Richard E. Arline, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Headquarters), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 3, 2003
01A24032 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 3, 2003)

01A24032

09-03-2003

Richard E. Arline, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Headquarters), Agency.


Richard E. Arline v. United States Postal Service

01A24032

September 3, 2003

.

Richard E. Arline,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Headquarters),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A24032

Agency Nos. HI-0035-00; HI-0028-01; HI-0033-01

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission

affirms the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Postal Inspector, Grade ISLE-14, at the agency's New Jersey Division

Headquarters, North Jersey Carribean Division, in Newark, New Jersey.

Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal

complaint on January 10, 2000 (Agency No. HI-0035-00), alleging that he

was discriminated against on the bases of race (African-American) and sex

(male) when (1) on November 5, 2000, complainant was not selected for

two vacancies in the position of Assistant Inspector in Charge, Grade

ISLE-15, in the Southwest Division of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

Complainant amended this complaint to include another allegation of

race and sex discrimination when (2) on May 17, 2000, complainant was

not selected for the position of Field Office Inspector in Charge, Grade

ISLE-15, located in Memphis, Tennessee, in the Southwest Division of the

U.S. Postal Inspection Service. Complainant again sought EEO counseling

and subsequently filed a formal complaint on October 17, 2000 (Agency

No. HI-0028-01), alleging that he was discriminated against on the bases

of race and sex when (3) on July 28, 2000, complainant was not selected

for two vacancies in the position of Assistant Inspector in Charge, Grade

ISLE-15, in the New York Metro Division of the U.S. Postal Inspection

Service. Complainant again sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed

a formal complaint on October 26, 2000 (Agency No. HI-0033-01), alleging

that he was discriminated against on the bases of race and sex when (4)

on March 13, 2000, complainant was not selected for the positions of

Field Office Inspector in Charge, Grade ISLE-15, located in St. Paul,

Minnesota, and Kansas City, Missouri.

At the conclusion of the investigations, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency consolidated these complaints. The FAD concluded

that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of race or sex

discrimination in regard to each of the non-selections. In reaching

this conclusion, the agency found that complainant failed to present

evidence of similarly situated individuals outside of his protected

classes who were treated more favorably under similar circumstances.

The FAD found that even assuming arguendo that complainant established a

prima facie case of race and sex discrimination, the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting complainant.

In regard to each non-selection, the selecting official explained the

proficiencies of the selectees' and the deficiencies of complainant's

applications. Generally, the selecting officials lauded complainant's

accomplishments but noted how the selectees were better qualified.

The FAD ultimately concluded that complainant failed to establish that

the agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions were

pretext for any of the alleged bases of discrimination.

On appeal, complainant states that �since June 1994, I have applied for

twenty-seven higher level positions. I was recommended for eighteen

positions and not recommended for nine positions. I have requested

seventeen detail and developmental opportunities. I received one of

the seventeen positions.� The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

As a preliminary matter, we note that we review the decision on an appeal

from a FAD issued without a hearing de novo. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

To prevail in disparate treatment claims such as these, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983). To ultimately prevail, complainant must prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation is a pretext

for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).

After a thorough examination of the record, the Commission finds that with

regard to each non-selection, even assuming arguendo that complainant

established a prima facie case of race and sex discrimination,

complainant failed to present evidence that more likely than not,

the agency's articulated reasons for its actions were pretext for

discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, we note that the agency

has broad discretion to set policies and carry out personnel decisions,

and should not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority absent

evidence of unlawful motivation. Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259; Vanek v. Department of the Treasury,

EEOC Request No. 05940906 (January 16, 1997). There is nothing in the

record to show that the agency's actions were a result of unlawful animus

towards complainant's protected bases. Further, we note that complainant

may be able to establish pretext with a showing that his qualifications

were plainly superior to those of the selectee. Wasser v. Department of

Labor, EEOC Request No. 05940058 (November 2, 1995); Bauer v. Bailar,

647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981). However, complainant has not

done so, nor has he presented any other evidence which contradicts the

testimony of the selecting official and the other officials involved in

the selection, or which undermines their credibility. Therefore, after

a careful review of the record, including complainant's contentions on

appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence not specifically

addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

September 3, 2003

______________________________ __________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director Date

Office of Federal Operations