Raymond Ng

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 30, 2021

2020004102 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/728,800 03/26/2007 Raymond K. Ng OR06-06101-CIP 3242
51067 7590 08/30/2021
PVFD-ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
c/o PARK, VAUGHAN, FLEMING & DOWLER LLP
2820 FIFTH STREET
DAVIS, CA 95618-7759
EXAMINER
WOLDEMARIAM, NEGA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2433
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/30/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
SYADMIN@PARKLEGAL.COM
USPTO-INCOMING@PARKLEGAL.COM
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RAYMOND K. NG
Appeal 2020-004102
Application 11/728,800
Technology Center 2400
Before LARRY J. HUME, NORMAN H. BEAMER, and
JOHN D. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–11, 13–23, and 25–27, which are all
claims pending in the application. Appellant has canceled claims 12 and 24.
See Appeal Br. 30 et seq. (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Oracle International
Corporation. Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The claimed subject matter is directed to “METHOD AND
APPARATUS FOR FACILITATING FINE-GRAIN PERMISSION
MANAGEMENT.” See Spec. (Title). In particular, Appellant’s disclosed
embodiments and claimed invention relate to an apparatus, method, and
system that facilitates fine-grain permission management and
delegated policy administration. During operation, the system
creates a permission associated with a resource. The system
also creates an admin permission associated with the
permission. Next, the system associates the admin permission
with a user. Finally, the system performs an administrative
action on the permission, wherein the administrative action is
enabled by the admin permission.
Spec. 29 (Abstract)
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
Appeal (emphases added to contested prior-art limitations):
1. A method for facilitating fine-grain permission
management, the method comprising:
creating, by a computer, a user permission that manages
access to a resource;
creating, by the computer, an admin permission for an
administrator to manage administrative access to the user

2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
Jan. 10, 2020); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed May 13, 2020); Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Mar. 13, 2020); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,”
mailed July 10, 2019); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed
Mar. 26, 2007) (claiming benefit as a continuation-in-part application of
US 10/430,737, filed May 6, 2003, now issued as US 7,788,489).
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permission, wherein the administrative access authorizes
performing an administrative action on the user permission;
obtaining a grant command, which is obtained from the
administrator and executable by the computer, that grants a
user, which is distinct from the administrator, the
administrative access to the user permission, wherein the
administrative access enables the user to grant or revoke the
user permission;
in response to obtaining the grant command, determining
whether the admin permission holds appropriate control over
the user permission that enables the administrator to grant the
user the administrative access to the user permission;
responsive to the admin permission holding the
appropriate control over the user permission, granting the user
the administrative access to the user permission by executing
the grant command; and
responsive to the user being granted the administrative
access:
receiving, from the user, a command that grants or
revokes the user permission to or from a second user,
respectively;
verifying whether the user has the administrative
access to the user permission; and
responsive to the user having the administrative
access, executing, by the computer, the command on the
user permission on behalf of the user.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence:
Name Reference Date
Teng et al. (“Teng”) US 2002/0138577 A1 Sept. 26, 2002
Exton et al. (“Exton”) US 2003/0041198 A1 Feb. 27, 2003
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REJECTION
Claims 1–11, 13–23, and 25–27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Exton and Teng.
Final Act. 4.
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 9–28) and our discretion
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of the obviousness
rejection of claims 1, 13, and 25 on the basis of representative claim 1.
We address the appeal of the obviousness rejection of dependent
claims 2–11, 14–23, 26, and 27, infra.
ISSUE
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 9–19; Reply Br. 8–21) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the
combination of Exton and Teng is in error. These contentions present us
with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests “[a] method for facilitating fine-grain permission management”
that includes, inter alia, the steps of:
(a) obtaining a grant command, which is obtained from
the administrator and executable by the computer, that grants a
user, which is distinct from the administrator, the administrative
access to the user permission, wherein the administrative access
enables the user to grant or revoke the user permission; [and]
(b) in response to obtaining the grant command,
determining whether the admin permission holds appropriate
control over the user permission that enables the administrator
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to grant the user the administrative access to the user
permission,
as recited in claim 1?
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of
references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). “The test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather,
the test is what the combined teachings of [those] references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 425.
In KSR, the Court stated “[t]he combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
416 (2007).
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103
likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless
its actual application is beyond his or her skill . . . . [A] court
must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable
use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.
Id. at 417.
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Further, the relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth
“some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard,
we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the
words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way
of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not
advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other
issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Independent Claims 1, 13, and 25
We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1, 13,
and 25 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and
adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in
the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals
set forth in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments.
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We highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 1
for emphasis as follows.
The Examiner finds the combination of Exton and Teng teach or
suggest all the limitations of claim 1 (Final Act. 4–6) and, in particular,
limitation (a) (“obtaining a grant command”) is taught or suggested by Exton
in paragraphs 35, 39, and 40. Final Act. 5. The Examiner finds that Exton’s
access control list (ACL) provided administrative privileges to various
protected resource levels in a hierarchical structure, thus defining operations
that can be performed on an object, and providing fine-grained control over
the protected resources. Id. Figure 5A of Exton is replicated below:

