Rouven DayDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 9, 201912891493 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 9, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/891,493 09/27/2010 ROUVEN DAY 22135-0064001 1522 32864 7590 08/09/2019 FISH & RICHARDSON, P.C. (SAP) PO BOX 1022 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022 EXAMINER MITCHELL, JASON D ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2199 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/09/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PATDOCTC@fr.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ROUVEN DAY ____________ Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before JASON A. MORGAN, BETH Z. SHAW, and AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25. Claims 18–24 and 26 are withdrawn. Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. RELATED APPEALS We previously decided Appeal No. 2017-000082 for this application on March 17, 2017 (“Prior Decision”). In the Prior Decision, we affirmed the Examiner’s rejections of the pending claims. Appellant stated “the Assignee and the Appellant do not know of any appeals or interferences that would directly affect or which would be directly Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 2 affected by, or have a bearing on, the Board’s decision in this Appeal.” App. Br. 5. However, 37 C.F.R. § 41.37 requires Appellant to include in the Appeal Brief: (ii) Related appeals, interferences, and trials. A statement identifying by application, patent, appeal, interference, or trial number all other prior and pending appeals, interferences, trials before the Board, or judicial proceedings (collectively, “related cases”) which satisfy all of the following conditions: involve an application or patent owned by the appellant or assignee, are known to appellant, the appellant’s legal representative, or assignee, and may be related to, directly affect or be directly affected by or have a bearing on the Board’s decision in the pending appeal, except that such statement is not required if there are no such related cases. If an appeal brief does not contain a statement of related cases, the Office may assume that there are no such related cases. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37; MPEP. 1207 (bold emphasis added). We remind Appellant to review the prosecution file history and include the appropriate information in the event of future appeals. INVENTION The invention is for business workflow processing in business process modeling notation tools. See Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1 is representative and is reproduced below: 1. A computer-implemented method for modeling a process, the method comprising: identifying a first process from a plurality of processes compatible with at least a first system, the first process being less than fully compatible with a particular process management system, such that the first process comprises at least one feature that has a format that is not compliant with the particular process management system, the at least one feature being executable on a physical system that is different from the particular process management system; Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 3 receiving a user input requesting modeling of the first process as a sub-process of a second process that is compatible with the particular process management system; generating a modeled sub-process modeling the first process as a sub-process of the second process by using a generic model for integrating the at least one feature that is not compliant with the particular process management system, the generic model being configured to identify the physical system on which the first process should be invoked based on a translation of data returned by an execution of the first process, inputs requested by the first process, and anticipated outputs of the first process, the modeled sub-process comprising: a reference, callable from the modeled sub-process, to the first system, and an interface definition defining an interface between the modeled sub-process and the first system; and generating a modeled interface between a model of the second process and the modeled sub-process, the modeled interface defining inputs from the second process to the first process and outputs from the first process to the second process. App. Br. 28. REJECTIONS The Examiner rejected claims 1–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite. Final Act. 8. The Examiner rejected claims 1–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Final Act. 9–13. The Examiner rejected claims 1–7, 11, 16, 17, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kuester (US 2007/0245297 A1; Oct. 18, 2007) and Sanjar (US 2006/0228654 A1; Oct. 12, 2006). Final Act. 13–18. The Examiner rejected claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kuester, Sanjar, and applicant acknowledged prior art techniques. Final Act. 18–19. Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 4 The Examiner rejected claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kuester, Sanjar, and official notice. Final Act. 19–20. The Examiner rejected claims 13 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kuester, Sanjar, and Fuchs (US 2009/0265684 A1; Oct. 22, 2009). Final Act. 20–21. ANALYSIS We conclude the Examiner did not err. We refer to, rely on, and adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions set forth in the Final Rejection and Answer. Section 112, Second Paragraph, Rejection Claim 1 recites, in part, “the generic model being configured to identify a physical system on which a first process should be invoked based on a translation of data returned by an execution of the first process.” The Examiner rejected claims as indefinite because this language makes it unclear if the identification of the physical system, or alternatively, the invocation, is “based on a translation of data returned by an execution of the first process.” Final Act. 8; Ans. 16. “[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim . . . indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). Appellant argues the phrase “on which the remote sub-process should be invoked” is a description of the physical system. App. Br. 13. Consequently, Appellant argues that those of ordinary skill in the art would Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 5 understand what is claimed when claim 1 is read in light of the specification. Id. Figure 2 of Appellant’s Specification is reproduced below. Figure 2 is a schematic illustration of an example system including a business process modeling system and business workflow platforms. Spec. ¶ 7. The Examiner explains the claimed phrase “based on a translation of data” could be understood to modify either the identification of a physical system or the invocation of the first process. Ans. 16. The Examiner concludes the claim language could be understood to describe a “generic model” or function which takes as input the “translation of data” and outputs Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 6 an identification of a physical system upon which the first process should be invoked; or, alternately, the invocation of a first process taking as input and/or triggered by (“based on”) the “translation of data” and invoked on a physical system previously identified in the generic model. Id. The Examiner explains that while it is clear from the claim language that the first process is somehow invoked on an identified physical system, it is not clear how that physical system is identified by the generic model. Id. at 17. We agree with the Examiner for the following reasons. Appellant cites to Specification paragraphs 32 and 33, which recite: [0032] . . . For instance, when the development component of the parent process is deployed, the development component 248 of the sub-process can be identified, together with the service reference 255, resulting in a remote function call 1260 to invoke and run the noncompliant business process on the server hosting the noncompliant business process. The service group resource 256 can identify the physical system on which the remote sub-process should be invoked through the remote function call interface 260. The business interface 265 can identify the inputs needed for the noncompliant sub-process, as well as the anticipated outputs, that will be exchanged with events, activities, and other sub-processes of the parent process. The interface 265 can correspond with start 270 and/or end 275 events of the noncompliant process. In other words, the modeled interface 265, generally, can define and specify the “contract” between the two development components 248, 249 modeling the respective parent- and sub-processes. [0033] . . . As an example, the modeled interface 265 can require a certain set of input data to be passed from a compliant parent process to a start event 270 of the sub-process. This can be defined by modeled interface 265. In some instances, the format or structure of the data passed by the compliant parent process will need to be translated for use in the sub-process executed on system 230. The interface 260 can be defined to translate the data transmitted from the Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 7 parent process for use by system 230. Additionally, the interface 260 can further translate data returned by the executed noncompliant sub- process on system 230 for use on the systems executing the parent process modeled by development component 248. In some instances, interface 260 can be a generic RFC interface implemented using WSDL. Spec. ¶¶ 32, 33 (emphasis added). The Examiner explains that the “service group resource 256” and “remote sub-process” respectively describe the claimed “generic model” and “first process.” Ans. 18. There is no disclosure in Appellant’s Specification of the “service group 256” determining or identifying a particular “physical system” based on any input, much less the claimed “translation of data . . . inputs . . . and anticipated outputs of the first process.” Id. Further, the “remote function call 260 to invoke . . . the . . . process” appears to be driven by the result of a translation/specification of data to be passed by an “interface 265.” In view of this disclosure, the Examiner determines, and we agree, that the claimed “identification” is not the result of some processing of the claimed “translation of data,” and that it is the invocation that is “based on” (i.e., uses) the claimed “translation of data.” Further, Figure 2 indicates that the “SERVICE GROUP” 256 is “configured by [a] user.” The examiner finds this indicates that the identification of the “physical system” (as described in paragraph 32 of the Specification) is preconfigured by a user and is not in some way derived from the claimed “translation of data.” Ans. 18. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, Appellant argues the phrase “on which the remote sub-process should be invoked” is a description of the Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 8 physical system. App. Br. 13. In view of the Examiner’s conclusions discussed above, with which we agree, and Appellant’s argument to the contrary, claim 1 is amenable to two or more plausible constructions. Therefore, we conclude that the Examiner did not err in concluding that claim 1 is indefinite for reciting “the generic model being configured to identify a physical system on which a first process should be invoked based on a translation of data returned by an execution of the first process.” Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite. We also sustain the rejection of claims 2–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25, which were not argued separately, for the same reasons. Section 101 Rejection Appellant argues the Section 101 rejection of the pending claims as a group. As permitted by 37 C.F.R. § 41.37, we decide this issue based on claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2016). Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section: “Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories, the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 9 to consider whether the claim is “directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then examine “the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)). That is, we examine the claims for an “inventive concept,” “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). The Patent Office recently issued guidance about this framework. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Eligibility Guidance”). Under the guidance, to decide whether a claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the claim (1) recites an abstract idea grouping listed in the guidance and (2) fails to integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See id. at 51. If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, as noted above, we then determine whether the claim recites an inventive concept. The 2019 Eligibility Guidance explains that when making this determination, we should consider whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well- understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Id. at 56. Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 10 With these principles in mind, we turn to the Examiner’s § 101 rejection. Abstract idea Turning to Step 2A, Prong 1, the claimed method is for modeling a business process. Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1 includes the following steps, as a “computer-implemented” method: identifying a first process from a plurality of processes compatible with at least a first system, the first process being less than fully compatible with a particular process management system, such that the first process comprises at least one feature that has a format that is not compliant with the particular process management system, the at least one feature being executable on a physical system that is different from the particular process management system; receiving a user input requesting modeling of the first process as a sub-process of a second process that is compatible with the particular process management system; generating a modeled sub-process modeling the first process as a sub-process of the second process by using a generic model for integrating the at least one feature that is not compliant with the particular process management system, the generic model being configured to identify the physical system on which the first process should be invoked based on a translation of data returned by an execution of the first process, inputs requested by the first process, and anticipated outputs of the first process, the modeled sub-process comprising: a reference, callable from the modeled sub-process, to the first system, and an interface definition defining an interface between the modeled sub-process and the first system; and generating a modeled interface between a model of the second process and the modeled sub-process, the modeled interface defining inputs from the second process to the first process and outputs from the first process to the second process. Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 11 Claim 1 recites an abstract idea grouping listed in the 2019 Eligibility Guidance: “mental processes.” See 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 53 (listing “[m]ental processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)” as one of the “enumerated groupings of abstract ideas” (footnote omitted)). The guidance explains that “mental processes” include acts that people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper, even if the claim recites that a generic computer component performs the acts. See 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”), quoted in 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14; Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d. 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that computer-implemented method for “‘anonymous loan shopping’” was an abstract idea because it could be “‘performed by humans without a computer’”); quoted in 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14. The method recited in claim 1 executes steps that people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper. A person can perform each of the “identifying,” “receiving,” and “generating” steps of claim 1 by using his or Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 12 her mind (or pen and paper) in the claimed manner. For example, a person can “identify a first process from a plurality of processes” compatible with the first system using a pen and paper. A person can “receiv[e] a user input requesting modeling of the first process as a sub-process of a second process that is compatible with the particular process management system” using a pen and paper. Appellant’s conclusory statement that the claimed invention “did not exist in the pre-Internet world” is attorney argument not supported by evidence. App. Br. 17; Reply Br. 4. Accordingly, claim 1 recites a mental process, and thus an abstract idea. Turning to Step 2A, Prong 2, the remaining elements recited in claim 1 do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. In addition to the steps discussed above, claim 1 recites in the preamble that the method is a “computer-implemented method.” The written description, however, discloses that the recited computer encompasses generic components. See, e.g., Spec. Fig. 1, ¶¶ 18–21 (“a server may be any computer or processing device such as, for example, a blade server, general-purpose personal computer (PC), Macintosh, workstation, UNIX-based workstation, or any other suitable device.”). Simply programming a general-purpose computer to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a practical application. See 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying “merely includ[ing] instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer” as an example of when an abstract idea has not been integrated into a practical application). Thus, the claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The claims: (1) do not improve the functioning of a computer Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 13 or other technology, (2) are not applied with any particular machine (except for a generic computer), (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a different state, and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Inventive Concept Because we determine claim 1 is “directed to” an abstract idea, we consider whether claim 1 recites an “inventive concept.” The Examiner determined claim 1 does not recite an inventive concept because the additional elements in the claim do not amount to “significantly more” than an abstract idea. See Final Act. 4. We agree. The additional element recited in the claim is the preamble’s “computer-implemented method.” The claim recites this “computer” at a high level of generality, and the written description indicates that the computers used are generic. See, e.g., Fig. 1, Spec. ¶¶ 18– 21. Using generic computer components to perform abstract ideas does not provide the necessary inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Thus, the “computer” does not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea. Appellant appears to contend various elements recited in the claim provide the necessary “inventive concept.” App. Br. 17–18. But these elements form part of the recited abstract ideas and thus are not “additional Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 14 elements” that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78); see also 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24 (“USPTO guidance uses the term ‘additional elements’ to refer to claim features, limitations, and/or steps that are recited in the claim beyond the identified judicial exception.” (emphasis added)). Rather, the recited “computer” is the additional recited element whose generic computing functionality is well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Intellectual Ventures, 792 F.3d at 1368 (noting that a recited user profile (i.e., a profile keyed to a user identity), database, and communication medium are generic computer elements); Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that components such as “interface,” “network,” and “database” are generic computer components that do not satisfy the inventive concept requirement); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”); accord Final Act. 3 (Concluding that the claims’ additional generic computer components do not add significantly more than the abstract idea.); see also Spec. Figs. 2, 3, ¶¶ 48–50, 78–82 (“program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose information handling device”). Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us claim 1 is “directed to” a patent-eligible concept. To the extent Appellant contends that the claimed invention is “rooted” in technology because it is ostensibly directed to a technical Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 15 solution (see App. Br. 17–19), we disagree. Even assuming, without deciding, that the claimed invention “addresses modeling and deploying processes that are non-compliant on a new process management platform, without having to redevelop the process for the new platform” faster than doing so manually, any speed increase comes from the capabilities of the generic computer components—not the recited process itself. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”)); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F. App’x 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (“Though the claims purport to accelerate the process of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general- purpose computer ‘do[ ] not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.’”). Like the claims in FairWarning, the focus of claim 1 is not on an improvement in computer processors as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use generic computing components as tools. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095 (citations and quotation marks omitted). For at least the above reasons, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is “directed to” an abstract idea and does not recite an “inventive concept.” Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 16 Section 103 Rejections Claim 1 First, Appellant argues the Examiner erred because the cited portions of Kuester are silent as to “at least one feature” that has a format that is not compliant with the particular process management system. App Br. 24; Reply Br. 3. We are not persuaded by this argument. The Examiner concludes that “Kuester discloses a first business process modeled in ‘an Event-Driven Process Chains (EPC) notation’ (see e.g. par. [0028]) and a second business process modeled in ‘WB notation using a WebSphere Business (MB) Modeler’ (see e.g. par. [0028]).” Ans. 9. The Examiner finds that “EPC notation” is different from and is therefore “less than fully compatible with ‘WB notation’ and/or the ‘WebSphere Business (WB) Modeler.’” Id. (citing Kuester ¶ 28 (“[a]n EPC business process model is structured differently to a WB model”)). As discussed in our Prior Decision, Appellant provides insufficient evidence proving that “less than fully compatible” is limited in a way that, under a broad but reasonable interpretation, is not encompassed by Kuester’s teachings. “[T]he PTO gives claims their ‘broadest reasonable interpretation.’” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Kuester’s paragraph 28 discloses that the first analysis model process is “less than fully compatible” with a particular business process management system (IBM WebSphere Business), as evidenced by the fact that the “legacy-business-process-model” in EPC is structured differently from a WB model. Kuester ¶ 28; see Ans. 9. Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 17 Kuester’s paragraph 28 explains that an “EPC model is not as strictly hierarchical as a WB model,” whereas a WB Modeler “is a visual process editor that helps build a choreographed business process in five simple steps.” Thus, we agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that Kuester’s first process is less than fully compatible with a particular business process management system. Appellant also argues Sanjar fails to teach “the generic model being configured to identify a physical system on which the first process should be invoked,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 24. Appellant argues the user in Sanjar is required to input fields. Reply Br. 7. We are not persuaded by these arguments. Rather, we agree with the Examiner’s findings that Sanjar teaches configuration of a “model” (Sanjar ¶ 44 “complete required fields . . . according to . . . the XML templates”) to identify a physical system (Sanjar ¶ 44 “fields . . . such as the database name (51), its source (52), the Internet Protocol (‘IP’) address (53)”). Ans. 24. We agree with the Examiner that Sanjar’s “templates” generically define an interface between two different systems and thus reasonably constitute a “model” as claimed. Id. Further, Sanjar teaches identifying a “target’” system (e.g., “DB2”) by an “Internet Protocol (‘IP’) address.” Id. The claims do not specify any particular means used to “identify the physical system,” and therefore an IP address teaches the broadly claimed “the generic model being configured to identify.” Those of ordinary skill would have recognized an IP address as identifying a system to which to send a remote function call (in this case database accesses). Ans. 24. For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 18 Claim 12 Claim 12 recites the method of claim 1, “wherein the first business process is associated with a third party source.” The Examiner finds Kuester discloses the method of claim 1, but Kuester does not explicitly disclose the first business process is associated with a third-party source. Final Act. 19– 20. The Examiner takes official notice that third parties were commonly used in the art to provide software systems. Id. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to apply Kuester’s process to a customer’s system (citing Kuester ¶ 24 (“[a] legacy-business-process-model”)) in which at least some of the components were provided by a third party source. Id. The Examiner concludes that “[t]hose of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the source of the components would have been irrelevant and would not have changed the operation of the system.” Id. “To adequately traverse such a finding [of official notice], an applicant must specifically point out the supposed errors in the examiner’s action, which would include stating why the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art.” MPEP § 2144.03(C) (citing 37 CFR 1.111(b)). An effective traverse must contain adequate information or argument to create, on its face, a reasonable doubt regarding the circumstances justifying notice of what is well known to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 728 (CCPA 1971). The Examiner offers evidence to support taking of notice that third parties were commonly used in the art to provide software systems. Ans. 14. Appellant does not address this evidence. Instead, Appellant merely argues that simply because a third-party may provide a software system it has not Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 19 been shown to teach or suggest a first business process. App. Br. 25, 26. The Examiner explains, however, that Kuester discloses the first business process as claimed and this business process constitutes a software system. Ans. 15 (citing Kuester ¶ 5). Accordingly, the Examiner concludes, “it would have been obvious for Kuester’s legacy business process to be associated with a third party.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Prior Decision. None of Appellant’s arguments contain adequate information to create, on their face, a reasonable doubt regarding the circumstances justifying notice of what is well known to one of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 12. Remaining pending claims With respect to the remaining pending claims, Appellant merely makes general allegations as to the teachings of the cited references, or reiterates substantially the same patentability arguments as those previously discussed for the above claims. See App. Br. 2–26. Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s assertions. Consequently, we affirm the Examiner’s Section 103 rejection of claims 1–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25. Appeal 2018-007284 Application 12/891,493 20 DECISION We affirm the rejections of claims 1–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation