Reina D.,1 Complainant, v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.

19 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 243,094 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 222,209 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (2000) Cited 21,660 times 22 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose"
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White
548 U.S. 53 (2006) Cited 11,757 times 104 Legal Analyses
Holding that a jury could find a reassignment from a position with "an indication of prestige" to one involving less desirable responsibilities "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,572 times 98 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.
510 U.S. 17 (1993) Cited 12,755 times 23 Legal Analyses
Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,445 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,301 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.
523 U.S. 75 (1998) Cited 5,337 times 50 Legal Analyses
Holding that "[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive . . . connotations"
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson
477 U.S. 57 (1986) Cited 6,633 times 18 Legal Analyses
Holding that sexual harassment may be actionable under Title VII as discrimination on the basis of sex if it is sufficiently severe and pervasive
Section 1630.2 - Definitions
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 Cited 8,576 times 141 Legal Analyses
Holding that major life activity is substantially limited if plaintiff is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities"

Reina D.,1 Complainant, v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.

19 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that a "trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose"

Holding that a jury could find a reassignment from a position with "an indication of prestige" to one involving less desirable responsibilities "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that "[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive . . . connotations"

Holding that sexual harassment may be actionable under Title VII as discrimination on the basis of sex if it is sufficiently severe and pervasive

Holding that major life activity is substantially limited if plaintiff is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities"