[Redacted], Virginia T., 1 Complainant,v.Mahmoud Bah, Acting Chief Executive Officer, Millenium Challenge Corporation, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Sep 21, 2022

Appeal No. 2021001735 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 21, 2022)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Virginia T.,1 Complainant, v. Mahmoud Bah, Acting Chief Executive Officer, Millenium Challenge Corporation, Agency. Appeal No. 2021001735 Hearing No. 570-2017-00956X Agency No. 2016-2 DECISION On January 15, 2021, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s December 17, 2020, final action concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final action. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an Associate Director (AD), Pay Band 3(b), in the Department of Compact Operations/Infrastructure, Environment and Private Sector/Energy Practice Group. Person A, Acting Practice Lead/Senior Director (PL/SD) of the Energy Practice Group, became Complainant’s first level supervisor in August 2015. Person B, former PL/SD of the Energy Practice Group was Complainant’s first level supervisor from 2013 to 2015. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2021001735 2 Complainant testified that the subject EEO case is her only EEO case. She initiated EEO Counselor contact on the subject matter on June 29, 2016. Complainant stated that in August 2013, she engaged in protected EEO activity when she told Person C, the Senior Director of Infrastructure at the time, that she felt the Agency’s hiring and promotion practices were biased in favor of males. Further, she claimed that on March 18, 2016, she met with Person A to discuss promotability and expressed concern that a male employee would be looked upon more favorably than her because he had been given more country assignments than she had. Complainant began maternity leave on June 4, 2014. She returned from maternity leave in September 2014. On September 29, 2016, Complainant filed an EEO complaint, which was subsequently amended. Her complaint contained the following allegations: 1. Complainant was subjected to discrimination based on her sex (female, pregnancy, gender-stereotyping, and female caregiver), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activities when she was not selected on June 10, 2016, for the position of Director, Energy Promotion Group, Pay Band 3(a). 2. Complainant was subjected to discrimination based on sex when beginning in 2013, she was paid less than male employees for equal work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions. 3. Complainant was subjected to an ongoing pattern and practice of discrimination and hostile work environment beginning in 2013, based on sex (female, pregnancy, gender-stereotyping, and female caregiver) and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity (opposing and/or reporting the Agency’s discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in August 2013 and March 2016) when: a. In the fall of 2013, Person B, Former PL/SD, failed to provide Complainant the opportunity to be part of the special working group (the Regional Compact Working Group) despite Person B having placed a similarly situated male employee, Employee 1, into the Regional Compact Working Group. b. Beginning in September 2013 and continuing to June 10, 2016, Complainant has continually been passed over for promotion, in favor of male employees, despite her superior qualifications. c. In February 2014, Person B has continually given country assignments that were promised to Complainant to a similarly situated male employee, Employee 1, Associate Director. 2021001735 3 d. In May 2014, after Complainant informed her supervisor of her pregnancy and immediately prior to commencing maternity leave, Person B reduced Complainant’s country workload from three countries to two without explanation. e. In September 2014, when Complainant returned from maternity leave, Person B further reduced Complainant’s country workload from two countries to one country, informing her that he had assigned a (male) staffer to the Malawi Compact without further explanation and continued to assign her a lower level of work assignments and responsibility than similarly situated male employees. f. In November 2014, Person B issued Complainant a negative and inaccurate FY 2014 performance appraisal containing unwelcome sex-based language such as that Complainant needed to be “less assertive,” and referencing an assignment that Complainant allegedly “missed” because she was on maternity leave at the time. g. In August 2015, Person A, Acting PL/SD, and Person B verbally instructed Complainant to cease work on the Niger Compact after she completed an initial rapid assessment of investment opportunities, and despite a request from another PL/SD to allow her to continue work on the compact. h. In August 2015, Complainant held individual meetings with Person A, Person B, and Person D in each of which she specifically discussed her desire to be promoted and to request that she be provided with specific goals and objectives and opportunities to achieve the desired promotion. Complainant did not receive any specific opportunities for assignment as a result of those meetings, such as a new country assignment or being given sole responsibility for the Benin Compact. i. In May 2016, Person A approached Complainant about the opportunity to work on the Liberia Infrastructure Activity, if she agreed to work “under” a male Senior Operations Advisor, and when Complainant expressed reservations about the male Senior Operations Advisor, and requested to lead the activity herself, Person A denied Complainant’s request. 4. Complainant was subjected to retaliation for her participation in her EEO complaint and for opposing Person A’s retaliatory practices when: a. On November 29, 2016, Person A singled out Complainant when he had human resources representative (HR Representative), participate in only Complainant’s annual performance review meeting and no other subordinate employee’s annual performance review meetings, without any prior notice to 2021001735 4 Complainant and despite that Complainant had never had a third-party present in her annual performance meetings during the entirety of her career at the Agency. b. On December 2, 2016, Person A again had HR Representative participate in a one-on-one meeting that Complainant had scheduled with Person A to discuss inaccurate information contained within her annual performance assessment without prior notice to Complainant, despite Complainant having indicated to Person A on November 29, 2016, and again during the December 2, 2016 meeting that HR Representative’s unanticipated presence in meetings made her feel uncomfortable and intimidated. During the course of the discussion with Person A, HR Representative interrupted and spoke over Complainant several times. c. On December 16, 2016, Person A verbally counseled Complainant for her alleged “unprofessional conduct” during the December 2, 2016 meeting between Complainant, Person A, and HR Representative, and memorialized the “formal counseling” in writing. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s motion for a decision without a hearing in part and issued a decision without a hearing on claims 1, 2, and 3. However, the AJ denied the motion with respect to claim 4 and all its subparts on the basis of reprisal. The AJ advised the parties that at the conclusion of the hearing on claim 4, she would issue a decision on both the claims decided on summary judgment and the one claim subject to hearing. Following a hearing on claim 4, the AJ issued a decision on the record on September 23, 2020. The hearing transcript was edited and signed on November 2, 2020, and an Order Entering Judgment was issued. The AJ detailed her summary judgment decision on claims 1, 2, and 3. Regarding claim 1, the AJ found that Complainant’s non-selection had nothing to do with her sex or protected EEO activity. The AJ noted the Selectee was unanimously nominated by the selection panel and Complainant was ranked third for the position behind another female. The AJ noted Complainant did not interview as well as the Selectee. The AJ found the evidence revealed that the Selectee was a better fit for the position than Complainant and that is why Complainant was not selected. Regarding claim 2, the AJ noted that as an AD, Complainant was at the Agency’s 3(b) pay band level. The AJ noted that Directors, with different responsibilities and duties, were at the 3(a) Pay Band level. The AJ also noted that as of November 21, 2016, Complainant’s annual salary of $118,262 was “higher than all but one of her male counterparts” at the same AD level in the Infrastructure Practice Group. 2021001735 5 The AJ noted the highest male AD in the entire area had a salary of $120,000. The AJ also noted that Complainant was paid higher than the rest of her male counterparts at the AD level. Further, the AJ noted that the HR Specialist stated that Complainant’s salary increased on an annual basis associated with relevant merit increases. The AJ also noted that the Agency completed a formal study entitled the “MCC Pay Equity Analysis” which was published in June 2016, finding that women’s salaries were on par with their male counterparts, and that women overall were paid more on the average than men in their same pay and at the Agency. The AJ concluded that Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case under the EPA. The AJ cited the Agency’s Pay Equity study spanning the years from 2013 to 2016, as “providing irrefutable data that not only was Complainant not paid less than her male counterparts, but women in general are paid more than their male counterparts at the Agency.” Regarding claim 3, the AJ noted that the majority of incidents cited as examples of harassment were untimely discrete acts. The AJ noted that Complainant suspected discrimination back in 2013, but did not initiate EEO contact until June 29, 2016, three years later. The AJ found Complainant did not exhibit good cause for the three-year delay. Thus, the AJ found any event occurring prior to May 15, 2016, was outside of the 45-day statutory period. The AJ noted that all incidents in claim 3, with the exception of claim 3(i), were untimely discrete acts. The AJ noted that while those incidents may be considered as background when considering the overall hostile work environment claim, they may not be considered as discrete acts. Taking all reasonable inferences in Complainant’s favor, the AJ found that the record was devoid of any evidence to suggest a nexus between a single incident identified and either of Complainant’s protected classes. As to the claim of retaliatory harassment, the AJ found no evidence that any of the identified responsible management officials were aware of the conversation Complainant had with Person C in 2013, and all but one of the incidents (claim 3(i)), occurred prior to Complainant’s March 2016 conversation with Person A. Regarding claim 3(i), the AJ noted that in May 2016, Person A asked Complainant to work on the Liberia Compact team under Person C, who was then a Senior Operations Advisor. Complainant expressed reservations about taking on the assignment unless she was the assigned lead for infrastructure. Person A stated that he considered her request but decided against it because “the program was already in a construction phase and [he] did not want to create unnecessary discontinuity of [Agency] oversight at that point.” The AJ noted Person A expressed his reluctance to hand over the project to Complainant in its entirety since construction was already underway. The AJ noted that this incident occurred a couple of months after Complainant spoke to Person A about being promoted, but that there was no substantive connection between the two events. Finding no reprisal for claim 3, the AJ considered Complainant’s claim of harassment under the “severe or pervasive” standard for establishing whether harassment occurred. The AJ noted that in claim 3 Complainant cited nine incidents occurring over three years. The AJ noted the incidents turned on Complainant’s feelings and beliefs rather than the facts presented in the record. Further, the AJ found that even if the actions constituted harassment, which they did not, Complainant failed to present evidence that she was harassed because of her protected bases. 2021001735 6 Finally, regarding claim 4, the AJ found Complainant engaged in protected activity when she initiated the subject complaint and noted there was no question that Person A knew about the protected activity no later than September 2016. Regarding the November 29, 2016 performance appraisal meeting, the AJ noted that Person A reached out to HR seeking guidance on how to proceed with Complainant’s upcoming performance review given that Complainant had filed an Agency complaint. The AJ noted that both Person A and HR Representative credibly testified that Person A was seeking guidance from HR to ensure that he did the right thing and handled everything correctly. The AJ found Person A credibly testified that he had never been in that situation before and wanted to know the right thing to do. Having received guidance to proceed as he normally would and to address any further questions regarding the EEO process to the EEO Director, Person A complied with those instructions. The AJ found that Person A expressed legitimate concerns about meeting with Complainant and sought to have a neutral third-party present for the evaluation. Specifically, Person A credibly testified that during Complainant’s mid-year evaluation for the FY 2016 period, Complainant took issue with some language Person A used. Person A noted that he used the word “tact” in her evaluation which, although he considered it to be neutral language, he acquiesced and changed the language. In addition, Person A credibly testified that the tone of self-assessment prepared by Complainant gave him pause as she spent a significant portion of the assessment criticizing others’ work. Finally, Person A testified that Complainant had repeatedly sought to have conversations with him about the promotion she felt she deserved, which Person A felt she was not ready for yet. The AJ found that based on the way Complainant’s mid-year evaluation went, the tone of her self-assessment, and her singular focus on getting promoted rather than focusing on improving her work, he reached out to HR to have a third-party neutral present during Complainant’s FY 2016 evaluation to keep the focus on constructive feedback rather than Complainant’s non-selection or her desire to be promoted. HR Representative testified that this was not an unusual request and she had acted as a third-party neutral in a number of performance evaluations. The AJ noted that both Person A and HR Representative testified that they believed the November 29, 2016 meeting went well. The AJ noted that while Complainant expressed that it was awkward, it was not an attempt to single her out or punish her. The AJ found given the totality of the context, it was unreasonable to assert that the mere presence of a third-party neutral from HR constituted reprisal or that it would have a chilling effect on a reasonable person. Regarding the December 2, 2016 meeting, that meeting took place at Complainant’s request. Person A stated upon receiving the invitation from Complainant, he reached out again to HR Representative to ask if HR should be present at that meeting also. HR Representative stated she would attend. The AJ noted that upon Complainant’s arrival at the meeting and seeing HR Representative, Complainant described herself as having a “total meltdown;” she repeatedly told Person A “you can’t keep doing this;” and turned to HR Representative and said, “with all due respect, I don’t know you from Adam!” 2021001735 7 The AJ noted that HR Representative attempted to calm the situation down, but Complainant cut her off and put her hand with an open palm inches from HR Representative’s face. The AJ noted that during her testimony, Complainant admitted to putting her open hand up to HR Representative as if to say stop, but she denied being in HR Representative’s personal space. The AJ found it highly credible that Complainant was loud and in HR Representative’s personal space. The AJ noted that in observing Complainant throughout the course of the hearing, “she exhibited physically emotional reactions during the testimony of others, from eye-rolling to tearing up and covering her face in her hands. It is abundantly critical that she indeed reacted in such a highly emotional manner.” The AJ found the evidence overwhelmingly supported the notion that Complainant’s behavior was unprofessional and unwarranted. Further, the AJ found the evidence showed that the incidents from December 2 - December 16 flowed directly from Complainant’s own conduct and unreasonable reaction to HR Representative’s mere presence and were not in any way motivated by Complainant’s EEO claim. The Agency subsequently issued a final action on December 17, 2020. The Agency’s final action fully implemented the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. Thereafter, Complainant filed the present appeal. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS At the outset, we find that claims 3(a) - (h) were properly dismissed for untimely EEO Counselor contact pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(2), but are being considered as background evidence of harassment in our decision. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non- moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a)(stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review…”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO-MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015)(providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). In order to successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence, and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. Such a dispute would indicate that a hearing is necessary to produce evidence to support a finding that the agency was motivated by discriminatory animus. 2021001735 8 Here, however, Complainant has failed to establish such a dispute. Even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in Complainant’s favor. Regarding claim 1, Complainant claimed she was subjected to discrimination when she was not selected for the position of Director, Energy Promotion Group. Person A (Selecting Official) noted that the Selectee was the better candidate due to: (1) his greater breadth of experience than the other candidates and demonstrated accomplishments on energy-related projects (i.e., Ghana II, Indonesia, and Nepal) and having more experience on infrastructure facilities; (2) he contributed more to Agency wide objectives, especially his work on developing the Agency’s approach to regional investments, demonstrating the ability to grasp and work with complex issues while interfacing with senior Agency officials and earning their trust; (3) he was a superb problem solver and more effective communicator than the other candidates; and (4) he provided more thoughtful answers regarding the challenges facing the Agency, pointing out in depth the challenges with the economic justification for energy projects along with managing the implementation of the growing energy portfolio. Panel Member 1 noted that he ranked the other two internal candidates above Complainant. He noted Complainant had comparatively less Agency experience on energy and less demonstrated direct experience on policy/institutional reforms in the energy sector compared to the other internal candidates. Panel Member 2 noted that while Complainant demonstrated the relevant skills and expertise, the other two internal candidates had more extensive experience working on projects in the energy sector. He noted that Complainant’s experience prior to joining the Agency was largely in the water sector and since coming to the Agency she had only worked on a small number of components and one of those entailed work in the water sector as opposed to the energy sector. Further, he noted that most of Complainant’s work at the Agency was during the compact development stage and that she did not have as much experience on compact implementation. He noted that Complainant projected a sense of entitlement over the course of the interview. He noted that in contrast to Complainant, the Selectee demonstrated far greater technical breadth and depth of experience in his resume and during the interview. Further, he stated the Selectee conveyed a more collegial and solution-oriented work style and highlighted a variety of division and Agency-level initiatives and working groups that he led and/or to which he contributed. Panel Member 3 noted that of the three internal candidates, Complainant “struck me as both the least qualified and the most assured she deserved the promotion (due to longevity).” She noted Complainant’s experiences were fewer in number (number of compacts and countries on which she worked) and narrower (mostly on hard core infrastructure rather than on the wide range of problems of sector reform and utility turnaround). Further, she noted that Complainant’s responses to the questions were not as thoughtful or introspective as compared to the other candidates. 2021001735 9 In an attempt to prove pretext, Complainant argued that the Agency preselected the Selectee for the position. She also claimed that she deserved the promotion because she had attained a graduate degree in civil engineering (which the Selectee did not possess), was the only Agency employee in any of the three sectors to have worked on a public-private partnership project, and had a longer tenure than the Selectee as an AD. However, other than Complainant’s bare assertion, we note that there is no indication the Selectee was preselected for the position at issue. With regard to Complainant having a graduate degree, we note that this was not a requirement for the position at issue. Further, the record reveals that Complainant began working as an AD with the Agency in 2009, while the Selectee had been employed with the Agency as an AD since 2008; thus, Complainant did not have a longer tenure than the Selectee as an AD. Upon review, we find Complainant failed to show that her qualifications were plainly superior to those of the Selectee, so as to warrant a finding of discrimination. Regarding her claim under the Equal Pay Act, we find the AJ correctly determined that Complainant did not establish a prima facie case with regard to the identified male Directors who were held to a higher level of responsibility and leadership than Complainant was in her position of Associate Director. Assuming arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination under the Equal Pay Act regarding the identified male ADs, the Agency has shown that any pay differential was based on a factor other than sex. The record reveals salary is set in accordance with the Agency’s pay band scale and salary policy, resulting in some differentials in individual pay based upon a variety of factors, including prior work history, experience, and prior salary, and merit increases in accordance with the Agency’s performance management and merit promotion policies. Complainant has not rebutted the Agency’s policy and practice for how salaries for ADs are determined. Upon careful review of the AJ’s decision and the evidence of record, as well as the parties’ arguments on appeal, we conclude that the AJ correctly determined that the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that Complainant was discriminated against by the Agency as alleged regarding claims 1, 2, and 3. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ’s credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, at § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015). 2021001735 10 Upon careful review of the AJ’s decision and the evidence of record, as well as the parties’ arguments on appeal, we conclude that substantial evidence of record supports the AJ’s determination that Complainant has not proven discrimination by the Agency as alleged in claim 4. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Agency’s final action finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. 2021001735 11 An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION-EQUAL PAY ACT (Y0408) You are authorized under section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) to file a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction within two years or, if the violation is willful, three years of the date of the alleged violation of the Equal Pay Act regardless of whether you have pursued any administrative complaint processing. The filing of the civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. 2021001735 12 You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations September 21, 2022 Date