her testimony to be credible and, conversely, find little
likelihood that employees would have been knowingly
permitted to take off extensive periods each workday, at
Respondent's expense, to escort their children from
school. I am somewhat concerned with the implications
of that portion of the rule which provides that "employ-
ees should clock out for that day," because it may be
argued that it unfairly shortens the employee's workday
by failing to permit the employee to return to work that
day. General Counsel does not contend, however, that
the quoted clause is a change of the past practice or con-
stitutes some new punishment or requirement; and I ex-
pressly do not consider such an issue. In the context of
the pleadings and briefs, I find no violation.
(f)I do find a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act By
Respondent's unilateral imposition of a monthly evalua-
tion of employees' work, rather than the annual evalua-
tions which had previously been the custom and prac-
tice. The new rule regarding evaluations, which specifi-
cally included "phone calls to clients, on site spot evalua-
tion, unannounced, written client survey," clearly in-
volved a term and condition of the employment of Re-
spondent's employees, who were thenceforward to be
subjected to additional work pressures, knowing that
their work was being carefully scrutinized and subjecting
them to more frequent reviews, thus making less stable
their employment relationship.
D.Respondent's Alleged Failure To Provide Requested
Information
General Counsel also complains that Respondent failed
to bargain collectively with the Union by neglecting to
reply to the Union's May 15, 1979, request for copies of
all contracts between Respondent and Government agen-
cies other than HEW, contending that such contracts are
"plainly relevant inasmuch as 39 percent of Respondent's
income is derived from the State of Missouri and any
contract limitations upon the use of such funds would be
directly relevant to any ecomomic proposals." There is
no competent proof in the record to support this conten-
tion. Further, by May 15 all economic proposals had
long since been agreed upon by the parties. Lacking any
demonstration that such contracts, if they exist, were
necessary for the Union to examine in order represent
the unit employees, I find no violation of Section 8(a)(5)
from Respondent's failure to comply with the Union's re-
quest.
E.Respondent's Suspension and Alleged Interrogation
of Pamela Hunt
Pamela Hunt was, from June 12, 1978, until the com-
mencement of the first strike, Respondent's personnel
clerk. Her status as an employee eligible to participate in
the representation election was fully litigated in Case 14-
RC-8401, wherein, contrary to the contentions of Re-
spondent, the personnel clerk was found not to be a con-
fidential employee to be excluded from the appropriate
unit. Hunt joined the strike and picketed every day.
When the strike was called off, she returned to the
Center on May 4'4 only to find that her timecard had
been removed and, upon checking with Henderson, who
asked her how many days she had picketed, was advised
that, although she had a personal right to join the strike,
she had no legal right to do so in that she was "manage-
ment." Further, Henderson told Hunt that her position
was confidential, that he did not know what to do with
her, and that Hunt ought to go home and he would
advise her where he was going to place her.
The following day, Hunt asked Henderson if she had
been suspended or laid off. Henderson replied that she
had not. '" By letter dated May 16, Henderson informed
Hunt that she remained "on Administrative Leave with-
out pay pending the decision as to where to reassign"
her. Two days later, by letter dated May 18, Henderson
advised Hunt that, pursuant to his attempt to find a posi-
tion for her "with reassignment in mind," he had located
a worksite which is "in keeping with [her] background."
Hunt received the letter on May 21 and reported that
day to the Center, where she was told by her former su-
pervisor, Davis, that she was being assigned as a clerk in
the mental health department. Although she remained at
that job all day, she apparently was assigned no particu-
lar duties, and the following day, when the Union re-
commenced its strike, Hunt joined the picket line.
During May 21, Hunt asked Henderson why his May
16 letter had said that she had been placed on administra-
tive leave without pay when she had never asked to be
on administrative leave and to forfeit her pay. Henderson
replied that he had intended to place her on administra-
tive leave without pay but, after he had received the
charges from her, his lawyer told him that she should be
on leave without pay. 6
It is axiomatic that motivation for an employer's ac-
tions is at the heart of determining the validity of an al-
leged 8(a)(3) violation. Here, there can be no argument
that Respondent's treatment of Hunt-its transfer of her
and placing her on leave without pay-was caused ex-
clusively by her protected and union activities in engag-
ing in the strike against Respondent. Notwithstanding the
Board's determination that the personnel clerk was not a
confidential employee and was properly a member of the
appropriate unit, Respondent doubted that such holding
accurately reflected the law and sought to punish the
personnel clerk solely for exercising the rights of an em-
1 Hunt had no intention to report for ork that day.
' Henderson's reply is, of course, not legally binding as to whether or
not Hunt was suspended. The facts demonstrate that from the time Hunt
reported for work until the tinme of her reassignment, Hunt was not em-
ployed to do any work for Respondent
"' Hunt's unfair labor practice charge was filed on May 7
1086 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployee to engage in protected and union activities by sus-
pending her without pay and transferring her to another
job.' 7 That constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act. Further, the withholding of her pay due
solely to her filing of an unfair labor practice charge
constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act.
In so holding, I discredit Henderson's denial that he
said anything about Hunt's filing of a charge. First, I
found Hunt to be a reliable and forthright witness whose
narration of the essentials of her complaint was clear and
direct. On the other hand, Henderson impressed me as
one who was attempting to retaliate against the Union
and its adherents (see, particularly, subpar. F, infra) and
who disliked the Union and its leadership. Further, I find
no reason expressed by Henderson for what seemed to
be a shift in his treatment of Hunt-from May 4, when
Henderson told Hunt to go home, without mentioning
her pay status, to May 16, when Henderson advised
Hunt that she was on administrative leave without pay.
Because Henderson conceded that, in the interim, he was
seeking the advice of his attorney about what to do with
Hunt, it is entirely probable that he was advised by his
attorney by May 16 not to pay Hunt and to discipline
her for filing a charge. Certainly, Henderson made no
mention of not paying Hunt prior to the May 16 letter,
and I find it probable that advice from Respondent's
counsel was what touched off the letter and was orally
related to Hunt by Henderson. Henderson's testimony
that he had not been counseled by his lawyer what to do
about Hunt prior to May 21 is belied by that letter in
which he advised Hunt that she was on administrative
leave without pay.
Respondent contends that, in any event, no harm was
done to Hunt because she was reinstated to a substantial-
ly equivalent position. as That, of course, is not Respon-
dent's responsibility, if Hunt's original position still exists.
I find that the personnel clerk position does exist, and
any effort to change or alter that position would be a
mere facade to permit Respondent to do what it is re-
quired by law not to do. To concede the validity of Re-
spondent's defense would thwart the intent of the Act
and permit her reinstatement to a substantially equivalent
job, thus creating a shield for Respondent to hide behind
while it commits blatant violations of Section 8(a)(3).
That cannot be countenanced. Hunt was removed from
her position only because she picketed, a right which
Henderson thought was not legally protected. If she did
not picket, the job of personnel clerk would have re-
mained hers. It was only because she exercised her Sec-
tion 7 rights and engaged in union activities that she was
l? Notwithstanding Respondent's concession that Hunt's status may
not be relitigated, it may. Serv-U-Stores, Inc., 234 NLRB 1143 (1978).
However, no facts were elicited which would vary the Board's prior
holding. Respondent contended at the hearing, although not in its brief,
that Hunt also screened job applicants. The record does not sustain that
contention. On only one occasion, she asked an applicant if she would
have any problem getting to and from work and if she would have prob-
lems hiring a babysitter. She made no recommendation to hire that em-
ployee. I find that she is not a confidential employee.
is Because of my holding, it is unnecessary to determine whether the
reassigned position in the mental health department was "substantially
equivalent." I note, however, that Hunt was well aware, as was Hender-
son, of complaints of assaults by mental patients against the Center's staff
and deemed the new position not as desirable as her old position.
reassigned. That is prohibited by Section 8(a)3) and (1)
of the Act. Further, because Henderson's questioning of
Hunt about her picketing activities touched off her sus-
pension, that interrogation is coercive under Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
F. Respondent's Alleged Interrogation Concerning
Picket Line Misconduct
When employees McGaughey, Evans, McFadden, and
Atkins returned to work when the first strike was called
off, between May 4 and 7, 1979, each of them was called
into Henderson's office, where Henderson told them that
an investigation was being conducted into various al-
leged activities on the picket line. These included being
forceful on the picket line, threatening and coercing em-
ployees and patients, touching someone (McGaughey),
blocking people form getting into the Center (Evans),
harassing patients and employees (Atkins), or merely
"discrepancies" or "disturbances" (McFadden). Al-
though I find that Henderson did not ask the employees
whether they engaged in these activities, it is equally
clear that his comments were intended to elicit some re-
sponse, as they in fact did. McGaughey asked who she
was alleged to have touched; and, when Henderson re-
fused to answer, denied that she touched anyone. Evans,
McFadden, and Atkins similarly denied the "miscon-
duct" they were being accused of, McFadden comment-
ing that she had not tried to hurt or harm anyone and
that she was on the picket line to try to help herself, and
Atkins noting that nonstriking employee Murph had
"pulled a knife" on her.
All the employees were subsequently given a letter
from Henderson, which read as follows:
This will confirm our recent conference at which
time we discussed alleged complaints from patients
and employees relating to what they felt was irregu-
lar practices employed by you during recent strike.
The purpose of the meeting was to advise you
that management was obligated to investigate said
allegations due to their nature.
As I stated at that time, if it is found that the
complaintants [sic] wish to pursue their charges,
you will be so advised. If not, the situation will re-
quire no further action.
General Counsel contends that the above facts support
his allegation of illegal interrogation, arguing that, under
Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 186 NLRB 1050 (1970),
modified in other respects 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
"Such interrogation would not be illegal if the Respon-
dent had proven that it was investigating allegations of
striker misconduct sufficient to justify denying reinstate-
ment to the striker." Here, however, none of the conduct
was sufficient to justify the denial of reinstatement;
rather, the activities were the "normal outgrowths" of
the feelings expressed on the picket line which must have
been contemplated by Congress when it allowed employ-
ees the right to strike. Terry Coach Industries, Inc., 166
NLRB 560 (1967), enfd. 411 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1969).
Respondent, arguing essentially from the same point,
contends that if it had allowed these employees to return
ST. LOUIS COMPREHENSIVE NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH CTR. 1087
to work without notice that they were under investiga-
tion, then it could not thereafter discipline the employees
because it would have been deemed to have condoned
any misconduct. In any event, Respondent claims that
Henderson's advice to the employees that they were
being investigated, although it "might arguably consti-
tute interference . . . does not constitute interrogation."
Twenty-five years ago, in Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109
NLRB 591 (1954), the Board held that interrogation,
which merely means the act of asking, is not per se un-
lawful. Rather, "the test is whether, under all the cir-
cumstances, the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain
or interfere with the employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the Act." Thus, illegal interrogation
occurs, for example, when an employer attempts to iden-
tify union adherents, union sympathies, and various
grievances in an attempt to dissuade or discourage em-
ployees from exercising their rights of self-organization,
protected by Section 7 of the Act.
The interrogation here, although peripherally related
to union activities, that is, the unfair labor practice strike
engaged in by the Union when Respondent refused to
bargain in good faith, waw directed not at that protected
and concerted activity but at various alleged incidents of
picket line misconduct which , although reasonably to be
expected, were nonetheless not wholly protected. Some
of the activities were acts of misconduct, no matter how
slight and no matter whether Respondent could utilize
them for the purpose of preventing the reemployment of
the employees who engaged in that activity. In Hart-
mann Luggage Company, 183 NLRB 1246 (1970), enfd. in
relevant respects 453 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1971), as well as
numerous other Decisions, the Board found that scat-
tered instances of name calling, isolated threats, and
blocking of ingress and egress were improper and not to
be condoned, but also found that Section 7 rights would
be "unduly jeopardized" if all strike misconduct, regard-
less of its seriousness, constituted a ground for a denial of
reinstatement. The necessary implication is that, in bal-
ancing the rights contained in Section 7 against the im-
proper conduct engaged in while exercising Section 7
rights, Section 7 is to prevail, and employees may not be
discharged or suspended because of their minor miscon-
duct. MP Industries, Inc. and its Subsidiaries, Micro Alloy
of Missouri, Inc. and Midwest Precision Castings Company,
227 NLRB 1709 (1977); American Cyanamid Company,
239 NLRB No. 60 (1978).
Here, however, no employee was discharged; indeed,
each of the four employees was rehired. The issue, in-
stead, is whether, considering the rights contained in
Section 7, Respondent engages in prohibited interroga-
tion when it asks employees about their improper con-
duct. General Counsel gives no cogent reason why this
should be declared illegal; and, although Respondent's
argument is less than persuasive, I conclude that there
has been, with the exception of McFadden, no illegal in-
terrogation herein. In doing so, I reject Respondent's ar-
gument that it was entitled to ask employees about their
misconduct because, if it did not do so, it might be held
to have condoned the illegalities. There is nothing here
to condone, because the above-cited Decisions demon-
strate that Respondent was not privileged to discharge or
suspend the employees for their minor misconduct. Be-
cause they could not be discharged, even if the investiga-
tion of the events proved the misconduct, condonation
never becomes an issue.
Respondent does have the right, however, to investi-
gate claims of even minor misconduct and to institute
action to stop it. That includes the commencement of a
legal action to enjoin the blocking of egress and ingress,
the touching of patients and employees, and at least some
of the other conduct of which the four employees were
accused. If the goals of such legal action are legitimate,
then I see no irrevocable harm in Respondent's asking
employees about such conduct. It has the right to stop it
and to take some action against its further commission. If
the interrogation has any coercive effect, it is to restrain
the employees from engaging in improper conduct, and
not from engaging in the right to strike protected by
Section 7 of the Act.
There were sufficient reasons for Respondent in good
faith to question McGaughey, Evans, and Atkins about
their alleged misconduct, even though some of the alle-
gations may have been based more on rumor than on
fact. That the interrogation was limited to them and
McFadden indicates that at least some discretion was
used to determine who engaged in improper conduct.
Where a general investigation of all employees is con-
ducted, there may be questions raised about the bona
fides of such investigation-that is, whether the interro-
gation was actually intended to restrain peaceful picket-
ing. However, this is not that case, and I dismiss the alle-
gation of illegal interrogation as to the three employees,
which I find was not intended to and did not coerce em-
ployees in their pursuit of protected Section 7 rights.
However, I find no justification for the interrogation of
McFadden who was accused only of some "discrepan-
cies" or "disturbances." That was not sufficient for Re-
spondent to commence an investigation, and her interro-
gation was merely an attempt to elicit her participation
in the strike itself, a protected activity. I find a violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
I also find that the totality of Respondent's conduct
constituted a threat of indeterminate discipline, including
discharge of the four employees. Implicit in the inter-
views and letters, as Henderson admitted, was the possi-
bility of discharge or suspension. Indeed, McGaughey
was told by Supervisor Brooks before her interview with
Henderson that Henderson did not want her back be-
cause of the allegations of misconduct. Further, I would
be remiss if I did not note that employee Murph, a non-
striker, was never interrogated nor given a letter, despite
the fact that Henderson had heard that she pulled a knife
on one of the picketers. Henderson was also aware of
cursing by nonstrikers, but never interrogated nor
warned them. The conclusion is that the letters were in-
tended to thwart only the activities of the strikers.
In any event, if Respondent were not entitled to dis-
charge or suspend employees for the minor misconduct
which Respondent accused them of, then Respondent
was not entitled to threaten them with discharge. By so
1088 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
doing, it violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by interfer-
ing with employees' protected Section 7 right to strike.'9
G.Respondent's Warning to Wilma Harrell
Upon the return to work of employee Wilma Harrell
from the first strike, she was given the following memo-
randum, dated May 7, from Henderson:
Reference is made to Section 2:19 I Policy C,
which states "Excessive receipt of garnishments can
cause dismissal, etc .... " On Saturday, May 5,
1979, the Health Center received the latest of many
garnishments in your behalf.
As you know, we have made numerous excep-
tions in your case, in this regard, in the past few
years with the hope that you would clear up these
financial matters. This, obviously, has been to no
avail.
I must inform you that further receipt of garnish-
ments can no longer be tolerated. Additional infrac-
tions of the policies of this agency, in this matter,
will result in disciplinary action.
General Counsel contends that this memorandum con-
stituted a pretextual means to threaten Harrell to discour-
age her union activities,2 0 while it is Respondent's "sole
position . . . that at some point in time when an employ-
ee's record becomes so bad in a particular area, the Em-
ployer has a right to take disciplinary action for cause."
Although Respondent's position has some appeal, it
would have had even more appeal had Henderson not
been aware of earlier garnishments and had he been
more candid in his testimony, instead of initially testify-
ing that his first notice of a garnishment was on May 7,
1979.
There is no doubt that Harrell had been in trouble
with her creditors for at least 8 years prior to the latest
garnishment of May 2. Harrell's salary was garnisheed
on at least five occasions from 1971-75, and Henderson
had notice of the sixth garnishment in late 1977. Another
was served in 1978, and it was on the eighth occasion,
and only when Harrell was on strike, that Respondent fi-
nally took action. Although the adage that "enough is
enough" may have some validity, it is more than coinci-
dental that the "enough" took place only when the
Union called its first strike. If a point of no return was
reached, surely that point was reached earlier than May
1979. Henderson originally claimed in his testimony that
the problem of Harrell's garnishments had never been
brought to his attention. The records introduced by Re-
spondent, however, showed that Henderson was aware
of at least one garnishment on September 29, 1977. 1 find
1 I fully recognize that the complaint specifically alleges that this con-
duct constituted illegal interrogations and not threats of discharge. How-
ever, the issue was fully litigated and the allegations of interrogations
must prove some restraint or coercion, so that a threat is not completely
dissimilar from the violation alleged. In that event, notwithstanding that
the complaint is barren of any such allegation, I have the power to find a
violation. Alexander Dawson, Inc. d/b/a Alexander's Restaurant and
Lounge, 228 NLRB 165 (1977); Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 237
NLRB 110 (1978).
20 Harrell was a member of the Union's negotiating committee and a
picket line captain.
that, as of that time, Harrell already had suffered exces-
sive garnishments and, although there may have been
justification at that time for invoking Respondent's rules
and policies, and further justification when the next gar-
nishment was served in or about March 1978, it was only
when the strike began that Harrell's financial problems
became disturbing to Respondent. I hold that, but for the
strike and Harrell's participation therein, Respondent
would not have taken action against her and that its
warning to her, which I find was the first time the
matter had been called to her attention, violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
H. Respondent's Alleged Threat To Withhold Benefits
Employee McFadden testified that, about 2 weeks
before the first strike, Supervisor Jackson told her that
she wanted to give the employees a raise, that she knew
the employees deserved it because they worked hard,
that she had talked to Henderson about the raise and
thought that she might be able to get it, but the "union
business" was coming up and she thought that she would
not be able to get it. General Counsel alleges that this
statement violated Section 8(a)(1) because Jackson
denied raises due to the employees' union activities.
Respondent contends that no violation was committed,
relying on Jackson's testimony that she did, indeed, have
conversations with McFadden about raises sometime
early in 1978, but in the context of having applied for a
grant for a hypertension study which, if accepted, would
supply additional funds so that the employees could sup-
plement their salaries from work done outside the regu-
lar working hours. Jackson admitted that she was not at
liberty to negotiate a raise for McFadden because that
was the function of their Union, but denied that any raise
was withheld because of her union activities.
I credit Jackson and discredit McFadden. I note that
employee Evans was also present during the conversa-
tion, as related by Jackson, but she was not called to
rebut Jackson's testimony. I infer that she would not
have denied Jackson's narration. Further, I do not find
McFadden's testimony credible, as she was a member of
the Union's negotiating committee and likely had knowl-
edge that, at the time of the conversation, the Union had
already agreed to Respondent's offer of a wage increase.
I must admit that I have some difficulty understanding
General Counsel's theory of a violation, because McFad-
den was a member of the negotiating committee and
should have been sophisticated enough to understand
that only the Union, as the employees' collective-bar-
gaining agent, had the authority to make an agreement
with Respondent, and not individual employees. Be that
as it may, Jackson was perfectly candid and credible in
the narration of her testimony, whereas McFadden was
not. As a result, I recommend the dismissal of this allega-
tion.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section II,
above, occurring in connection with the operations de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
ST. LOUIS COMPREHENSIVE NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH CTR. 1089
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor dis-
putes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. St. Louis Comprehensive Neighborhood Health
Center, Inc., is a health care institution within the mean-
ing of Section 2(14) of the Act and an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
2. Local 50, Service Employees International Union,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All full-time and regular part-time employees, in-
cluding office clerical employees, employed by Respon-
dent at its St. Louis, Missouri, facility, excluding techni-
cal employees, confidential employees, professional em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defind in the Act,
constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act.
4. All technical employees employed at Respondent's
St. Louis, Missouri, facility, excluding office clerical and
professional employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act, and all other employees, constitute a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. The Union has been certified as, and is now, the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of all the em-
ployees in the aforesaid units for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of work, and other terms and conditions of employment.
6. By interrogating employees about their union and
protected concerted activities and by impliedly threaten-
ing employees with discharge because of their alleged
minor picket line misconduct in order to discourage
them from engaging in union and protected concerted
activities, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in,
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
7. By issuing an unlawful warning to Harrell because
she engaged in union and protected concerted activities
with other employees for the purposes of mutual aid and
protection, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging
in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
8. By suspending Pamela Hunt on May 4, 1979, and
thereafter refusing to reinstate her to her former position,
for engaging in union and protected concerted activities,
and refusing to pay her because she filed an unfair labor
practice charge against Respondent, Respondent has en-
gaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act.
9. By failing and refusing since December 12, 1978, to
bargain with the Union in the above-described units and,
more specifically, by failing to meet at reasonable times
and engage in collective bargaining and by failing to au-
thorize agents or representatives to bargain with the
Union at reasonable times; and by unilaterally promulgat-
ing and adopting new work rules forbidding them to so-
cialize with other employees and patients, requiring them
to clock in and out at the lunch hour, requiring them to
advise their supervisors of their whereabouts, prohibiting
employees from smoking in all Respondent's premises
except the nurses' lounge, and requiring them to be eval-
uated monthly, all without prior notice to or consultation
with the Union as the lawfully certified representative of
the employees, Respondent has engaged in, and is engag-
ing in, unfair labor practices in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
10. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. The strike which began on April 23, 1979, ended
on May 3, 1979, and resumed on May 22, 1979, is and
has been since its inception an unfair labor practice
strike.
12. Respondent has not violated the Act in any other
respects not specifically found herein.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be or-
dered to cease and desist therefrom and to take appropri-
ate affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Having found that Pamela Hunt was unlawfully sus-
pended on May 4, 1979, I shall recommended that Re-
spondent offer her immediate and full reinstatement to
her former position or, if that job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position of employment without
prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges
previously enjoyed, and make her whole for any losses
suffered as a result of the discrimination against her, with
backpay to be computed in the manner prescribed in F.
W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with in-
terest thereon as set forth in Florida Steel Corporation,
231 NLRB 651 (1977). 2 1
Having found that Respondent unlawfully issued a
warning notice to Harrell, I shall recommend that Re-
spondent rescind its warning notice to her and remove
said notice from Harrell's personnel file.
Having found that Respondent failed to bargain in
good faith with the Union as the certified collective-bar-
gaining representative of employees in the appropriate
units of Respondent's employees, I shall recommend that
Respondent, upon request, bargain collectively in good
faith with the Union as the exclusive representative of all
employees in the units herein found to be appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
terms and conditions of employment, and, if an under-
standing is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement.
Having found that Respondent unilaterally changed
employees' terms and conditions of employment without
consulting with or notice to the Union, I shall recom-
21 See, generally. Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962)
General Counsel seeks an order requiring that interest on backpay be
computed on the basis of 9 percent per annum The Board has already
rejected that position. Southern California Edison Company, 243 NLRB
No 62 (1979); but see IHansen Cakes. Inc., 242 NLRB No. 74 (1979)
1090 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mend that Respondent cease and desist therefrom and re-
scind its new rules, if the Union so desires.
Having found that an ingredient of Respondent's fail-
ure to bargain in good faith was Respondent's resort to
dilatory tactics and techniques designed to avoid mean-
ingful bargaining, and in order to insure that the employ-
ees in the units herein found appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining will be accorded the statutorily
prescribed services of their selected bargaining represen-
tative for the period provided by law, I shall recommend
that the initial year of certification begin on the date Re-
spondent commences to bargain in good faith with the
Union as the recognized bargaining representative in the
appropriate units. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 166 NLRB
938 (1967), enfd. 388 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1968); South
Hoover Hospital, 196 NLRB 1077 (1972); John Hutton
Corp., d/b/a KUMU Radio AM/FM, 213 NLRB 85
(1974).
I have found that certain unit employees commenced
picketing on April 23, 1979, to protest Respondent's re-
fusal to bargain with the Union. At the time of the hear-
ing, some of the employees were still on strike and the
job status of the strikers was not set forth in the record. I
shall, therefore, recommend that Respondent be required
to sign and mail copies of the notice to the homes of the
unit employees who went on strike, and to reinstate them
upon application in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Because Respondent has previously been found to
have violated the Act in certain respects similar to the
violations found herein, it seems clear that Respondent
has a disregard for the Act's requirement that it bargain
in good faith with the certified collective-bargaining
agent of its employees. Additionally, although perhaps
not so egregious and widespread, it has attempted to use
other unlawful means to discourage its employees from
engaging in activities protected by Section 7 of the Act.
Accordingly, I shall recommend that a broad remedial
order issue herein because of Respondent's proclivity to
violate the Act. Hickmott Foods, Inc., 242 NLRB No.
177 (1979).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER 2 2
The Respondent, St. Louis Comprehensive Neighbor-
hood Health Center, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating employees about their union and pro-
tected concerted activities.
(b) Impliedly threatening employees with discharge
because of their alleged minor picket line misconduct in
order to discourage them from engaging in union and
protected concerted activities.
22 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
(c) Unlawfuuly issuing warning notices to employees
because they engage in union or concerted protected ac-
tivities with other employees for the purposes of mutual
aid and protection.
(d) Suspending employees without pay, transferring
employees to other job assignments, or otherwise discri-
minating against employees because of their union or
concerted protected activities and because said employ-
ees have filed unfair labor practice charges.
(e) Discouraging membership in the Union, or any
other labor organization of its employees, by discriminat-
ing against them in regard to their hire and tenure of em-
ployment or any terms and conditions of employment.
(f) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of
pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment with Local 50, Service Employees Internation-
al Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of its employees in the appropriate units de-
scribed below.
(g) Refusing and failing to meet with the Union at rea-
sonable times and engage in collective bargaining.
(h) Refusing and failing to authorize an agent or repre-
sentative to bargain meaningfully with the Union at rea-
sonable times.
(i) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by
unilaterally promulgating and adopting new work rules
forbidding employees to socialize with other employees
and patients, requiring employees to clock in and out at
the lunch hour, requiring employees to advise their su-
pervisors of their whereabouts, prohibiting employees
from smoking in all of Respondent's premises except the
nurses' lounge, and requiring employees to be evaluated
monthly, without prior notice to or consultation with the
Union.
0j) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which will ef-
fectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Offer Pamela Hunt immediate and full reinstate-
ment to her former position or, if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prej-
udice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed, and make her whole for any loss of
earnings she may have suffered by reason of the discrimi-
nation practiced against her by payment to her of a sum
of money equal to that which she would have earned
after May 4, 1979, less any net interim earnings, with in-
terest, as outlined in "The Remedy" portion of this Deci-
sion.
(b) Revoke and rescind its unlawful warning notice to
Wilma Harrell and remove said warning from Harrell's
personnel file.
(c) Upon request, bargain with the above-named labor
organization as the exclusive representative of all em-
ployees in the following appropriate units with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement:
All full-time and regular part-time employees, in-
cluding office clerical employees, employed by Re-
------
ST. LOUIS COMPREHENSIVE NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH CTR. 1091
spondent at its St. Louis, Missouri, facility, exclud-
ing technical employees, confidential employees,
professional employees, guards and supervisors de-
fined in the Act.
All technical employees employed at Respondent's
St. Louis, Missouri, facility, excluding office clerical
and professional employees, guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act, and all other employees.
For the purpose of determining the duration of the
Union's certification, the initial year of certification shall
be deemed to begin on the date Respondent commenced
or commences to bargain in good faith with the Union as
the recognized bargaining representative in the above ap-
propriate units.
(d) Meet with the Union at reasonable times and
engage in collective bargaining.
(e) Authorize an agent or representative to bargain
meaningfully with the Union at reasonable times.
(f) Rescind the new work rules forbidding employees
to socialize with other employees and patients, requiring
employees to clock in and out at the lunch hour, requir-
ing employees to advise their supervisors of their where-
abouts, prohibiting employees from smoking in all of Re-
spondent's premises except the nurses' lounge, and re-
quiring employees to be evaluated monthly, unilaterally
promulgated and adopted by Respondent, without prior
notice to or consultation with the Union, if the Union, as
the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees
in the appropriate units, so desires.
(g) Upon application, offer immediate and full rein-
statement to their former jobs or, if those positions no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, if jobs
are available, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights and privileges, to all those employees of Re-
spondent in the certified units who were on strike on or
after April 23, 1979, and who have not already been re-
instated, dismissing, if necessary, any persons hired as re-
placements by Respondent on or after April 23, 1979. If
sufficient jobs are not available for these employees, they
shall be placed on a preferential hiring list in accordance
with their seniority or other nondiscriminatory practices
theretofore utilized by Respondent and they shall be of-
fered employment before any other employees are hired.
Make whole these employees for any loss of earnings
they may have suffered, or may suffer, by reason of Re-
spondent's refusal, if any, to reinstate them by payment
to each of them a sum of money equal to that which
each one normally would have earned during the period
from 5 days after the date on which each applied, or
shall apply, for reinstatement, to the date of Respon-
dent's offer of reinstatement to each one, absent a lawful
justification for Respondent's failure to make such offer.
Backpay shall be computed on the basis of calendar
quarters, in accordance with the method prescribed in F
W. Woolworth Company, supra. Interest shall be added to
the net backpay and shall be computed in the manner set
forth in Florida Steel Corporation, supra.2 3
(h) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
23 See, generally. Isis Plumbing & Hearing Co.. supra.
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(i) Post at its St. Louis, Missouri, facility copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 24 and mail a copy
thereof to each of its striking employees. Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 14, after being duly signed by Respondent's rep-
resentative, shall be posted by it immediately upon re-
ceipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(j) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dis-
missed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not spe-
cifically found.
24 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board"
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPILOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National
Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has or-
dered us to post this notice.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all such
activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees about
their protected concerted activities and their activi-
ties on behalf of Local 50, Service Employees Inter-
national Union, AFL-CIO.
WE WILL. NOT impliedly threaten our employees
with discharge because of their alleged minor picket
line misconduct in order to discourage them from
engaging in union and protected concerted activi-
ties.
1092 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT unlawfully issue warning notices
to our employees because they engage in union or
concerted protected activities with other employees
for the purposes of mutual aid and protection.
WE WILL NOT suspend our employees without
pay, transfer our employees to other job assign-
ments, or otherwise discriminate against our em-
ployees because of their union or concerted protect-
ed activities and because our employees have filed
unfair labor practice charges against us.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the
Union, or any other labor organization of our em-
ployees, by discriminating against them in regard to
their hire and tenure of employment or any terms
and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively con-
cerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment with the Union, as
the exclusive bargaining representative of our em-
ployees in the appropriate units described below.
WE WILL NOT refuse or fail to meet with the
Union at reasonable times and engage in collective
bargaining.
WE WILL NOT refuse or fail to authorize an agent
or representative to bargain meaningfully with the
Union at reasonable times.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
the Union by unilaterally promulgating and adopt-
ing new work rules forbidding our employees to so-
cialize with other employees and patient, requiring
our employees to clock in and out at the lunch
hour, requiring our employees to advise their super-
visor of their whereabouts, prohibiting our employ-
ees from smoking in all our premises except the
nurses' lounge, and requiring our employees to be
evaluated monthly, without prior notice to or con-
sultation with the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exer-
cise of their rights to self-organization, to join or
assist Local 50, Serviee Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization,
or to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection or to refrain from any and all such ac-
tivities.
WE WILL offer Pamela Hunt immediate and full
reinstatement to her former position or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi-
tion, without prejudice to her seniority or any other
rights or privileges she previously enjoyed and
make her whole for any loss of earnings she may
have suffered by reason of the discrimination prac-
ticed against her.
WE WILL revoke and rescind our unlawful warn-
ing notice to Wilma Harrell and remove said warn-
ing from Harrell's personnel file.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the Union
as the exclusive representative of all employees in
the following appropriate units with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employement, and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement:
All full-time and regular part-time employees, in-
cluding office clerical employees, employed by
the Employer at its St. Louis, Missouri, facility,
excluding technical employees, confidential em-
ployees, professional employees, guards and su-
pervisors as defined in the Act.
All technical employees employed by the Em-
ployer at its St. Louis, Missouri, facility, exclud-
ing office clerical and professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, and
all other employees.
WE WILL regard the Union as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of the employees in these
units for a period of at least I year after we com-
mence bargaining in good faith pursuant to the
Board's Order.
WE WILL meet with the Union at reasonable
times and engage in collective bargaining.
WE WILL authorize an agent or representative to
bargain meaningfully with the Union at reasonable
times.
WE WILL rescind the new work rules forbidding
employees to socialize with other employees and
patients, requiring employees to clock in and out at
the lunch hour, requiring employees to advise their
supervisors of their whereabouts, prohibiting em-
ployees from smoking in all our premises except the
nurses' lounge, and requiring employees to be eval-
uated monthly, unilaterally promulgated and adopt-
ed by us, without prior notice to or consultation
with the Union, if the Union, as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of the employees in the ap-
propriate units, so desires.
WE WILL, upon application, offer all employees
who went on strike on April 23, 1979, or thereafter
(discharging, if necessary, any employee hired on or
after April 23, 1979), immediate and full reinstate-
ment to their former jobs or, if those positions no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent jobs (placing
on a preferential hiring list any employee for whom
there is no job available), without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges.
WE WILL make the above-mentioned employees
whole for any loss of pay they may suffer as a
result of our refusal to reinstate them or employ
them upon their application.
ST. LOUIS COMPREHENSIVE NEIGHBOR-
HOOD HEALTH CENTER, INC.