“FIG. 5A is a diagram illustrating an authorization server database in
accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.” Exton
¶ 13.
Exton discloses, with respect to Figure 5A:
Authorization server database 500 includes a plurality of access
control lists 510 associated with a plurality of managed
resources 540. . . . For example, the first entry has an entry of
“user” to indicate that the entry is for an individual user, rather
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than a group of users. The name of the user is “boss” and the
operations permitted for “boss” are “wavmc”. In this example,
the resources are groups of users and the permissions are “w”
for change password, “a” for add user, “v” for view list of users
in the group, “m” for modify, and “c” for create new group.
Thus, in the example shown in FIG. 5A, the user “boss” is
permitted to perform all operations on groups A and C.
Exton ¶ 30.
Thus, the present invention solves the disadvantages of
the prior art by providing an administration model using access
control lists. The model identifies a number of objects to be
administered. Associated with each of these objects is a set of
administrative operations that can be performed on the object.
For each of these operations a permission in an access control
list entry is defined. The protected resources are arranged in a
hierarchical fashion and an access control list may be associated
with any point in the hierarchy. The access control list provides
fine-grained control over the protected resources. At the time an
administrator requests to perform an operation, the
administrator's identification is used to look up the prevailing
access control list to determine whether the operation is
permitted.
Exton ¶ 39.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred because Exton teaches
granting administrative access to an object instead of controlling the ability
to provide access “to an admin permission that manages access to a user
permission.” Appeal Br. 10.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because the rejection
is based upon the combination of Exton and Teng. See Keller, 642 F.2d
at 426.
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The Examiner responds to Appellant’s contentions by finding:
Exton discloses providing and revoking administrative privilege
to user using access control list (see Exton Figs. 5A–5B and
¶¶39-40, providing/revoking admin privilege to an entity/user/
group). More explicitly, Teng discloses (see Teng ¶173, The
Delegated Identity Administrator is an administrator who has
been delegated rights from the Master Identity Administrator.
The Delegated Access Administrator can be delegated rights
from a Master Access Administrator; ¶109, any number of
delegated administrators (both inside and outside the company)
can be given the authority to: (1) create and delete users in the
user directory, (2) approve a change that a user has requested,
and (3) change the information about users to grant or revoke
services. An administrator can be delegated any allowed degree
of responsibility.
Ans. 3 (emphasis added).
We find, under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the
recitation of “administrative access to the user permission, wherein the
administrative access enables the user to grant or revoke the user
permission” reads on Teng’s teaching of administrative privilege delegation
in which “[a]n administrator can be delegated any allowed degree of
responsibility,” i.e., the user can be granted administrative access to
determine user permissions. See Teng ¶ 109.
Appellant further argues Exton does not teach or suggest a “grant
command.” Appeal Br. 9–10.
The Examiner responds, and we agree, “[a] person with ordinary skill
in the art would understand that when performing/executing or granting an
administration privilege is inherently executing a ‘grant commend’. Exton
and Teng disclose ‘grant command’ that is granting/providing an admin
permeation [sic] (see Exton Figs. 5A–5B and ¶¶39–40, providing/revoking
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admin privilege to an entity). More explicitly, Teng discloses (see Teng
¶174, delegating/granting an administrative privilege (i.e. ‘grant
command’)[, thus d]isclosing the recited claim limitation.” Ans. 5.
The express, implicit, and inherent disclosures of a prior art reference
may be relied upon in the rejection of claims under either 35 U.S.C. §§ 102
or 103. “The inherent teaching of a prior art reference, a question of fact,
arises both in the context of anticipation and obviousness.” In re Napier, 55
F.3d 610, 613 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirmed a 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection based
in part on inherent disclosure in one of the references). See also In re
Grasselli, 713 F.2d 731, 739 (Fed. Cir. 1983); and see PAR Pharmaceutical,
Inc. v. TWI Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 773 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2014).3
A prima facie case of obviousness that relies on inherency requires
the Examiner to put forth a reasoned explanation within the Graham
framework as to why the inherent element was present in the prior art based
on knowledge available at the time of invention. In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d
1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1993); KSR, 550 U.S. at 399 (2007) (“While the
sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the
factors define the controlling inquiry.”).
A well-supported argument that the element is the inevitable result of
a process or is necessarily present in the prior art creates a rebuttable

3 The question of obviousness is “based on underlying factual
determinations including . . . what th[e] prior art teaches explicitly and
inherently . . . .” In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(citations omitted).
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presumption of inherency. In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1254–55
(CCPA 1977):
[W]here the Patent Office has reason to believe that a
functional limitation asserted to be critical for establishing
novelty in the claimed subject matter may, in fact, be an
inherent characteristic of the prior art, it possesses the authority
to require the applicant to prove that the subject matter shown
to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied
on.
To rebut the presumption, the applicant must prove that the prior art
does not inherently possess the claimed feature. Id.
In this case, the Examiner makes findings that both Exton and Teng
inherently rely upon a “grant command” whenever an administrative access
is granted or provided, as cited above. See Ans. 5.
Appellant argues the “Examiner's allegations are not technically sound
because ‘granting an administration privilege’ can be done in a number of
ways. For example, typically, an administration privilege is granted by
modifying a configuration file or by changing a parameter value. These
operations do not involve execution of a computer-executable command that
specifically grants ‘an administration privilege.’” Reply Br. 11.
Appellant has not persuasively argued the Examiner erred because
Appellant does not present any evidence to rebut the presumption that the
characteristic of a “grant command” relied upon by the Examiner is not
inherently present in the prior art, but instead merely relies upon attorney
argument to contend there are multiple ways to grant an administrative
privilege. Moreover, such attorney argument is not commensurate with the
scope of the claim, which does not require “execution of a computer-
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executable command that specifically grants ‘an administrative privilege’”
as argued by Appellant. Instead, claim 1 recites “obtaining a grant
command, which is obtained from the administrator and executable by the
computer, that grants a user, which is distinct from the administrator, the
administrative access to the user permission,” as recited in claim 1.
Mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are
unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re
Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe,
736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693,
slip op. at 7–8 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/
fd09004693.pdf. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require
more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the
claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were
not found in the prior art.”); cf. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388,
391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to examine the
claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable]
distinctions over the prior art.”). Arguments not made are therefore waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
With respect to limitation (b), i.e., “in response to obtaining the grant
command, determining whether the admin permission holds appropriate
control over the user permission that enables the administrator to grant the
user the administrative access to the user permission,” Appellant argues the
“Examiner has rejected ‘obtaining the grant command’ element of the
instant application using Exton. Therefore, Examiner must show the
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execution of the alleged operations of Teng is executed because of the
corresponding alleged operation of Exton. Otherwise, the ‘[in] response to
obtaining the grant command’ element of the instant claims remains
without a rejection.” Appeal Br. 14.
We disagree because, as the Examiner points out, “Exton and Teng
disclose granting admin privilege (see Exton ¶40, the enforcement is done at
the time the operation is requested [i.e. in response to obtaining the ‘grant
command’] and, hence, privileges can be instantaneously revoked).” Ans. 6.
We agree with the Examiner’s finding because administrative
privileges are granted upon the inherent “grant command” in either Exton or
Teng whenever an administrative access is granted or provided, as discussed
above.
Accordingly, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are
not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art
combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we
find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent
claim 1, and grouped independent claims 13 and 25, which fall therewith.
See Claim Grouping, supra.
Dependent Claims
Further, although Appellant raised additional arguments for
patentability of grouped dependent claims 2 and 14; 3 and 15; 4 and 16; 5
and 17; 6 and 18; 7, 8, 19, and 20; 9 and 21; 10 and 22; 11 and 23; and 26
and 27 (see Appeal Br. 19–27), we find the Examiner has rebutted, in the
Answer, each of those arguments by a preponderance of the evidence. See
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Ans. 7–11. Therefore, we adopt the Examiner’s findings, underlying
reasoning, and legal conclusions, which we incorporate herein by reference.
Consequently, we find no error in the Examiner’s rejections of dependent
claims 2–11, 14–23, 26, and 27.4
REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 7–35) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position
in the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the
Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s
Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellant has not shown.
CONCLUSIONS
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection.
More specifically, Appellant has not persuasively argued that the
Examiner erred with respect to the obviousness rejection of claims 1–11,
13–23, and 25–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the cited prior art
combination of record, and we sustain the rejection.

4 See Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1042 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“As an initial matter, the PTAB was authorized to incorporate
the Examiner’s findings.”); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 n.13
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the PTAB’s findings, although it “did not
expressly make any independent factual determinations or legal
conclusions,” because it had expressly adopted the examiner’s findings).
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
References/
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–11, 13–23,
25–27 103(a)
Exton, Teng 1–11, 13–23, 25–27
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED