Quizzit, Inc.

16 Cited authorities

  1. Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay North America, Inc.

    786 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 31 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that although the "Board is not required to discuss every piece of evidence," it cannot "disregard [evidence] without explanation" or "short-cut its consideration of the factual record before it"
  2. In re Bayer

    488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 40 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark
  3. In re Cordua Rests., Inc.

    823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 27 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that certain words referring to key aspects of a genus of services were generic for those services
  4. In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP

    373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 30 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that courts "may weigh the individual components of the mark" to assess its overall distinctiveness
  5. In re Steelbuilding.com

    415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 26 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Affirming the refusal of the Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark STEELBUILDING.COM, because the mark was descriptive of online services for the design of steel buildings, and lacked secondary meaning
  6. In re Nett Designs, Inc.

    236 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 28 times
    Finding that prior registrations of marks including the term ULTIMATE "do not conclusively rebut the Board's finding that ULTIMATE is descriptive in the context of this mark"
  7. In re N.C. Lottery

    866 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses

    2016-2558 08-10-2017 IN RE: NORTH CAROLINA LOTTERY, Appellant David E. Bennett, Coats & Bennett, PLLC, Cary, NC, argued for appellant. Also represented by David D. Kalish. William Lamarca, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee Joseph Matal. Also represented by Nathan K. Kelley, Thomas L. Casagrande, Christina Hieber. Prost, Chief Judge. David E. Bennett , Coats & Bennett, PLLC, Cary, NC, argued for appellant. Also represented by David

  8. In re Trivita, Inc.

    783 F.3d 872 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 6 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 2014–1383. 04-17-2015 In re TRIVITA, INC., Appellant. Adam Stephenson, Adam R. Stephenson, LTD., Tempe, AZ, for appellant. Nathan K. Kelley, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for appellee. Also represented by Thomas L. Casagrande, Christina Hieber, Thomas W. Krause. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. Adam Stephenson, Adam R. Stephenson, LTD., Tempe, AZ, for appellant. Nathan K. Kelley, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria

  9. In re Reed

    482 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 13 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the Board properly considered websites containing "lawyer.com" or "lawyers.com" in their domain names to determine what the relevant public would understand LAWYERS.COM to mean
  10. In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States

    675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 8 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor

  11. Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification

    15 U.S.C. § 1051   Cited 3,904 times   126 Legal Analyses
    Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
  12. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,605 times   274 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"