Raymond NgDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 30, 20212020004102 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/728,800 03/26/2007 Raymond K. Ng OR06-06101-CIP 3242 51067 7590 08/30/2021 PVFD-ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION c/o PARK, VAUGHAN, FLEMING & DOWLER LLP 2820 FIFTH STREET DAVIS, CA 95618-7759 EXAMINER WOLDEMARIAM, NEGA ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2433 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/30/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): SYADMIN@PARKLEGAL.COM USPTO-INCOMING@PARKLEGAL.COM PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RAYMOND K. NG Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 Technology Center 2400 Before LARRY J. HUME, NORMAN H. BEAMER, and JOHN D. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–11, 13–23, and 25–27, which are all claims pending in the application. Appellant has canceled claims 12 and 24. See Appeal Br. 30 et seq. (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Oracle International Corporation. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 The claimed subject matter is directed to “METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR FACILITATING FINE-GRAIN PERMISSION MANAGEMENT.” See Spec. (Title). In particular, Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to an apparatus, method, and system that facilitates fine-grain permission management and delegated policy administration. During operation, the system creates a permission associated with a resource. The system also creates an admin permission associated with the permission. Next, the system associates the admin permission with a user. Finally, the system performs an administrative action on the permission, wherein the administrative action is enabled by the admin permission. Spec. 29 (Abstract) Exemplary Claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on Appeal (emphases added to contested prior-art limitations): 1. A method for facilitating fine-grain permission management, the method comprising: creating, by a computer, a user permission that manages access to a resource; creating, by the computer, an admin permission for an administrator to manage administrative access to the user 2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed Jan. 10, 2020); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed May 13, 2020); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Mar. 13, 2020); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed July 10, 2019); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed Mar. 26, 2007) (claiming benefit as a continuation-in-part application of US 10/430,737, filed May 6, 2003, now issued as US 7,788,489). Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 3 permission, wherein the administrative access authorizes performing an administrative action on the user permission; obtaining a grant command, which is obtained from the administrator and executable by the computer, that grants a user, which is distinct from the administrator, the administrative access to the user permission, wherein the administrative access enables the user to grant or revoke the user permission; in response to obtaining the grant command, determining whether the admin permission holds appropriate control over the user permission that enables the administrator to grant the user the administrative access to the user permission; responsive to the admin permission holding the appropriate control over the user permission, granting the user the administrative access to the user permission by executing the grant command; and responsive to the user being granted the administrative access: receiving, from the user, a command that grants or revokes the user permission to or from a second user, respectively; verifying whether the user has the administrative access to the user permission; and responsive to the user having the administrative access, executing, by the computer, the command on the user permission on behalf of the user. REFERENCES The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence: Name Reference Date Teng et al. (“Teng”) US 2002/0138577 A1 Sept. 26, 2002 Exton et al. (“Exton”) US 2003/0041198 A1 Feb. 27, 2003 Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 4 REJECTION Claims 1–11, 13–23, and 25–27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Exton and Teng. Final Act. 4. CLAIM GROUPING Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 9–28) and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of the obviousness rejection of claims 1, 13, and 25 on the basis of representative claim 1. We address the appeal of the obviousness rejection of dependent claims 2–11, 14–23, 26, and 27, infra. ISSUE Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 9–19; Reply Br. 8–21) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Exton and Teng is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches or suggests “[a] method for facilitating fine-grain permission management” that includes, inter alia, the steps of: (a) obtaining a grant command, which is obtained from the administrator and executable by the computer, that grants a user, which is distinct from the administrator, the administrative access to the user permission, wherein the administrative access enables the user to grant or revoke the user permission; [and] (b) in response to obtaining the grant command, determining whether the admin permission holds appropriate control over the user permission that enables the administrator Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 5 to grant the user the administrative access to the user permission, as recited in claim 1? PRINCIPLES OF LAW “[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of [those] references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 425. In KSR, the Court stated “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill . . . . [A] court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. Id. at 417. Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 6 Further, the relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard, we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). ANALYSIS In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Independent Claims 1, 13, and 25 We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1, 13, and 25 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments. Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 7 We highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis as follows. The Examiner finds the combination of Exton and Teng teach or suggest all the limitations of claim 1 (Final Act. 4–6) and, in particular, limitation (a) (“obtaining a grant command”) is taught or suggested by Exton in paragraphs 35, 39, and 40. Final Act. 5. The Examiner finds that Exton’s access control list (ACL) provided administrative privileges to various protected resource levels in a hierarchical structure, thus defining operations that can be performed on an object, and providing fine-grained control over the protected resources. Id. Figure 5A of Exton is replicated below: “FIG. 5A is a diagram illustrating an authorization server database in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.” Exton ¶ 13. Exton discloses, with respect to Figure 5A: Authorization server database 500 includes a plurality of access control lists 510 associated with a plurality of managed resources 540. . . . For example, the first entry has an entry of “user” to indicate that the entry is for an individual user, rather Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 8 than a group of users. The name of the user is “boss” and the operations permitted for “boss” are “wavmc”. In this example, the resources are groups of users and the permissions are “w” for change password, “a” for add user, “v” for view list of users in the group, “m” for modify, and “c” for create new group. Thus, in the example shown in FIG. 5A, the user “boss” is permitted to perform all operations on groups A and C. Exton ¶ 30. Thus, the present invention solves the disadvantages of the prior art by providing an administration model using access control lists. The model identifies a number of objects to be administered. Associated with each of these objects is a set of administrative operations that can be performed on the object. For each of these operations a permission in an access control list entry is defined. The protected resources are arranged in a hierarchical fashion and an access control list may be associated with any point in the hierarchy. The access control list provides fine-grained control over the protected resources. At the time an administrator requests to perform an operation, the administrator's identification is used to look up the prevailing access control list to determine whether the operation is permitted. Exton ¶ 39. Appellant contends the Examiner erred because Exton teaches granting administrative access to an object instead of controlling the ability to provide access “to an admin permission that manages access to a user permission.” Appeal Br. 10. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because the rejection is based upon the combination of Exton and Teng. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 426. Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 9 The Examiner responds to Appellant’s contentions by finding: Exton discloses providing and revoking administrative privilege to user using access control list (see Exton Figs. 5A–5B and ¶¶39-40, providing/revoking admin privilege to an entity/user/ group). More explicitly, Teng discloses (see Teng ¶173, The Delegated Identity Administrator is an administrator who has been delegated rights from the Master Identity Administrator. The Delegated Access Administrator can be delegated rights from a Master Access Administrator; ¶109, any number of delegated administrators (both inside and outside the company) can be given the authority to: (1) create and delete users in the user directory, (2) approve a change that a user has requested, and (3) change the information about users to grant or revoke services. An administrator can be delegated any allowed degree of responsibility. Ans. 3 (emphasis added). We find, under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the recitation of “administrative access to the user permission, wherein the administrative access enables the user to grant or revoke the user permission” reads on Teng’s teaching of administrative privilege delegation in which “[a]n administrator can be delegated any allowed degree of responsibility,” i.e., the user can be granted administrative access to determine user permissions. See Teng ¶ 109. Appellant further argues Exton does not teach or suggest a “grant command.” Appeal Br. 9–10. The Examiner responds, and we agree, “[a] person with ordinary skill in the art would understand that when performing/executing or granting an administration privilege is inherently executing a ‘grant commend’. Exton and Teng disclose ‘grant command’ that is granting/providing an admin permeation [sic] (see Exton Figs. 5A–5B and ¶¶39–40, providing/revoking Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 10 admin privilege to an entity). More explicitly, Teng discloses (see Teng ¶174, delegating/granting an administrative privilege (i.e. ‘grant command’)[, thus d]isclosing the recited claim limitation.” Ans. 5. The express, implicit, and inherent disclosures of a prior art reference may be relied upon in the rejection of claims under either 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103. “The inherent teaching of a prior art reference, a question of fact, arises both in the context of anticipation and obviousness.” In re Napier, 55 F.3d 610, 613 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirmed a 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection based in part on inherent disclosure in one of the references). See also In re Grasselli, 713 F.2d 731, 739 (Fed. Cir. 1983); and see PAR Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. TWI Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 773 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2014).3 A prima facie case of obviousness that relies on inherency requires the Examiner to put forth a reasoned explanation within the Graham framework as to why the inherent element was present in the prior art based on knowledge available at the time of invention. In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1993); KSR, 550 U.S. at 399 (2007) (“While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the factors define the controlling inquiry.”). A well-supported argument that the element is the inevitable result of a process or is necessarily present in the prior art creates a rebuttable 3 The question of obviousness is “based on underlying factual determinations including . . . what th[e] prior art teaches explicitly and inherently . . . .” In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 11 presumption of inherency. In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1254–55 (CCPA 1977): [W]here the Patent Office has reason to believe that a functional limitation asserted to be critical for establishing novelty in the claimed subject matter may, in fact, be an inherent characteristic of the prior art, it possesses the authority to require the applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on. To rebut the presumption, the applicant must prove that the prior art does not inherently possess the claimed feature. Id. In this case, the Examiner makes findings that both Exton and Teng inherently rely upon a “grant command” whenever an administrative access is granted or provided, as cited above. See Ans. 5. Appellant argues the “Examiner's allegations are not technically sound because ‘granting an administration privilege’ can be done in a number of ways. For example, typically, an administration privilege is granted by modifying a configuration file or by changing a parameter value. These operations do not involve execution of a computer-executable command that specifically grants ‘an administration privilege.’” Reply Br. 11. Appellant has not persuasively argued the Examiner erred because Appellant does not present any evidence to rebut the presumption that the characteristic of a “grant command” relied upon by the Examiner is not inherently present in the prior art, but instead merely relies upon attorney argument to contend there are multiple ways to grant an administrative privilege. Moreover, such attorney argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claim, which does not require “execution of a computer- Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 12 executable command that specifically grants ‘an administrative privilege’” as argued by Appellant. Instead, claim 1 recites “obtaining a grant command, which is obtained from the administrator and executable by the computer, that grants a user, which is distinct from the administrator, the administrative access to the user permission,” as recited in claim 1. Mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693, slip op. at 7–8 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/ fd09004693.pdf. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”); cf. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over the prior art.”). Arguments not made are therefore waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). With respect to limitation (b), i.e., “in response to obtaining the grant command, determining whether the admin permission holds appropriate control over the user permission that enables the administrator to grant the user the administrative access to the user permission,” Appellant argues the “Examiner has rejected ‘obtaining the grant command’ element of the instant application using Exton. Therefore, Examiner must show the Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 13 execution of the alleged operations of Teng is executed because of the corresponding alleged operation of Exton. Otherwise, the ‘[in] response to obtaining the grant command’ element of the instant claims remains without a rejection.” Appeal Br. 14. We disagree because, as the Examiner points out, “Exton and Teng disclose granting admin privilege (see Exton ¶40, the enforcement is done at the time the operation is requested [i.e. in response to obtaining the ‘grant command’] and, hence, privileges can be instantaneously revoked).” Ans. 6. We agree with the Examiner’s finding because administrative privileges are granted upon the inherent “grant command” in either Exton or Teng whenever an administrative access is granted or provided, as discussed above. Accordingly, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped independent claims 13 and 25, which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra. Dependent Claims Further, although Appellant raised additional arguments for patentability of grouped dependent claims 2 and 14; 3 and 15; 4 and 16; 5 and 17; 6 and 18; 7, 8, 19, and 20; 9 and 21; 10 and 22; 11 and 23; and 26 and 27 (see Appeal Br. 19–27), we find the Examiner has rebutted, in the Answer, each of those arguments by a preponderance of the evidence. See Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 14 Ans. 7–11. Therefore, we adopt the Examiner’s findings, underlying reasoning, and legal conclusions, which we incorporate herein by reference. Consequently, we find no error in the Examiner’s rejections of dependent claims 2–11, 14–23, 26, and 27.4 REPLY BRIEF To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 7–35) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellant has not shown. CONCLUSIONS We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection. More specifically, Appellant has not persuasively argued that the Examiner erred with respect to the obviousness rejection of claims 1–11, 13–23, and 25–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the cited prior art combination of record, and we sustain the rejection. 4 See Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“As an initial matter, the PTAB was authorized to incorporate the Examiner’s findings.”); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the PTAB’s findings, although it “did not expressly make any independent factual determinations or legal conclusions,” because it had expressly adopted the examiner’s findings). Appeal 2020-004102 Application 11/728,800 15 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–11, 13–23, 25–27 103(a) Exton, Teng 1–11, 13–23, 25–27 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation