Rouven Day

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 9, 2019

12891493 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 9, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/891,493 09/27/2010 ROUVEN DAY 22135-0064001 1522
32864 7590 08/09/2019
FISH & RICHARDSON, P.C. (SAP)
PO BOX 1022
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022
EXAMINER
MITCHELL, JASON D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2199
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/09/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PATDOCTC@fr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROUVEN DAY
____________

Appeal 2018-007284
Application 12/891,493
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JASON A. MORGAN, BETH Z. SHAW, and
AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25. Claims
18–24 and 26 are withdrawn. Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
RELATED APPEALS
We previously decided Appeal No. 2017-000082 for this application
on March 17, 2017 (“Prior Decision”). In the Prior Decision, we affirmed
the Examiner’s rejections of the pending claims.
Appellant stated “the Assignee and the Appellant do not know of any
appeals or interferences that would directly affect or which would be directly
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affected by, or have a bearing on, the Board’s decision in this Appeal.” App.
Br. 5. However, 37 C.F.R. § 41.37 requires Appellant to include in the
Appeal Brief:
(ii) Related appeals, interferences, and trials. A statement identifying
by application, patent, appeal, interference, or trial number all other
prior and pending appeals, interferences, trials before the Board, or
judicial proceedings (collectively, “related cases”) which satisfy all of
the following conditions: involve an application or patent owned by
the appellant or assignee, are known to appellant, the appellant’s legal
representative, or assignee, and may be related to, directly affect or be
directly affected by or have a bearing on the Board’s decision in the
pending appeal, except that such statement is not required if there are
no such related cases. If an appeal brief does not contain a statement
of related cases, the Office may assume that there are no such related
cases.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37; MPEP. 1207 (bold emphasis added). We remind
Appellant to review the prosecution file history and include the appropriate
information in the event of future appeals.

INVENTION
The invention is for business workflow processing in business process
modeling notation tools. See Spec. ¶ 1.
Claim 1 is representative and is reproduced below:
1. A computer-implemented method for modeling a process, the
method comprising:
identifying a first process from a plurality of processes
compatible with at least a first system, the first process being less than
fully compatible with a particular process management system, such
that the first process comprises at least one feature that has a format
that is not compliant with the particular process management system,
the at least one feature being executable on a physical system that is
different from the particular process management system;
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receiving a user input requesting modeling of the first process
as a sub-process of a second process that is compatible with the
particular process management system;
generating a modeled sub-process modeling the first process as
a sub-process of the second process by using a generic model for
integrating the at least one feature that is not compliant with the
particular process management system, the generic model being
configured to identify the physical system on which the first process
should be invoked based on a translation of data returned by an
execution of the first process, inputs requested by the first process,
and anticipated outputs of the first process, the modeled sub-process
comprising:
a reference, callable from the modeled sub-process, to the
first system, and
an interface definition defining an interface between the
modeled sub-process and the first system; and
generating a modeled interface between a model of the second
process and the modeled sub-process, the modeled interface defining
inputs from the second process to the first process and outputs from
the first process to the second process.
App. Br. 28.
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 1–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25 under 35
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite. Final Act. 8.
The Examiner rejected claims 1–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25 under 35
U.S.C. § 101. Final Act. 9–13.
The Examiner rejected claims 1–7, 11, 16, 17, and 25 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kuester (US 2007/0245297 A1; Oct. 18,
2007) and Sanjar (US 2006/0228654 A1; Oct. 12, 2006). Final Act. 13–18.
The Examiner rejected claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Kuester, Sanjar, and applicant acknowledged prior art
techniques. Final Act. 18–19.
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The Examiner rejected claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Kuester, Sanjar, and official notice. Final Act. 19–20.
The Examiner rejected claims 13 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Kuester, Sanjar, and Fuchs (US 2009/0265684 A1;
Oct. 22, 2009). Final Act. 20–21.
ANALYSIS
We conclude the Examiner did not err. We refer to, rely on, and adopt
the Examiner’s findings and conclusions set forth in the Final Rejection and
Answer.
Section 112, Second Paragraph, Rejection
Claim 1 recites, in part, “the generic model being configured to
identify a physical system on which a first process should be invoked based
on a translation of data returned by an execution of the first process.” The
Examiner rejected claims as indefinite because this language makes it
unclear if the identification of the physical system, or alternatively, the
invocation, is “based on a translation of data returned by an execution of the
first process.” Final Act. 8; Ans. 16.
“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions,
the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the
metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim . . .
indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008)
(precedential).
Appellant argues the phrase “on which the remote sub-process should
be invoked” is a description of the physical system. App. Br. 13.
Consequently, Appellant argues that those of ordinary skill in the art would
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understand what is claimed when claim 1 is read in light of the specification.
Id.
Figure 2 of Appellant’s Specification is reproduced below.

Figure 2 is a schematic illustration of an example system including a
business process modeling system and business workflow platforms. Spec.
¶ 7.
The Examiner explains the claimed phrase “based on a translation of
data” could be understood to modify either the identification of a physical
system or the invocation of the first process. Ans. 16. The Examiner
concludes the claim language could be understood to describe a “generic
model” or function which takes as input the “translation of data” and outputs
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an identification of a physical system upon which the first process should be
invoked; or, alternately, the invocation of a first process taking as input
and/or triggered by (“based on”) the “translation of data” and invoked on a
physical system previously identified in the generic model. Id. The
Examiner explains that while it is clear from the claim language that the first
process is somehow invoked on an identified physical system, it is not clear
how that physical system is identified by the generic model. Id. at 17.
We agree with the Examiner for the following reasons.
Appellant cites to Specification paragraphs 32 and 33, which recite:
[0032] . . . For instance, when the development component of the
parent process is deployed, the development component 248 of the
sub-process can be identified, together with the service reference 255,
resulting in a remote function call 1260 to invoke and run the
noncompliant business process on the server hosting the noncompliant
business process. The service group resource 256 can identify the
physical system on which the remote sub-process should be invoked
through the remote function call interface 260. The business interface
265 can identify the inputs needed for the noncompliant sub-process,
as well as the anticipated outputs, that will be exchanged with events,
activities, and other sub-processes of the parent process. The interface
265 can correspond with start 270 and/or end 275 events of the
noncompliant process. In other words, the modeled interface 265,
generally, can define and specify the “contract” between the two
development components 248, 249 modeling the respective parent-
and sub-processes.

[0033] . . . As an example, the modeled interface 265 can require a
certain set of input data to be passed from a compliant parent process
to a start event 270 of the sub-process. This can be defined by
modeled interface 265. In some instances, the format or structure of
the data passed by the compliant parent process will need to be
translated for use in the sub-process executed on system 230. The
interface 260 can be defined to translate the data transmitted from the
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parent process for use by system 230. Additionally, the interface 260
can further translate data returned by the executed noncompliant sub-
process on system 230 for use on the systems executing the parent
process modeled by development component 248. In some instances,
interface 260 can be a generic RFC interface implemented using
WSDL.
Spec. ¶¶ 32, 33 (emphasis added).
The Examiner explains that the “service group resource 256” and
“remote sub-process” respectively describe the claimed “generic model” and
“first process.” Ans. 18. There is no disclosure in Appellant’s Specification
of the “service group 256” determining or identifying a particular “physical
system” based on any input, much less the claimed “translation of data . . .
inputs . . . and anticipated outputs of the first process.” Id. Further, the
“remote function call 260 to invoke . . . the . . . process” appears to be
driven by the result of a translation/specification of data to be passed by an
“interface 265.”
In view of this disclosure, the Examiner determines, and we agree,
that the claimed “identification” is not the result of some processing of the
claimed “translation of data,” and that it is the invocation that is “based on”
(i.e., uses) the claimed “translation of data.” Further, Figure 2 indicates that
the “SERVICE GROUP” 256 is “configured by [a] user.” The examiner
finds this indicates that the identification of the “physical system” (as
described in paragraph 32 of the Specification) is preconfigured by a user
and is not in some way derived from the claimed “translation of data.” Ans.
18.
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, Appellant argues the phrase “on
which the remote sub-process should be invoked” is a description of the
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physical system. App. Br. 13. In view of the Examiner’s conclusions
discussed above, with which we agree, and Appellant’s argument to the
contrary, claim 1 is amenable to two or more plausible constructions.
Therefore, we conclude that the Examiner did not err in concluding
that claim 1 is indefinite for reciting “the generic model being configured to
identify a physical system on which a first process should be invoked based
on a translation of data returned by an execution of the first process.”
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph, as being indefinite. We also sustain the rejection of
claims 2–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25, which were not argued separately, for the
same reasons.

Section 101 Rejection
Appellant argues the Section 101 rejection of the pending claims as a
group. As permitted by 37 C.F.R. § 41.37, we decide this issue based on
claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2016).
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories,
the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first
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to consider whether the claim is “directed to one of those patent-ineligible
concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then examine “the elements of
each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)). That is, we examine
the claims for an “inventive concept,” “an element or combination of
elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at
217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The Patent Office recently issued guidance about this framework. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Eligibility Guidance”). Under the guidance, to decide
whether a claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the
claim (1) recites an abstract idea grouping listed in the guidance and (2) fails
to integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See id. at
51. If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, as noted above, we then
determine whether the claim recites an inventive concept. The 2019
Eligibility Guidance explains that when making this determination, we
should consider whether the additional claim elements add “a specific
limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry.” Id. at 56.
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With these principles in mind, we turn to the Examiner’s § 101
rejection.
Abstract idea
Turning to Step 2A, Prong 1, the claimed method is for modeling a
business process. Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1 includes the following steps, as a
“computer-implemented” method:
identifying a first process from a plurality of processes
compatible with at least a first system, the first process being less than
fully compatible with a particular process management system, such
that the first process comprises at least one feature that has a format
that is not compliant with the particular process management system,
the at least one feature being executable on a physical system that is
different from the particular process management system;
receiving a user input requesting modeling of the first process
as a sub-process of a second process that is compatible with the
particular process management system;
generating a modeled sub-process modeling the first process as
a sub-process of the second process by using a generic model for
integrating the at least one feature that is not compliant with the
particular process management system, the generic model being
configured to identify the physical system on which the first process
should be invoked based on a translation of data returned by an
execution of the first process, inputs requested by the first process,
and anticipated outputs of the first process, the modeled sub-process
comprising:
a reference, callable from the modeled sub-process, to the
first system, and
an interface definition defining an interface between the
modeled sub-process and the first system; and
generating a modeled interface between a model of the second
process and the modeled sub-process, the modeled interface defining
inputs from the second process to the first process and outputs from
the first process to the second process.
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Claim 1 recites an abstract idea grouping listed in the 2019 Eligibility
Guidance: “mental processes.” See 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52, 53 (listing “[m]ental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)” as one of
the “enumerated groupings of abstract ideas” (footnote omitted)). The
guidance explains that “mental processes” include acts that people can
perform in their minds or using pen and paper, even if the claim recites that
a generic computer component performs the acts. See 2019 Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable
interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of
generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes
category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”); see
also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented
steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from
being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”), quoted in
2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14; Mortg. Grader, Inc. v.
First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d. 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that computer-implemented method for “‘anonymous loan
shopping’” was an abstract idea because it could be “‘performed by humans
without a computer’”); quoted in 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52 n.14.
The method recited in claim 1 executes steps that people can perform
in their minds or using pen and paper. A person can perform each of the
“identifying,” “receiving,” and “generating” steps of claim 1 by using his or
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her mind (or pen and paper) in the claimed manner. For example, a person
can “identify a first process from a plurality of processes” compatible with
the first system using a pen and paper. A person can “receiv[e] a user input
requesting modeling of the first process as a sub-process of a second process
that is compatible with the particular process management system” using a
pen and paper. Appellant’s conclusory statement that the claimed invention
“did not exist in the pre-Internet world” is attorney argument not supported
by evidence. App. Br. 17; Reply Br. 4. Accordingly, claim 1 recites a
mental process, and thus an abstract idea.
Turning to Step 2A, Prong 2, the remaining elements recited in claim
1 do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. In addition to
the steps discussed above, claim 1 recites in the preamble that the method is
a “computer-implemented method.” The written description, however,
discloses that the recited computer encompasses generic components. See,
e.g., Spec. Fig. 1, ¶¶ 18–21 (“a server may be any computer or processing
device such as, for example, a blade server, general-purpose personal
computer (PC), Macintosh, workstation, UNIX-based workstation, or any
other suitable device.”). Simply programming a general-purpose computer
to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a practical
application. See 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying
“merely includ[ing] instructions to implement an abstract idea on a
computer” as an example of when an abstract idea has not been integrated
into a practical application).
