Ryder Truck Rental

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 13, 1995

318 N.L.R.B. 1092 (N.L.R.B. 1995)

1092
318 NLRB No. 117
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
1 All dates are in 1994, unless otherwise indicated.
2 An allegation in the charge that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(3) and (5) by transferring work and unit employees from its
Livonia facility to its new Novi facility and refusing to apply an
agreement covering Livonia unit employees to employees at the
Novi facility was dismissed (see Jt. Exh. 1).
3 The Respondent and the Union also were parties to 5 other
agreements involving some 10 to 12 locations.
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. and Local Lodge No. 698,
District Lodge 60, International Association of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO.
Case 7–CA–36406
September 13, 1995
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS BROWNING, COHEN, AND
TRUESDALE
On June 19, 1995, Administrative Law Judge
George Aleman issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.,
Novi, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in the Order.
Richard F. Czubaj, Esq., for the General Counsel.
J. Michael Kota, Esq., of Alpharetta, Georgia, for the Re-
spondent.
Frank Forgione, Rep., of Willowick, Ohio, for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE ALEMAN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried before me in Detroit, Michigan, on March 13,
1995. A charge in this matter was filed on September 26,
1994,1 by Local Lodge 698, District Lodge 60, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–
CIO (the Union), on which a complaint was issued on No-
vember 30, 1994, by the Regional Director for Region 7 of
the National Labor Relations Board, alleging that the Re-
spondent, Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., had violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.2 By answer dated December 5,
the Respondent denied some and admitted other allegations
in the complaint, and denied having committed any unfair
labor practices. During the hearing, the General Counsel was
granted leave to amend the complaint to further allege a vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1), which the Respondent de-
nied.
The parties at the hearing were given full opportunity to
call and examine witnesses, to submit oral as well as written
evidence, and to argue on the record. On the entire record,
including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses,
and after considering the briefs filed by the Respondent and
the General Counsel, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation with an office and place of
business in Southfield, Michigan, is engaged in the service,
repair, and rental of trucks and trailers at various facilities
in Southeast Michigan. During the calendar year ending De-
cember 31, 1993, the Respondent derived gross revenues in
excess of $500,000 in the course and conduct of its above
business operations and, during the same period, purchased
and received goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 at its Michigan facilities from points and places lo-
cated outside the State of Michigan. The Respondent admits,
and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce with-
in the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. It
further admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Allegation
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by soliciting employ-
ees to resign their membership in the Union in order to trans-
fer to its newly opened Novi facility, and violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to recognize and bargain with the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its serv-
ice and maintenance employees employed at the Novi facil-
ity. The Respondent denies having unlawfully refused to rec-
ognize and bargain with the Union or having conditioned the
transfer of employees on their resigning from the Union.
B. Facts
The Respondent and the Union were parties to a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement effective from April 1 through
March 31, 1997, covering all service and maintenance em-
ployees employed by the Respondent at five Michigan loca-
tions: Roseville, Troy, Livonia, Fort Street (Detroit), and
Sexton (Belleville).3 Employees at these sites serviced, re-
paired, and maintained Respondent’s trucks leased out to its
various customers. On occasion, customers would make sep-
arate arrangements with the Respondent to have minor serv-
ice and repair work performed on the customer’s premises
1093RYDER TRUCK RENTAL
4 Union Business Representative Joseph Potas referred to these as
‘‘captive’’ accounts. He testified that the Sexton facility covered by
the contract was a ‘‘captive’’ account because it only serviced trucks
used by a company known as Sexton Foods. The other facilities cov-
ered by the contract, according to Potas, were not ‘‘captive’’ facili-
ties.
5 Of these four, only Stankus was not a member of the Union.
6 The form letter, addressed to White, and to be signed by the indi-
vidual employee accepting a transfer, reads:
I understand that you are opening a new location in Novi,
Michigan to service the P.F.S. fleet. I also understand that this
will be a non-union position and am very much interested in
going to work there if in fact it is non-union. [See G.C. Exh.
8.]
7 An honorary withdrawal from the Union was permitted under
certain circumstances: when a member became part of management,
left the trade due to illness, obtained employment outside the trade
or industry, to further his education, or was required by cir-
cumstances beyond the member’s control to join another labor orga-
nization (see G.C. Exh. 10). The honorary withdrawal card allowed
the member to leave in good standing, affording an opportunity to
return at future date. It was not tantamount to a full resignation from
the Union.
rather than at any of the Respondent’s locations.4 In early
1993, the Respondent entered into a lease arrangement with
PepsiCo Food Service (PFS) whereby PFS trucks would be
serviced at the PFS’ facility in Novi, Michigan. To service
the PFS account, the Respondent initially had employees
from its Livonia facility go to the PFS location and perform
whatever repairs were needed on the trucks. Union Steward
John Dancer testified without contradiction that the same
group of employees were regularly used to perform such re-
pairs at Novi, and that the repairs were performed at the PFS
parking lot.
Union Business Representative Joseph Potas testified that
in early 1994, while engaged in contract negotiations with
Respondent, he asked Respondent’s district manager and ne-
gotiator, Richard Spence, whether rumors concerning the
opening of a permanent facility at Novi were true. Spence
replied that Respondent did intend to open a Novi facility,
but that it would be separate from the Livonia site and would
operate nonunion. Potas replied that if that was the case, the
Union would file complaints over the separation of Novi
from Livonia, and over the fact that it would be operating
nonunion. On June 14, following the opening of the Novi fa-
cility, Potas wrote to Respondent stating that the work at
Novi was being performed by bargaining unit employees
from the Livonia site, that the Union was entitled to that
work because the Novi facility was an accretion to the
Livonia facility and was covered by the parties’ contract, and
requested that Respondent contact him to arrange for the
consummation of an agreement regarding the above site
(G.C. Exh. 3). In a letter dated June 21, Spence disagreed
with the Union that the Novi work was covered by the col-
lective-bargaining agreement, and pointed out that a majority
of the work performed at Novi took place at the customer’s
location and at its request, and that the Respondent’s ‘‘deci-
sion to open a facility at Novi was a business decision to ac-
commodate the customer and not an attempt to remove work
from Livonia.’’ (G.C. Exh 4.)
In a June 29 letter, Potas reiterated the Union’s position
that the Novi location was simply an accretion to the Livonia
facility and that the work and employees employed at Novi
should continue to be covered by the collective-bargaining
agreement. He further stated that the Union considered the
Respondent’s contrary position as an ‘‘evasion/violation of
the contract and applicable labor laws’’ and that the Union
was prepared to pursue all contractual and/or legal avenues
to resolve this issue. In a followup letter dated August 17,
Potas reaffirmed the Union’s position, and requested the ini-
tiation of bargaining with respect to the Novi facility. By let-
ter to the Union dated September 9, the Respondent repeated
its position and again declined to engage in negotiations over
the Novi facility.
The Respondent, as noted, opened a permanent mainte-
nance operation in Novi on June 4, situated about an eighth
of a mile from the PFS location, and staffed it with four in-
dividuals—Rod Markin, Steve Orvis, Bogoljub Jakovljeski,
and Martin Stankus5—all of whom had been employed at the
Livonia facility, so that all work that was previously done at
the PFS parking lot was thereafter performed at the nearby
Novi site. Prior to being transferred, all four employees were
told by the Respondent that the Novi facility was to be a
nonunion shop and that the contract it had with the Union
covering its other facilities would not apply to the Novi site.
According to Spence, employees were told this was because
Respondent wanted employees to know ‘‘up front’’ about the
nonunion status of the Novi facility before accepting a trans-
fer to that facility.
Two of the four employees who transferred to Novi,
Markin and Orvis, testified about what was said to them re-
garding their transfers. Markin, the lead mechanic at the
Novi facility, testified that he worked on PFS equipment
while on the Livonia payroll for about 1 year prior to June
4, when the Novi facility opened. Sometime on or about June
3, Markin was told by Flasher, identified by Markin as his
superior, that the Novi operation was going to be a full-time,
nonunion operation, and was asked by Flasher if he wanted
to run it, to which Markin responded affirmatively. Flasher
told him he would have to be a nonunion employee, but at
no time, according to Markin, did Flasher indicate that he
had to resign his union membership to work at the Novi fa-
cility. Markin further testified that he had a similar conversa-
tion that same day with Spence and White, identified as Re-
spondent’s district service manager, during which White and
Spence, after explaining the Novi operation, handed Markin
a letter they had prepared for his signature and asked if he
was willing to work at Novi under the conditions stated
there.6 Markin agreed to do so and signed the letter. During
Respondent’s cross-examination, Markin stated that at no
time did any member of Respondent’s management seek to
pressure him regarding his relationship with, or membership
in, the Union, and that at no time since he began working
at the Novi facility did he desire to be represented by the
Union at that facility.
Markin also testified regarding discussions he had with the
Union concerning the transfer. Thus, he stated that he was
contacted by John Dancer, the union steward at the Livonia
facility, who told Markum he was wrong for leaving the
Union, and that ‘‘we should stick with the Union,’’ to which
Markin replied that he had decided ‘‘not to go with the
Union.’’ Markin thereafter sought, but was denied, an honor-
ary withdrawal card from the Union.7 Potas, according to
1094 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
8 Although the nonunion remarks made by the employers in Kessel
Food Market and Bay Area Mack arose in the context of an alleged
successorship relationship, the rationale for finding such remarks un-
lawful is equally applicable in nonsuccessorship cases.
Markin, told him he was denied a withdrawal card because
the Union still wanted to represent employees at the Novi fa-
cility because of its belief that the facility should be a union
shop.
Orvis’ testimony is similar to Markin’s in most respects.
Thus, he testified that for about 1 year prior to June 4, while
still employed at Livonia, he worked 2 days a week servicing
the PFS trucks at the Novi location. Having heard rumors
about the possible opening of a permanent Novi facility,
Orvis informed management of his interest in working per-
manently at Novi. On June 3, Orvis was called to Flasher’s
office and, after some discussion regarding the Novi facility,
was handed a letter identical to the one given to and signed
by Markin regarding employment at the Novi facility (G.C.
Exh. 9). Orvis testified that before giving him the letter,
Flasher told him that work at Novi was to be the same as
that performed at Livonia, except that the Novi facility
would be a nonunion operation, that the decision whether or
not to withdraw from the Union was strictly his, but that he
did not have to withdraw from the Union to work at the
Novi facility. Like Markin, Orvis stated during Respondent’s
cross-examination that he had no desire to be represented by
the Union at Novi, and that he communicated his feelings in
this regard to management. Orvis found the offer to work at
Novi attractive because it meant he would not have to pay
union dues. He also testified that he was not pressured in any
way by Respondent regarding his membership in, or relation-
ship with, the Union, and that he was never told by manage-
ment that he could not work at Novi unless he resigned his
union membership. Orvis also requested a withdrawal card
from the Union, but testified he has not heard from the
Union regarding that request. He nevertheless stated that he
is currently not a member of the Union, and replied, ‘‘no’’
when asked if he wished to be represented by the Union.
Spence, the Respondent’s only witness, testified that he
drafted the letter that was given to prospective employees to
sign, but denied telling employees who transferred to Novi
that their transfers were conditioned on their resigning from
the Union. He also testified to being aware of the possibility
that the Respondent might have to recognize the Union if the
three union members who transferred from Livonia to Novi
did not resign their union memberships. When asked during
cross-examination whether the Respondent would have trans-
ferred the individuals if they had not resigned their union
membership, Spence replied, ‘‘[t]hey would have stayed at
Livonia.’’
C. Discussion
As noted, the Regional Director for Region 7 found no
merit to, and consequently dismissed, the Union’s allegation
that the Novi facility was an accretion to the Livonia facility.
In so doing, he utilized the criteria established by the Board
in Gitano Distribution Center, 308 NLRB 1172 (1992), to
assess an employer’s bargaining obligation when it transfers
employees from an existing location to a new location. The
Board in Gitano, above at 1175, held that:
when an employer transfers a portion of its employees
at one location to a new location, we will no longer de-
fine the nature of the transfer in terms of the relation-
ship between the ‘‘new’’ unit and the ‘‘old’’ unit (i.e.,
whether one is a ‘‘spinoff’’ or ‘‘partial relocation’’
from the other). Rather, we will begin with the Board’s
long-held rebuttable presumption that the unit at the
new facility is a separate appropriate unit. Assuming
that that presumption is not rebutted, we will then apply
a simple fact-based majority test to determine whether
the respondent is obligated to recognize and bargain
with the union as the representative of the unit at the
new facility. If a majority of the employees in the unit
at the new facility are transferees from the original bar-
gaining unit, we will presume that those employees
continue to support the union and find that the em-
ployer is obligated to recognize and bargain with the
union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the employees in the new unit. Absent this ma-
jority showing, no such presumption arises and no bar-
gaining obligation exists. [Footnotes omitted.]
No party here disputes that the employees at the Novi fa-
cility constitute a separate appropriate unit for purposes of
collective bargaining, or that a majority (three of four) of
employees at that facility transferred from the bargaining unit
at Livonia, raising a rebuttable presumption of their contin-
ued support for the Union, as set forth in Gitano. The Re-
spondent, however, contends that it was justified in refusing
to recognize and bargain with the Union regarding the Novi
employees because of statements made by the transferees to
Respondent that they did not wish to be represented by the
Union at the Novi facility. It further asserts that its statement
to transferees, that the Novi facility was to be nonunion and
that Novi employees would not be covered under the Livonia
contract, was lawful and not coercive, citing as support Bay
Area Mack, 203 NLRB 125 (1989). Conversely, the General
Counsel argues that the Respondent’s verbal and written
statement to employees, that the Novi site was to be non-
union, unlawfully interfered with their Section 7 rights, and
had the effect of encouraging transferees to withdraw from
the Union.
I agree with the General Counsel. Nonunion statements
similar to those made here by the Respondent have been
found by the Board to be coercive and violative of Section
8(a)(1). In Kessel Food Markets, 287 NLRB 426 (1987), for
example, a successor employer’s statement to job applicants,
that certain stores it planned to open would operate non-
union, was found to be unlawful. The Board there reasoned
that when an employer informs applicants, before it has hired
any employees, that the company will be nonunion, it indi-
cates to applicants that it intends to discriminate against the
seller’s employees to ensure its nonunion status.8 Similarly,
in Williams Enterprises, 301 NLRB 167 (1991), the Board,
in agreement with an administrative law judge, found unlaw-
ful a successor employer’s comment at a meeting of employ-
ees, that ‘‘it did intend to operate [its] Richmond plant as a
nonunion plant.’’ As in Kessel Food Markets, supra, the
Board in Williams Enterprises reasoned that the employer’s
remark implicitly conveyed to employees the message that
‘‘any conduct by them which is not consistent with that
1095RYDER TRUCK RENTAL
9 In Jerome Russo Quality Painting & Decorating, 309 NLRB
973, 979 (1992), the Board found that an employer’s letter to job
applicants and employees, not unlike the one the Respondent asked
the transferees here to sign, requiring that they acknowledge as a
precondition to employment that the employer was no longer a union
contractor, was comparable to a ‘‘yellow dog’’ contract and violative
of Sec. 8(a)(1). See also Excel Fire Protection, 308 NLRB 241, 244
(1992); Eddyleon Chocolate Co., 301 NLRB 887 (1991). Here, the
letter that the Respondent had employees sign as a precondition to
their transfer to Novi serves no legitimate purpose. In fact, the letters
may very well adversely affect the continuing employment status at
Novi of the applicants who signed the letters should they choose to
engage in organizational activities at Novi. Accordingly, I find that
the letters in question here are tantamount to ‘‘yellow dog con-
tracts’’ and violate Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act.
10 See Respondent’s posttrial brief, p. 7.
11 According to Potas, none of the transferees qualified for an hon-
orary withdrawal card under union guidelines and, except for Orvis
who inadvertently obtained an honorary withdrawal at a time when
the Union was computerizing its records, had their requests denied.
12 Jakovlkeski did not testify at the hearing, and the only evidence
regarding his alleged desire not to be represented by the Union at
Novi comes from the letter he was asked to sign as a precondition
for securing employment at that location, which I concluded was un-
lawful.
ukase may jeopardize their employment possibilities or secu-
rity.’’
The Respondent, as noted, contends that the Board’s deci-
sion in Bay Area Mack, supra, supports its position that the
nonunion remarks were not unlawful. The Respondent appar-
ently did not fully review the Board’s decision in that case
for, had it done so, it would have found that the Board
reached a contrary result. Thus, although the administrative
law judge in that case, as argued by Respondent, declined to
find unlawful an employer’s statement to job applicants that
it was starting up as a nonunion company, and that it was
up to employees and the employer to ensure that the com-
pany remained nonunion, on review the Board, relying on
Kessel Food Stores, supra, reversed the judge and found the
employer’s remarks violative of Section 8(a)(1).
Like the nonunion remarks found unlawful in Kessel Food
Stores and other cases cited here, the Respondent’s nonunion
comments, made orally and in the letter applicants were
asked to sign prior to transferring (see fn. 6, supra),9 implic-
itly suggested to the four transferees, three of whom were
union members, that they would have to alter or terminate
their relationship with the Union if they wished to secure
employment at the Novi facility. The Respondent argues that
its nonunion comments were only intended to provide pro-
spective employees with ‘‘up front’’ information so that they
could make a ‘‘clear-eyed decision [on] whether to accept a
job at Novi.’’10 The determination, however, of whether an
employer’s comments interfere, restrain, or coerce employees
under Section 8(a)(1) hinges not on an employer’s motiva-
tion in making the remarks, but rather on whether the em-
ployer’s conduct and words reasonably tend to interfere with
the exercise of employee rights. American Lumber Sales, 229
NLRB 414, 416 (1977). In any event, the Respondent’s con-
duct in preparing the letter for applicants to sign as a pre-
condition for employment at Novi, its understanding that it
might have to recognize the Union if the three union mem-
bers from Livonia transferred to Novi without resigning their
memberships, and Spence’s rather candid admission that had
the transferees not resigned they would have remained at
Livonia establish rather convincingly that the Respondent’s
nonunion remarks were designed to induce the potential
transferees from the Livonia facility into withdrawing from,
or terminating their membership in, the Union. In fact, it is
clear that the Respondent achieved its intended goal, for soon
after making its nonunion comments and obtaining signed
letters from all transferees, union members Markin, Orvis,
and Jakovljeski proceeded to request honorary withdrawal
cards from the Union.11
The Respondent, as noted, contends that statements made
by Markin, Orvis, and Jakovljeski,12 that they did not wish
to be represented by the Union at Novi, is sufficient to rebut
the presumption under Gitano that the Union enjoyed major-
ity support at Novi, and served to justify its refusal to recog-
nize and bargain with the Union regarding employees at that
facility. Although Markin and Orvis both testified to having
made such statements, their remarks to Respondent were
made immediately after the Respondent unlawfully informed
them that the Novi facility was to be nonunion. Having
worked at the PFS location in Novi for approximately 1 year
before the Respondent permanently opened its Novi facility
on June 4, and apparently anxious to obtain a permanent po-
sition at that facility, Markin and Orvis were faced with a
Hobson’s choice of either securing employment at Novi by
resigning or withdrawing from the Union, or retaining their
union membership and foregoing possible employment at
Novi. Markin clearly believed this to be the case for, while
he was not specifically told he would have to resign from
the Union to work at Novi, his testimony reflects his under-
standing that to be a nonunion employee, as would be ex-
pected of employees at Novi, he would have to resign his
union membership. There is no indication that the Respond-
ent sought to allay any doubts Markin may have had in this
regard. Further, it is significant to note that despite having
worked as union members at the PFS’ Novi location for 1
year before Respondent established the permanent site,
Markin and Orvis apparently expressed no interest in with-
drawing or terminating their relationship with the Union until
after it was suggested by Respondent in its unlawful remarks.
Orvis, as noted, unlike Markin, testified he was told by
Flasher that he did not have to withdraw from the Union to
work at Novi, that the decision was his to make, and that
he understood he did not have to sign the letter given to him
by Flasher to work at Novi. I am not, however, convinced
that Orvis was being fully candid as to what he was told.
Rather, from my observation of his demeanor on the witness
stand, I am convinced that Orvis’ testimony in this regard
was contrived and designed to curry favor with and dem-
onstrate loyalty to the Respondent. Further, Orvis’ under-
standing that he did not have to sign the letter to work at
Novi lacks any factual basis. The fact of the matter is that
he did sign the letter, and there is nothing to suggest that he
either inquired about, or was told of, possible repercussions
if the letter were not signed. Indeed, in light of Spence’s tes-
timony that unless the transferees resigned their union mem-
bership they would remain at Livonia, and the possibility that
it might have to recognize the Union if it did not establish
a basis for asserting a good-faith doubt of majority support,
it is highly unlikely that the Respondent would have allowed
1096 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
13 I find it significant that Markin, Orvis, and Jakovljeski did not
tender full resignations from the Union, but instead only petitioned
for honorary withdrawal cards. This suggests that all three valued
and sought to maintain ties with the Union, despite their outward
manifestations to the Respondent that they did not wish to be rep-
resented by the Union.
14 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
Orvis to transfer to Novi without first obtaining his signature
on the letter.
Finally, I note that unlike Orvis, Markin, who also was
asked by Flasher if he wanted to work at Novi, testified only
that Flasher told him that the Novi work would be nonunion,
and made no mention of having been told by Flasher that he
would not have to resign his union membership. Given the
significance of such remarks, I find it highly unlikely that
Flasher would only address them to Orvis, and not to
Markin. Further, Spence, the Respondent’s only witness and
the author of the letter at issue here, was asked no questions
regarding what he may have told employees when asking
them to sign the letters. Consequently, except for Orvis’ tes-
timony, which I do not credit, there is nothing to suggest that
applicants were assured by Respondent that the failure to re-
sign or alter their union membership would have no impact
on their employment at Novi. I note further that both Orvis
and Markin stated at the hearing, in response to queries by
Respondent’s counsel, that they did not want to be rep-
resented by the Union at Novi.13 Again, these statements ap-
pear to have been made for the purpose of persuading the
Respondent of their loyalty as employees, and have no bear-
ing on whether the Union enjoyed the support of a majority
of the Novi employees as of June 14, when the Respondent
unlawfully refused to recognize and bargain with the Union.
In summary, I find that the Respondent cannot rely on the
verbal or written statements by the transferees to support a
good-faith doubt of the Union’s majority support at Novi,
and that it therefore has failed to rebut the presumption under
Gitano that the three transferees from Livonia to the Novi fa-
cility continue to support the Union. The Respondent’s re-
fusal to recognize and bargain with the Union was thus un-
justified and amounted to a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act, as alleged.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Ryder Truck Rental Inc., is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Local Lodge No. 698, District Lodge 60,
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, AFL–CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Since June 14, 1994, the Union has been the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent’s em-
ployees in the following appropriate unit:
All service and maintenance employees employed by
Respondent’s facility located in Novi, Michigan; but
excluding office-clerical employees, salesmen, watch-
men, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
4. By telling employees wanting to transfer from its
Livonia facility to its Novi facility that the latter facility was
to be nonunion, and by having them sign a letter acknowl-
edging that fact, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. By refusing, since June 14, 1994, to recognize and bar-
gain in good faith with the Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the above-described bar-
gaining unit, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease
and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent shall be required to recognize and, on re-
quest, to bargain in good faith with the Union as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of its employees in
an appropriate bargaining unit regarding their terms and con-
ditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached,
embody the understanding in a signed agreement. The Re-
spondent will also be required to remove and rescind from
its records the letters signed by Novi employees acknowledg-
ing that the Novi facility was to be nonunion and to post an
appropriate notice.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended14
ORDER
The Respondent, Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., Southfield,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling prospective employees or transferees from its
other facilities that its Novi, Michigan facility is a nonunion
operation, and discouraging union membership by requiring
that they sign letters acknowledging that fact.
(b) Refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union,
Local Lodge No. 698, District Lodge 60, International Asso-
ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO,
which is the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the Respondent’s employees in the following appropriate
unit:
All service and maintenance employees employed by
Respondent’s facility located in Novi, Michigan; but
excluding office-clerical employees, salesmen, watch-
men, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the above-described ap-
propriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employ-
ment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the under-
standing in a signed agreement.
1097RYDER TRUCK RENTAL
15 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
(b) Remove and rescind from its records the unlawful doc-
uments signed by employees who transferred from its other
facilities to the Novi facility acknowledging that the Novi fa-
cility would be a nonunion operation, and notify those em-
ployees, in writing, that this has been done.
(c) Post at its facility in Novi, Michigan copies of the at-
tached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’15 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re-
ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT tell prospective applicants for employment
at our Novi facility or transferees from our other facilities
that the Novi facility is a nonunion operation, and WE WILL
NOT discourage union membership by requiring that they
sign letters acknowledging that the Novi facility is nonunion.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain with Local
Lodge No. 698, District Lodge 60, International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO, which is
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our em-
ployees in the following appropriate unit:
All service and maintenance employees employed by
our facility located in Novi, Michigan; but excluding
office-clerical employees, salesmen, watchmen, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union and put in
writing and sign any agreement reached on terms and condi-
tions of employment for our employees in the above-de-
scribed bargaining unit.
WE WILL rescind and remove from our records the letters
signed by employees who transferred to the Novi facility
stating that they understand that the Novi facility was non-
union, and WE WILL notify those employees, in writing, that
we have done so.
RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, INC.