Thus, the claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application. The claims: (1) do not improve the functioning of a computer
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or other technology, (2) are not applied with any particular machine (except
for a generic computer), (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular
article to a different state, and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way
beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Inventive Concept
Because we determine claim 1 is “directed to” an abstract idea, we
consider whether claim 1 recites an “inventive concept.” The Examiner
determined claim 1 does not recite an inventive concept because the
additional elements in the claim do not amount to “significantly more” than
an abstract idea. See Final Act. 4.
We agree. The additional element recited in the claim is the
preamble’s “computer-implemented method.” The claim recites this
“computer” at a high level of generality, and the written description
indicates that the computers used are generic. See, e.g., Fig. 1, Spec. ¶¶ 18–
21. Using generic computer components to perform abstract ideas does not
provide the necessary inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he
mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Thus, the “computer” does
not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea.
Appellant appears to contend various elements recited in the claim
provide the necessary “inventive concept.” App. Br. 17–18. But these
elements form part of the recited abstract ideas and thus are not “additional
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elements” that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78); see
also 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24 (“USPTO guidance
uses the term ‘additional elements’ to refer to claim features, limitations,
and/or steps that are recited in the claim beyond the identified judicial
exception.” (emphasis added)).
Rather, the recited “computer” is the additional recited element whose
generic computing functionality is well-understood, routine, and
conventional. See Intellectual Ventures, 792 F.3d at 1368 (noting that a
recited user profile (i.e., a profile keyed to a user identity), database, and
communication medium are generic computer elements); Mortgage Grader,
Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (noting that components such as “interface,” “network,” and
“database” are generic computer components that do not satisfy the
inventive concept requirement); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d
1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the
information over a network—with no further specification—is not even
arguably inventive.”); accord Final Act. 3 (Concluding that the claims’
additional generic computer components do not add significantly more than
the abstract idea.); see also Spec. Figs. 2, 3, ¶¶ 48–50, 78–82 (“program
instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose information
handling device”). Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us claim 1 is
“directed to” a patent-eligible concept.
To the extent Appellant contends that the claimed invention is
“rooted” in technology because it is ostensibly directed to a technical
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solution (see App. Br. 17–19), we disagree. Even assuming, without
deciding, that the claimed invention “addresses modeling and deploying
processes that are non-compliant on a new process management platform,
without having to redevelop the process for the new platform” faster than
doing so manually, any speed increase comes from the capabilities of the
generic computer components—not the recited process itself. See
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (citing Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d
1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could
be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the
patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”)); see also Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F. App’x 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (unpublished) (“Though the claims purport to accelerate the process
of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have held that speed and
accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general-
purpose computer ‘do[ ] not materially alter the patent eligibility of the
claimed subject matter.’”). Like the claims in FairWarning, the focus of
claim 1 is not on an improvement in computer processors as tools, but on
certain independently abstract ideas that use generic computing components
as tools. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095 (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
For at least the above reasons, we agree with the Examiner that claim
1 is “directed to” an abstract idea and does not recite an “inventive concept.”
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–8, 11–14, 16,
17, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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Section 103 Rejections
Claim 1
First, Appellant argues the Examiner erred because the cited portions
of Kuester are silent as to “at least one feature” that has a format that is not
compliant with the particular process management system. App Br. 24;
Reply Br. 3. We are not persuaded by this argument.
The Examiner concludes that “Kuester discloses a first business
process modeled in ‘an Event-Driven Process Chains (EPC) notation’ (see
e.g. par. [0028]) and a second business process modeled in ‘WB notation
using a WebSphere Business (MB) Modeler’ (see e.g. par. [0028]).” Ans. 9.
The Examiner finds that “EPC notation” is different from and is therefore
“less than fully compatible with ‘WB notation’ and/or the ‘WebSphere
Business (WB) Modeler.’” Id. (citing Kuester ¶ 28 (“[a]n EPC business
process model is structured differently to a WB model”)).
As discussed in our Prior Decision, Appellant provides insufficient
evidence proving that “less than fully compatible” is limited in a way that,
under a broad but reasonable interpretation, is not encompassed by Kuester’s
teachings. “[T]he PTO gives claims their ‘broadest reasonable
interpretation.’” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting
In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Kuester’s paragraph 28
discloses that the first analysis model process is “less than fully compatible”
with a particular business process management system (IBM WebSphere
Business), as evidenced by the fact that the “legacy-business-process-model”
in EPC is structured differently from a WB model. Kuester ¶ 28; see Ans. 9.
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Kuester’s paragraph 28 explains that an “EPC model is not as strictly
hierarchical as a WB model,” whereas a WB Modeler “is a visual process
editor that helps build a choreographed business process in five simple
steps.” Thus, we agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that Kuester’s first
process is less than fully compatible with a particular business process
management system.
Appellant also argues Sanjar fails to teach “the generic model being
configured to identify a physical system on which the first process should be
invoked,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 24. Appellant argues the user in
Sanjar is required to input fields. Reply Br. 7.
We are not persuaded by these arguments. Rather, we agree with the
Examiner’s findings that Sanjar teaches configuration of a “model” (Sanjar
¶ 44 “complete required fields . . . according to . . . the XML templates”) to
identify a physical system (Sanjar ¶ 44 “fields . . . such as the database name
(51), its source (52), the Internet Protocol (‘IP’) address (53)”). Ans. 24.
We agree with the Examiner that Sanjar’s “templates” generically define an
interface between two different systems and thus reasonably constitute a
“model” as claimed. Id. Further, Sanjar teaches identifying a “target’”
system (e.g., “DB2”) by an “Internet Protocol (‘IP’) address.” Id. The
claims do not specify any particular means used to “identify the physical
system,” and therefore an IP address teaches the broadly claimed “the
generic model being configured to identify.” Those of ordinary skill would
have recognized an IP address as identifying a system to which to send a
remote function call (in this case database accesses). Ans. 24. For these
reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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Claim 12
Claim 12 recites the method of claim 1, “wherein the first business
process is associated with a third party source.” The Examiner finds Kuester
discloses the method of claim 1, but Kuester does not explicitly disclose the
first business process is associated with a third-party source. Final Act. 19–
20. The Examiner takes official notice that third parties were commonly
used in the art to provide software systems. Id. The Examiner concludes
that it would have been obvious to apply Kuester’s process to a customer’s
system (citing Kuester ¶ 24 (“[a] legacy-business-process-model”)) in which
at least some of the components were provided by a third party source. Id.
The Examiner concludes that “[t]hose of ordinary skill in the art would have
recognized that the source of the components would have been irrelevant
and would not have changed the operation of the system.” Id.
“To adequately traverse such a finding [of official notice], an
applicant must specifically point out the supposed errors in the examiner’s
action, which would include stating why the noticed fact is not considered to
be common knowledge or well-known in the art.” MPEP § 2144.03(C)
(citing 37 CFR 1.111(b)). An effective traverse must contain adequate
information or argument to create, on its face, a reasonable doubt regarding
the circumstances justifying notice of what is well known to one of ordinary
skill in the art. In re Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 728 (CCPA 1971).
The Examiner offers evidence to support taking of notice that third
parties were commonly used in the art to provide software systems. Ans. 14.
Appellant does not address this evidence. Instead, Appellant merely argues
that simply because a third-party may provide a software system it has not
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been shown to teach or suggest a first business process. App. Br. 25, 26.
The Examiner explains, however, that Kuester discloses the first business
process as claimed and this business process constitutes a software system.
Ans. 15 (citing Kuester ¶ 5). Accordingly, the Examiner concludes, “it
would have been obvious for Kuester’s legacy business process to be
associated with a third party.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Prior
Decision.
None of Appellant’s arguments contain adequate information to
create, on their face, a reasonable doubt regarding the circumstances
justifying notice of what is well known to one of ordinary skill in the art.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 12.
Remaining pending claims
With respect to the remaining pending claims, Appellant merely
makes general allegations as to the teachings of the cited references, or
reiterates substantially the same patentability arguments as those previously
discussed for the above claims. See App. Br. 2–26. Thus, we are not
persuaded by Appellant’s assertions. Consequently, we affirm the
Examiner’s Section 103 rejection of claims 1–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25.

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20
DECISION
We affirm the rejections of claims 1–8, 11–14, 16, 17, and 25.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED